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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the benefit of risk-based decision methods in engineering 
decisions. A thorough literature review identified the major issues and limitations in 
current methods. Consequently a more comprehensive model was developed to account 
for the complexities of real life decision-making. The enhancements introduced to the 
model include identifying and evaluating stakeholder influences, decision objectives, 
criteria and preferences between criteria and decision outcomes. Monitoring and 
controlling important parameters during implementation is also included to ensure 
objectives are met and risks controlled. Tools and techniques were identified to support 
decision-making within the new model. The research focuses on how available 
techniques can improve engineering decision-making. 
The model was applied to four case studies analysing real life, "live" decision problems 
in bridge management and pipeline management. These confirmed the relevance and 
importance of the model enhancements. The practicality of the methods, their benefits 
and limitations were evaluated such that the proposed model was enhanced further. The 
enhanced model was shown to bring enhanced understanding to all four case studies and 
made the decisions more rational, thorough and auditable. The fifth case study 
reviewed how unsupported decisions are currently made within the sponsoring 
company. This involved a detailed desktop analysis of past projects and interviews with 
senior engineers and provided further evidence, which emphasised the value of using 
the decision model. 
General guidelines were developed based on the case study experiences to help the 
decision-maker identify the level of analysis required for different types of decision 
problems. These were defined as applicability matrices. The benefit of using a third 
party facilitator in each of the case studies was identified in terms of the roles of leader, 
liaison, disseminator, spokesman and disturbance handler. The balance between these 
five roles through the stages of the decision process was found to be important to ensure 
the facilitator does not dominate the decision. 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
A successful economy is reliant on well-maintained assets such as buildings, structures, 
plant and equipment. These assets have to be in a state to ensure the safety of personnel 
and the environment, efficient operation and adequate profit margins. Breakdowns or 
closures and low efficiency put pressure on profits and reduce the level of service 
supplied. In contrast to this, excessive maintenance time and costs also reduce 
efficiency and profits. Asset managers are therefore required to make difficult decisions 
at every stage of the asset's life, to achieve a proper balance between safety and profits, 
maintenance and productivity. These decisions include: 
" Start-of-life decisions (such as the selection of materials and geometries and the 
acceptance of safety margins and design lives), 
" Mid-life decisions (when to inspect/maintain and how to inspect/maintain), 
" End-of-life decisions (such as life extension, rehabilitation or decommissioning). 
In recent years, the press coverage of structural failures has increased and society has 
found a growing voice in environmental and safety issues. Environmental and civil 
rights pressure groups have become more vocal and more acceptable by the media. 
There is now less acceptance of the consequences of structural failure. The companies 
responsible have to be able to show a duty of care to the environment and the 
communities they affect. If the companies fail in this, the consequences to them in 
terms of damaged reputation and lost business as well the cost of lawsuits and 
compensation can be crippling. 
Despite these increased complexities and significant consequences, individual asset 
managers are under increased pressure to make quick but confident decisions 
concerning the asset structural integrity. These managers also have less opportunity to 
seek support from seniors. In some companies, the age of "empowerment" has meant 
"passing the buck" to the more junior managers if the decision is perceived to be wrong. 
This increased pressure combined with a lack of training has meant that many 
significant decisions are not evaluated properly in terms of addressing all options and 
accounting for all risks. Stakeholder issues are often ignored until it is too late and 
external pressure groups are perceived as an enemy rather than as a participant in the 
decision outcome. Key examples of poorly evaluated decisions include, 
" the decision to start up a condensate pump while undergoing maintenance causing 
the Piper Alpha disaster [1], 
" the initial decision to sink the Brent Spar platform west of Shetland causing public 
outrage [2], 
" the decision to launch the space shuttle in exceptionally cold weather, despite the 
known o-ring problems, causing the Challenger disaster [3]. 
This research, while relevant to all branches of industry, focuses on two specific areas: 
" transport infrastructure, specifically the management of road bridges; 
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" upstream oil and gas, specifically the design and management of subsea pipelines. 
Both industries have a high profile in society, owning a huge number of assets involving 
design, installation, maintenance and decommissioning. Both of these industries are 
however constrained by tightly controlled budgets and affected by government policies 
of taxation, environmental issues and government spending. 
2.1 Decisions in Bridge Management 
UK government spending of the road transport budget is focussed more on maintaining 
and repairing existing bridges than on building new ones. This is a result of both lower 
public spending and recognising the significance of existing bridges in maintaining the 
integrity of the nation's infrastructure. 
Bridges do not, and were not expected to, last forever, but if they are managed properly, 
they should achieve at least their design life of 120 years, and probably more. As part 
of the management process, existing bridges need regular maintenance and are subject 
to repair and rehabilitation when excessive deterioration or damage is discovered. 
The management of DoT bridges falls into three distinct areas of work: steady state 
maintenance, assessment and strengthening of bridges not conforming to the DoT 
standards, and upgrading of sub-standard features. 
The choice of strengthening method from a number of alternatives is currently decided 
based on minimum whole life costs accounting for the predicted cost of traffic delays 
during works. Comparisons are made of the estimated cost of different options that give 
the structure different estimated remaining lives. 
A major limitation in current practice is in the regional decision-making process. The 
decisions made at these levels are dominated by subjective judgements. The inspection 
data available to the maintenance agents are crude and hence do not allow quantitative 
deterioration and capacity assessments to be made. The bridge condition and the 
deterioration criticality are also assessed subjectively. The uncertainty involved in 
loading, capacity and deterioration assessments results in the re-qualification of existing 
bridges being based on conservative, deterministic codes with large safety factors 
overcompensating for the uncertainties in these values. 
The decisions to prioritise maintenance between bridges are dominated by a few key 
factors, such as the safety of the bridge, the overall repair costs or the need to minimise 
traffic disruption. All of these are established subjectively. In addition, the comparison 
of costs and benefits for different bridge maintenance projects is not consistently carried 
out. Trade-offs are required to select the "best" projects as different projects score better 
in terms of different issues. For example, one project may strengthen a bridge to a high 
level of safety while being very expensive, while another project may give only a small 
strength advantage but at very little cost. 
2.2 Decisions in Pipeline Engineering 
Until recently, the continuing low oil price has left no margin for profit, which has 
limited and continues to limit future investment. The need to continue to reduce costs 
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and increase competitiveness is paramount to the industry's survival, both in new 
developments and in maintaining and extending the life of older developments, to 
safeguard the thousands of jobs that rely on it. 
In 1986 and 1992 the oil prices collapsed, bringing national and international activity to 
a grinding halt. In 1993 this problem was `officially' recognised by the UK government 
following a report produced by a DTI working group investigating UKCS (UK 
Continental Shelf) oil industry competitiveness. A result of this investigation was the 
introduction of a Cost Reduction Initiative for the New Era (CRINE) proposed in June 
1992. It was recognised that the problem of escalating capital and operating costs 
against continuing low oil prices was becoming prohibitive to the development of many 
marginal oil and gas discoveries. CAPEX (Capital expenditure) and OPEX (Operating 
expenditure) had to be reduced. 
In the last two years it has become clear that the initial evaluation of cost reduction 
strategies is nearing its end. Cost reduction in isolation is beginning to acquire a bad 
name. Warnings have been made of the consequences of cost reductions on safety and 
on the industry's smaller companies. Instead, the concept of increasing competitiveness 
has emerged as the way ahead. Competitiveness addresses a wider gambit of issues 
including cost, quality, scheduling, customer relations and innovation. 
The issue of safety in the industry and its associated cost has raised the question of 
"how safe is safe enough? " In general, the maximum allowable level of risk of fatality 
(individual risk) for the offshore industry has been accepted as being around 10 per 
year (1 fatality per 1000 person-years) for a given activity. A negligible level of risk is 
often taken to be about 10-5 or 10-6 per year (1 in a million years). Between these two 
limits the risks should be reduced if it is reasonably practicable to do so (ALARP). The 
ALARP principle involves a process of evaluating risks and reducing them where it is 
reasonably practicable. The test of "reasonable practicality" is based on cost-benefit 
analysis and introduces the concept of value for life. The decisions involved in such a 
process are therefore complex and significant. 
A major limitation of current practice is in the decision-making process. The decisions 
are dominated by subjective judgements. Crude inspection data contains significant 
uncertainties making quantitative assessments of deterioration and capacity difficult. 
Decisions to repair or replace pipelines are dominated by a few factors. These include 
the pipeline safety/integrity, the overall costs for repair or replacement and the need to 
minimise operational downtime. These factors are frequently established subjectively or 
they based on very uncertain data. In addition, the comparison of costs and benefits for 
different pipeline repair/replacement strategies is not evaluated consistently. 
2.3 Research in Risk-based Decision Analysis 
Risk-based decision analysis is a field of research that has been active for at least the 
last forty years in the fields of economics and operations research. It has developed a 
vast range of models, theories and processes that offer support to the decision-maker in 
terms of gaining insight into the decision problem. These methods allow the decision 
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problem to be decomposed into a set of smaller and easier to 
handle problems. Decision 
theory practitioners claim that the methods help the decision-maker to learn about their 
own and other's values and objectives concerning the problem. They also claim that it 
promotes creativity in the way the decision is made. Some of the theories also help 
identify and quantify uncertainties and risks. It is claimed that risk-based decision 
analysis helps decision-makers make better and more rational decisions. 
Risk based decision-making has been predominantly used in the fields of finance, 
commerce, government and medicine. Little use has been made of these methods in the 
field of engineering, especially in the management of engineering structures. However, 
due to the problems and complexities encountered in decision-making in this field, as 
described above, it is believed that these methods have the potential to transform the 
effectiveness and efficiency of its decision-making. 
2.4 Research Objective 
The objective of this research therefore, is to investigate if and how risk-based decision- 
making theories, developed outside engineering, can support engineering decisions. A 
generic process to support engineering risk-based decisions will be proposed based on 
current literature. This will then be applied to real life examples to investigate the 
benefits and problems that can arise from formalising such a process. The research 
focus will not be on the development of new techniques so much as investigating how 
the available techniques can improve decision-making in an engineering environment. 
The overall objective of this research therefore, is to evaluate the benefit that risk-based 
decision-making can bring to real life engineering decision problems through: 
1. Identifying tools and techniques that can be used to support decision-making; 
2. Developing a more comprehensive model to address the major issues of decision- 
making, within which the various tools and techniques can be applied; 
3. Applying the model and the appropriate tools and techniques to a range of real life 
decision problems; 
4. Analysing the effects of using this model and drawing conclusions on how well it 
works and any implications for decision-makers. 
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3 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Decision analysis has predominantly been used in very limited fields such as finance, 
commerce, government and medicine. Minimal use of decision analysis methods has 
been made in the field of engineering, which is the specific area of consideration in this 
review. Engineering, by definition, is concerned with detailed analyses of machines and 
structures. The results of the analyses inform the decisions that are made. These 
decisions can involve product design, feasibility, production, maintenance, marketing or 
sales. The analysis is usually performed with extreme care and accuracy. The decisions 
can be based on subjective judgement and intuition, accounting for just one or two 
dominating criteria, combined with conservative assumptions on the uncertain variables. 
The potential for decision analysis to improve engineering decision-making is 
significant and could result in the more successful application of engineering solutions. 
In nearly every industry, difficult and complex decisions are made concerning assets 
throughout the assets' life cycles. In this case an asset is defined as an investment which 
supports the business, either produced by the business for revenue (e. g. a car for a car 
manufacturer) or used by the business to support the acquisition of revenue (e. g. a car 
for a roadside rescue service). The life cycle stages of project appraisal, project 
implementation and operation of the asset [4] should be extended for decision-making 
to include decommissioning as the end of life phase. For all industries each of these 
phases involves a number of intermediate stages which each involve decision-making. 
Sometimes these decisions are quite simplistic but at other times they are highly 
complex, involving many alternatives, data uncertainty, conflicting decision objectives 
and different stakeholder viewpoints. In many industries this situation is magnified by 
high safety and environmental risks and the high investment required. 
At each stage of the life cycle, the type of decision, the number of alternatives available, 
the information uncertainty and the number of stakeholder influences, vary. In later life 
decisions there are a limited number of alternatives (such as whether to repair or replace 
a structure), the decision consequences only interest a local stakeholder group, the costs 
are less than the initial capital investment and uncertainties can be effectively modelled 
due to the availability of historical data [4]. In contrast, decisions made earlier in the 
life cycle involve significant investments, many alternatives, extreme uncertainties and 
a lack of information [4]. These decisions also tend to be high profile, with significant 
management input and with many other stakeholder influences. A well-defined and 
evaluated decision at the conceptual stage could remove the need for a difficult decision 
later in the asset's life. 
3.1 Typical Decision Scenarios 
The typical decision scenarios faced at each stage of a structure's life cycle have been 
investigated and the multiple criteria on which these decisions should be made, 
identified. Examples of these are summarised in Table 1 below. 
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Life cycle stage Decision characteristics Example decisions 
Transport Industry Oil & Gas Industry 
Project appraisal 
Project definition High level, qualitative Identify the Identify the need or 
decision based on limited opportunity or need to opportunity to produce 
data and subjective transport traffic across oil and/or gas from a 
judgements. an obstruction (e. g. new field 
river). development. 
Feasibility Simplified quantitative Justify the feasibility Justify the feasibility 
assessment decision based on limited of transporting traffic of producing and 
data, subjective judgements across an obstruction transporting oil and/or 
and predictions of capacity, (road, river, railway). gas from a new 
turnover, whole life cost and development. 
profit. 
Conceptual design More detailed quantitative Identify conceptual Identify conceptual 
decision based on limited options from a chain transportation options 
data to check the feasibility ferry to a six-lane including a tanker or a 
and the cost effectiveness of river crossing. subsea pipeline. 
the selected concepts. Consider issues such Consider issues such 
Significantly influenced by as crossing location, as tie-in points, 
uncertainties. capacity, construction capacity, construction 
issues, etc. issues, etc. 
Project implementation 
Detailed design Very detailed quantitative Design bridge for Design pipeline for 
decision based on safety and whole life safety and whole life 
engineering predictions of cost through selecting cost through selecting 
safety, based on analysis and dimensions and dimensions and 
testing. Some uncertainty materials suitable for materials suitable for 
remains, such as magnitudes safety and durability. safety and durability. 
of loads. 
Manufacture/ High level decisions based Select contractor/ Select steel mill to 
procurement on stakeholder preference, supplier to construct manufacture pipe and 
e. g. for certain and procure bridge contractor to procure 
contractors/suppliers. components. components. 
Installation Strategic decisions affecting Determine Determine installation/ 
the timeliness and accuracy installation/ construction schedule. 
of construction. They are construction schedule. This affects the 
dominated by uncertainties This affects the commission date, the 
in manufacture completion/ commission date, the whole life cost of the 
component delivery and whole life cost of the project. 
environmental conditions. project. 
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Pre-operation Detailed quantitative Determine schedule Determine schedule 
testing/inspection decisions affected by and procedure for pre- and procedure for pre- 
uncertainties in operation testing and operation testing and 
environmental conditions inspection. inspection. 
and the accuracy with which 
operational and test 
conditions can be monitored 
and controlled. 
Operation of asset 
Operation Regular quantitative Determine and control Determine and control 
decisions based on capacity flow capacities. flow capacities. 
demands and market forces. 
Affected by uncertainties the 
accuracy with which 
operational can be monitored 
/ controlled. 
Inspection, Regular quantitative or Determine schedule Determine schedule 
maintenance and qualitative decisions based and methods for and methods for 
repair on assessment of inspection, inspection, 
deterioration and failure maintenance and maintenance and 
rates. Affected by repair. repair. 
uncertainties in inspection 
results and deterioration 
models. 
Requalification/ Quantitative decision based Reassessment of Reassessment of 
life extension on uncertainties in historical design initiated by design initiated by 
and inspection data, and changes in operational changes in operational 
uncertainties/ vagueness in parameters, excessive parameters, excessive 
the future design deterioration, deterioration, 
requirements. unexpected damage, unexpected damage or 
or a need to extend the a need to extend the 
structure's life. structure's life. 
End of life 
Decommissioning Strategic decision based on Decision to take the Decision to take the 
uncertainties in the current structure out of structure out of 
condition, environmental operation to a safe operation to a safe 
conditions and future state when it is no state when it is no 
requirements have to be longer required for longer required for 
accounted for. operations. operations 
Table 1: Identification of decision characteristics at stages in the life cycle 
3.2 The Generic Decision Problem 
In recent years, particularly in the field of structural engineering, there has been less 
demand for the design of new structures but increased demand for better management of 
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existing structures. The decisions that have to be made in relation to the management of 
existing structures to ensure safety, maximum service life, minimum cost and many 
other important factors, can become quite complex. The aim of this work is to apply the 
established methods of decision analysis to the management of engineering structures. 
Before a decision scenario can be modelled, all factors affecting the decision problem 
must be understood. For that reason, a generic decision scenario has been defined in the 
form of an entity diagram as shown in Figure 1. The entity diagram describes all major 
entities involved in risk-based decision-making for structural asset management as 
blocks and the relationships between them as lines linking the blocks [5]. 
This work had two purposes. Firstly, as a basis for structuring a decision process, it 
provides a model for all of the information that is required. Secondly, it is a checklist 
for all necessary research areas to complete the decision process. 
The entity model was formulated from the research aim to "develop a decision support 
process for managing the risk of a structural asset, to minimise the probability and 
consequences of `failure" as perceived by the stakeholders". 
The key entities and relationships were then mapped on to the entity model in Figure 1. 
To help describe the generic decision problem and its solution an example decision 
problem has been adopted to illustrate each of the important points. The example 
decision was taken from the field of bridge management and considers the need to 
restrict, maintain or repair an under-strength bridge. The example will be defined in 
more detail through this discussion. The description of this model is as follows. 
3.3 The Decision 
The focal points of the entity model are the decision and the structural asset. But all 
parties must agree on what structural asset is being considered, what decision is to be 
made, how it can be made and under what constraints. The decision is then dependent 
on identifying all available alternatives and evaluating which is best. 
In this example, the decision is whether a bridge failing assessment should be repaired, 
strengthened, or left as it is for another year. There are a number of different repair and 
strengthening options available and new techniques may still be identified. The 
decision is constrained predominantly by budgets and safety. 
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3.3.1 The decision-making group 
The Decision-making group consists of the Asset manager, the asset management group 
and other stakeholders, all of whom are interested in and influence the decision, to 
different extents. It is necessary to determine who is in the decision-making group and 
to what extent each person can, and wants to, influence the decision. 
The stakeholders are those affected by the availability and/or safety of the structural 
asset. In this example, they would include bridge users (private, commercial and 
industrial), environmental pressure groups (campaigning for pedestrianisation, etc. ) or 
government officials (MPs from local constituencies, etc. ). 
It is important to determine who the different stakeholders are, how they can be 
identified, what roles they play in the decision process and how to accounted for them. 
The asset management group is the committee responsible for allocating annual budgets 
for each asset manager. In this example, this would be a sub-group of local government 
or the Highways Agency. It is necessary to identify the group members, the group 
dynamics, the power holders in the group, and how decisions are made and agreed. 
The asset manager is responsible for the day-to-day asset operation including defining 
maintenance and repair schedules and bidding for funding. In this example, this would 
be the county or borough bridge engineer and could belong to the asset management 
group. It is necessary to identify the asset manager and his power in the decision. 
3.3.2 The perceptions of the decision makers 
Each decision-maker has different perceptions of the key decision issues, of which are 
important and the severity of the risks. These perceptions have to be identified and 
accounted for in the decision process. In this example, some stakeholders may consider 
that the safety of bridge users is of utmost importance. For others, keeping the bridge 
open for use by buses or lorries may be more important. Each decision-maker will also 
have different preferences over the decision criteria, the types of consequences and the 
probabilities of the consequences (risk prone or risk averse). These preferences need to 
be identified, measured and modelled. ' 
3.3.3 Assessment of the risks 
One of the decision objectives is to minimise the risk of structural failure. There are a 
number of definitions of risk currently in use by different groups of risk practitioners. 
These were summarised in a report by the Royal Society [6] as: 
" Probability of undesired consequences. 
" Seriousness of (maximum) possible undesired consequences. 
" Multi-attribute weighted sum of components of possible undesired consequences. 
" Probability multiplied by seriousness of undesired consequences (expected loss). 
" Probability weighted sum of all undesired consequences (average expected loss). 
" Fitted function through a graph relating probability to undesired consequences. 
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" Semi variance of possible undesired consequences about their average. 
" Variance of all possible consequences about mean expected consequences. 
" Weighted combination of probability distribution parameters for all consequences. 
" Weight of possible undesired consequences relative to those that are desired. 
Each definition seems logical in its own right, yet each is different. Some are more 
complex than others. In line with standard engineering risk assessment practice, the 
fourth definition has been adopted here: 
Risk = Probability of failure x Consequence of failure 
The complexities of consequence uncertainty and multiple attributes will be introduced 
later in the decision analysis. 
The risks considered result from different possible failure events. It is necessary for the 
decision process to clarify the failure events being considered. All decision-makers 
need to agree that this is "failure". Associated with each failure event are one or more 
probabilities and consequences. The probability of the failure event will need to be 
calculated with an understanding of how accurate the value is and what the value 
means. The consequences of the failure events need to be identified and how they can 
be quantified. In the example problem, the consequences of bridge failure could be 
traffic disruption, disruption to local businesses and shops, damage to the environment, 
cost of repair, compensation, death and injury. 
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4.1 Introduction 
For centuries, a philosophical debate has considered the hypothesis that human 
behaviour is, as a rule, rational. If rationality is defined as the ability to remain 
emotionally unaffected, or to understand and base decisions on personal motivations, 
then with effort, man can be rational. If rationality is the ability to equally consider all 
options and select the optimal one, then man struggles with this unaided. 
Many decisions are complex. Decisions may involve multiple, conflicting objectives, 
where a better outcome in one objective results in a worse outcome in another. 
Decisions may involve a degree of uncertainty, where an uncertain outcome relies on an 
uncertain future event occurring. Some decisions may be sequential, i. e. one decision 
cannot be made until the results of a previous decision are known. Decisions may also 
involve multiple stakeholders, where different people, with different authority and 
influence levels, may have different decision objectives and preferences. 
It is in the face of such complexity that man struggles to be rational and decision theory 
brings support. Psychological research has shown that the brain finds it very difficult to 
simultaneously consider more than a limited amount of information at any one time [7]. 
Decision analysis decomposes the decision problem into a set of smaller and easier to 
handle problems. After each sub-problem has been dealt with separately, decision 
theory supports the integration of results to enable the selection of a course of action [8]. 
Decision theory will not solve a decision problem, nor is it intended to. Its purpose is to 
produce insight into the problem, to help decision makers learn about their own and 
other's values and objectives concerning the decision problem and to promote creativity 
to help decision makers make better, more rational, decisions. 
Decision analysis requires the decision-maker to be clear and explicit about his or her 
judgements. This makes it possible to trace back through the analysis to discover why a 
particular course of action was preferred. This "audit trail" means that it is possible to 
use decision analysis to produce a defensible rationale for choosing a particular option. 
This overview of decision analysis has been produced to identify appropriate methods 
that could be used to support risk-based decisions required in the management of 
structural assets. These could include pipelines, bridges, power plants buildings and 
other capital equipment used for profit making purposes within industry. A high level 
review is therefore made of the methods adopted in other industries to support risk- 
based decisions. These include military, aerospace, power plants, bridges, offshore 
structures and pipelines. The key principles of the decision methods adopted in these 
fields are identified. This overview also briefly describes the history of the } 
development of decision analysis, identifies key decision analysis principles and 
describes the decision analysis process and the types of methods available. The 
limitations and strengths of each method are discussed in the context of structural asset st 
management. The review starts by considering what is meant by the term rationality 
and the influences that affect it. 
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Decision analysis is a very broad subject. The full scope of decision analysis 
encompasses a wide range of diverse subjects and theories including soft systems 
methodologies, the theory of constraints and neural networks. It is not possible to tackle 
such a wide range of subjects within this thesis. Consequently, this review is concerned 
with a subset of decisions where a finite number of alternative courses of action and 
outcomes are considered. This form of decision analysis is often referred to as 
"Classical Decision Theory". 
4.2- Rationality in Decision-making 
The aim of decision theory is to help the decision-maker to make rational decisions. 
However, what is a rational decision? Traditionally, the study of decision-making has 
tended to be normative, identifying what the decision-maker ought to do. This assumes 
that the decision-maker naturally behaves in a rational and logical manner. 
Consequently, the decision-maker is expected to maximise satisfaction by selecting the 
decision alternative with the greatest value. Research into descriptive decision analysis 
reveals that this is not the case in reality. 
Decisions may appear to be irrational or sub-optimal due to lack of training or 
understanding on the part of the decision-makers. The nature of the decisions may 
make the assumption of rationality inappropriate. For example, a decision-maker would 
only be able to identify the best overall decision alternative if he had first identified all 
possible alternatives and all possible consequences. This situation is known as the 
condition of perfect knowledge [85]. 
In addition, the decision-maker would require a rational mechanism to consistently rank 
the value of each outcome to reflect his preferences. This situation is known as the 
condition of perfect judgement [85]. It reality these situations do not occur as decision- 
makers may only have limited knowledge, time and even ability to tackle many 
decisions. A distinction has to be made between perfect and limited rationality [9]. 
Furthermore, personal and organisational objectives are often derived from 
stakeholders' consensus, which may not equally account for all members' views, which 
in turn may be incompatible with each other. 
In reality, the decision process is more likely to be based on minimum acceptable 
requirements rather than maximising payoff. This is known as satisficing behaviour 
[85]. Decision-makers however, would often prefer to maximise than to satisfy. They 
hold rationality, perfect judgement and knowledge as highly desirable goals. These 
goals are idealistic, but should still be aimed for. In order to improve the quality of 
decision-making it is necessary to investigate the sociological factors that make a 
} simplified model of reality necessary. Some of the factors that limit the decision- 
maker's ability to behave in a rational, maximising manner are discussed below. 
4.2.1 Perception 
Perception is the process by which the individual receives, organises and processes data. 
From experience, we know that we do not take in and process all available information 
in a given situation. This is known as selective perception [85]. Evidence suggests that 
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individual perceptions differ based on personal needs, background and experiences [10]. 
Selective perception limits the information derived from a particular situation but which 
still forms the basis of future actions. We naturally try to organise the limited 
information in such a way that it seems to provide a complete picture, or a satisfactory 
explanation of the situation. This process is known as closure [11]. 
A common method of closure is to categorise decision situations according to past 
experiences [85]. Experience is a valuable factor in decision-making; however, it also 
has significant potential dangers since assumptions of familiarity can be misguided and 
incorrect. Stereotyping is another common form of closure, where an individual or 
situation can be evaluated based on one particular characteristic (e. g., sex, race, 
occupation) and all other cues are ignored in preference to personal beliefs. Finally, we 
can force closure in a situation by seeing what we expect to see. We can be 
preconditioned to organise perceptions into expected patterns through either 
forewarning or familiarity. Such expectancy can also be brought about by our own 
needs and enthusiasm for a particular outcome. 
4.2.2 Values 
Values are very significant in determining human behaviour. Individuals, groups and 
organisations construct and maintain value systems and use them to evaluate alternativer 
courses of action. Individuals learn to adopt particular beliefs from organising and 
interpreting information [12]. Many beliefs are descriptive, where no judgement is 
implied. Other beliefs may be evaluative, where judgement is clearly implied. Some 
beliefs go even further and become prescriptive. Evaluative and prescriptive 
judgements involve assessing value and therefore affect the individual's decision 
behaviour [85]. When a number of compatible, related beliefs are organised into a 
stable pattern, an attitude is formed. Attitudes tend to pre-dispose us to behave in a 
predictable way. At a more basic level, general preferences (values) underlie attitudes, 
which are even more ingrained and significantly affect behaviour [13]. 
Values play an important role in decision-making behaviour [85]: 
1. Most people are unaware of the values they exhibit in their behaviour, which can 
operate at a subconscious level. 
2. Values affect judgements between alternatives, which -are made in terms of 
perceived worth. 
3. People pick out characteristics in others or in situations to support their personal 
value system, disregarding whatever does not fit. 
4. Individuals are rarely entirely consistent in applying values to situations. Different 
values can be triggered by different stimuli. 
4.2.3 Uncertainty 
Decision-making, especially in the context of risk, involves assessing the value of 
outcomes and the likelihood of the outcome occurring. 
ä 
.,. 
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Probability of an event is defined as the likelihood of its occurrence. It can be assessed 
objectively or subjectively. Objective probability must be based on an unbiased 
assessment of either historical data or substantial experimentation. Subjective 
probability is an expression of the degree of belief of an occurrence. This however has 
limitations [14]: 
1. People tend to overestimate low probability events and underestimate high 
probability events. 
2. People tend to predict that an event that has not occurred for a while is more likely 
to occur in the near future ("gamblers fallacy"). 
3. People tend to overestimate the probability of favourable events and underestimate 
the probability of unfavourable events. 
The third point has an important effect on decision behaviour as it reveals a link 
between the value of an outcome and the assumed probability of occurrence. The 
theory of utility (which is described in more detail later in Section 4.5.3) considers the 
way the value of an outcome changes with decision-maker and with time and therefore 
affects the perceived riskiness of a gamble. The decision-maker can combine an 
assessment of the utility of an outcome with the likelihood of the outcome to give a 
subjective expected utility, which can be used as the basis of decision-making under 
uncertainty. This can also be applied to the risk itself so that low risk outcomes can be 
made more or less attractive than high-risk outcomes. The tendency for decision- 
makers to accept a higher or lower risk more readily is known as risk propensity. This 
has a significant effect on a decision-maker's approach to decision-making. These 
issues are also discussed in more detail in Section 4.5.3. 
4.2.4 Limited rationality 
It has been shown that most decisions are not perfectly rational. However, after taking 
account of all influencing factors decisions can be made under limited rationality. By 
simplifying rational decision-making to the assumptions of limited rationality, a rational 
decision can be defined according to Lee's [15] four characteristic principles: 
1A rational decision is one from a specified set of possible decisions. If all possible 
options are not identified, then the best decision will only be the best of those 
identified and could therefore be sub-optimal. 
2A rational decision depends on the decision rule employed by the decision-maker to 
specify which of the set of possible decisions is rational. 
3 The rational decision for a specific situation may differ between decision-makers, 
because people's subjective probabilities and consequence values differ. 
4A rational decision depends on the information available. It is judged irrational to 
ignore relevant available information. Large quantities of information could, 
however, take excessive time to assimilate. The decision-maker has to evaluate the 
time, effort and costs required to obtain adequate information for a rational decision. 
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4.3 A Review of the Risk-based Decision Process 
The first seeds of decision theory seem to have been sown early this century in two 
different fields. In the field of economics, Alfred Marshall [16] described "economic 
man" as basing his decisions not on habit or custom, but on deliberate and 
knowledgeable reasoning about the possible results of his decision. His final choice is 
the course of action expected to bring him maximum gain. In the field of mathematics, 
Ramsey [17] was the first to express an operational theory of action based on both 
judgmental probability and utility involving a subjective or decision-theoretic 
viewpoint. Von Neumann and Morgernstern [18] then developed the modem 
probabilistic utility theory in 1947. Utility theory first had been conceived in the 17`h 
and 18th centuries but was dropped in the mid 19th century as an immeasurable science. 
Von Neumann and Morgernstern revitalised utility theory and pointed the way to 
scientific methods to measure conflicting criteria and thus devised a set of axioms for 
preferences between gambles. Mosteller and Nogee [19] set out to test the descriptive 
adequacy of Von Neumann - Morgenstern theory by measuring the utility for small 
amounts of money for real people. An example of the typical utility functions they 
found is shown in Figure 2. Each line represents an individual participant, groups k 
and B were undergraduate students, group C were national guardsmen. The students 
were found to behave far more in accordance with classical diminishing returns notions 
than the guardsmen, this was thought to be due to the less favoured economic status of 
the guardsmen. 
Amount of Money, in cents corresponding to utile values 
for all subjects according to Mosteller and Nogee 
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Mosteller and Nogee's technique, however, was criticised, as people do not, as they 
assumed, base decision-making on objective probabilities. Davidson, Suppes and 
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free of this criticism. The utility functions they found for money, (shown in Figure 3), 
also reflected the utility curve hypothesised by Friedman and Savage [21] with a similar 
falling off in marginal utility. A pair of curves represent the upper and lowers bounds 
= for each participant between which the true utility curve would lie. 
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Decision theory was first developed by mathematicians and economists, behavioural 
decision theory then came about as a result of psychology. Behavioural decision theory 
is concerned with the hypothesis of general rationality and aims to explain human 
decisions. Normative decision theory concerns choices that a rational man should make 
in a given situation regardless of the decisions actually made. Descriptive decision 
theory concerns the choices real people actually make. Economists have been less 
concerned than psychologists with rationalising observed human behaviour and more 
concerned with choices that should be made to maximise profits or utility. Likewise, 
mathematicians have usually been more concerned with the mathematical theory of 
rational decision-making and the development of the mathematics of optimisation. 
A key source for modem decision theory is Raiffa [22] who defined the decision 
analysis process as: 
1. List viable options available for gathering information, experimentation and action. 
2. List the events that may possibly occur. 
3. Arrange the information required and the choices to make in chronological order. 
4. Decide preferences for the consequences resulting from the various actions. 
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5. Judge what the chances are that any particular uncertain event will occur. 
Keeney and Raiffa [23] proposed a more thorough and logical decision-making process 
as: 
1. Pre-analysis - This involves identifying the problem and the viable action 
alternatives available. 
2. Structural Analysis - This involves identifying which choices can be made now and 
which can be deferred. It also identifies the necessary information or experiments to 
inform the choices. The decision-maker can order and address these questions 
through a decision tree. 
3. Uncertainty Analysis - The decision-maker assigns probabilities to the branches on 
the decision tree. These can be based on past empirical data, assumptions fed into 
and results taken from stochastic models, expert testimony and subjective 
judgements of the decision-maker. 
4. Utility or Value Analysis - The decision-maker assigns utilities to consequences 
associated with the decision tree paths. The consequence of each path filly 
describes the implications of that path. The decision-maker then encodes his 
preference for the consequences in terms of a utility number such that the 
maximisation of expected utility becomes the decision basis. 
5. Optimisation Analysis - The decision strategy optimises expected utility. This 
strategy indicates what the best action at the start of the decision tree and at every 
decision node along the decision tree. 
This process is a good starting point for decision support but it has limitations. Firstly, 
the process is based on a single decision-maker, not accounting for group dynamics or 
conflicting stakeholder views. In reality, more people may be involved in the decision, 
with their own perceptions of the risks and preferences for final outcomes. Secondly, 
the process assumes that the decision-maker starts the analysis completely undecided 
and that the decision process reveals a set of answers to be scrutinised to ensure 
consistency. However, the decision-maker may already have preconceptions, which can 
influence the way the decision process is carried out. If the purpose of the decision 
analysis is to reassure the decision-maker or communicate the solution to others, then 
that is acceptable. If the decision-maker is hoping to gain insight into the decision then 
he must start the decision process with an open mind. The process also assumes that the 
decision problem has already been identified and the viable alternatives specified. This 
however is a very crucial stage of the decision process and time must be spent ensuring 
that the problem is suitable for decision analysis and that all of the possible alternatives 
have been identified and addressed. 
Many decisions involve multiple conflicting objectives, poorly quantified uncertainties, 
costs and benefits relating to individuals and organisations, long-term consequences and 
societal impacts. Keeney and Raiffa's decision process does not aim to generate an 
"objectively correct" answer to the problem based on this array of complexities. Such a 
response could be impossible and if possible is likely to be irrelevant. Instead, this 
Caroline M Roberts Page 18 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
process is able to receive subjective evaluations for unquantifiable criteria, along with 
objective values for quantifiable criteria. 
Keeney and Raiffa's decision process was aimed at supporting both strategic decisions 
(e. g. how much to invest in a certain field of research) and repetitive operational 
decisions (e. g. how much to charge for a certain product). The strategic decisions are 
more complex to evaluate, but that is even more reason for decision analysis to be used 
to support it. 
Finally, Keeney and Raiffa's decision process does not mention implementation of the 
solution or post analysis of the decision results. This stage in the decision process 
should identify how to communicate the right instructions to the right people, and who 
should be responsible for their completion. This should also include an evaluation of 
the results, both short term, (e. g. an immediate assessment of the fulfilment of 
objectives and a need to refine the evaluation process) and long term (e. g. monitoring 
the long-term decision results). This can result in the need to iterate the solution based 
on sensitivity, to ensure that no new variables or alternatives arise and that the final 
solution can be implemented. 
Comparing Keeney and Raiffa's decision process with the generic formulation of the 
decision problem identifies whether the decision process does actually address all the 
entities (or issues) raised by the entity model. Table 2 below relates the entities to 
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Based on this assessment of Keeney and Raiffa's proposals, we can see that a number of 
gaps exist in their proposed decision process. These gaps are: 
" The need to identify and account for multiple decision makers (or stakeholders); 
" The need to identify decision criteria (especially if multiple criteria are needed); 
" The need to identify constraints on the decision; 
" The need to review the whole decision process to identify opportunities to improve 
the evaluation. This could be achieved through sensitivity analysis and model 
refinement at the end of the decision process [24]. 
I have concluded that it is therefore necessary to develop an enhanced decision process 
that will provide for the deficiencies identified in Keeney and Raiffa's process. This 
will also provide a much richer basis for evaluating decision problems. This enhanced 
decision process is shown in Figure 4. The boxes representing decision steps originally 
proposed by Keeney and Raiffa are white, while I propose to introduce the shaded 
boxes as part of this research. 
This enhanced decision process is the backbone of this research. The enhancements 
ensure that all the inputs identified by the entity diagram in Figure 1 can be provided 
and hence ensure that all aspects of the decision problem are accounted for. This 
enhanced decision process will be used as a basis for a literature review into the 
available generic decision theories developed in the decision sciences. Based on the 
results of this review, the enhanced process will then be tested, with appropriate tools, 
on real life decision problems. First, to understand the current status of risk-based 
decision-making in engineering applications, a review is carried out of the application 
of the methods in various industries. 
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Figure 4: Outline of the proposed risk-based decision process 
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4.4 A Review of Applications of Decision Methods in industry 
A number of industries have applied and been responsible for further developing 
different forms of decision theory to support decision-making particular to those fields. 
A review has therefore been carried out of these decision theory applications in different 
industries, to identify any methods or experiences that would be of benefit to this 
research. The industries that have been considered are the military, aviation, plant 
management, bridges, offshore structures and pipelines. 
4.4.1 Decision-making In The Military 
One of the first application areas of decision theory was in the military. The focus here 
was in the application and development of game theory. Game theory is a mathematical 
approach to decision-making in conflict. It is applied to problems involving 
competition [101,25]. Game theory addresses problems where two or sometimes more 
groups, have a number of options from which to choose, and the outcome depends on 
the decisions of all opponents with different aims. Important characteristics of game 
theory are the number of participants and options, the level of competition, the 
availability of information, the value of possible outcomes and the timing of the 
decisions. 
The simplest form of decision problem is the finite two person zero sum game, where 
there are two sides opposing one another, and the gain to one is the loss to the other. 
Each side can choose from a finite number of strategies. The game is solved by 
constructing a "payoff matrix" representing the loss and gain for each side for each 
available strategy. Each side then tries to maximise their payoff. 
The game is solved when the expected amount that one side will win if both sides use 
their best strategies, is determined. This is the value of the game. Each side then 
chooses the strategy giving them the expected gain/loss equal to the value of the game. 
Although the methodology for the solution of games exists if the game can be put into a 
matrix, the practical applications for the technique have proved to be limited. Game 
Theory has rarely been used as a tool for military decision-making. Its main use has 
been in the analysis of decisions after they have been made, either in real conflicts or 
during gaming. In other words, it is probably more suitable as a descriptive tool than as 
a direct decision-making aid. This is because in military conflict the games are often 
not zero-sum, nor is it likely that the opponents' scales of values will be common. It is 
also unlikely that one side will know the other's true preferences and the number of 
plausible strategies can be very large. This gives rise to large, unmanageable matrices. 
Game theory could have the potential to support decision-making in situations of high 
stakeholder conflict, where the different stakeholders would be treated as opponents in a 
game model. However, the limitations described previously would also restrict the 
suitability of using game theory to help support these types of decisions. These 
limitations have been partially addressed in the Hypergame and Metagame extensions 
of game theory. These extensions of traditional game theory are able to handle more 
realistic problems [93,94,95]. The Hypergame approach recognises that the players 
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may have different perceptions of the game being played. These differences arise from 
their views of the outcomes, their perception of opponents' motives, their attribution of 
responsibility, their view of the options open to their opponents and even who their 
opponents are. The Hypergames are analysed by developing separate payoff matrices 
for each player and finding the "equilibrium" strategy where no player can improve on 
his own terms by unilateral change. The Metagame approach concentrates on the 
decision options open to the various "sides" in a problem. It is less formal than either 
classical game theory or Hypergames. Its most characteristic feature is its emphasis on 
the tactical, political and psychological relationships between the various "sides". 
Metagames are analysed by considering a number of scenarios or by analysing the 
threats and promises for each side within a strategic map. The formulation of both of 
these models is very complex and therefore has rarely been adopted. 
Haywood wrote one of the first documented applications of Game Theory to Military 
decision-making in 1954 [26]. He applied the principles of Game Theory to the 
reconstruction of the strategic decision problem facing the two opposing commanders at 
the battle of Avranches in August 1944. This paper became a pioneering basis for the 
methodology of military analysis, particularly in the role of game theory in military 
strategic decision-making. However, more than 30 years after its publication previously 
secret military information concerning the battle was disclosed. This shed new light on 
Haywood's conclusions and raised questions over game theory's effectiveness as a 
military decision-making tool over the past fifty years [27]. Haywood claimed that the 
decision problem facing the US Commander against the German Commander could be 
modelled and assessed by using Game Theory. It was claimed that such analysis would 
show that the US Commander, considering all risks and options available to his 
opponent, had selected the best strategy available. However, an order direct from Hitler 
had stopped the German Commander following his best strategy. If the German 
Commander had selected his best strategy then the US victory may not have been so 
conclusive. The recent disclosure revealed that US military intelligence intercepted 
Hitler's order and therefore knew the German Commander's strategy before it was 
initiated. This allowed the US Commander to base his decision on certainty not 
uncertainty, removing the benefit claimed from Game Theory. 
Another decision tool developed in this field is Military Appreciation [28]. Every 
military officer is taught Military Appreciation as a qualitative approach to decision- 
making. The approach aims to help senior officers be confident that all factors have 
been thought through in situations of extreme stress. The Military Appreciation is a 
disciplined process to support the examination of all relevant factors and produce a 
confidently reasoned conclusion. An appreciation is most useful as a written document 
for presentation to higher authority, but it can be used as a checklist, if time is short. A 
Military Appreciation is carried out in 7 main steps: 
" Study the existing situation 
" Specify the aim to be attained 
Examine and draw reasoned conclusions on all relevant factors 
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" Consider all practicable courses of action 
" Decide on the best course of action to attain the aim 
" Make a plan to implement the selected course of action 
" Check all reasoning and the practicality of the plan 
The appreciation is not an easy method to apply and it is important not to let the form 
become the substance. However, it is a useful and effective method for supporting 
decision-making in those cases where mathematical techniques are inappropriate. This 
type of checklist provides a helpful starting point for developing a decision framework 
for both quantitative and qualitative decision-making in any field of application. 
The Mission Orientated Approach (MOA) [29], is a decision technique that develops a 
hierarchy to connect the individual requirements to the overall mission. The hierarchy 
creates a ladder by which the effects of equipment at tactical level can be combined to 
show the resulting ability to satisfy the strategic direction. The hierarchy starts at the 
strategic level, which describes the degree to which the overall mission is accomplished 
under different scenarios. The next level acknowledges both that the strategic level is 
too broad for practical planning and the necessity to identify the essential elements of 
the overall mission. These are the Key Mission Components (KMCs). They 
correspond to major aspects of military operations, failure in any one of which would 
jeopardise the overall strategic mission. KMCs are supported by a series of military 
functions, which represent the level in the military world at which equipment is issued 
and used. 
MOA is a structured judgement approach, where different types of judgement come 
from different sources. The technical assessments of capability are provided by 
technical experts and the judgements relating functions to KMCs and the KMCs to 
strategic capability are provided by more senior officers. MOA therefore ties together 
disparate sources of information and judgement that could make it difficult for any one 
person to influence the decision too much. This makes the best of the available 
information. This type of structuring technique is very similar to Saaty's analytical 
hierarchy process [100] in that it is useful for breaking the decision into manageable 
levels and identifying influencing factors at each level. 
It is concluded that the decision-making methods adopted in the military are therefore 
designed to account for qualitative rather than quantitative data, and account for 
significant uncertainty and conflict in stakeholder/opponent views. 
4.4.2 Decision-making In Aviation 
Another important field for using risk-based decision methods is aviation. This field 
addresses two problems: design optimisation and inspection/maintenance scheduling. 
Design optimisation involves a trade-off in reducing weight against maximising safety. 
One method developed to address this problem uses Genetic Algorithms [30,31]. 
These are parameter search procedures based on the mechanics of natural genetics. 
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a random yet structured information exchange exploiting knowledge from old solutions. 
This technique has become popular in recent years as a robust optimisation tool for a 
variety of problems in engineering, science, economics, finance, etc. A number of 
structural design applications have been documented, for example in [32,30], to 
maximise strength to weight ratios. 
Another example of design optimisation considered the trade-off of cost and risk 
{ (although this was a simplified version of the real problem, which involved risk 
reduction, cost, technical feasibility, weight and performance). The example assessment 
was performed conceptually [33] to illustrate a proposed method for finding the most 
cost effective of a number of risk reduction strategies in the presence of uncertainty. 
The uncertainties in the decision attributes were expressed as probability distributions 
based on engineering analyses. The decision-maker then compared the usefulness of 
each option against his objectives. To avoid the problems associated with the 
evaluation of multiple attribute utility each option was assessed separately against each 
attribute (i. e. risk and cost). Further evaluation was then required to separate the 
strategies, through benefit-to-cost ratio and expected cost impact. Analysing the 
decision using a variety of indicators and presenting the results in a number of formats 
offered different perspectives on the problem. However, decisions considered on more 
than risk and cost, could become unmanageable and reveal unreconciled conflicts. 
A Multi Attribute decision methodology was proposed by Hauge and Wright [99] 
showing how to identify the best overall strategy through reconciliation and involved 
six main steps: 
" Initiation - involving identifying objectives, assessing their relative importance, 
determining risk acceptance g criteria and identifying hidden objectives. 
" Hazard analysis - involving identifying the hazards threatening the objectives and 
generic scenarios containing these hazards and assessing each scenario's criticality. 
" Risk assessment - involving collecting relevant data, verifying the criticality of each mg 
risk scenario, classifying them into risk categories, and then calculating the overall 
III risk. ýýi 
.: " Countermeasure analysis - involving identifying all possible countermeasures to 
each risk scenario, evaluating their costs and effects and calculating their utility if 
other indirect factors need to be accounted for, then carrying out a sensitivity 
analysis. 
" Countermeasure deployment - involving both implementing and monitoring of the 
selected countermeasure's effectiveness. 
" Post-implementation evaluation - involving evaluating the effectiveness and feeding 
back into the decision process any lessons learnt to support later decisions. 
This process is very similar to that proposed by Keeney and Raiffa [23] and can also be 
used as the starting point for a decision framework. 
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Hauge and Wright went on to discuss the problems associated with trying to make such 
decisions based on both qualitative and quantitative uncertain information. The paper 
proposed the adoption of the Fuzzy-Bayesian extension to the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process [100] developed under the CEC funded project - RESTRUCT [34]. This 
method allows pair-wise comparisons of the relative importance of any two 
consequences, based on a set of descriptive terms. These are then translated as 
numerical values into a matrix, the principal eigenvalue of which gives importance 
weights for each decision objective. The countermeasures are then scored and ranked 
according to their weighted desirability against the, decision objectives. The Fuzzy- 
Bayesian extension to this method allows the pair-wise comparison and the desirability 
scoring of each countermeasure to be performed using both fuzzy numbers and 
probability distributions. This allows different objectives to be integrated into a single 
desirability measure expressed as deterministic, fuzzy and probabilistic quantities. This 
approach was claimed to provide a systematic, flexible, intuitive and guided process, 
which does not remove any decision from management. It also supports the 
consideration of important but occasionally less conspicuous hazards, which may be 
overlooked in project management decisions. 
Inspection and maintenance planning are extremely important activities in the aviation 
industry. For airline companies, maintenance costs can account for 20-30% of annual 
expenditure. However, maintenance planning can frequently be given second place to 
operational planning. The problem, therefore, is determining the extent of the 
maintenance and supporting the flight operations manager who has to face delayed and 
cancelled flights, unforeseen breakdowns, additional acute maintenance needs, etc. 
Rapid decisions are often required concerning delaying or cancelling flights, swapping 
aircraft and any maintenance implications of the decision. Reference [35] describes an 
interactive decision support system developed for the flight operations manager. The 
system supports decisions aimed at optimising service while still paying attention to 
maintenance costs. A heuristic approach was defined based on a cost coefficient 
computed from the aircraft's remaining flying hours, provided the maintenance is 
performed at the aircraft's latest overnight stay in a maintenance base before it runs out 
of flying hours. If the problem is discovered to have no feasible solution then 
maintenance slots can be interchanged. Such an interactive procedure allows the many 
additional factors to be taken into account. 
The use of optimisation and operations research in the aviation industry is not new. 
Such maintenance scheduling problems have been the subject of considerable research 
over the last 10-15 years. However, only a few methods of "real" optimisation have 
been developed. These methods tend to be automatic with very little input from the 
decision-maker. Examples are the programmes developed by American Airlines [36] 
and Swissair [37] to control the execution of maintenance plans. The aircraft 
maintenance status was taken as the main input to the problem. Based on the average 
flying hours per day and the maximum flying hours between maintenance, the latest 
date at which each aircraft should go in for maintenance was determined. 
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The decision-making methods adopted in the aviation industry are therefore designed to 
optimise planned maintenance schedules in terms of cost, but also in terms of safety. It 
is not difficult to draw parallels from these maintenance planning problems to those in 
general maintenance planning of engineering structures, and therefore to see that these 
techniques could also be useful. However, the focus of these techniques seems to be on 
the optimised prioritisation of a number of maintenance tasks, rather that on the 
optimum scheduling based on minimising risk and cost. 
4.4.3 Decision-making In Plant Management 
The first scientific approaches to maintenance management date from the 1950s and 
1960s. At that time, preventive maintenance was advocated as a means to reduce 
failures and unplanned downtime [38]. Researchers such as Barlow and Proschan [39] 
and McCall [40] introduced the first operations research models for maintenance 
optimisation in the early 1960s. In 1960 Mayer [41] and in 1967, Turban [42] found out 
that little application had been made of these models to real life problems. In the 1970s, 
condition monitoring came forward, focussing on techniques that predict failures using 
information on the actual state of the equipment [43,44,45]. In the 1980s, the 
computer was introduced into the maintenance function, initially to facilitate 
administrative processes, later to collate and present management information. 
One of the most important approaches in plant maintenance management, founded in 
the 1960s is Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) [46]. RCM directs maintenance 
effort to the components whose reliability is critical. RCM is currently probably the 
most popular method for identifying a cost-effective strategy for plant maintenance. 
The goal of RCM is to identify the optimal maintenance for each component taking 
safety, maintenance costs and cost of lost production into account. RCM provides a 
practical and structured approach for determining a recommended maintenance strategy 
for each component. However, it cannot be claimed that the strategy derived from 
RCM is in fact "optimal" particularly in terms of the overall performance of the plant. 
Reference [47] describes an extension to RCM claiming to integrate maintenance into 
the total business system. The method uses utility theory to model different decision 
objectives, system performance measures to evaluate objectives and plant specific 
preferences to rank the performance measures. The methodology, therefore, combines a 
number of well-known models from various fields into a complete and structured 
approach to quantify 'the effect of maintenance strategies on the overall production 
system's performance. The methodology's aim was to provide insight into the 
relationship between maintenance and economic return and safety. Influence diagrams 
were used in the communication process. The four main analysis stages were: 
" Problem definition, involving defining the main objectives of plant activity along 
with the system boundaries and the available alternative maintenance strategies. 
" Loss function and preference evaluation, measuring the degree of goal attainment 
with respect to the main plant objectives. Safety, health and environmental 
objectives are considered along with costs due to maintenance and production loss. 
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" Dependability modelling involving optimising maintenance scheduling with respect 
to multiple objectives, focusing on the main aspects of plant activity and providing 
insight into the relation between maintenance, economic return and safety. 
" Compiling results of the risk function based on the expectation of the loss function. 
Difficulties arise when combining safety performance measures and economic losses 
into one overall loss function, especially when considering the value of human life. 
These safety performance measures also tend to require dependability analyses, which 
make the total analysis too complex and costly to be practical. However, RCM does not 
achieve credibility as a maintenance optimisation tool while claiming to prioritise safety 
without trying to quantify safety and relate it to its associated costs. 
Reference [48] presents a simple approach for using two importance measures typically 
calculated within a standard Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). These are the 
minimal cutset contribution (which determines the maintenance risk importance based 
on the equipment risk importance) and the risk reduction importance (which determines 
the maintenance importance based on the risk impact if the maintenance were not 
carried out). Maintenance works were classified as either risk important, marginal or 
unimportant. The identification of risk unimportant maintenance strategies was also 
useful, because any component failing with minimal risk impact represents a waste of 
valuable resources. The methods rely on results from a PRA, which could produce 
subjective results. Both measures also rely on minimal cutsets being identified - for 
complex structures this could be difficult and time consuming. Reference [49] also 
presents a similar approach for using two measures calculated as part of a standard 
PRA. The measures adopted here were the Birnbaum importance measure (which 
approximates the conditional probability of nuclear core melt given the failure of the 
system) and the weld importance measure (the product of the Birnbaum importance 
measure and the probability of weld failure which presents the risk of core melt due to 
pipe breaks in the system). Therefore, both measures were important inspection' 
planning factors and hence were used as part of risk-based inspection guidance for, 
nuclear power facilities to prioritise inspection for facilities, systems and components. 
An important distinction must be made between systems that can only be in two 
condition states: failure and non-failure and systems that deteriorate continuously over 
time, for which several non-failure conditions can be identified. In the latter case, it is 
possible to inspect the system in order to reveal its current condition. A model 
presented in [50] focuses on partially known continuous-time deterioration processes 
based stochastically on a finite number of condition levels. A range of possible actions 
was considered in terms of inspection, repair and replacement strategies over an infinite 
time horizon divided into discrete moments. The process objective was to minimise the 
long-term average cost via a policy iteration based algorithm. The deterioration process 
was converted into a- Markov decision process, where the time passed since the last 
known condition was incorporated into the state description. Costs were determined for 
operation, repair, inspection and damage for the component. This allows the expected 
component cost to be evaluated in its expected state when the decision is made. The 
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objective is to determine the cost-optimal policy, to identify which actions to take in 
each state. Although it is difficult to obtain reliable condition data, the paper 
demonstrated a satisfactory application of this method to a real problem, showing the 
real savings made in an optimal policy versus the periodic inspections. 
The data collection problem for such decision models was addressed in [51] by basing 
the preventive replacement decision on information about the state of the component 
obtained by monitoring a suitably chosen parameter. The paper also approximates from 
the infinite time solution to evaluate a finite time horizon optimal age-replacement 
interval. The infinite time solution described in the previous paper assumes that the 
renewal system is in a steady state with infinite number of renewals. However, due to a 
limit usually imposed on the useful life of the component, this situation is seldom true. 
Limiting the horizon gives rise to unnecessary extra costs, especially if preventive 
replacement is made near to the end of the useful life of the component. Therefore, this 
paper proposed correcting the limiting solution to respect the finite time horizon. This 
method is claimed to considerably simplify and speed up the calculation of the optimal 
age or diagnostic replacement interval and approximates well to the exact solution. 
A counting process approach was adopted in [52] for determining the optimal 
replacement time, through minimising the long run expected cost per unit time. The 
counting process was defined as the number of failures in a specified time interval 
during which no replacement is carried out. The model was based on an observable 
stochastic process, representing the component's condition with time, assuming no 
planned replacement in the time interval. Therefore, given the component history up to 
the current time, and assuming it is still functioning, the probability that the component 
will fail in the next time interval was calculated. This was then used to determine a 
planned replacement time by minimising the long run expected cost per unit time. 
These models represent a fraction of the hundreds of maintenance optimisation models 
proposed over the past 30 years. Even recently, researchers have been investigating the 
reasons why very few applications of maintenance optimisation methods have been 
made successfully. In [53] it is claimed that it is the user-friendliness of the model 
rather than its appropriateness that dominates the situation. A frequent complaint of 
maintenance optimisation models, however, is that they address the wrong type of 
maintenance. They are often aimed at planned overhauls and preventive replacements, 
rather than predictive maintenance based on a measured condition. Even if it is possible 
to find the right model for the right problem, it is still difficult to determine the values of 
the parameters to use in the model. For example, there is rarely much data available 
about indirect costs. It can also be difficult to determine statistical lifetime 
distributions, implying that these models may be based on the wrong concept. 
However, a lack of data is not an excuse to set models aside. Decisions still have to be 
taken and can be based on subjective data or engineering judgement as necessary. 
Maintenance strategies should not only be tuned to the deterioration and failure 
processes but to the economic return of the installation. Therefore, to fully optimise the 
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costs and benefits of alternative maintenance strategies, it is necessary to study the 
various decision processes and their consequences in detail. 
It is concluded that the decision-making methods adopted in plant maintenance 
decisions are therefore designed to optimise planned maintenance schedules based on 
historical reliability estimates and projections of deterioration, when this information is 
available. 
4.4.4 Decision-making in the Management of Bridges 
The traditional approach to decision-making in bridge management evaluates the 
options with cost-benefit analyses. However, problems arise differentiating between 
competing projects, as a simple cost-benefit ratio does not encompass all factors. 
References [54,55] developed an incremental benefit cost program that ranks 
alternatives in decreasing order of their incremental benefit cost ratios. Under limited 
budgets, this results in near optimal sets of bridge improvement options. The alternative 
options were ranked by establishing level-of service goals and then determining the 
deficient bridges with attributes below these goals. The available improvement 
alternatives were then identified with associated costs, benefits and the remaining or 
extended life. Finally, the budget was allocated to the least-cost improvement 
alternatives for all bridges deemed deficient, in descending order of their incremental 
cost benefit ratios. "Do nothing" was added internally as an option with zero cost and 
consequence although this is simplistic, as it is likely to have some cost or consequence. 
This algorithm only optimises the strategy for unlimited budgets. For many 
maintenance alternatives and bridges, the algorithm becomes very complex. 
Furthermore, no account of time was made on deterioration and the improvement needs 
were assumed to remain constant, hence the above model is only suitable for a short 
time horizon (1-5 years). 
A similar cost-benefit assessment was proposed as the basis for the optimal allocation of 
resources to bridge repair and maintenance in [56]. This work focussed on the repair or 
preventive upgrading for earthquake situations, based on optimising resource allocation 
to reduce system vulnerability. The optimisation was carried out based on the costs of 
restoring service and the time out of service. The cost of restoring service was 
optimised by maximising the total savings achieved by each intervention against the 
cost of no intervention. The time out of service was optimised by maximising the total 
savings in days out of service for restoration compared to days out of service for 
restoration following previous interventions. The paper reduced the computational 
burden of this problem by formulating it as a multi-stage decision process, with each 
stage independent from the preceding ones and solving it by dynamic programming. 
Reference [57] proposed a multi-attribute, life cycle analysis to evaluate the 
rehabilitation needs of a bridge network in Texas. The size of the annual budget needed 
for the rehabilitation and replacement activities was calculated over a specified length of 
time. A full life cycle analysis determining actual expenditures through deterioration 
curves and predicted cost consequences was considered too complicated. The 
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techniques were simplified by assuming a fixed useful life of each bridge, after which 
the structure would need to be replaced and an average rehabilitation requirement at 
mid-life. A horizon was set for the budget planning exercise and the age of each 
structure was calculated for every year in that horizon, to categorise each for 
rehabilitation or replacement (or "do nothing"), evaluating the required budgets for each 
year. Any backlogs in the work were identified and the work re-scheduled to permit a 
reasonably constant funding level throughout the planning horizon. The paper proposed 
an attribute percentile scaling (weighted average ranking) technique to select specific 
rehabilitation and replacement projects against a common set of multiple criteria. This 
is a measure of the project's position as a candidate for funding relative to the rest of the 
projects in the set. Constraints set on attributes automatically prioritise projects if they 
are exceeded. This scaling process is self-adaptive. If conditions change over time the 
relative position of the alternative projects can change accordingly. 
A key problem in optimal maintenance planning is the time dependent evaluation of a 
structure's safety. Neither of the previous papers considered the deterioration in 
structural safety and based the current evaluation of safety according to the statutory 
codes and standards. The time dependence of the structure's safety is however one of 
the key problems associated with optimal maintenance planning. This is accounted for 
in considering current and future structural reliability in [58]. The bridge reliability is 
measured using the reliability index, ß, for a single failure element and for the bridge as 
a whole [104]. The reliability is assumed to decrease with time due to deterioration but 
limited by a minimum reliability index. Current and detailed inspections are carried out 
at fixed intervals updating basic variables based on Bayesian methods [59]. Following 
these, the reliability is calculated and a decision is made on the need for any subsequent 
maintenance work or for a more detailed structural assessment. Economics are ignored 
at this time. Structural assessments are only performed following the identification of 
nonconformities during a current or detailed inspection. The reliability is calculated and 
a decision is made on the need and timing of repair work. 
This method was developed further in [60]. Again, inspections were assumed to be 
performed at constant time intervals, to meet regulatory requirements. However, the 
inspection strategy was formulated so that girders with the largest failure probability 
were classed in one group and inspected more frequently than others. Girder failure 
was modelled as a series system with three failure modes of bending, shear and bearing. 
The optimal inspection strategy with respect to costs was then determined for each 
girder group. The objective function measured the girder's expected lifetime cost and 
included the inspection, repair and failure costs. The inspection interval was optimised, 
constrained by the minimum reliability index, to minimise the total expected cost. 
Reliability analysis of bridges and their components was developed in [61,62,63] for 
repair selection within a network. The method was based on inspection methods and 
inventory database information. A function related the condition state to a reliability 
index using a normal distribution. The function was found either from subjective 
estimates or by applying First Order Reliability Methods (FORM) [104]. Bridge 
elements were combined in series to model the bridge behaviour. In [61,62], Markov 
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chains were applied to current condition ratings to obtain probability distributions for 
element conditions for each year in the planning horizon. This was developed further in 
[63] so that the condition of one component affected the deterioration rate of another via 
a transition matrix. Bayesian updating was introduced to update the transition matrices 
based on inspection results. However, constructing Markovian transition matrices to 
predict deterioration based on historical data is complex and time consuming. 
The risk analysis model developed in [62] measured bridge failure consequences in 
terms of the detour costs from bridge closure. Other costs, such as expected injuries and 
fatalities, social and political impacts and the costs of bridge repair were not considered. 
A range of optimisation algorithms is discussed in [62], including mathematical 
programming, search strategies (inappropriate for large problems) and near-optimum 
solutions (such as genetic algorithms). Under certain conditions, genetic algorithms can 
achieve optimum solutions, but the near optimum is considered sufficient, as so much of 
the problem is uncertain. The use of genetic algorithms for risk-optimised selection of 
bridge repair work is described further in [63]. 
Another system reliability approach to optimising bridge inspection and repair, in [64], 
provides a more efficient use of financial resources by ensuring an acceptable level of 
safety at minimum expected cost. Limit state equations were developed and the 
reliability of each component was computed separately. The reliability of the bridge 
system was modelled decreasing over time based on increasing live load and corrosion. 
A minimum allowable system reliability was established as 2.0. Several repair options 
including "do nothing", and their costs were established. A discount rate was assumed. 
All possible repair strategies based on combined repair options and their discounted 
costs were evaluated for different remaining lives, evaluating the cost optimum strategy. 
4.4.5 Decision-making in the Management of Offshore Structures 
Experienced engineers have historically made decisions concerning the inspection,, 
repair and maintenance (IRM) of offshore platforms applying judgement supported by, 
deterministic code assessments. However, the ageing population of offshore platforms 
has prompted more attention to the problem. For example, in 1993, the American' 
Petroleum Institute produced new guidelines to specifically address the reassessment 
requirements of ageing platforms [65]. This reassessment recognised that existing new 
design codes allow a probability of failure greater than zero, which should be the same: 
in a reassessment. However, design codes do not always explicitly address risk, but 
implicitly account for them through design practices such as safety factors, based on 
experience or on target reliabilities. However, the benefit of accounting for risk in 
terms of the failure likelihood and consequences was recognised in the management of 
existing structures, [66]. Structural reliability analysis has been adopted as the main 
approach to account for uncertainties and evaluate the failure likelihood. 
Fatigue and fracture is the principal failure mode in many structural and mechanical 
systems. However, since fatigue design factors are very uncertain, reliability methods 
are useful for design decisions [67]. Periodic inspections and repair or replacement can 
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improve system reliability. This however, can be expensive. The goal of the design 
process is therefore, to specify a design, inspection and repair strategy to minimise life 
cycle costs. This paper presented a method for analysing the fatigue reliability and 
maintainability for a structural system, providing supporting information for an 
economic analysis to design inspection strategies for minimum life-cycle costs. The 
inspection process was defined by the probability of detection associated with the given 
inspection type, the number and spacing of inspections, and the quality of the joint after 
repair. Monte Carlo Simulation was used to accommodate the complex crack growth 
and fracture processes into the formulation. The method easily accounts for many 
possible options with respect to inspection and repairs in a manner flexible enough to 
address many probability questions concerning fatigue, quickly and easily. 
Monte Carlo Simulation was also adopted in a detailed probabilistic fracture mechanics 
model in [68]. This model's results were used to optimise an in-service inspection 
schedule. Trade-offs between the reduction in the probability of failure due to 
inspection and repair of detected defects, against the cost of inspection were considered. 
Therefore, a Monte Carlo Simulation based fracture mechanics model evaluated the 
"probability of repair and failure". The costs of each candidate inspection schedule 
were evaluated with a decision tree. Scenario probabilities were then calculated as a 
product of all probabilities leading to that scenario and the expected cost for each 
inspection schedule. The least costly inspection schedule would then be selected. 
Reliability analysis of crack growth and inspection effects on reliability updating of 
crack growth and optimal inspection planning is described in [69]. Leak and fracture 
failure criteria were considered, corresponding to the serviceability and ultimate limit 
state respectively. The reliability of non-destructive inspection techniques with respect 
to no crack detection, crack detection and crack size measurement were evaluated. 
Methods for reliability model updating from successive inspection events were also 
developed. Finally, inspection strategies were explored to improve design life 
reliability. 
The problem of defining the optimal inspection time based on cost minimisation is 
considered in [70]. It suggests that an inspection's effect cannot be quantified 
immediately after an inspection but at a later assessment time. Therefore, defining the 
optimum inspection time should be based on the optimum ratio of inspection time to 
assessment time. The paper considers four main costs in the optimisation process: cost 
of component failure, inspection, downtime due to inspection, and repair or 
replacement. Therefore, the optimal inspection time minimises the total expected cost. 
One of the main contributors to the use of risk-based decision methods in the 
management of offshore structures was the CEC funded "Thermie" project [71]. This 
project developed a knowledge based system incorporating reliability inspection 
planning methods called "RISC - Reliability based Inspection SCheduling for fixed 
offshore platforms". The RISC programme pulled together fatigue and fracture 
mechanics growth modelling techniques, advanced structural reliability methods, 
material, stress concentration factor and sample inspection reliability databases and 
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scheduling algorithms incorporating resource constraints [72]. This whole system was 
controlled by a knowledge-based system to provide a rational and workable set of IMR 
schedules for each structure. The optimal inspection and maintenance plan was based 
on minimising the expected total costs for maintaining the structure throughout its 
anticipated lifetime [73]. This allowed different maintenance plans to be compared, 
constraints to be enforced and hence a rational plan to be chosen. The inspection 
reliability, in terms of crack detection and sizing was evaluated by modelling different 
inspection method qualities by assigning different crack detection probabilities. 
A ranking algorithm that quantified a number of weighted selection factors reduced the 
number of joints requiring detailed consideration. The weights determined by the 
operator include legal and safety requirements; joint criticality and location; ratio of past 
life to predicted fatigue life and earlier inspection results. Thresholds were set for 
certain criteria based on acceptance limits. Structural reliability techniques were used to 
evaluate failure of the main joints according to two main failure criteria, accumulated 
damage and fracture failure [74]. 
IMREL [75] is a similar program for Inspection and Maintenance planning of fixed 
offshore structures using RELiability based methods. IMREL assumes a particular 
inspection and repair scheme and calculates the associated cost function, for a set of 
plans within the scheme. The decision-maker has to check that the reliability of the 
particular joint is acceptable and then chooses the plan with the smallest cost function 
value. A minimum acceptable reliability index of 3.0 was selected. 
A thorough formulation of reliability-based optimisation in structural engineering based 
on classical decision theory is presented in [76]. The main focus is on reliability based 
optimal design of structural systems with component or systems reliability constraints. 
Adaptations of the model are also presented for reliability based optimal inspection 
planning and reliability based experiment planning. Solution strategies are found by 
applying first order non-linear optimisation algorithms but considering sensitivity 
analysis and optimisation stability. For reliability based optimal inspection planning, 
the optimisation was formulated in terms of the expected cost of inspection, repairs and 
failure. The optimisation was constrained by the changing reliability index over time, 
remaining greater than a specified minimum reliability index. However, the authors 
proposed that the constraint on minimum reliability is already incorporated into the 
objective function through the expected cost of failure. 
Reference [77] proposed simplifying this model, to make it more practical for use. 
First, only the time and quality of the next inspection could be optimised. Secondly, the 
inspection planning could be based on reliability considerations alone. Thirdly, the 
decision tree branches could be evaluated in terms of probabilities for no repair events 
for high reliability situations, due to the very few repairs that would be expected. 
The decision-making methods developed and adopted in structural engineering have 
been progressed in different areas to begin to account for the results of structural 
reliability calculations and probabilistic degradation models. Developments to 
incorporate multiple criteria into the decisions have, however, been very limited. 
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4.4.6 Decision-making In Pipeline Engineering 
To date, very little research and development has been carried out in risk-based 
decision-making for the management of pipelines (onshore and offshore). The 
following summarises the limited work that has been achieved. Two main categories of 
risk-based pipeline management techniques have been developed over the last ten years, 
qualitative index based systems and quantitative risk analysis based systems. 
The qualitative risk index systems such as those presented in [78,79] assign subjective 
scores to the factors thought to influence the failure probability and consequences. The 
scores are then combined to give a risk index, which provide relative rankings, but do 
not indicate the risk acceptability. Therefore, there is no guidance regarding the 
necessity of risk reduction measures. The risk indexes are also based on a number of 
subjective evaluations, which introduce inaccuracies and inconsistencies. 
The quantitative risk analysis approaches, such as those presented in [80,81,82], 
estimate the level of risk based on direct estimates of failure probability and 
consequences. However, these papers consider single consequences such as risk to 
human life and economic risk. They do not consider environmental damage or multiple 
consequences together. Furthermore, the failure probability estimates tend to be based 
on historical data only. This is a problem due to the rarity of pipeline failures. In 
addition, the effect of maintenance on failure probability tends to be subjectively 
accounted for, rather than through quantified historical inspection results. 
A combined method using both qualitative and quantitative risk assessment techniques 
was presented in [83] for prioritising pipeline inspection, maintenance and repair. This 
method provides a more detailed assessment than the relative risk scores described 
above. This allows clear actions to be defined. The scheme prioritises inspection, 
maintenance and repair using available information and provides data on the most likely 
damage a line will suffer and the possible extent of the failure consequences. This can 
then be used to investigate the most appropriate action to reduce the failure risk. 
One paper that aimed to address the issues of combining different failure consequences 
into one measure and modelling the effect of maintenance actions is reference [84]. The 
risk-based decision framework proposed was based on [23] using influence diagrams to 
solve the decision problems. Three decision criteria were identified as cost of failure, 
number of fatalities due to failure and the residual spill volume after clean up. The 
paper recommends initially evaluating the best solution using a cost optimisation 
routine constrained by life safety and environmental damage, optimising on the option 
with the least expected cost. This removes the need for assessing trade-offs between 
cost and safety. However, the result obtained may not be overall optimal from the 
operator's point of view, especially for existing pipelines, as it may force the operator 
into an expensive solution in order to meet the recognised safety criteria. In these cases, 
the paper recommends defining a utility function to ; explicitly quantify the trade-offs between cost, safety and environmental damage. The optimal solution is then the one 
that maximises the expected utility. The limitation for this model is the potential 
reluctance of decision-makers to address these trade-off issues directly. 
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The decision-making methods developed and adopted in the pipeline industry have 
begun to draw on some of the methods described previously, however, experience in 
their application and hence their refinement and applicability can still be improved. 
4.4.7 Summary of key points 
This overview of decision analysis applications has reviewed the methods adopted in six 
different industries to support risk-based decisions. The industries that have been 
investigated are military, aviation, power plants, bridges, offshore structures and 
pipelines. This overview has briefly described the key principles of the decision 
methods that have been adopted in the different fields. The limitations and strengths of 
each method have been discussed. This overview has shown a range of methods and 
models available to support decision-making. Each method could be useful and helpful 
to the decision-maker in the right context. For example: 
" Military decision-making methods are useful in qualitative, high level decisions or 
in those involving significant stakeholder conflicts such as in conceptual design. 
" Methods used in the aviation industry are useful for optimising planned maintenance 
in terms of cost and safety such as developing inspection /maintenance strategies at 
the design stage, when minimal data is available, but the solution can be optimised. °; 
" Plant maintenance decision methods are useful for planning maintenance based on 
historical reliability and deterioration estimates. These help to update inspection, 
maintenance and repair strategies with new inspection and analysis results. 
" Decision methods used in the management of bridges and offshore structures are 
useful for incorporating structural reliability and deterioration model results and 
begin to address multiple criteria issues. These could also help update inspection, 
maintenance and repair strategies with new inspection and analysis results. 
" The methods developed in pipeline engineering have begun to draw on some of the 
above principles; however, they have only been applied to very limited problems. 
A number of systematic decision processes were presented in this overview similar to 
the one suggested by Keeney and Raiffa [23], discussed in Section 4.3. Table 3 shows a 
comparison between each process. This table therefore indicates the rationality of 
adopting Keeney and Raiffa's process as the basis for the proposed risk-based decision 
process and the thoroughness of the modified proposed risk-based decision process. 
c 
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Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
However, it is not possible to identify any particular approach described in the above 
overview as suitable to support all risk-based decision-making in the management of 
structural assets. There are obviously limitations in the availability and flexibility of 
methods so far adopted in industry. It is therefore necessary to take the research back to 
the basics of decision analysis and review the range of methods developed in the 
decision sciences and operations research. 
4.5 A Review of Available Risk-based Decision Theories 
The aim of this section is to take the research back to the basics of decision analysis. 
The range of decision methods developed within the decision sciences and operations 
research are reviewed to identify models that can support decision-making at each stage 
of the proposed decision process. Therefore, the proposed decision process, presented 
in Figure 4, has been used as a basis for the following review. 
4.5.1 Problem Definition 
The very first step in any decision analysis is to define the problem to be solved. This 
includes identifying the decision problem and defining the decision criteria, alternatives 
and objectives. Then, the key decision-making group must be identified, as must all 
other stakeholders, as these will affect the decision criteria, alternatives and objectives. 
4.5.1.1 Identify problem or opportunity 
-i ne aecision-malung process starts with an individual noticing either 
11 that something is amiss or that a likely decision opportunity exists in 
the organisational environment. This may not always be based on 
s evidence, but sometimes on intuition [85]. This awareness may not °' °b result in immediate action but in a time of reflection, possibly 
° involving minor activity to make the problem go away. Following o_ 
reflection, or evidence accumulation, the decision-maker becomes 
-; Z-- convinced of the need to make a decision. Decision identification is 
the central "node" shown in the entity diagram in Figure 1. Common 
sense suggests that the first task in evaluating a decision problem is to 
determine what the problem is. However, defining the problem is more complex, 
especially if it requires multi-disciplinary inputs or conflict resolution. 
It does not take much insight to sense the waste, inefficiency and possibilities of 
significant failure for the decision-maker if a careful and deliberate inquiry into the 
problem is omitted. Therefore, the decision-maker should initially seek to identify and 
understand the basic need that the decision is to fulfil. This should be done from all 
relevant viewpoints, which may identify different perceptions of the true problem. The 
definition of the problem would then have to be evolved through a series of discussions 
with the other decision-makers until a clearly defined problem can be presented. 
Examples of situations giving rise to the need for decision analysis could include: 
"A problem to prioritise projects for funding due to insufficient funds for all needs. 
" An opportunity to invest surplus funds at a good return, due to excess profits. 
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Example problems covered by this research, from structural asset management, include: 
" Selecting the best inspection, maintenance, or repair strategy for a structure. 
" Prioritising components for inspection, maintenance or repair to optimise fund usage. 
If the problem or opportunity is not clearly identified at this stage then confusion can 
occur later in the decision analysis process when further details are defined. These 
problems could be further magnified if more than one decision-maker is involved. 







Keeney and Raiffa [23] briefly mentioned the possibility of more than 
one decision maker being considered, or of other stakeholders having 
an interest in and an influence over the decision process. However, 
they ignored this problem, to keep the theories simple. Von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards [86] also explicitly ignored the problem. 
However, it is now understood that this is a significant part of the 
decision process as shown in Figure 1. If this is not addressed, 
significant problems could be encountered later on in the decision. 
There are in fact very few decisions that can be reached by a single 
decision-maker with total disregard for others' views. Even where the 
formal procedures of an organisation dictate that an individual has responsibility for 
making the decision, the views of interested parties usually need to be sought. On a 
formal level, a committee can be formed consisting of representatives from the 
organisation who are expected to represent departmental interests as well as 
contributing their own views. Committees may still, however be influenced by other 
external parties (or stakeholders) who would also need to be consulted. This results in 
all members of the decision body (whether a committee or a set of independent 
advisors) having different degrees of influence in the decision. 
It is through the decision body that the organisation's objectives are interpreted and 
translated into evaluation criteria. This means that the decision stakeholders not only 
make the choice itself but can also control the options and information considered. The 
overall objective of accounting for all stakeholders in a decision situation is to obtain 
consensus and ownership. When identifying the stakeholders, there can be a tendency 
to concentrate on an organisation's formal structure. It is, however, necessary to 
identify informal stakeholder groups and to assess their importance. For internal 
stakeholders, the indicators for power are derived from the level of the person in the 
company hierarchy, the recognition of individual leadership skills, the degree of control 
of strategic resources and the amount of relevant specialist knowledge. For those 
outside the organisation, the key indicators are the degree of dependence of the 
organisation on external resources, the involvement of the external parties in 
implementation and the amount of relevant specialist knowledge. Some examples of 
the decision-makers and stakeholders to be considered in our example problem have 
already been discussed in Section 3.3.1. Not all people with an interest in the decision- 
making process are experts with respect to all aspects of the problem situation. Group 
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decision techniques can, therefore, be adopted to allow the expertise, preferences and 
relative importance of each stakeholder to be accounted for. The different group 
consensus methods can be broadly grouped into sharing, aggregating and comparing 
methods [87] and involve negotiation, joint scoring systems and voting techniques. 
Each method could be appropriate in different situations depending on the stakeholders' 
strength of feelings and their relative power. 
4.5.1.3 Identify viable alternatives 
The decision alternatives are the various courses of action between 
which the decision group must choose. Unless there is more than one 
way to proceed, there is no choice and therefore no decision. The 
° whole purpose of decision analysis is to select the best alternative from Ea 6b 
the set of available alternatives. Frequently, decision analysis literature 
° has assumed that the available alternatives are provided for the 
decision-maker to choose between, or are at least easy to find. 
;Z However, it is common for problems in decision-making to stem from 
a failure to produce sufficient feasible alternatives. De Bono [88] 
13 stated that there is a need to shift the emphasis in decision analysis 
from deciding between the alternatives to the generating of alternatives. I believe that 
there needs to be a good balance between the two as the following discussion illustrates. 
Decision problems can be classed as two main types, as follows: 
" The evaluation problem, is concerned with selecting the best alternative from a set of 
discretely defined alternatives. This is "Multiple Attribute Decision-making" and is 
usually solved by some form of ranking method. 
" The design problem, is concerned with identifying the preferred alternative from a 
potentially infinite set of alternatives defined by a set of constraints. This is 
"Multiple Objective Decision-making" and is usually solved by mathematical 
programming. However, as stated initially, this review is concerned only with 
decisions involving a finite number of alternatives. This form of decision problem 
will not be explored further here; for completeness, a brief summary of the 
differences is presented in Appendix 1. 
In some decisions, the alternatives are obvious when the decision problem is defined. 
However, in other decisions, the available alternatives are not immediately apparent. In 
this case, for the evaluation problem, it is not always straightforward to generate them. 
Gardiner [89] identified the potential decision situation where the number of 
alternatives available for potential consideration is virtually unlimited and the number 
currently on hand for evaluation and decision-making is comparatively small. He posed 
the question: "At what point do we stop looking for additional alternatives and make a 
decision based on what we know so far? " This is because the alternatives on hand 
cannot be compared to those still undiscovered. This problem will strongly influence 
how seriously the final selection is taken. Gardiner proposed a method to overcome this 
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complete Decision Space of all possible outcomes. This was superimposed on to the 
values of utility calculated for the known options to show how the known options score 
against all possible options. 
However, the problem with this method is that some of the possible alternatives that 
could be produced in the decision space may not be feasible. This could result in 
generating too many alternatives to handle and it may prove difficult to avoid or 
recognise those that are infeasible. This could give a biased view of the alternatives that 
are known, causing excessive resources to be spent generating more alternatives to 
produce a more balanced decision space. 
Other techniques for generating alternatives include attribute listing, brainstorming and 
focused object linking [85]. 
Attribute listing is an analytical technique similar to the approach proposed by Gardiner, 
described above. The major decision attributes under consideration are identified, such 
as size, cost, shape, etc and then each attribute is altered in as many ways as possible. 
Each alteration creates a potentially different solution. This can result in a vast number 
of alternatives, which may then become difficult to handle. 
These solutions would then have to be screened for feasibility. Any decision that has to 
consider a large number of alternatives can mean that thorough evaluation of all 
alternatives is impossible in the available time. Screening narrows the range of 
alternatives again to a manageable number. The value of screening methods increases 
with ease of use or speed in eliminating alternatives, however a good screening method 
should also be reliable with respect to the alternatives that it keeps and those that it 
rejects. Any screening method, according to Walker [90] should possess two properties: 
no very good alternative should be removed and the number of alternatives remaining 
after screening should be relatively small. In addition, a screening process should 
remove alternatives that are infeasible, unacceptable or dominated by other alternatives. 
Brainstorming is probably the best known idea generation method and is classed as an 
association technique. Brainstorming sessions would optimally involve about 8 people 
and be controlled by very precise guidelines. These include aiming for as many ideas as 
possible, recording all ideas, building on other's ideas and banning all criticism and 
judgement. Without these, the session can become unstructured and biased. 
A derivative of brainstorming is "brainwriting" [91], where participants write their ideas 
on paper instead of contributing them to a communal list. The leader generates a 
separate list in advance, which is held the centre of the group. Any member that runs 
out of ideas exchanges his list with the central one and continues to generate ideas there. 
It is suggested that each participant is stimulated by ideas picked up from the central 
list. In addition, participants concentrate better without being distracted or influenced 
by other group members. However, this isolation could also limit lateral thinking. 
Focused Object Linking [85] is a forced relationship technique based on establishing 
relationships between normally unrelated ideas. This technique is particularly useful 
where new applications are sought for existing products, or new ideas for solving 
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existing problems. One idea is fixed, the other is either chosen randomly or from a pre- 
prepared list. Participants then try to find as many ways as possible to relate the fixed 
idea with the random one. Forcing these relationships can lead to many new ideas. 
Von Winterfeldt and Edwards [86] describe a method known as means-end analysis 
developed from artificial intelligence techniques by Pearl [92]. This method defines the 
problem as the difference between a desired goal state and the current state. Sub- 
problems are defined by the dimensions on which the current state falls short of the 
Goal State. The problem is then solved by dimension by sequentially inventing actions 
to reduce the difference between the current and the Goal State. This process is 
thorough, but may also become tedious if there are many alternative increments. 
Other "soft" operational research techniques such as Strategic Options Development 
and Analysis, Strategic Choice, Soft Systems Methodology, Robustness Analysis, 
Hypergames and Metagames can be used to help set down the alternatives (and criteria) 
for a particular problem [93,94,95]. Many different people's viewpoints can be 
accounted for by use of cognitive mapping, decision trees, influence diagrams, payoff 
matrices, scenarios, strategic mapping and metaphorical thinking, [96,24]. 
In the current example, a bridge has been assessed to have insufficient capacity to carry 
the current traffic load, should be strengthened to full capacity, repaired to maintain the 
current capacity but protected against further deterioration or left as it is with a load 
restriction enforced, to try to keep the loading below the assessed capacity. There 
would obviously be many more alternatives in the real situation that would consider 
different methods of repair and different repair dates. 
This is an evaluation type decision scenario, as there are a discrete number of possible 
repair and strengthening options available. The problem in identifying all of the "right" 
alternatives would usually rely on the experience of the bridge engineers involved, but 
brainstorming methods could introduce new alternatives not normally considered. 





The final part of defining the decision problem is identifying the 
criteria on which the decision is to be based. The decision criteria 
should be comprehensive and measurable representations of the 
decision-maker's objectives used to describe the different alternatives. 
They can be objective (e. g. considering the cost of repair and the risk 
of collapse resulting in death or injury) or subjective (considering 
environmental damage and disruption to traffic and local business). 
,z The formulation of decision objectives supports the decision process 
by forcing the decision group to think about the requirements for an 
acceptable solution and stimulating interest by providing a feeling of 
accomplishment. It also serves as a reference against which possible solutions can be 
measured and provides consensus on what is trying to be achieved. 
Keeney and Raiffa [23] put this stage much later on in the decision process as part of 
the utility/value analysis. However, in my view the decision criteria should be defined 
k. 
a 
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at this earlier stage as part of the problem definition, before the problem is formally 
structured. The objectives are likely to influence the structuring process. 
In an evaluation problem, the decision alternatives are likely to be known, but the 
decision criteria made may not be clearly defined. In this case, a "bottom-up" approach 
can be adopted to determine the decision criteria [7]. A number of different techniques 
can be used to analyse some of the alternatives, to compare them to see how they differ, 
or to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each alternative. These observations can 
then help formulate the set of important criteria on which the decision has to be made. 
If, however, the decision alternatives are not known, but the objectives are, then the 
criteria should be defined in order to achieve the decision objectives. 
Once the decision criteria have been established, it is important to identify minimum 
standards on any of the criteria, which will act as constraints on any of the alternatives. 
The criteria that could be considered for the bridge management example are cost, 
fatalities, injuries, traffic delays, social impacts, environmental effects and political 
impacts. The decision objectives would be formulated based on these criteria. The 
decision objectives in this case are to minimise all of the criteria. The limits within 
which these objectives can be attained are defined by the constraints. The situation may 
arise where the decision alternatives, criteria and objectives are different for different 
interested parties (stakeholders) in the decision process. These could include the 
Highways Agency, the borough council, the local community, businesses and 
environmental pressure groups. 
Before moving on to the next stage of the decision process a number of checks should 
be made to ensure that the objectives have been clearly defined. They should also be 
consistent and agreed by all members of the decision group. This allows the decision 
group to understand what is being achieved. Objectives should also be "sensible" [85], 
such that they are needed, practically achievable, relevant to the overall organisation 
objectives and measurable so that their achievement can be known. This is similar, but 
more subjective, to the "clarity check" proposed by Howard [97]. This concept was 
introduced to ensure that all stakeholders in the decision process have achieved clear 
definitions of the decision events and variables, before decision analysis starts. The 
clarity check considers the future and assumes access to all information concerning the 
future. The clarity check then asks whether it would be possible to say if the event in £ question (e. g. failure of a certain bridge component) had occurred. This means that if 
the problem is defined to such detail that specific numbers can be applied to the 
decision attributes, then the problem has sufficient clarity. This removes any vagueness 
in the decision criteria and alternatives and ensures that all stakeholders understand the 
common and distinct value perceptions held by each other. 
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In many decisions, it is necessary to break the main decision into 
smaller parts. Depending on the decision problem this can mean 
subdividing the decision on different bases, depending on which most 
helps to solve the problem. There could be a series of decisions to be 
made over time, where each sub-decision requires a follow-up action: 
Alternatively, the selection of one alternative could open up a whole 
series of other alternatives or events. A decision matrix, a decision tree 
or an influence diagram can be used to represent these scenarios. 
A decision (or outcome) matrix models straightforward decisions under 
uncertainty in a way that makes the options and the possible uncertain 
outcomes explicit to the decision maker. The matrix also defines a simple decision rule 
to choose between the alternatives. This method is limited to one off decisions and 
cannot take account of the sequential nature of decision-making. 
The decision tree format, in contrast, represents sequential decisions and traces back the 
consequences of future decisions to assess their influence on the present decision. In a 
decision tree, the alternatives and events are represented by the branches of a horizontal 
tree [98]. Figure 5 shows the decision tree for the example problem. It considers a' 
bridge that is below the required strength where a decision has to be made between 
replacing the bridge with one of sufficient strength, allowing over loaded vehicles onto 
the existing bridge or limiting the bridge to its assessed capacity. 
Although decision trees are most useful for tackling complex, sequential problems, they 
can also be useful for structuring simple ones. The decision tree shows the possible : 
sequence of events with a notional time scale going from left to right. Earlier events 
and decisions are shown on the left with later ones shown on the right. 
An influence diagram provides a simpler graphical representation of a decision problem. 
The decision problem elements (the choice to be made, uncertain events and the value 
of outcomes) are shown as different shapes. These shapes are then linked with arrows 
to show the relationships among the elements [24]. The same example problem as 
before is presented in the form of an influence diagram in Figure 6. 
Influence diagrams are very useful for the structuring phase of problem solving for large 
or complex problems. Decision trees show more of the detail of the problem but can 
become complex and out of hand [99]. Whichever method of representation is selected 
should not affect the ultimate decision, as both are interchangeable. 
The structuring stage can also be used to define the decision criteria in more detail. For 
example, the Analytic Hierarchy process [100] helps the decision-maker arrange criteria 
into a hierarchy with the lowest criteria as measures for the criteria in the level above. 
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Figure 5: Example Decision Tree 
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Figure 6: Influence Diagram of Example Problem 
The structuring process, especially with influence diagrams, supports the decision- 
maker in identifying all possible alternatives and outcomes, and to see all the decision 
paths open to him. To the non-specialist it allows the structure of the risk scenarios to 
become divorced from the often-confusing mathematical technicalities. If the decision 
is relatively straight forward, the decision tree or influence diagram can also be used to 
help solve the problem [24]. The values associated with each possible outcome and the 
probability of each possible outcome can be added to the structure. The "expected 
value" of each decision can then be calculated and based on this the best decision can be 
chosen. If, however, the decision is very complex (e. g. involving multiple criteria) then 
it may be too complicated to solve with the use of a decision tree or influence diagrarn 
alone and multi criteria decision analysis methods will have to be adopted. Even so, the 
structuring process is still very useful in formulating the problem. 
A number of computer programs have been developed to aid decision-makers in 
structuring decision problems. These guide the decision maker in formulating the 
problem. Several of the most common tools are discussed in Section 4.6. 











Since uncertainty is such a critical element of many decisions it is 
necessary to consider this in the decision modelling process. 
Uncertainty analyis ' is one of the most difficult stages of the decision 
process. The differing degrees of certainty under which decisions have 
to be made are classified into the following four main conditions [15]: 
1. Certainty: The situation when outcomes are certain plays a very 
small role in decision theory, since the decision criterion is so simple. 
However, certainty is a mathematical abstraction since real-life 
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decisions (even those characterised by a condition of certainty) involve uncertainty. 
For example, most people consider it a certainty that when a light switch is switched 
on, the light will come on. Of course, it is not 100% certain. 
2. Rational competition: The condition of rational competition occurs in "strategic 
decision-making situations" and implies that any decision strategy acceptable to a 
fully rational decision maker would be equally apparent and acceptable to his 
rational competitor. The decision alternative recommended by the decision maker 
reflects this assumption. This is the basis of Game Theory [101]. 
3. Risk: The decision maker makes his decision under the condition of risk if he is 
aware of the probabilities for the various states of nature resulting from the decision. 
When the condition of risk exists, each of the decision options can be interpreted as 
a gamble. However, it may be that the probabilities for these states of nature cannot 
be calculated objectively from the mathematical theory of probability. In these 
cases, the decision maker may have "subjective probabilities" for the various 
consequences. It is these uncertainties of the occurrence of an event or the 
consequence of an event that have traditionally been handled by risk analysis. 
4. Ignorance: The decision maker makes his decision under the condition of ignorance 
if he recognises the possibility of more than one consequence for a decision, but is 
ignorant of which consequence is likely to occur. 
Decision analysis literature makes very little mention of the formal handling of 
uncertainty. Traditionally simple subjective probabilities have been assigned to each of 
the chance nodes in the decision problem. The most detailed evaluation of uncertainties 
that is mentioned in the decision analysis literature is the risk assessment method 
originally described by Hertz [102], as follows: 
1. Choose the uncertain variables having significant bearing on the decision. 
2. For each variable, estimate the probability distribution most closely reflecting the 
decision maker's degree of belief of the likelihood of the variable taking any value. 
3. Choose the measure of outcome that will be used to evaluate the options. 
4. Determine the function that relates the uncertain variables to the measure of 
outcome. 
5. Randomly select a value from each distribution and combine them to determine a 
value for the measure of outcome. 
6. Repeat (5) many times until a distribution for the measure of outcome is formed. 
7. Repeat (1) to (6) for each option under consideration. 
This method, from the field of quantitative risk assessment, is a form of Monte Carlo 
Simulation, which will be described in more detail later. It rigorously accounts for 
uncertainty through the definition of subjective probabilities, an earlier criticism would 
have been the significant computation time required, however, this is no longer such a 
problem with current computer technology. 
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The literature concerning probability theory and structural reliability theory handles 
uncertainties more thoroughly, as described below (although subjective probabilities can 
still be used). 
The main decision objective is to minimise the risk of structural failure. The main 
definitions of risk were described in Section 3.3.3 where the proposed definition of risk 
to be adopted in this risk-based decision process is: 
Risk = Probability of failure x Consequence of failure 
The calculation of the probability of structural failure and the assessment of the 
magnitude of the consequences of failure includes the assessment and modelling of 
uncertainties. The uncertain parameters are, then modelled as random basic variables 
described using appropriate probability distributions. These uncertainties arise from the 
inherent variability of loads and material resistance parameters, uncertainties in the 
deterioration over time, uncertainties in the analysis models used for determining the 
load effects and capacities, and the uncertainties in measurement and inspection 
techniques. In view of these uncertainties, it is possible that a structural component, 
such as a bridge crossbeam, could fail from an adverse combination of extreme values 
of the variables. 
A codified design or assessment uses a number of partial safety factors to guard against 
extreme variations of the variables ensures the safety of a structural component [103]. 
Safety under a particular limit-state is checked using a design compliance equation of 
the form 
Fc " function 
f"` 
zy j3 
(effects oAy JD " QD +y JL " QL 
}) 
1k Equation 1 
Where, fk is the characteristic material strength, QD is the nominal dead load and QL is 
the nominal live load. The uncertainty in material parameters is accounted for through 
the material partial factor yk for each material type, and separate partial factors ym and 
ya are used to account for the uncertainties in dead load and live load, respectively. The 
uncertainty in the evaluation of load effects (analysis uncertainty) is accounted for 
through the partial factor ye. The reduction in the component capacity due to 
deterioration is accounted for either through the condition factor F, or by calculating the 
component capacity using the net cross-section allowing for deterioration. 
Structural reliability methods attempt to treat rationally the various sources of 
uncertainties involved in a design or assessment process. In a reliability analysis, the 
partial factors as in Equation 1 are not used. Instead, the uncertain parameters are- 
modelled using appropriate probability distribution functions and the probability of 
failure of the component is calculated. If the computed reliability is higher than the 
specified "target reliability", the component is considered to be acceptable. 
Three main types of uncertainty could be encountered in a decision problem [104]; 
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1. Physical Uncertainty: Due to the inaccuracies of manufacturing processes and the 
inherent variation of nature, there is inherent variability in physical quantities. These 
could include variability in dimensions, loads, and material properties. This 
variability can be described in terms of probability distributions but only after 
examining sample data (e. g. Counting traffic, measuring strengths, etc. ) However, 
because of the practical and economic limitations of taking measurements, 
uncertainty will remain, this is statistical uncertainty. 
2. Statistical Uncertainty: Statistical uncertainty arises from inferring probability 
distributions from sets of sample data. However, since very large samples are 
required to reliably estimate the parameters of a distribution, uncertainty remains. 
This uncertainty is reduced as the number of samples increase, but' is never 
completely removed. This therefore, is solely a result of lack of information. 
3. Model Uncertainty: Predictions of many different kinds make use of mathematical 
models that relate required output quantities to the available input quantities. These 
models may be based on intimate 'understanding of the physical relationships 
between the inputs and outputs, or they could be based on empirical data. Either 
way, they will be based on some level of simplifying assumptions and so uncertainty 
will remain. These uncertainties can have a significant effect on reliability. 
The reliability analysis approach is closely linked to the "limit-state" concept. For each 
limit-state (or failure mode) of a structural component (e. g. bridge crossbeam), a 
separate reliability analysis is carried out to evaluate the probability that this limit-state 
will not be reached. For the calculation of the probability of failure, it is necessary to 
define failure modes for the structure in question. For example, a reinforced concrete 
bridge crossbeam could have failure modes for bending, shear and loss of bond 
capacity. Appropriate loading and resistance models have to be developed for each 
failure mode and each uncertain variable within these models has to be modelled as a 
random variable. The probability distributions associated with each random variable 
should be based on as large a sample set of data as possible. For some variables, this 
will not be possible, so subjective probability distributions have to be defined based on 
similar data and experience. 
The results of the separate reliability analyses can be combined, if necessary, to 
calculate the overall reliability of the component. In analogy with the design 
compliance equation, the "safety margin equation" used in reliability analysis can be 
expressed as 
Z= function fk 1, g, d) " BR - effects of 
(Qo + QýL + QL )) " BQ Equation 2 
and the probability of failure is calculated as 
pp = Probability[Z S 0] Equation 3 
Where, Z is the "safety margin" and pf is the probability of failure. The resistance of 
the component is evaluated as a function of the uncertain material parameters fk, 
geometrical parameters g, and deterioration parameters d, which are considered as 
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random "basic variables" and described using appropriate probability distributions. On 
the loading side, the dead load QD, the super-imposed dead load QSDL, and the live load 
QL are treated as random variables. In addition, the variables BR and BQ are introduced 
to model, respectively, the uncertainty in the capacity calculations and in the analysis 
method used for calculating the load effects. 
The probability of failure as expressed in Equation 3 can in principle be calculated using 
any one of the three methods: Numerical integration, Monte-Carlo simulation and 
FORM/SORM methods. 
Direct numerical integration is only feasible if there are less than around five basic 
variables. The Monte-Carlo method becomes computationally expensive if the failure 
probabilities are very small, which is typical of bridge components. In recent years a 
number of techniques such as "importance sampling", "directional simulation", etc. 
have been developed to improve the efficiency of the simulation method. The third 
category of methods are approximate analytical methods designed to compute the 
failure probability very efficiently, and have become the most widely used methods in 
recent years. In a First Order Reliability Method (FORM) a linear approximation to the 
actual non-linear limit-state function is used, while in a Second Order Reliability 
Method (SORM), a quadratic approximation is used [104,105]. Commercial structural 
reliability software, such as STRUREL [106] is available to support this. 
The probability of failure (for each failure mode) is calculated for each alternative in the 
decision tree, so takes into account the loading reduction, the resistance increase or the 
continued structural deterioration. The exact effect of these measures is unknown, so 
these uncertainties are also included. The analysis gives the probability of failure pf and 
the "reliability index" ß, related to pfthrough, 
p, = (D(-ß) Equation 4 
Where (D(. ) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable. 
A reliability analysis also provides "sensitivity factors" which express the relative 
importance of each basic random variable's uncertainty to the computed probability of, _ failure of the component. In addition, the gradients of the reliability index with respect - to the mean value aß/öµ; and the standard deviation 8ß/c3aj for each random variable X1, 
can also be calculated. These gradients are normalised by the reliability index and are 
often termed as "elasticities" of the mean and the standard deviation. The analysis gives 
the "most-likely" combination of variable values that would cause component failure. 
To evaluate the failure consequence magnitudes, the different consequences must be 
identified. The most common consequences considered are financial, injury, fatalities 
and environmental consequences. However, others may be accounted for 
subconsciously including social, political and commercial consequences. It is very difficult to predict the magnitude of these consequences and to identify a useful scale to 
measure each consequence against. 
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Traditionally, each consequence is converted to a financial scale, which causes 
problems when trying to put a value to a life, the environment, society, etc. Multi- 
criteria decision analysis means that all these consequences do not have to be converted 
to a common scale, but can be assessed in their natural units. Uncertainties can then be 
accounted for by describing each consequence as a probability distribution in these 
terms. The distributions can either be derived from historical data or, if this is 
unavailable, then subjectively based on "expert" opinion. 
A distribution representing the structural failure risk for each consequence can then be 
derived. These individual risk values can be represented on each branch of the decision 
tree [107] but they should not be combined into an overall risk at this stage, until after 
the utility/value analysis has been carried out. If such a detailed assessment is not 
required, or an initial view of the problem is required before detailed analysis, then a 
simplified risk scoring system can be used similar to that described in [108]. 







Once the decision problem has been formulated, it is necessary to 
evaluate each alternative in the light of the decision criteria, so that the 
"best" alternative can be chosen. 
There are two types of preferences to be considered in the decision 
analysis, one is the decision-makers' preference between the decision 
criteria, i. e. is cost more significant than safety? Ordering or weighting 
the decision criteria can handle this type of preference. Therefore, this 
type of preference is called weighting. 
13 I The other type of preference concerns the decision maker's tolerance to 
the decision consequences. Traditionally, this is defined using the concepts of value or 
utility. Utility is the preference between a sure consequence and a gamble [86] (e. g. 
how much the decision-maker is prepared to sell a gamble for). This accounts for the 
degree of risk aversion of the decision-maker. Value is the preference for gain or loss 
of a sure amount compared with a different sure amount [86] (e. g. how much worse is a 
cost of £lm than Elk, and the relationship to the decision maker's value of money and 
the direct value of money). The standard argument states that the procedures used to 
develop a value function will not lead to the same utility function, although the evidence 
in the argument is scarce [86]. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards argue, however, that the 
distinction between the two types of preference function is spurious because nothing is 
certain, so a value function for a certainty is really for a low risk gamble [86]. Risk 
aversion can be easily accounted for in utility functions and by marginally decreasing 
value functions. Finally, error and method variances within value and utility 
measurement procedures tend to overshadow the subtle theoretical differences. 
I believe that the last point is the most significant in this matter and that a value/utility 
function can be created for each measure accounting for the level of uncertainty in that 
measure. Therefore, from now on the term utility will represent what has formerly been 
known as value and utility. 
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The two types of preferences: utility and weighting are inter-linked and techniques for 
modelling both of these types of preferences are discussed below. There are two 
distinct types of approach for the evaluation problem: aggregate value function 
approaches and outranking approaches [7]. 
Aggregate Value Function Approaches 
Aggregate value functions have been largely developed and applied in the USA and 
cover four main forms of approach: 
9 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
This complex technique attempts to jointly model the preferences between the decision 
criteria and the preferences between the consequences. Preference structures are 
elicited from the decision maker by comparing pairs of preferentially independent 
attributes assuming the other attributes are fixed. Detailed questioning derives a 
relationship for each pair of attributes, to show how much of one attribute the decision 
maker will give up for a certain amount of the second attribute at different values of the 
first attribute. This method can derive very detailed relationships (utility functions) 
between attributes allowing the acceptability of risks to be compared. However, the 
questioning process required to arrive at these relationships is so demanding that many 
decision-makers have trouble answering the questions posed [23]. 
" Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique 
This technique is a simplified multi-attribute utility method. It derives multi-attribute 
utilities (reflecting the "attractiveness" of an attribute's gain or loss) for the decision 
criteria based on simple rating methods. The technique involves ten steps to identify the 
important criteria and then ranks and weights them. A scale of 1-100 is derived for each 
criterion for each possible outcome and each alternative is scored. Simple additive 
aggregation trade-offs between attributes calculate the total utility for each alternative. 
The alternative with the highest total utility is selected. This method is not theoretically 
elegant, but it is easily taught and derives values one criterion at a time [109]. 
" Inverse Preference Methods 
These methods apply preferences to a sample alternative and infer the preferences for 
the criteria from them. Holistic judgements are made about the value of the alternatives. 
The decision makers consider a number of alternatives described in terms of the 
selected criteria and indicate their preferences by assigning a score to the options. 
Mathematical programming is used to determine a weighted value function consistent 
with the decision maker's ordering. The function is shown to the decision maker, who 
can decide how appropriate it is. If necessary, the process can be iterated until a 
suitable value function is achieved. Examples of this method are PREFCALC by 
Lagreze and Shakun [110] and POLICY by Rohrbaugh and Wehr [111]. 
" Analytic Hierarchy Process 
This technique derives weights to reflect the relative importance of the different criteria, 
The criteria are arranged into a hierarchy so that the lowest level criteria are measures 
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for the next level criterion above. Pair-wise comparisons elicit individuals' preferences 
for each criterion in each level of the hierarchy. A scale from I (equally preferable) to 9 
(absolutely dominant) is used to indicate the strength of dominance of one criterion over 
another. This can be carried out in the form of a questionnaire. From these results, a 
pair-wise comparison matrix can be constructed. The ratio weights, summing to 1 are 
the normalised eigenvector based on the principal eigenvalue. A by-product of this 
calculation is a consistency index for the decision-maker's preferences [100]. 
At the end of the utility/value analysis, each consequence of each alternative should be 
converted to a common (utility) scale. The risk of each consequence should be 
accounted for as a probability distribution and then weighted according to the relative 
importance of each type of consequence (criteria). This should result in a table that 






1. Limit Load C1 = wxfx. i(Ui) S1 = w, xfü, (U, 1) I w; xfwl(U; l) RT1=C1+S1+I1 
2. Repair C2 = wcxfxc2(Uc2) S2 = w, xf, (U, 2) 12 = w; xfw2(U; 2) Rn=CZ+S2+I2 
3. Strengthen C3 = wcxfxc3(Uc3) S3 = w, xff, 3(U, 3) 13 = w; xfxi3(Uj3) R =C3+S3+I3 
Table 4: Calculating the weighted probability distribution for each criterion utility 
Where Uaj is the utility of criterion, a, for alternative i. 
fxa; is the combined probability distribution for alternative, i of the probability of 
failure and the probability of the consequence, a, given failure. 
wa is the derived preference weighting for criterion, a. 
RTi is the distribution representing the total risk for that alternative. 
Outranking Approaches 
The outranking methods, principally developed in France and Belgium, consider that in 
some situations, the decision maker will be unwilling or unable to compare some 
options. The output of these methods is not a value function for each alternative but an 
outranking graph indicating preferences, indifferences and incomparabilities. The two 
most dominant groups of outranking methods are ELECTRE IV developed by Roy 
[112,113] and PROMETHEE developed by Brans, Mareschal and Vincke [114]. 
" The ELECTRE N method 
Each pair of alternatives is initially compared to determine the strength of each 
outranking. Two groups are identified, those that are strongly outranked by any 
particular alternative and those that are weakly outranked by any alternative. Each 
alternative is then qualified by the number of alternatives that are outranked by that 
alternative minus the number of alternatives that outrank that alternative. The 
alternatives are then "distilled" by taking the highest qualifying alternative as number 
one, removing it and re-qualifying the remaining alternatives, then taking the next 
highest qualifying alternative out and re-qualifying again, and so on until a distilled 
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order is achieved. This can then give the final ranking. This time consuming -and 
complex process is not very attractive to many decision makers. 
" The PROMETHEE Method (Preference Ranking Organisation METHod for 
Enrichment Evaluations) 
This method includes two phases: constructing an outranking relationship for the 
decision space and exploiting the relation to maximise the decision criteria. Initially, a 
valued outranking relation based on each criterion is considered, a preference index is 
defined and a valued outranking graph, representing the preferences of the decision 
maker is obtained. The outranking relation is exploited by considering for each action a 
degree of preference over each other alternative for each criterion. A partial pre-order is 
obtained in PROMETHEE I, or a complete pre-order with PROMETHEE H. Then all 
possible actions can be proposed to the decision maker to resolve the decision problem. 
Brans, Vincke and Mareschal [114] carried out tests to identify the influence on 
rankings when small deviations are introduced in preference values, for both methods.. __ They showed that PROMETHEE is more stable than ELECTRE as small deviations do 
not affect the rankings while large deviations do. They also found that the evaluations' 
are less stable for extreme disagreement between criteria. 
Sometimes, the choice between using an Aggregate Value Function method or an 
Outranking method may be a small part of the overall analysis, at other times the issue 
can become more significant and be the focus of substantial discussion. The chosen 
method is likely to be selected due to the requirements and availability of input data 
rather than on the output information that is provided, as all methods give very similar 
results. The analysis rigour however, depends on the availability of input information 
and could therefore affect the decision maker's confidence in the results. 






Once the attributes have been scored and weighted, several methods are ; available to select the best alternative. In the analytic hierarchy process, 
once the weighted scores for each attribute have been determined, they, 
are summed for each alternative as shown in the final column of Table 4 
and the alternatives are then ranked according to their total weighted 
scores. The "best" option is the one with the highest score. 
'° Other methods are available, although they do not take a direct sum of 
the score but look at the scores for each attribute individually. One of the 
13 most common methods 
that makes use of informal preferences is the 
Expected Value Principle [115], this is a very simple view of risk and 
was criticised by Howard [116] who believed that expectation does not capture the way 
most people think about risk. He proposed that for most people it is the standard 
deviation that represents the risk, not the mean or expected value. It is true that the 
highest expected value is very often not the preferred option for many people as it can 
still represent a very high probability of a bad outcome despite a very low probability of 
a very good outcome. In addition, the consequence space is sometimes not continuous 
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and so the outcome will either be very good or very bad. However, expected value 
remains a concept that is straightforward to calculate and explain which can make it a 
very popular method in every day risk assessments. Another method of evaluating risk 
is to determine a certain equivalent of that risk, i. e. how much would be paid to be free 
from the given risk. This however, can be very difficult to quantify consistently and 
needs to be carried out for every risk considered. Other "informal" risk evaluation 
methods include: dominance theory [117]; the criterion of pessimism [118]; the 
criterion of least regret [119]; the criterion of rationality [120]; lexicographic ordering 
[121]; the Efficient Frontier (which originates from the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
[122]); the use of artificial constraints; and the use of variable, linear-weighted 
averages. These methods have been well documented in the early text on decision 
theory; so further description is not necessary here. 











Sensitivity Analysis answers "What matters in this decision? " 
Sensitivity analysis should be an integral part of the decision modelling 
process, however, no "optimal" sensitivity analysis method exists for 
decision analysis [24]. The flow chart in Figure 4 shows how sensitivity 
analysis can feed back information to different stages in the decision 
process, even to the problem identification. The question at this stage is 
"Are we solving the right problem? " The answer does not require 
quantification but in does require careful thought and protects against a 
decision treating a symptom rather than the cause. 
Sensitivity analysis can also be carried out in the context of the problem structuring; this 
could result in requiring a more complete set or a more detailed description of the 
possible outcomes. It could even mean the problem is represented in a different way. 
Sensitivity analysis can also help determine which variables are important and therefore 
which uncertainties would be best refined. Graphical techniques have been developed 
within decision analysis to help determine the relative importance of different variables. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis can be carried out to determine the diversity of decision 
makers' preferences, their effect on the consensus weightings and the sensitivity of the 
outcome to any conflicts. 
4.5.5.1 Tornado Diagrams 
These show how much an alternative's value varies with changes in a specific attribute 
[97]. Each alternative's attribute's mean value is assumed as the base value, and then 
each variable is evaluated between its minimum and maximum to determine how much 
that alternative's final decision value would change. Considering the example presented 
before, the effect of the loading, strength and injury probability uncertainty on the total 
cost, is considered in the context of the bridge restriction alternative. This example is 
shown in Figure 7 and shows that the cost is most sensitive to the bridge loading. 
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Figure 7: Example Tornado Diagram 
4.5.5.2 Two Way Sensitivity Analysis 
Tornado diagrams identify the effect of changing one variable at a time. We may want 
to consider, though, the impact of several variables at one time. The Two-way 
Sensitivity Graph is a graphical technique that considers the interaction of two 
variables. The same example problem is shown in Figure 8 and considers the cost 
sensitivity to loading and injuries [24]. The diagram shows a rectangular space 
representing all possible values that the two variables could take. A relationship is then 




Figure 8: Example Two Way Sensitivity Graph 
4.5.5.3 Strategy Regions 
A two-way sensitivity graph for two uncertain variables can show for a decision 
between two alternatives, the conditions of uncertainty when the expected value of 
alternative 1 is greater than that for alternative 2 [24]. An example is shown in Figure 
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9. This indicates when different strategies are optimal. This plot can provide guidance 
in determining how much effort is needed to model uncertainty in the decision problem 
when the decision-maker is uncertain of the probability of the two uncertain variables. 
However, for large numbers of uncertain variables and alternatives, the number of 
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Figure 9 Example of Strategy-Region Graph 
4.5.5.4 Alpha Value Sensitivity Analysis 
On a more detailed level, it is possible to evaluate the uncertainty relative importance of 
each input variable in the structural reliability calculation. First and Second Order 
reliability analysis methods inherently provide "sensitivity factors" which express the 
relative importance of each basic random variable's uncertainty to the computed 
component failure probability [105]. This allows the decision-maker to identify the 
benefit of obtaining additional data to refine the most important uncertain variables. 
4.5.5.5 Multi Dimensional Scaling 
Multi-dimensional scaling can be used to determine the individual decision maker's 
preference diversity, their effect on the consensus weightings and the sensitivity of the 
final outcome to any conflicts. A map is produced showing the relative positions of a 
number of attributes based on the distance between each attribute pair. Using each 
decision makers' weights produced from interviews, it is possible to calculate the total 
distance between any two decision-makers. A map can then show each decision 
makers' relative position. The consensus weights can also be added to the map to 
investigate the existence of a true consensus rather than a purely mathematical one. 
Finally, the decision makers can be grouped using cluster analysis to identify possible 
reasons behind any clustering. This ensures all decision makers were interviewed 
consistently. 
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4.5.6 Summary of the Review's Findings 
This overview has identified the key principles of decision analysis methods. It has 
described the decision analysis process from the identification of the decision problem 
through evaluation to the selection of the best alternative according to the decision 
maker's specified criteria and preferences. A wide range of available decision analysis 
methods has been described and their limitations and strengths have been discussed. 
It is clear from this review that many methods exist with the potential to support 
decisions within structural asset management. Based on this review, the following lists 
the recommended methods for use in decision-making for structural asset management. 
4.5.6.1 Identify problem or opportunity 
In structural asset management, someone other than the asset manager may notice either 
something amiss or a likely decision opportunity. The asset manager must initiate' a 
detailed inquiry into the problem from many different viewpoints to ensure it is clearly 
understood. If this is not fulfilled here, confusion can occur later, when further details 
are defined. This is further magnified if more than one decision-maker is involved. The 
problem definition would evolve best through discussions with the stakeholders until a 
clearly defined problem is presented. 
4.5.6.2 Identify Stakeholders in the decision 
The existence of multiple stakeholders has a significant influence on the decision- 
making process. The objective of accounting for all appropriate stakeholders in a 
decision is to obtain ownership and commitment to the decision implementation by all. 
Building group consensus in decision-making can be achieved through sharing, , 
aggregating and comparing methods, involving negotiation, joint scoring systems and 
voting techniques. Each method is appropriate in different situations depending on the 
strength of stakeholders' feelings. 
4.5.6.3 Identify viable alternatives 
Structural asset management decisions are usually evaluation type problems. 'T'his 
means that it is necessary to identify all of the alternatives available. Of the techniques 
available for generating alternatives, the simpler methods such as attribute listing and 
brainstorming are the most appropriate in these applications as they involve little 
methodology for a potentially high output. Interactive software to support brainstorming 
makes the process less tedious for the decision-makers involved. The complete set of 
alternatives can then be reduced to a manageable size by removing alternatives that are 
infeasible, unacceptable in terms of stakeholder perception, or clearly inferior. 
4.5.6.4 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
The decision criteria must be comprehensive and measurable representations of the 
decision-maker's objectives. They are used to describe the different alternatives. If the 
alternatives are known, then a "bottom-up" approach can be used to determine the 
decision criteria. The alternatives can be compared to identify their differences or their 
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weaknesses and strengths. These differences form the basis for developing decision 
criteria. It is important to identify minimum standards constraining the alternatives. 
4.5.6.5 Structural Analysis 
Decision matrices can model straightforward decisions under uncertainty although in 
structural asset management the decisions are unlikely to be this straightforward. 
Influence diagrams represent decision problems graphically and are particularly useful 
for the structuring phase of problem solving and for representing large or complex 
problems. Decision trees represent sequential decisions and allow the influence of 
future decision consequences to be traced back. Decision trees show more detail than 
influence diagrams and can, therefore, become too complex. 
4.5.6.6 Uncertainty and probabilistic analysis 
Hertz presented a form of Monte Carlo Simulation to rigorously account for uncertainty 
by defining subjective probabilities. Structural reliability methods aim to treat design 
and assessment uncertainties rationally. Probability distributions model the uncertain 
parameters to allow the component failure probability to be calculated. The component 
is acceptable if the computed reliability is higher than the specified target reliability. 
The individual reliability analysis results are then combined to calculate the total 
component reliability. 
The failure probability can be calculated using numerical integration, Monte-Carlo 
simulation or FORM/SORM methods. Monte-Carlo simulation is computationally 
expensive if the failure probability is very small, as is typical of many structural 
components. FORM/SORM analyses approximate to the non-linear limit-state function, 
to efficiently compute the failure probability, and are now the most widely used 
methods. If a higher level, less detailed view of the problem is required, simplified risk 
scoring system can be used. 
4.5.6.7 UtilityNalue Analysis 
There are two types of preferences to be considered in the decision analysis: utility and 
weighting. These are inter-linked and the most practical techniques for modelling both 
of these types of preferences are the Simple Multi-Attribute Rating Technique and the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process. These methods use simple comparisons to produce 
importance ratios to represent individual or consensus preferences between criteria. 
4.5.6.8 Selection of "best" alternative 
Several methods are available for selecting the best alternative based on scored and 
weighted attributes. In the analytic hierarchy process, the weighted attribute scores are 
summed for each alternative, which are then ranked according to their total weighted 
scores. The "best" option would be the one with the highest score. 
Other methods available consider the individual attribute scores rather than the direct 
sum of the score. One of the most common is the Expected Value Principle, which uses 
informal preferences and risk calculations clearly communicated to decision-makers. 
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4.5.6.9 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is an integral part of the decision process. It ensures that a decision 
does not treat a symptom rather than a cause. Sensitivity analysis of the problem 
structuring could identify a need to develop a more complete set, or detailed description, 
of possible outcomes. Sensitivity analysis can also help determine the important 
variables whose uncertainties would be best refined. Finally, sensitivity analysis can 
determine the diversity of individual decision makers' preferences, their effect on the 
consensus weightings and the sensitivity of the final outcome to any conflicts. 
4.5.6.10 Final Remarks 
This review has revealed significant opportunities for further work. For example, the 
development of utility functions is challenging when a detailed relationship between 
utility and each criterion is required. The prediction of failure consequences is also very 
difficult as actual failures are very rare and data is inevitably limited. The evaluation of 
distributions for each consequence utility is also very demanding. Further research is 
also needed to identify the best sensitivity analysis methods. At a higher level, 
interactions need to be developed between the separate theories to produce a holistic 
decision process to handle all the complexities and conflicts involved in structural asset 
management. 
These methods have been discussed in the context of bridge management decision 
problems that involve significant uncertainties and the broad variety of strong ' 
stakeholder opinions. Decision analysis is expected to offer a rational and auditable 
method for combining all factors and opinions to arrive at the best decision for all, 
parties. Work is still required to identify and apply the most appropriate decision tools f 
to each stage of the decision process for risk-based structural asset management 
decisions. 
In summary, the principal aims of decision analysis are to help decision-makers to 
explore the problem situation, to learn about their own and other's values and, 
judgements and to identify a preferred course of action. This process, when applied 
carefully, will lead to better considered, justifiable and explicable decisions. 
4.6 A Review of Decision Support Software 
Modem computer systems and databases have provided new opportunities in decision- 
making. The need for information access and processing is a critical part of the 
decision-making process. Tools have only recently become available that are able to 
cope with the volumes of data and complex analysis methods. A number of computer 
programs have therefore been developed to aid decision-makers in decision problem 
structuring, probability and value elicitation and sensitivity analysis. These aid the 
decision maker in the problem formulation and evaluation. The following discussion 
describes some of the most popular decision support tools, their capabilities and their 
limitations. 
EXPERT CHOICE was one of the first computer based decision tools to be developed 
and is a multi attribute decision support program based on Saaty's analytic hierarchy 
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process [100]. The structuring module provides a framework for collecting ideas (e. g. 
pros and cons of alternatives) and transforming them, by developing and organising 
criteria into an AHP model. This method is only suitable for conceptualising small 
problems and becomes cumbersome as the problems increase in size. The evaluation 
and choice module allows pair wise comparisons, solution synthesis, sensitivity analysis 
and report generation. In small problems, the criteria at each hierarchy level are pair 
wise compared, but this is impractical with larger problems. An alternative method is 
provided in which the alternatives are compared against a set of standards instead. This 
approach significantly reduces the number of comparisons that are required. The 
Inconsistency Ratio is calculated and recommendations for improved consistency are 
made, under user control. It is possible to enter quantitative criteria data directly (e. g. 
costs). Probabilities can also be input. Solution synthesis provides and graphically 
presents an overall score for each alternative. Sensitivity analysis uses several different 
graphical modes to consider the sensitivity to criteria priorities. 
CRITERIUM DECISION PLUS implements two approaches to multi attribute decision- 
making. It uses both Saaty's analytical hierarchy process [100] and Edwards' Simple 
Multi Attribute Rating Technique (SMART) [109]. The software helps the user 
understand multi-criteria analysis and the effect of outcome uncertainty and preference 
on the decision options. A brainstorming module sets up complex models and converts 
them automatically into a hierarchy, which the decision-maker can' modify. The 
software helps the decision-maker assign consistent relative importances to criteria 
(using numbers, bar graphs and words) and rates the alternatives against the criteria. 
Each alternative's weighted score indicates how well they meet the decision criteria. By 
graphically presenting the results, the decision-maker can analyse the decision for 
reasonableness, robustness and sensitivity to trade-offs. The decision-maker can also 
apply probability distributions to define uncertain data. The outcomes based on these 
uncertainties are overlaid on the results from a deterministic assessment to graphically 
represent the impact of uncertainty on the decision. Sensitivity analysis of the 
uncertainties identifies the most important uncertainties to reduce. This package is 
apparently as robust as EXPERT CHOICE and has the added advantage of being able to 
choose between SMART and AHP for evaluating importances. 
Other packages allowing alternatives structuring and criteria weights definition through 
AHP and/or SMART are HIPRE3+, LOGICAL DECISIONS and ALIAHTHINK. 
However, these do not have the added benefit of uncertainty analysis. 
Simplified decision software tools are available to allow decision problem definition 
through, decision trees and influence diagrams, based on single attribute decision- 
making and the expected value criterion. Some packages have powerful uncertainty 
analysis tools such as ANALYTICA, CRYSTAL BALL, DEFINITIVE SCENARIO, 
NETICA and DECISION PRO. The tools based only on subjective probabilities and 
expected value criteria include PRECISIONTREE, DPL (Decision Programming 
Language) and DATA. 
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Recently, due to the further development of computer technology, decision support 
software houses have started to produce group decision support systems such as TEAM 
EXPERT CHOICE and DECISION EXPLORER. These use group brainstorming 
techniques to develop the model and voting techniques to develop consensus in the 
determination of criteria, importances and therefore in decision solutions. 
There are too many decision support software tools available on the market to discuss in 
detail here, but the benefit brought by these tools to decision-making, in terms of time 
saving, problem visualisation and consensus building, is clear. 
4.7 Conclusions 
In nearly every industry, many difficult and complex decisions about the industry's 
assets are made throughout the asset's life cycle. At each stage of the life cycle, the 
type of decision, the number of alternatives available, the uncertainty in the information 
available and the number of people influencing the decision will vary. However, one 
common factor within all these decisions is that they all involve risk. 
Asset managers responsible for decision-making are required to justify the basis on 
which risks are managed. This review has already discussed the obstacles to doing this : 
rationally. In some industries it is necessary to show that codes and standards have been 
applied appropriately. When codes and standards are met for at least one decision 
alternative, then it is possible to simplify the decision by removing all non-conforming 
alternatives. The choice between the remaining alternatives can then be based on cost 
and may also account for environmental effects, stakeholder values and company 
image. The risk-based decision process may not be essential, but may still be beneficial 
in these situations, to ensure that all important factors are taken into account 
In cases where codes and standards do not apply, detailed engineering analysis and risk 
assessment has to be carried out to prove the safety of the structure under consideration. ' 
In these situations, the risk becomes a much more significant driver in the decision 
problem, and the decision alternatives become more difficult to compare. The 
consequences of failure may also be more significant and may influence more ,- 
stakeholders who would then have to be considered in the decision process. In addition -, 
to these complexities the decision factors such as environmental issues, political - 
pressures, costs, company image, etc. all need to be accounted for. It is in these 
situations that the risk-based decision process, suggested here, is expected to be of most 
benefit. 
The process has been designed to allow risks to be fully quantified and to allow other 
decision factors to be accounted for. Each decision factor can be assessed in its most 
convenient form without needing difficult judgements to be made to bring all factors to 
a common cost basis. 
The greatest benefit of the risk-based decision process is the rational and auditable 
manner in which the problem situation can be fully explored. Significant risks can be 
evaluated and quantified. A variety of opinions, values and judgements can be 
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accounted for. A preferred course of action can be identified and agreed upon through 
discussion and consensus building leading to better considered and justifiable decisions. 
After this review had been compiled and a substantial amount of the thesis work 
undertaken, a draft report was published by the UK Offshore Operators Association 
(UKOOA) [123]. The report outlines a framework to support decision-makers in 
identifying and evaluating appropriate decision factors in a given situation. The 
framework also helps establish the most appropriate basis for the decision depending on 
its context. The framework aims to help decision-makers determine the extent to which 
good practice, risk analysis and stakeholder values should be considered in each 
situation depending on a number of factors. These include the novelty of the decision 
situation, the extent of established practice to solve the problem, the interest and 
involvement of stakeholders, the significance of uncertainties in the decision and the 
severity of economic implications. Based on these factors, decisions are categorised 
into three generic decision types. The framework then recommends thr processes to be 
adopted for each decision type. The UKOOA model is summarised in Figure 10 below: 
The UKOOA report recommends that novel and challenging decision problems 
involving strong stakeholder views, major economic implications and significant risk 
and uncertainty should 
be 
addressed through combining engineering judgement, cost 
benefit analysis, quantitative risk assessment and evaluating company and societal 
values. This type of decision is most suited for solution with the support of the risk- 
based decision process proposed in this review. However, as stated previously, this 
does not necessarily mean that, the process will not aid decision-making in more 
apparently straightforward situations (as suggested by the UKOOA report). 
4 Significance of Basis to Decision-making Process -00- 
Means of Calibration Decision Context 
A Nothing new or unusual 
Codes and standards 
No major risk implications 
Established practice 
No major stakeholder implications 




B Business risk or lifecycle 
Peer Review implications 
Some risk trade-offs 
Some uncertainty or deviation from 
Benchmarkin stanor est practice g Some significant economic 
implications 
Internal Stakeholder C Strong stakeholder views and Consultation 
perceptions 
Significant risk trade-offs or risk 
External Stakeholder transfer 
Consultation Large uncertainties Lowering of safety standards 
Major economic implications 
Figure 10: A decision support framework for decisions in the context of operations 
entirely within the goal-setting UK offshore regime, proposed by UKOOA [1231 
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It is expected that the decision process proposed out of this review will be a support to 
all risk-based structural asset management decision-making at different levels. At the 
simplest level, it can be used as a checklist to ensure that all factors are considered. At a 
more detailed level the different decision models can be adopted to evaluate and 
quantify all decision factors. The use of appropriate decision models for each decision 
situation would depend on many different factors such as: 
" The level of detail required in the assessment of the problem 
" The time-scale in which the decision has to be made 
" The number and availability of alternative solution strategies 
" The number of factors on which the decision is to be based 
" The presence of strong and conflicting stakeholder influences 
" The amount and level of uncertainty in the information available 
" The probability of failure and the severity of failure consequences 
" The degree of preferences and biases influencing the decision 
" The level of optimality required in the solution 
" The ability to revisit the decision following later inspection results 
It is therefore important to develop a framework in which the available models can be 
considered in the context of the problem at the different stages of the decision-making. 
A popular decision process was identified at the start of this literature review as the . basis for a methodology. Comparison with characteristics of real life decision problems 
identified a number of gaps, including clearly identifying the decision problem, 
identifying and accounting for stakeholder influences, identifying decision criteria and 
objectives, identifying key decision parameters and allowing for re-valuation and model 
refinement. 
The proposed risk based decision process has been enhanced with these improvements. 
It is now necessary to determine whether the use of the process does actually support 
real life decision-making and whether it accounts for all the important issues. 
It is proposed that this risk based decision process be tested on a number of real life case 
studies that are representative of the range of decisions faced by asset managers in the 
life cycle of the assets, from conceptual design to end of life. The range of issues 
including stakeholder conflict, significant uncertainties and risks and multiple decision 
criteria should also influence the case studies. This risk based decision process will 
therefore form the basis for the remainder of this research. 
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5 RESEARCH METHOD 
The research objectives were outlined in the introduction to this thesis in Section 2.4. 
The first objective, to identify tools and techniques that can be used to support decision- 
making was achieved in the literature review in the area of risk-based decision-making 
and its application to engineering decision situations. From this review, a clear research 
need was identified in the area of developing a risk-based decision methodology that 
could be applied to support engineering asset management decisions. This led to the 
development and proposal of a new, enhanced risk based decision process. This fulfils 
research objective 2, to develop a more comprehensive model to address the major 
issues of decision-making, within which the various tools and techniques can be 
applied. However, out of the vast number of individual decision models available, the 
problem is in identifying which models to use to help solve which problems. Having 
determined which models to use the second problem is in knowing how to apply them 
to the problems in a meaningful way that does not over simplify the problems. This 
leads on to the third objective, to apply the model and the appropriate tools and 
techniques to a range of real life decision problems. 
Consistent with this objective, the following questions have been formulated to enable 
this objective to be met through empirically addressing them in each case study. 
1. Do risk-based decision methods allow the problem to be fully explored and 
understood? 
2. Do risk-based decision methods support the identification, evaluation and 
quantification of all significant risks? 
3. Do risk-based decision methods support the identification and agreement of a 
preferred course of action? 
4. Do risk-based decision methods make engineering decision-making easier? 
5. Do risk-based decision methods help make more rational engineering decisions? 
6. Do risk-based decision methods help make engineering decisions more auditable? 
7. Do risk-based decision methods help build consensus and ownership in engineering 
decisions? 
8. When is it appropriate to use risk-based decision methods in engineering decision- 
making? 
In order to try to answer these questions, it was decided that the research should be as 
true to life as possible. Therefore, real life case studies were chosen as the basis for the 
majority of the research to allow a full understanding of the real life issues to be gained 
in the way the decision methods were applied, the benefits that were gained from them 
and the problems that were faced. The alternative approach would have been to carry 
out interviews or use questionnaires to investigate how decisions are made and whether 
practising engineers see a benefit in the methods. However, this approach would have 
allowed no experience of applying the methods, which was believed to be the important 
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issue and would have meant educating practising engineers in the methods available. 
The use of case studies allowed a hands-on approach to experiencing the difficulties 
encountered in real life decision-making such as a lack of data, short time-scales and 
stakeholder influences. It was believed that this would allow the maximum learning 
both on my part as a facilitator and consultant as well as on the part of the individual 
decision-makers and other stakeholders. Then, having exposed the decision-makers to' 
risk-based decision methods for the first time, it would be clearer to identify the benefits 
that they gained from using them. A separate set of interviews was also used to 
compare how decisions are made in real life with the methods applied in this research. 
The focus of the research however was the series of experimental case studies that 
allowed every dimension of decision-making with the support of risk-based decision 
models to be experienced. 
The literature review showed how decision problems have frequently been modified to' 
fit the decision model that is being used to solve them, often with unsatisfactory results, 
or have been carried out as purely academic exercises. Issues such as time-scales, 
stakeholder influences, amount of information, significance of the risks and availability 
of alternatives, however, are all factors that cannot be controlled by the decision-maker, , but are dependent on the decision problem. The real benefit was therefore, expected to 
be gained from experimenting with the decision models to make them fit real life 
decision problems in a way that would bring benefit to the way the decision was made. 
In order to learn the most about applying risk-based decision methods to real life . 
engineering asset management problems a number of key criteria were identified that " 
any suitable case study should fulfil. These are listed below: 
1. There should be a number of stakeholders at least interested in, but preferably also 
influenced by, the decision, with different views and preferences for the different 
outcomes. 
2. There should be a number of alternatives from which to choose, with initially no 
clear obvious choice. 
3. There should be a number of criteria and objectives, preferably conflicting, 
influencing the selection of the best alternative. 
4. There should be a need to identify and gather relevant information to support the 
decision process. 
5. There should be significant risks resulting from the different alternatives, which can 
be quantified to a certain extent. 
The case studies ideally would represent each of these above issues to varying degrees, 
to allow an appreciation of their effect on the decision-making process. The case 
studies should be taken from different fields of engineering to allow for variations in 
availability of data, structural models, codes and stakeholder perspectives. The case 
studies should be taken from different stages of the structure's life cycle again to allow 
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for variations in availability of data, structural models, decision significance and 
stakeholder perspectives. 
Due to the real life, real time nature of the case studies they could not be "designed" to 
address these different issues as they arose out of business opportunities during the 
schedule of the research period. They were therefore dictated by the client's 
requirements in terms of level of detail of analysis, time-scale of the decision and 
stakeholder involvement. However, despite this external control, the four case studies 
that were selected did fit the above requirements and complemented each other to 
provide a broad overview of the research area. Furthermore, a change in sponsoring 
company half way through the research period opened up opportunities for case studies 
from different engineering fields. 
In order to address the above research questions in each case study, the proposed 
decision process, shown in figure 4 was applied to each case study, from the outset of 
the decision problem and the benefit gained was evaluated. The methods of analysis 
adopted for each case study differed according to the availability of data, the importance 
of the decision, the time available for the decision, the influence of stakeholders and the 
time in the structure's life. Therefore, the case studies are described separately in the 
following chapters along with the lessons learnt and the benefits gained from using 
these methods. 
As mentioned briefly above, a fifth case study was also undertaken, based on 
questionnaires and interviews, to consider how real decisions are normally made, within 
the sponsoring company, when they do not have the support of a risk-based decision 
process. A number of recent projects were identified and the key 'engineers and project 
managers involved in these projects were interviewed. These interviews explored the 
managers' experiences in decision-making, the problems they have faced and any 
methods they have adopted in the past to help them. In addition, the effect of good and 
bad decision-making on the overall project outcomes was investigated. 
Having applied the risk based decision process to the different case studies the research 
needs to investigate whether any benefit has been gained, and if so the extent of the 
benefit above "natural" decision-making. This will mean that the fourth research 
objective, to analyse the effects of using this model and drawing conclusions on whether 
it works and any implications for decision-makers, can be met. This is achieved 
through a cross case analysis in the discussion section of this thesis. 
The background to the five case studies is briefly introduced below, however, the full 
description of their evaluation, in terms of the decision process, is presented in the 
following five chapters. 
5.1 CASE STUDY 1: Feasibility of Re-using Subsea Facilities in New 
Field Developments 
An operating company was considering the development of an oil field in the UK sector 
of the central North Sea. Early development work investigated a number of field 
development options. The operator narrowed down their options to a single drill centre 
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with 6 production wells including 1 spare, 3 water injection wells including 1 spare and 
a possible gas injection well. It was still planned for the initial development to be tied 
back to a Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Vessel (FPSO) (phase 1), but 
with an option to tie back to another nearby development later (phase 2). 
Independent of this development, the installation contractor was also supporting a 
second operating company in their evaluation of abandonment strategies for one of their 
fields. This field consists of two drill centres tied back to an FPSO. This field has been 
operating for less than 2 years and has proven to be uneconomic. 
The installation contractor was therefore investigating the opportunity of combining the 
abandonment of the second field with the hook-up of its FPSO at the new field during 
the same mobilisation period up to one year earlier. This would provide the first 
operator with the opportunity of starting production on the new field one year earlier. 
The concept of the single mobilisation depends on the resolution of a number of key 
issues, such as the ability to re-use equipment and or the ability to procure equipment 
within the relatively short time frame. In addition to this, there are a number of 
important related issues such as certification/verification, which need to be addressed. 
To assist in their investigation the installation contractor asked Andrew Palmer and 
Associates to perform a study. This included the development of a field layout, an 
overall assessment of the feasibility, a study to investigate the cost benefit of reusing 
equipment and development of project schedules 
The decisions that had to be made concerning the feasibility of re-using the abandoned 
facilities for Phase 1 (and possibly Phase 2) of the new field development were very 
complex and involved some degree of uncertainty. For example, the successful removal 
of the abandoned risers, without damage was uncertain. These decisions were also 
sequential in that one decision could not be made until the results of a previous decision 
were known. 
The probability and consequences of unsuccessful removal or re-installation was, 
therefore, a key influence on the decision-making. This made the use of the risk-based 
decision process very attractive. However, the decision was being made very early on 
in the design process at a conceptual level, therefore only a simple, high level decision 
analysis was required. Therefore, decision trees were adopted as a useful tool for 
modelling the problem and expert opinion was used to provide the necessary 
information. Stakeholder preferences were not considered at this stage due to the 
conceptual nature of the decision. 
The problem was addressed by forming a workgroup consisting of experienced 
installation engineers. Within this workgroup, a brainstorming session was initially 
carried out to identify all the alternatives available within these decisions. These then 
formed the starting point for constructing decision trees through group discussion and as 
a part of this structuring process to identify the different possible outcomes of each 
decision alternative. Carrying this out in a work group environment meant that a cross- 
fertilisation of ideas ensured that every consequence was considered. Finally, again as a 
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group, probabilities of each outcome and associated costs were put to each branch of 
each decision tree. Again, carrying this out as a group meant that the probabilities and 
costs were as objective as possible as they were under scrutiny from the remaining 
group and therefore had to be fully justified. This whole process was carried out in a 
whole day, which meant that all members of the group were fully attentive, interested 
and committed to the process through out the day and did not give chance for 
distractions. Following the work group session, the decision trees were formalised and 
evaluated to fully quantify each alternative and identify the best alternatives available. 
This work took six weeks from being presented with the problem to having a solution to 
present to the client. 
5.2 CASE STUDY 2: Developing a Maintenance Strategy for Viaduct 
Crossbeams 
Around ten years ago, a routine inspection of the group of viaduct crossbeams under 
consideration revealed significant deterioration of the waterproofing of the expansion 
joints. This had allowed water, contaminated with de-icing salts, to seep into the 
concrete and the dissolved chlorides to ingress through the concrete to attack the steel 
reinforcement. It takes many years for the corrosion process to cause the capacity of the 
crossbeam to be significantly reduced. However, even at the time, the potential 
significance of the problem was understood. The engineers responsible for the 
management of the viaducts set out a plan for repair and maintenance to address the 
problem before it became too serious and the capacity of any of the viaducts was 
seriously compromised. However, the pressure on each year's budgets was so high that 
the requested funds were never fully supplied. The repair work fell behind schedule 
each year, allowing further deterioration to occur. Finally, the backlog was so 
significant and the integrity of the viaducts so uncertain that the maintenance agent 
asked for help to prioritise each crossbeam for repair and strengthening, in terms of 
minimising the overall risk. 
The problem of prioritising viaduct crossbeams for strengthening involves quantitative 
assessments of many different factors. These include the capacity of a crossbeam, 
consequences of failure of a crossbeam, traffic disruption and strengthening costs as 
well as subjective judgements of other less well defined issues such as impacts on the 
local community of traffic restrictions on the viaducts. When such multiple criteria are 
used, certain "trade-offs" are required, as different viaducts would score better in terms 
of different criteria considered in isolation. 
The procedures for calculating the deterioration and the strength of deteriorated 
reinforced concrete bridge components are not fully codified at present. The partial 
safety factors given in the codes do not take into account the additional uncertainties 
involved in the rate of deterioration and the strength of deteriorated components. 
Therefore, it is difficult to make rational decisions concerning the strengthening 
requirement for the crossbeams. 
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For this reason, the case study developed a methodology for the reliability analysis of 
the viaduct crossbeams taking into account all the significant sources of uncertainty in 
loading, strength and deterioration parameters. The methodology evaluates the 
probability of failure of a crossbeam for the limit-states of bending, shear and bond 
failure. The results of the reliability analysis were then used as a more rational basis on 
which to make the necessary repair and strengthening decisions. 
The problem was addressed by initially holding a number of meetings with the 
maintenance agent representatives and the highways agency to determine the objectives 
of the decision problem. Due to the time schedule for this project, the focus of the work 
was on the risk assessment of the crossbeams (calculation of probability and 
consequence of failure). This was because establishing a better understanding of the 
reliability of the crossbeams was considered the most critical problem to give 
confidence (or otherwise) in the safety of the structures. The development of a decision 
strategy for selecting crossbeams for strengthening and identifying appropriate, 
strengthening methods was to be addressed as a second phase. Despite the focus of this 
work on structural reliability calculations, the problem is still discussed in the format of 
the risk-based decision framework, as the structural reliability results inform the 
necessary decisions. The decision-making process is therefore discussed at a higher 
level. 
This work took 15 months from being presented with the problem to the time my 
involvement ended as I moved on to a different sponsoring company. This involved 7 
formulating the problem, identifying and gathering necessary data, detailed evaluation 
of the information and development of the necessary models with which to assess the 
data. Finally, the calculation of the probability of failure for a number of different 
crossbeam types would allow a decision strategy to be formulated. However, as"- 
described in the associated chapter even at this point, the work was not completed. 
5.3 CASE STUDY 3: Planning of Pipeline Repair and Replacement 
Schedules 
The client for this work produces oil and associated gas from two large offshore fields. 
The fields have been in operation since soon after oil was first discovered in that area. 
Production fluids arrive at central processing platforms through a network of flowlines 
from unmanned satellite wells and from a companion field. Large diameter pipelines 
transport oil, gas and condensate for final treatment for export. 
Corrosion has occurred in the production and injection water pipeline networks and the 
transmission pipelines. The client prefers to avoid leaks by proactive repair or 
replacement of corroded pipelines. We were requested to perform a Remnant Life 
Assessment (RLA) study of the field's Main Oil Pipelines including the development of 
Remnant Life Prediction software. This was then to be used to optimise the extent and 
timing of repair or replacement for each pipeline. The scope of work incorporated two 
Main Oil lines of 30" diameter. 
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The repair/replace decision problem addressed in this work is based on the predicted 
condition and hence integrity of the pipelines, based on a review of a number of surveys 
undertaken for the client over the last ten years. The quantitative results presented are 
based on wall thickness measurements obtained through two internal intelligent pig 
inspection surveys. The pig inspections were carried out in 29 and 32 years after 
commissioning using a magnetic flux pig and an ultrasonic inspection tool, respectively. 
In addition to the intelligent pigging inspections, a number of external ultrasonic 
inspections had also been carried out. These were also accounted for. 
The two sets of intelligent pig results had been obtained using significantly different 
instruments. This means that the accuracy of the measurements obtained during the 
surveys is also significantly different. Because of this, a major obstacle in the 
assessment of the survey data is the reconciliation of the two sets of findings. It was 
therefore necessary to account for the uncertainties in the measurements to provide a 
realistic and rational basis for the repair/replace decisions to be made. This was done 
using probabilistic techniques, described later. 
This case study presents a methodology for the risk-based remnant life assessment of 
corroding pipelines. The methodology accounts for the uncertainty in the deterioration 
parameters that dominate the problem (uncertainties in loading and resistance 
parameters were not accounted for). This allowed the probability distribution of the 
failure date to be evaluated for the pipeline for the limit states of through wall corrosion 
and rupture. 
The problem was addressed by initially holding a number of meetings with the quality 
assurance department, responsible for ensuring the safety and operability of the 
pipelines, to determine the objectives of the decision problem. From these meetings, the 
conflicting views the two different shareholder groups became apparent. It was 
therefore decided that since the one agreed objective between the shareholders was to 
ensure absolute safety in the pipelines, the focus of the work should initially be a risk 
assessment of the pipelines in question. Since the dispute was on whether the pipelines 
should be repaired or replaced, a reliability based remnant life assessment was carried 
out, to help establish the cost benefit of repairs for the remaining life versus a full 
replacement. This provided a better understanding of the key issues involved. Despite 
the focus of this work on reliability calculations, the problem is still discussed in the 
format of the risk-based decision framework, as the structural reliability analysis 
informs the necessary decisions. The results of the risk-based remnant life analysis 
were therefore used as a more rational basis on which to make the necessary repair or 
replacement decisions. This allowed the focus of the decision to be placed on the most 
important factors and allowed the less important factors, which were viewed in 
conflicting ways by the stakeholders, to be discounted. This decision-making process is 
discussed at a higher level in the write-up. 
This work took four months from being presented with the problem to presenting a 
solution to the client. This involved formulating the problem, identifying and gathering 
necessary data, detailed evaluation of the information and development of the necessary 
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models with which to assess the data. Finally, the calculation of the probability 
distribution for the pipeline remnant life allowed a solution to be identified and 
recommended. 
5.4 CASE STUDY 4: Prioritisation of Bridge Strengthening Works 
A consortium of bridge engineers from every London borough was faced with the 
problem of selecting the most important bridges, which had failed assessment, to be 
strengthened. Due to the very tight limits on budgets, only a small selection of those 
bridges requiring strengthening could be put forward for funding from the next year's 
budgets. We were commissioned with the task of rationally prioritising all of the 
bridges in the London area, to identify those in most urgent need of strengthening. 
Significant uncertainties were involved in this problem (such as further deterioration of 
the bridges, excessive loading on the bridges and their current capacity). In addition, 
the different stakeholders held a broad variety of strong opinions (such as the Governors 
of London, the borough councils, local businesses and frequent users of the bridges). It 
was therefore felt that decision analysis could offer a rational and auditable method for 
combining all factors and opinions to arrive at the best decision for all parties. 
The problem of prioritising bridge strengthening works involves quantitative' 
assessments from bridge engineers concerning issues such as safety of the bridge, traffic- 
disruption and strengthening costs. Subjective judgements of other less well-defined' 
influences are also involved, such as impacts on the local community and the cost 
savings associated with combining works with upgrading work. 
Certain trade-offs were required to select the "best" projects as different projects score 
better in terms of different issues. For example, one project may strengthen a bridge to 
a high level of safety but be very expensive, while another project may give only a 
small strength advantage but at very little cost. 
This case study therefore, outlines the process that was carried out to determine the 
main factors considered important in the prioritisation of bridge strengthening works, 
and the relative importance of those factors. The results of this process are also . -. 
presented to show how a consensus was achieved for the weightings of factors used to 
determine an overall "bridge priority index". 
Due to the time schedule for this project, (the client had only a couple of months before 
this year's submissions for funding had to be completed), certain simplifications were 
imposed by the client: 
" It was not at all feasible for all the bridges failing assessment to be subjected to a 
full structural reliability assessment; therefore, a simplified risk scoring system was 
used. 
" The client requested that the bridges be prioritised on a current year basis. So that 
those bridges selected for strengthening this year would be removed from the list the 
following year. 
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" Representatives of four borough councils only were interviewed (borough bridge 
engineers and council representatives) to gain an idea of stakeholder views. 
The problem was therefore addressed by first holding meetings with representatives of 
the consortium of engineers. This allowed the objectives of the decision to be identified 
and the types of stakeholders to be considered were discussed. The main decision 
criteria were then identified in a combination of brainstorming with the consortium 
representatives and reviewing previous related work. Interviews were then set up with a 
number of borough representatives, to allow the stakeholder views to be identified and 
the criteria preferences to be quantified. From these interview results consensus 
weightings were calculated. To ensure full stakeholder involvement, consensus and 
ownership of the final solution, intermediate results were communicated back to the 
interviewees and the consortium representatives at several stages. The information to 
support each alternative was then gathered through questionnaires sent out to every 
borough. The weighted decision criteria were applied to the information provided for 
each alternative, to allow a full ranking of the alternatives to be carried out. This was 
again presented to the consortium representatives who then presented it to all the 
borough representatives. This detailed communication meant that a full consensus was 
achieved throughout the stakeholders, which also supported the implementation of the 
final decision. 
This work took seven months from being presented with the problem to presenting a 
solution to the client. This involved formulating the problem, identifying necessary 
data, developing a suitable interview technique for gathering the data, setting up and 
carrying out the interviews. It also involved detailed evaluation of the information 
gathered and the development of the necessary prioritisation models with which to 
assess the data gathered from the questionnaires. Finally, the prioritised list of 
alternatives was presented to the client for their approval. 
5.5 CASE STUDY 5: Review of Risk based Decision-making in Andrew 
Palmer and Associates 
The process of field development involves several stages from the identification of a 
potential field through to delivery of first oil/gas. Currently at APA, preliminary 
engineering design starts after the high value field development (concept selection) 
decisions have been made. Decisions such as the type of field development, the need 
for a pipeline for product export and sometimes even the operating conditions of the 
pipeline have already been determined by the operator before they commission APA 
with the task of designing the pipelines. Therefore APA is left with the lower value, 
lower complexity decisions in preliminary and detailed pipeline design. 
The earlier decisions made by the operator and the selected contract strategy can cause 
severe restrictions on the way design decisions are made by APA, causing APA to 
produce, at times, sub-optimal designs. 
AA is faced with a number of preliminary engineering design decisions. These 
typically include the routing of the pipeline, the diameter and wall thickness of the line 
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pipe, the dimensions and locations of spools and crossings, types of valves and pigging 
facilities, methods for protecting the spools and valves, pipeline coatings and other 
corrosion inhibitors. 
These decisions are not necessarily influenced by a large number of external 
stakeholders, neither are they dependent on a large number of factors. They are 
however, dependent on a few important and often conflicting factors, such as safety, 
durability, reparability, cost of installation, operation, maintenance and 
decommissioning, etc. They also are made under significant uncertainty such as 
uncertainty in the cost and in the inherent risk of each alternative. Most importantly, the 
decision has to be auditable for governing and regulatory bodies. Risk-based decision- 
making could help to fulfil these requirements. 
A number of recent conceptual and preliminary engineering design projects were 
identified and reviewed in detail to establish the types of decisions that APA generally 
make in a conceptual and preliminary engineering design project. Also identified were 
the decisions that APA did not make, which were made already by the contractor or the 
operator. For every key decision, an indication of the main decision-makers, the 
important decision criteria and any constraints were identified. 
A selection of senior engineers and managers within APA were then interviewed about 
the way they make decisions in conceptual and preliminary engineering design projects. 
The specific design projects that have been identified were explored in depth with the 
project managers and lead engineers that worked on these projects. In addition, project 
managers and senior engineers were asked more generally on the usual approach to 
conceptual and preliminary, engineering design decision-making and the types' of, 
decisions usually encountered. The results of these interviews were then assessed in 
detail and collated to build up a full picture of the problem encountered in unsupported 
; decision-making and the consequences of these not being fully evaluated. 
5.6 Summary of the Case Studies 
The four real-life case studies were therefore selected to represent the broadest range of 
asset management decisions as possible in terms of a number of factors including: 
" The time in the structures life cycle, for example the design stage, the operational 
stage and the decommissioning stage. 
" The amount of data available to support risk analysis, for example subjective expert 
opinion, deterministic approximations or probabilistic distribution. 
" The influence of stakeholders, considering for example, a negligible influence 
(where there is interest but very minimal influence); a noticeable influence, where 
different groups of people have a say in the final decision but also share similar 
goals and a significant influence where different groups of people have a say in the 
final decision but have conflicting goals. 
" The time available to make the decision. For example, the difference between 
having less than two months and more than a year to produce a solution to the 
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decision has a significant influence on the level of detail with which the analysis can 
be carried out. 
" The number of alternatives available. For example, the difference between choosing 
from two or three alternatives will require a different level of analysis to a decision 
between a vast number of alternatives. 
" The number of decision criteria. For example, the difference between making a 
decision based on one or two decision criteria and making a decision based on 
multiple, conflicting criteria. 
" The field of engineering. For example the difference between decision-making in 
the oil and gas industry and in the transportation industry. 
Each level of each of the above characteristics is represented by at least one of the case 
studies, thereby ensuring that a broad variety of decision types were investigated in the 
research programme. The following table shows how the required variety was achieved 









Life cycle time Design  
Operation    
Decommission  
Amount of data Expertjudgement  
Deterministic  
Probabilistic   
Stakeholder Negligible  
influence Noticeable   
Significant  
Time to make T<2 months  
decision 2 mths< T<9 mths   
9 months <T  
Number of N<5  
alternatives 5<N<20  
20<N   
Number of criteria Expected Cost only  
Expected Cost and Safety   
Multiple Criteria  
Field of Bridge Engineering   
Engineering Pipeline Engineering  . 
Iable 5 summary of the four real-life case studies adopted for the research 
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6 CASE STUDY I 
FEASIBILITY OF RE-USING SUBSEA FACILITIES IN NEW FIELD 
DEVELOPMENTS 
6.1 Problem Definition 
6.1.1 Identify problem or opportunity 
The decision problem evaluated in this case study was identified by an installation 
contractor who was consecutively investigating the development options of one 
operator's new field and the decommissioning options of a second operator's abandoned 
field. 
The installation contractor identified the opportunity of combining the abandonment of 
the abandoned field with the hook-up of its disused FPSO at the new field during the 
same mobilisation. This would provide operator of the new field with the opportunity 
of starting production one year earlier. 
The concept of the single mobilisation depends on the resolution of a number of key 
issues, such as the ability to re-use equipment and or the ability to procure equipment 
within the relatively short time frame. In addition to this, there are a number of 
important related issues such as certification/verification, which need to be addressed. 
Andrew Palmer and Associates were asked to perform a study, which included the 
development of a field layout, an overall assessment of the feasibility, a study to 
investigate the cost benefit of reusing equipment and development of project schedules. 
These decisions also involve multiple stakeholder views, for example, operators prefer 
to reuse the maximum amount of infrastructure, while contractors and designers will 
only gain revenue if new infrastructure is designed. 
The objective of this risk-based decision analysis was to evaluate, as rationally as 
possible, the alternative options available for the reuse, abandonment or disposal of the 
different redundant facilities. Where necessary, the comparative costs of purchasing 
new have also been considered. 
6.1.2 Identify Stakeholders in the decision 
A number of stakeholders were interested in and or influenced by these decisions. 
These included: 
" the abandoned field operator who was looking for some compensation; 
" the new field operator who wanted to minimise installation costs and lead times; 
" the installation contractor and designers who would benefit from the design and 
procurement of new facilities; 
" environmental and legislative bodies who were keen to minimise risks. 
However, the decision was taken at very a conceptual level. The objective was to investigate the feasibility and cost effectiveness of the alternatives, rather than building 
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consensus between stakeholders, at this stage. Therefore, the different stakeholder 
preferences were not taken into account at this stage. 
6.1.3 Identify viable alternatives 
Five sub-decisions were considered, to decide on whether to re-use or abandon and buy 
new for each type of facility. The available alternatives for each sub-decision are 
summarised in the table below: 
Number Number Decommissioning Decision Alternatives 
Available Required Requirements 
Production and Water 4 3 Must be removed Remove & Reuse or Remove, 
injection risers Dispose and buy new 
Gas Lift Risers 2 1 Must be removed Remove & Reuse or Remove, 
Dispose and buy new 
Dynamic Umbilicals 2 1 Must be removed Remove & Reuse or Remove, 
Dispose and buy new 
Flowline Umbilicals 2 1 Can be abandoned Remove 1 or 2 and reuse or 
abandon and buy new 
Structures 1 1 Must be removed Remove & Reuse or Remove, 
Dispose and buy new 
'l'abte 6: Summary of the decision alternatives for each sub decision 
6.1.4 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
Each decision was modelled in the context of minimising (in simplistic terms) the 
expected whole life cost of the alternatives available for the new field development. 
The whole life cost assessment was simplistic in that the only post installation cost 
considered was the cost of replacing the risers if they failed during operation as a result 
of the decision to reuse the abandoned risers. The risks common to both alternatives 
were not considered. 
6.2 Structural Analysis 
The structuring process supports the decision-maker in the identification of all possible 
alternatives and all possible outcomes. To the non-specialist it allows the structure of 
the risk scenarios to become divorced from the often-confusing mathematical 
technicalities. If the decision is relatively straightforward, the decision tree can also be 
used to help solve the problem. The values associated with each possible outcome and 
the probability of each possible outcome can be added to the structure. The "expected 
value" of each decision can then be calculated to allow the best decision to be chosen. 
A complex decision tree was generated for each sub-decision and considered the choice 
between the proposed alternatives described previously. For the removal options, the 
chance of successfully removing each item from the disused installation was considered 
(successful removal included minor damage that could be easily repaired offshore). 
Then for each alternative, the chance of successfully installing each item into the new 
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consensus between stakeholders, at this stage. Therefore, the different stakeholder 
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Table 6: Summary of the decision alternatives for each sub decision 
6.1.4 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
Each decision was modelled in the context of minimising (in simplistic terms) the 
expected whole life cost of the alternatives available for the new field development. 
The whole life cost assessment was simplistic in that the only post installation cost 
considered was the cost of replacing the risers if they failed during operation as a result 
of the decision to reuse the abandoned risers. The risks common to both alternatives 
were not considered. 
6.2 Structural Analysis 
The structuring process supports the decision-maker in the identification of all possible 
alternatives and all possible outcomes. To the non-specialist it allows the structure of 
the risk scenarios to become divorced from the often-confusing mathematical 
technicalities. If the decision is relatively straightforward, the decision tree can also be 
used to help solve the problem. The values associated with each possible outcome and 
the probability of each possible outcome can be added to the structure. The "expected 
value" of each decision can then be calculated to allow the best decision to be chosen. 
A complex decision tree was generated for each sub-decision and considered the choice 
between the proposed alternatives described previously. For the removal options, the 
chance of successfully removing each item from the disused installation was considered 
(successful removal included minor damage that could be easily repaired offshore). 
Then for each alternative, the chance of successfully installing each item into the new 
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Figure 11: Decision tree of the evaluation of alternatives for the reuse of the structures 
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field was considered followed by the chance of successful tie-in and the chance of each 
item surviving the design life. An example decision tree is shown in Figure 11. The 
detailed decision trees for each decision problem are shown in Appendix 2. 
6.3 Uncertainty and Probabilistic Analysis 
Engineers experienced in the removal and installation of subsea infrastructure 
subjectively determined the probability of each event. These were "first pass" estimates 
which could be refined later with more accurate information if it was considered 
worthwhile. The following outlines some of the assumptions made in the evaluations. 
" The sum of the probability of all possible outcomes of an event equals 1. 
" The probability of successful tie-in was not affected by the item being reused or new. 
" The probability of successful tie in of the flowline umbilicals/structures was set to 1. 
" The probability of all items surviving phase 1 (i. e. the short term tie-back to FPSO) 
was set to 1. 
" The probability of the flowline umbilicals/structures surviving phase 2 (i. e. the 
longer term tie back to another pipeline) was set to 1. 
The following tables list the probability values of used for each decision problem: 
Probability of successfully removing 4 risers 0.9 
Probability of successfully removing only 3 risers 0.07 
Probability of successfully removing only 2 risers 0.025 
Probability of successfully removing only 1 riser 0.004 
Probability of successfully removing 0 risers 0.001 
Probability of midline damage to riser in removal 0.3 
Probability of end damage to riser in removal 0.7 
Probability of installing 3 out of 4 risers 0.95 
Probability of installing 2 out of 4 risers 0.03 
Probability of installing 1 out of 4 risers 0.015 
Probability of installing 0 out of 4 risers 0.005 
Probability of installing 3 out of 3 risers 0.92 
Probability of installing 2 out of 3 risers 0.06 
Probability of installing 1 out of 3 risers 0.015 
Probability of installing 0 out of 3 risers 0.005 
Probability of end damage to riser in installation 0.6 
Probability of midline damage to riser in installation 0.4 
Probability of successful tie-in 0.98 
Probability of unsuccessful tie-in 0.02 
Probability of surviving phase 2 0.99 
Probability of surviving phase 1 only 0.01 
't able 7 List of probabilities used as inputs to evaluate the decision of whether to 
re-use the production and water injection risers or not. 
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Probability of successfully removing 2 risers 0.95 
Probability of successfully removing only 1 riser 0.045 
Probability of successfully removing 0 risers 0.005 
Probability of midline damage to riser in removal 0.3 
Probability of end damage to riser in removal 0.7 
Probability of installing 1 out of 2 risers 0.99 
Probability of installing 0 out of 2 risers 0.001 
Probability of installing 1 out of 1 riser 0.97 
Probability of installing 0 out of 1 riser 0.03 
Probability of end damage to riser in installation 0.6 
Probability of midline damage to riser in installation 0.4 
Probability of successful tie-in 0.98 
Probability of unsuccessful tie-in 0.02 
Probability of surviving phase 2 0.99 
Probability of surviving phase 1 only 0.01 
Table 8 List of probabilities used as inputs to evaluate the decision of whether to 
re-use the gas injection risers or not. 
Probability of successfully removing 2 umbilicals 0.95 
Probability of successfully removing only 1 umbilical 0.045 
Probability of successfully removing 0 umbilicals 0.005 
Probability of midline damage to riser in removal 0.2 
Probability of end damage to riser in removal 0.8 
Probability of installing 1 out of 2 umbilicals 0.99 
Probability of installing 0 out of 2 umbilicals 0.001 
Probability of installing 1 out of 1 umbilical 0.97 
Probability of installing 0 out of 1 umbilical 0.03 
Probability of end damage to riser in installation 0.8 
Probability of midline damage to riser in installation 0.2 
Probability of successful tie-in 0.98 
Probability of unsuccessful tie-in 0.02 
Probability of surviving phase 2 0.99 
Probability of surviving phase 1 only 0.01 
Table 9 List of probabilities used as inputs to evaluate the decision of whether to 
re-use the dynamic umbilicals or not. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 81 CASE STUDY 1 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
Probability of successfully removing 1 out of 1 umbilical 0.9 
Probability of successfully removing 0 out of 1 umbilical 0.1 
Probability of successfully removing 2 out of 2 umbilicals 0.81 
Probability of successfully removing only 1 out of 2 umbilicals 0.18 
Probability of successfully removing 0 out of 2 umbilicals 0.01 
Probability of installing 1st umbilical 0.9 
Probability of not installing 1st umbilical 0.04 
Probability of installing 2nd umbilical 0.98 
Probability of not installing 2nd umbilical 0.02 
Probability of installing 3rd umbilical 1 
Table 10 List of probabilities used as inputs to evaluate the decision of whether to 
re-use the flowline umbilicals or not. 
Probability of successfully removing piping module 0.97 
Probability of unsuccessfully removing piping module 0.03 
Probability of minor repairs to piping module 0.85 
Probability of major repairs to piping module 0.15 
Probability of successfully removing structure from piles 0.8 
Probability of unsuccessfully removing structure from piles 0.2 
Probability of piles freeing on surface 0.7 
Probability of piles being stuck on surface 0.3 
Table 11 List of probabilities used as inputs to evaluate the decision of whether to 
re-use the structures or not. 
6.4 UtilityNalue Analysis 
The value of each option was determined on a purely cost basis. The costs were 
evaluated subjectively based on the experience of engineers in design, installation and 
removal of subsea infrastructure. Again, these were "first pass" estimates which could 
be refined and updated later with more accurate information if it was considered 
worthwhile. The following outlines some of the assumptions made in the evaluations. 
For each action, for each option, the costs considered 
"a mobilisation cost, 
" the number of vessel days required to carry out the operation 
" the day rate of the type of vessel that would have to be used, 
" the cost of materials used (e. g. for repair work or for new purchases) 
" transportation costs associated with the acquisition of materials 
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" the cost of disposing of redundant items (salvage value was accounted for where 
appropriate) 
" the cost of the consequences of major schedule delays, based on the interest on 
investment. 
Considering specific costing assumptions: 
" The costs of removal also allowed for costs of minor offshore repair work and any 
necessary testing. 
" The cost of removing the flowline umbilicals also included the costs of deburial. 
"A moderately damaged riser or flowline was taken as having suffered from end 
damage, therefore the cost of repair was taken to be the cost of returning to port to 
re-terminate the line. A severely damaged riser or flowline was taken as having 
suffered mid-line damage; therefore, the cost of repair was taken to be the cost of 
returning to port and replacing the line, with the consequential costs of schedule 
delays. 
"A riser damaged during tie-in was assumed to suffer moderate damage as defined 
previously and therefore requires removal and re-terminating. These costs were 
therefore included here. 
" Unsuccessful recovery of the piping modules was considered to result in fabrication 
damage (requiring structural repair of flanges etc. ) or system damage resulting in the 
need for major repairs to valves, controls, etc. The associated schedule delay 
consequences were, therefore included. 
" Unsuccessful removal of the structure frames was assumed to result in two levels of 
failure. 1) Failure to remove from the piles on the seabed requiring removal on the 
surface. 2) Failure to remove from the piles on the surface requiring specialist 
equipment in port. The consequential costs of vessel time, and schedule delays were 
therefore accounted for. 
The following tables list the input values of costs that were used for each decision 
problem: 
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6.5 Selection of "Best" Alternative 
The probabilities and costs for each action were combined within the decision trees to 
give a total expected cost of each decision alternative. This can then be used as the 
basis for choosing between alternatives. The results of the decision tree analyses are 
presented below: 
Decision Remove all 4 production & Remove all 4 production & 
water injection risers & water injection risers and 
reuse 3 buy 3 new 
Expected Cost £2 660 213 £5 315123 
Table 17: Results for Reusing the Production and Water Injection Risers 
Decision Remove both Gas Lift 
Risers and reuse 1 
Remove both Gas Lift 
Risers and buy 1 new 
Expected Cost £1375 804 £2 595 545 
Table 18: Results for the Reuse of the Gas Lift Risers 
Decision Remove both Dynamic 
Umbilicals and reuse 1 
Remove both Dynamic 
Umbilicals and buy 1 new 
Expected Cost £1378 207 £2 391291 
Table 19: Results for the Reuse of the Dynamic Umbilicals 
Decision Remove one Flowline Remove both Flowline Leave both Flowline 
Umbilical to reuse Umbilicals and reuse 1 Umbilicals and buy 1 
new 
Expected £1 023 178 £1 279 292 £ 636 281 
Cost 
! 'able 2U: Results for the Reuse of the Flowline Umbilicals 
Decision Remove each structure to 
reuse 
Buy new structures 
Expected Cost £2 505 475 £3 100 000 
i awe zu-. xesuits for inc xeuse of tde structures 
From this analysis, it can be seen that the risers and the dynamic umbilicals should be 
removed and reused, but that the flowline umbilicals should be left on the seabed. The 
choice between re-using the structures or not is quite close and therefore would 
definitely benefit from some sensitivity studies on costs and risks. 
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
APA engineers have evaluated the costs and risks subjectively and therefore a 
sensitivity study was advised to identify the significance of each variable on the 
decisions. Any variables found to be significant in the selection of alternatives should 
then be confirmed by the operator, to ensure that the decisions are not made on the 
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wrong assumptions. However, because the decision was considered preliminary the 
client would not commit to any additional work. It was then suggested to the client that 
as soon as they had better information in terms of either costs or probabilities, these 
should be included in the analysis. A refinement of this method would therefore include 
more detailed evaluations of probabilities and consequences of failure in each process. 
This would make it possible to determine any effect on the final decision. 
Such a refined evaluation would also include a verification of the fitness for purpose of 
each structure following the change in location and possible change in environmental 
conditions. This would include an assessment of the environmental conditions at the 
new location and a comparison with the old location. An assessment of fatigue life of 
risers and compatibility of remnant life with the new location would also be carried out. 
Piping stress analysis of the manifold pipe work subject to the new pressures and 
temperatures would be necessary as would pile capacity calculations to assess the 
suitability of the structural foundation for the new location. 
6.7 Conclusions 
The decision problem addressed in this case study was very early in the design life of 
and therefore required a preliminary evaluation of the alternatives to allow a high level 
decision to be made in conceptual terms. At such an early stage, the problem involved a 
significant number of uncertainties that were difficult to quantify. This would usually 
make any type of risk assessment very difficult. However, at such an early stage it is 
very important to carry out a good risk assessment, as it is easier to manage the risks 
now rather than later once preliminary design decisions have been made. In addition, 
the cost of managing the risks at conceptual design stage can be much lower. 
Stakeholders were not considered an essential issue at this stage, as this was just a 
preliminary feasibility assessment of whether an important option should be considered 
further or not. However, due to the risks in terms of costs and environmental impacts 
that were at stake in the ultimate design, stakeholders were expected to play an 
important role in the final decision that was made. Therefore, it was believed that by 
using risk-based decision methods to support the preliminary decision at this stage that 
the audit trail would be available to gain support and consensus from the other 
stakeholders later when this was needed. 
In this case study, the number of alternatives did not play a significant role in the way 
the decision was made. This decision was primarily a choice between re-using existing 
subsea facilities or not. There were no intermediate alternatives to consider. 
As a preliminary evaluation, the important decision criterion was identified as being the 
"expected cost" of each alternative. This provided a simple but auditable basis for the 
conceptual decision to be made. It allowed the risk assessment and expert judgements 
to be integral to the decision-making without requiring costly gathering of additional 
information. This was not considered beneficial to the decision at such an early stage. 
The use of decision trees as part of the structural analysis provided a structured and 
detailed method for evaluating the consequences of important uncertain events for each 
y 
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of the alternatives. The process of defining the decision trees supported a rational 
evaluation of all the alternatives and possible risks involved in reusing the subsea 
infrastructure. In some cases, the process became almost iterative as one question 
further down a branch of the decision tree introduced ideas of alternatives higher up on 
a different branch. This aided the understanding of the decision problem and the 
implication of uncertain events on the overall consequences of the decision. In this case 
study there was a limited number of alternatives requiring a limited amount of data, 
therefore the decision trees were practical and very useful. However, even then in some 
cases they did become quite large and awkward to handle. If the problem had been any 
more complex, then it would have been impractical to use this method without robust 
computer assistance. 
The main problem that had to be addressed in this case was the lack of concrete 
information. As mentioned previously, this lack of information made the risk-based 
decision even more important. The tools used to support the decision in this case were 
therefore selected to support the identification and gathering of information. Much of 
this information was expert judgement at this stage. However, the process then allowed 
the important information to be identified for further investigation at a later stage. This 
optimises the requirement and use of information in the decision process both at this 
early stage and later when more detailed information is available. 
The important risks that were identified and assessed in this problem were the risks of 
damaging the facilities on removal so that they could not be re-installed. The 
subsequent risk of scheduling delays that would then result from having to order new 
equipment instead was also considered. Due to the lack of information and the 
preliminary nature of the assessment, it was not considered beneficial to carry out for 
example, a structural reliability assessment of the riser under removal loading. Neither 
was there sufficient documented information on the frequency of successful and 
unsuccessful removal operations. Therefore, experts with a number of years experience 
in carrying out these operations were asked to give their subjective opinions on the 
probability of success (and/or failure) for each operation. This was considered 
appropriate to the preliminary nature of the decision. The results of the risk assessment 
were directly incorporated into the decision criteria as "expected cost", which directly 
influenced the final decision. 
By asking experts for their subjective opinions of likelihood and consequences 
inherently introduces preferences and perceptions. It is impossible to remove these 
from such experience-based data entirely and at such a preliminary level, it was not 
considered a serious problem. However, perceptions and preferences were controlled 
by having more than one expert and by using experts from different backgrounds. Then 
through the role of a third party facilitator I was able to control the preferences and 
perceptions of the experts by ensuring they came to agreement on the assessment of 
each risk. This meant that if there was not initially consensus then each expert had to 
justify their own point of view until all experts finally understood each other and could 
agree. This provided an effective method for controlling the subjectiveness of the 
assessment. 
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The decision-makers gained significant confidence in the recommended decision due to 
the structured manner in which the problem was addressed using the risk-based decision 
model. They therefore took the recommendations on board and used the decision trees 
to argue their case to their clients. 
Sensitivity analysis was not carried out at this stage, although it was suggested to the 
client that a sensitivity study could be carried out especially on the probabilities. The 
costs and risks have been evaluated subjectively by APA engineers and therefore should 
be checked for suitability by both the installation contractor and the operator. However, 
because the decision was considered preliminary the client would not commit to any. 
additional work. It was then suggested to the client that as soon as they had better 
information, in terms of either cost or probabilities, these should be included in the 
analysis. A refinement of this method would therefore include more detailed evaluation 
of probabilities and consequences of failure in each process. This would make it 
possible to determine any effect on the final decision. 
The use of the risk-based decision model meant that risk was clearly accounted for in 
the decision. It is very likely that in the absence of such a model normal practice would 
have been to evaluate the alternatives based on cost only. The risks involved are 
however significant and therefore have a significant impact on the final decision. 
The application of the risk-based decision model to this case study has shown that not 
all stages are relevant for all decisions. However, for the stages that were not relevant, 
it was still useful to have to consider whether it was relevant or not. For example in the . case of considering stakeholders, without the decision model, stakeholders might never 
have been considered at all. As it was, careful consideration was made as to whether 
they should be accounted for now or later. 
The use of a structured decision process to support the decision helped the decision- 
makers identify the key issues to be addressed and allowed the important decision 
criteria and alternatives to be identified and agreed. Not only did this promote 
ownership of the ideas, but also sharing of knowledge and understanding introduced 
new possibilities and ideas that might never have been thought of. It also helped 
understand of others opinions and perceptions and helped build consensus in the final 
decision. 
The use of the risk-based decision model brought the significance of the risks to the fore- 
and meant that the assessment of risks was an integral part of the decision process. The 
consideration of all of these issues meant that a clear audit trail could be produced of the 
way the decision was made. This could then be to be re-visited, understood and if 
necessary re-addressed at a later stage. 
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7 CASE STUDY 2 
DEVELOPING A MAINTENANCE STRATEGY FOR VIADUCT 
CROSSBEAMS 
7.1 Problem Definition 
7.1.1 Identify problem or opportunity 
The problem addressed by this case study was identified around ten years ago, during 
routine inspection of a group of viaduct crossbeams, which revealed significant 
deterioration of the waterproofing of the expansion joints. Water, contaminated with 
de-icing salts, had seeped into the concrete and ingressed through the concrete to attack 
the steel reinforcement. It takes many years for the corrosion process to pass through 
the stages of chloride ingress, depassivation of the concrete, corrosion of the 
reinforcement bars and finally delamination of the concrete from the reinforcement. It 
is only in the last two stages that the capacity of the crossbeam is significantly reduced. 
Even at the time, the potential significance of the problem was understood and the 
engineers responsible for the management of the viaducts set out a plan for repair and 
maintenance of the crossbeams before their capacity was seriously compromised. 
However, each year, the requested funds were never fully supplied and the repair work 
fell behind schedule, allowing further deterioration. Finally, the backlog was so 
significant and the viaduct integrity, uncertain that we were asked to assess the current 
and future crossbeam integrity and to prioritise them for repair and strengthening. 
7.1.2 Identify stakeholders in the decision 
Due to the significance of the stretch of motorway of which these viaducts are a part, in 
terms of the UK's motorway network, a wide range of stakeholders had to be taken into 
account in the decision-making process. The decision, after all, had to be seen to 
minimise the consequences of any interim measures, repair work, and any failure should 
it occur. These consequences were in terms of finance, national and local politics 
impacts on commuters, haulage firms, local residents and the environment. 
One of the first stages in preparing for the analysis, therefore, was to determine who 
was in the decision-making group and to what extent each person could and wanted to, 
influence the decision. 
The external stakeholders included users of the viaducts (private, commercial and 
industrial), environmental pressure groups (campaigning for improved facilities for 
environmental and reduced congestion) and government officials (Local Councillors, 
MPs from local constituencies, etc. ). 
There are two main groups of internal stakeholders, the asset managers and the asset 
management group. The asset manager is the maintenance agent contracted by the 
Highways Agency to manage the route network to which these viaducts belong. The 
maintenance agent is responsible for the safety and maintenance of all the structures in 
the network including planning and allocating budgets to inspection, maintenance, 
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repair, strengthening and upgrading of all the network's structures. The asset 
management group is the committee responsible for allocating annual budgets for each 
asset manager including the highways agency network management division 
representatives, the network maintenance agent and council representatives. 
7.1.3 Identify viable alternatives 
The alternatives in this decision were the many viaduct crossbeams that required 
strengthening. However, in each financial year, more than one crossbeam could be 
strengthened to ensure best use of the annual budget. Part of the decision-making 
involved identifying whether several crossbeams on one viaduct should be strengthened 
at one time, thus limiting the disruption to traffic, or whether the absolute worst 
crossbeams should be strengthened at the same time, thus minimising the probability 
and consequences of failure. The combinations of alternatives were therefore far more 
numerous than the number of crossbeams requiring repair. 
7.1.4 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
The decision criteria were identified very early on in the analysis through discussions 
with experienced bridge engineers and members of the asset management group who 
were trying to represent the views of external stakeholders (such as local business and 
industry) in addition to their own. In addition, previous work for the Scottish Office 
[108] was reviewed. The main criteria, on which the crossbeam maintenance 
scheduling decisions were to be based, defined in more detail below, were found to be: 
" The cost of carrying out strengthening work 
" The risk of crossbeam and hence viaduct failure if strengthening work is not done 
" The cost of interim measures such weight restrictions, or propping if strengthening 
work is not carried out immediately. 
7.1.4.1 Cost of Strengthening Works 
Since one of the main issues in scheduling the viaduct crossbeams for strengthening is 
the optimal allocation of resources from the annual budget, the cost of carrying out the 
strengthening work on each crossbeam should be taken into account. 
The factors that were identified to evaluate the cost of strengthening works included: 
" the cost of actually carrying out the work (labour, material, equipment), as stated in 
the works budget, 
" the cost of traffic management schemes during the works (lighting, signing, cones, 
etc. ), provided by the assessing engineer's estimates, 
" the cost of traffic delays during the works (imaginary cost), taken from look-up 
tables for costs of diversion and cost of delays. These were based on the assessing 
engineer's estimate of the likely traffic flows, the make up of those flows, diversion 
lengths, road types, etc. 
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All of these factors can be aggregated directly to represent the overall cost of 
strengthening for the particular strengthening project under consideration. 
7.1.4.2 Cost of Interim Measures 
It was decided to consider only viaduct crossbeams that have failed the standard 
capacity assessment. Therefore, until the strengthening work was completed, it may 
have been necessary to implement certain interim measures. These could include 
weight restrictions, lane restrictions, propping, etc. The costs of implementing such 
interim measures would be saved if strengthening work was carried out. 
The costs associated with implementing any necessary interim measures were 
identified. These included costs associated with traffic disruption (real and imaginary 
costs due to delays and diversions) incurred by the implementation of weight or lane 
restrictions on and around the bridge. In addition, the costs of implementing and 
maintaining road signs and markings to indicate weight or lane restrictions or the cost of 
propping were also considered. These costs would have been saved if the bridge was 
strengthened. 
The costs associated with the traffic disruption caused by the implementation of interim 
measures were calculated from Quadro, a specialised software program based on the 
assessing engineer's estimate of the likely traffic flows, the make up of those flows, 
diversion lengths, road types, etc. The cost of implementing and maintaining the 
interim measures was taken directly from estimates made by the assessing engineer. 
All of these factors can be aggregated directly to represent the overall cost of interim 
measures for the particular strengthening project under consideration. 
7.1.4.3 Risk of Crossbeam Failure 
Despite a viaduct crossbeam failing an assessment, it is not feasible in all cases to 
implement interim measures, such as weight restrictions, to maintain safety. In these 
cases, the probability and consequences of failure can be high. In other situations, the 
probability of the crossbeam failing under standard operation is considered acceptable. 
The scheduling process will carefully calculate the probability of each crossbeam failing 
under standard operation and assess the consequences of failure. This then provides a 
comparison with the cost of interim measures, as a bridge without interim measures will 
have both a higher probability of failure and higher consequences of failure (e. g. more 
traffic would continue to use the bridge subjecting more people to the risk). This 
therefore should be taken into account in establishing optimum repair schedules. 
Obviously, this risk will be greatly reduced if the strengthening works are carried out. 
Early on in the assessment, a separate study was carried out to identify all the 
consequences of failure and the factors influencing their magnitude. The results of this 
study indicated that due to all the viaduct crossbeams being part of the same road 
network and therefore being subjected to very similar levels of traffic loading, the 
consequences of failure of different crossbeams were very similar. There would of 
course be some differences depending, for example, on whether the viaduct crossed 
over another road (and the size of that road), a railway line or a river/canal. These 
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differences were considered negligible and therefore it was recommended that the focus 
of the risk assessment be on the probability of failure instead. A detailed description of 
the method adopted for the calculation of failure probability is presented in Section 7.3. 
The main constraint on the decision was the budgets given for that year. However, the 
constraints on safety influenced other factors such as traffic disruption and impact on 
the local community. 
7.2 Structural Analysis 
Due to the number of alternatives available in this decision problem, it is not possible to 
illustrate it in its entirety. Therefore, Figure 12 shows a sample of the much more 
complex decision tree representing this decision problem. 
7.3 Uncertainty and Probabilistic Analysis 
The uncertainties typically involved in the design or assessment of bridges arise from: 
" the inherent variability of loads and material resistance parameters; 
" uncertainties in the deterioration of bridge components over time; 
" uncertainties in analysis models used for determining the load effects and capacities;: 
" uncertainties in measurement and inspection techniques. 
In view of these, it is possible that a bridge component could fail from an adverse 
combination of extreme values of the variables. 
In a traditional codified design or assessment, such as in BD 44/95 [124], the safety of a bridge component is ensured through using partial safety factors to protect against' 
extreme variations of the variables. Safety under a particular limit-state is checked 
using a design compliance equation of the form: 
Fc " function 
Y "` Zy f3 
(effects 
of (y JD " QD +7h" QL 
)) Equation 5 
k 
Where, fk is the characteristic material strength 
QD is the nominal dead load 
QL is the nominal live load (traffic load). 
Yk is the material partial factor for each material type (e. g. concrete and 
reinforcement) and accounts for the uncertainty in material parameters. 
ym is the partial factor used to account for the uncertainty in dead load. 
Ya is the partial factor used to account for the uncertainty in live load. 
yn is the partial factor used to account for uncertainty in the evaluation of load 
effects (analysis uncertainty). 
FF is the condition factor used to account for the reduction in the capacity of the 
component due to deterioration. Alternatively, the component capacity can be 
calculated using the net cross-section allowing for deterioration. 
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Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
Structural reliability methods attempt to rationally treat the various sources of 
uncertainty involved in a design or assessment process. In a reliability analysis, the 
partial factors as in Equation 5 are not used. Instead, the uncertain parameters are 
modelled using appropriate probability distribution functions and the probability of 
failure of the component is calculated. If the computed reliability is higher than the 
specified "target reliability", the component is considered to be acceptable. 
The reliability analysis approach is closely linked to the limit-state concept. For each 
limit-state (or failure mode) of a bridge component (e. g. crossbeam), a separate` 
reliability analysis is carried out to evaluate the probability that this limit-state will not 
be reached. These results can then be combined, if necessary, to calculate the overall ; 
reliability of the component. 
In analogy with the design compliance equation, the safety margin equation used in 
reliability analysis can be expressed as 
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes. Equation 6 
and the probability of failure is calculated as 
pf = Probability[Z S 0] Equation 7 
Where, Z is the "safety margin". 
pf is the probability of failure. 
The component's resistance is evaluated as a function three uncertain parameters sets: 
" material parameters fk (e. g. strength of concrete, yield strength of 
reinforcement/tendons, etc. ) 
" geometrical parameters g (e. g. effective depth, cover, area of steel, etc. ) 
9 deterioration parameters d (e. g. corrosion rate, delamination growth rate, etc. ) 
These are considered as random basic variables and are described using appropriate 
probability distributions. On the loading side the uncertain parameters are grouped 
together as the dead load QD, the super-imposed dead load Qsß and the traffic load QL. 
These are also treated as random variables. In addition, the variables BR and Bg have 
been introduced to model, to represent the uncertainty in the capacity calculations and in { 
the analysis method used for calculating the load effects, respectively. A number of 
efficient techniques are now available for calculating the probability of failure as 
expressed in the above equation. 
The main components involved in reliability analysis of a viaduct crossbeam are: 
" Modelling of dead and live loading on the viaduct 
" Modelling of the strength of the crossbeam under different failure modes 
" Modelling of deterioration of the crossbeam 
" Identifying and quantifying uncertainties in the variables 
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" Calculating failure probabilities (or reliability) with respect to each failure mode and 
the overall probability of failure. 
The approaches used during this case study are discussed in the following. 
7.3.1 Modelling of dead and live loading on the viaduct 
7.3.1.1 Traffic load modelling 
For loaded lengths of more than 25m (which was typical of the viaducts under 
consideration), the maximum lane loading occurs due to a combination of two or more 
vehicles. The traffic load effect for the section considered depends on the total traffic 
flow rate, composition of different vehicle classes, the weight and length of individual 
vehicles. Since these quantities are random, the traffic load effect is also random. 
In a reliability analysis, the probability distribution of the annual maximum traffic load 
effect is required. Initially, the annual maximum traffic load effect distribution was 
assumed to follow a Gumbel distribution based on code specified load. This model was 
adequate to provide correct sensitivities but not necessarily accurate reliability values. 
Therefore, a future improvement to the analysis method was planned to develop the 
probability distribution of the annual maximum traffic load effect by using a Monte- 
Carlo simulation technique based on the traffic data specific to these viaducts. 
7.3.2 Modelling Of The Strength Of The Crossbeam Under Different 
Failure Modes 
The ultimate limit-states of interest for the RC crossbeams are: (1) Flexure, (2) Shear 
and (3) Bond. The models for flexure and shear are essentially those given in BD 44, 
but with the partial factors removed. The model for bond was developed based on beam 
tests carried out at Westminster University [125]. 
7.3.2.1 Flexure 
The neutral axis position of a Reinforced Concrete section under flexure was calculated 
using the method of section analysis based on the assumptions given in BD 44: 
" The strain distributions in the concrete in compression and in the steel reinforcement 
are derived from the assumption that plane sections remain plane. 
" The stresses in concrete are calculated from the strains using the stress-strain curve 
for concrete given in figure 1 of BD 44 with the partial factor ymr. set to unity. 
" The tensile strength of concrete is ignored. 
" The stresses in the reinforcement are calculated from the strains using figure 2 of 
BD 44 for reinforcement with the partial factor yy set to unity. 
" The moment of resistance of an under-reinforced section is then calculated as in BD 
44, Section 5.3.2.3 (ignoring the contribution of compression reinforcement) 
M. = f, A5z Equation 8 
Where, As is the area of tension reinforcement (mm2) 
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fy is the yield strength of reinforcement (N/mm2) 
z the lever arm (mm) 
7.3.2.2 Shear 
The shear capacity of a Reinforced Concrete section is calculated based on the empirical 
formulae given in BD 44, Section 5.3.3.2 with the partial factors set to unity, as below. 
The shear strength of a section with effectively anchored longitudinal reinforcement in 
excess of that required to resist the coexistent bending moment at the section is: 
V. _4, vbd+fYA., 
d 
r 
100A, l '3 
vý = 0.24( bd l 
ýf`")Y 
4, = (500/d)y but not less than 0.7 
Where, b is the width of the beam (mm) 
d is the effective depth (mm) 
fi, is the cube strength of concrete (N/mm2) 
A, is the area of shear reinforcement (mm2) 
AJ is the area of main reinforcement (mm2) 
f,, is the yield strength of shear reinforcement (N/mm2) 
s,, is the spacing of stirrups (mm) 
Equation 9 
The limits on the maximum shear stress v, and the checks for effectiveness of shear 
reinforcement are made in accordance with BD 44. 
7.3.2.3 Bond 
A bond exists between reinforcement and concrete creating the bar end anchorage and 
composite interaction between steel and concrete along the bar. The corrosion of the 
reinforcement causes a reduction in the bar section, reducing the tensile strength. The 
by-products of the corrosion process expand, cracking the concrete cover. These two 
factors combine to reduce the bond strength of the reinforcement affecting the 
composite interaction and anchorage strength on which the design loads were based. 
Reference [138] describes experiments carried out to correlate the bond strength with 
the loss in reinforcement section for geometries with and without stirrups. In the 
experiments, the main bars were corroded but the stirrups were not. The equations that ' 
fitted to the experimental results by linear regression relate the attack penetration, x (decrease of bar radius) to the bond strength, fb. If the stirrups are also corroded then 
the bond strength will fall between the above two cases. Expressions were, therefore, 
derived by linear regression [138] to evaluate the bond strength for any condition of 
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main reinforcement and any condition of stirrups. A further relationship was developed 
between the standard bond strength along the length of the beam and the increased bond 
strength at the support zones caused by the external pressure at the support reactions. 
These theories were supplemented by beam- tests carried out at the Westminster 
University, the results of which are given in [125]. This also describes the methodology 
adopted for calculating the bond capacity of a Reinforced Concrete section. 
The anchorage length La required to sustain full tensile capacity for an undelaminated 
reinforcement is first evaluated using: 
A3fy 
La =0B Equation 10 
where, As is the area of each bar of main steel reinforcement (mm2) 
f is the yield strength of steel reinforcement (N/mm2) 
0 is the perimeter of each bar of main steel reinforcement (mm) 
B is the undelaminated bond strength of concrete, calculated as 
B=ß7 Equation 11 
where, ß is the Bond coefficient (taken as 0.7 here), 
When part of the reinforcement in the anchorage zone is delaminated, an additional 
required anchorage length is determined. A "usage factor", la, is then calculated to 





where, Ld is the delaminated length of reinforcement (mm) 
L is the undelaminated length of reinforcement (mm) 
il is the factor on bond strength = 0.32 for delaminated bars. 
Finally, the bond capacity of the reinforcement is calculated by: 
B, =µA, fy Equation 13 
The value of 0.32 for il is based on a limited number of beam tests carried out by 
Westminster University for the Highways Agency. The effects of the loss of shear links 
and clamping on the bond strength were not accounted for at this stage. 
The failure of a crossbeam under bond is checked by comparing the bond capacity from 
equation 10 with the force in the bars due to the applied loading evaluated as 
M VCot9 
Fx =Z+2 Equation 14 
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VS 
where, Cots =AfZ 1< Cot& S5 Equation 15 
M is the moment in the beam (N-mm) 
Z is the lever arm of beam section (mm) 
V is the shear force in the beam (N) 
AS is the cross sectional area of the legs of a shear link (mm2) 
Fy is the yield strength of shear reinforcement (N/mm2) 
S is the spacing of shear links 
7.3.3 Modelling of Deterioration of the Crossbeam 
The alarming rate of bridge component deterioration has inspired considerable research 
into the causes, prevention, and prediction of deterioration. All these affect . the value 
and certainty of the calculated structural reliability. 
Steel embedded in concrete is normally passivated (coated with oxide) by the strongly 
alkaline pore water. Deterioration of reinforced concrete bridges is often caused by the 
corrosion of steel reinforcement where the passivation has been breached. The two 
main causes of de-passivation involve chloride ingress and carbonation of the concrete. 
Since the deterioration of bridge components is such a key factor in the evaluation of 
risk and reliability, much attention has been focused on this area. 
7.3.3.1 Carbonation 
Carbonation is the entry of carbon dioxide into concrete, which reduces the structure's 
alkalinity. When the carbonation front reaches the steel reinforcement, the passivation 
effects of the concrete are lost and reinforcement corrosion can start if moisture and 
oxygen are present. Martin, Rausen and Schiessl [126], Klopfer [127] and Parrott [128] 
predicted the rate of penetration of CO2 based on Fick's law as: 
x= (2Dt)°'s Equation 16 
Where, x = depth of penetration (mm) 
D= diffusion coefficient (mm2/year) 
t= time (years) 
According to Mallett [129], diffusion coefficients are notoriously inconsistent. They 
can only be calculated with confidence where historical data on carbonation depths are 
available [130], but it can be a problem to find such consistent data. 
Cady and Weyers [131] presented another model based on experimental results by 
Somerville [132] that accounts for the water - cement ratio and the depth of cover. 
Rostam and Geiker [133] gave a model for carbonation rate that also accounted for 
concrete porosity. Skaarup and de Fontenay [134] accounted for differences in water 
cement ratios, curing times and types of exposure. Other equations were also developed 
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[128] to consider exposure, surface finish, water/cement ratios, curing, fly ash content 
and climate. 
Parrott [128] also calculated the expected depths of carbonation based on the concrete 
compressive strength, the effects of atmospheric CO2 levels in relation to the concrete's 
CO2 binding capacity, and the effect of temperature. 
7.3.3.2 Chloride Ingress 
The common source of chloride, if not from the sea, is from de-icing salt, either leaking 
through faulty waterproofing or deck joints, or splashed up by traffic. This was such a 
major problem on the viaducts under consideration that eventually, de-icing salts were 
banned from the viaducts. The presence of chloride ions causes depassivation of steel 
even if the pore solution is highly alkaline. 
Pocock and Gibbs [135] plotted chloride distribution curves from samples taken at 
distances from the concrete surface and found that Fick's second law of diffusion 






Where, C = chloride ion concentration (% cement weight), at a depth, x after time, t 
D, = chloride diffusion coefficient 
Thoft-Christensen et. al. [136], Cady and Weyers [131], Rostara and Geiker [133] and 
Miyagawa [137] took this further and presented the solution of the above differential 
equation. However, Rostara and Geiker [133] made an adjustment to allow for the 
surface chloride concentration varying over time. 
Thoft-Christensen et. al. [136] then went on to suggest that the corrosion initiation 
period was based on the equilibrium chloride concentration on the concrete surface, the 
initial chloride concentration, the critical chloride concentration and the concrete cover. 
Following the start of corrosion, Thoft-Christensen et. al. [136] and Rodriguez et. al. 
[138] modelled the diameter of the reinforcement bars, DI(t) at time t by applying 
Faraday's Law in terms of initial diameter, corrosion coefficient and the corrosion rate. 
Fick's second law of diffusion is widely accepted as the best method of modelling the 
diffusion of chloride through concrete. However, Wood [139] stated that it is a crude 
simplification of the processes that led to chloride ingress in real structures. Concrete is 
not a stable, inert material and diffusion is only one of five processes that lead to 
chloride ingress [140,133]. Other processes include capillary suction, permeation, 
evaporation and backwards diffusion. Fick's Law's appropriateness was also questioned 
in [141] on the grounds of chemistry. 
The models described above relate to an average deterioration of reinforcement in 
concrete. An important aspect though, is the additional pitting of reinforcement. This 
could have more influence on structural integrity, due to increased weakening of the 
reinforcement locally. This can be accounted for by defining a ratio, R, of the 
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maximum penetration (due to pitting), PCmax and the average penetration, PCay. This has 
been estimated at between 4 and 10 [142]. 
Due to the questions raised in the above review, as part of this project additional 
corrosion samples were taken from crossbeams that have already been removed to be 
replaced. Based on all this information, deterioration models were developed [143] to 
allow the most appropriate prediction of corrosion and delamination growth. The time 
of initiation of corrosion was calculated based on the chloride measurements and cover 
data. The rate of corrosion (mm2/year) was assumed constant and is determined for the 
longitudinal and shear reinforcements as: 
r,,, Qr = -C,,, aJ,, 
(E + 260 )2 rshear = -Cshea, (E + 260 )2 Equation 18 
where: C is the Corrosion Coefficient (mm2/year) 
E is the half-cell potential in mV. 
The final area of reinforcement, accounting for corrosion loss over a period of t years 
after initiation, was then based on the as-built cross-sectional area of reinforcement and 
the corrosion rate for the main or shear steel over time, as shown in equation 19 below: 
A, 
', 
= A,, 0 +-t 
As,, t = A,,,, o + rya,, -t Equation 19 
where: Asp is the as built cross sectional area of tensile reinforcement 
As, t is the remaining cross sectional area of tensile reinforcement at time t 
Asv, o is the as built cross sectional area of shear reinforcement 
A. v, t is the remaining cross sectional area of shear reinforcement at time t 
The delamination at any point in time is calculated from a measured initial delamination 
(from the last delamination survey) and then growing the delamination over time using 
an appropriate delamination growth rate. For this analysis, for simplicity, only 
delamination growth in the direction of the main reinforcement was considered. All of 
the reinforcement bars were assumed to be equally delaminated across the width of the 
crossbeam. 
It should be noted that this delamination model was not coupled with the corrosion 
model while in reality corrosion leads to delamination. Furthermore, the delamination 
is assumed to "grow" over time along its entire boundary, which is not corroborated by 
the field data. These limitations would have to be addressed in a final analysis. 
7.3.4 Identification And Quantification Of Uncertainties In The Variables 
An important task in reliability analysis is to identify the significant sources of 
uncertainty, which influence the probability of failure, and model these through random 
variables each of which is described using a probability distribution. A number of 
important random variables were identified for use in this reliability analysis. The 
probability distributions for these variables were obtained by collecting and 
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synthesising published information. The provisional probability distributions are 
summarised in Table 22. The basis of these models is discussed in the following. 
Traffic Loading - The probability distribution of the traffic load effect due to the static 
weight of vehicles is assumed to follow a Gumbel distribution. The static load effect is 
multiplied by an Impact Factor, to account for the dynamic effects. 
Impact Factor - The total load effect experienced by the bridge could be considerably 
increased by the bridge dynamic response during a vehicle crossing. To account for 
this, the load effect calculated using the static vehicle weight is multiplied by an 
"impact factor" (defined as the ratio of the total dynamic load effect to the static load 
effect). The impact factor here is applied to the gross weight of a vehicle, in contrast to 
the impact factor of 1.8 applied on the heaviest axle weight used in deriving the HA 
loading given in BD37. The impact factor is a function of the vehicle suspension and 
speed, bridge dynamic characteristics and the surfacing condition. Since the vehicle 
characteristics are unknown, the impact factor was modelled as a function of the bridge 
span and surfacing condition with probability distributions obtained from [144]. 
Dead Load - The total dead load is made up of. (i) the deck element weight, (ii) the deck 
beam weight, (iii) the surfacing weight and (iv) the weight of other non-structural 
elements. The probability distributions for these were obtained from [145,146]. 
7.3.4.1 Material and Geometric Parameters 
Material parameters such as strength of concrete, yield strength of steel/ reinforcement/ 
tendons have been modelled as random variables. Published data is available on the 
probability distributions of these variables. The values given in Table 22 are considered 
appropriate for bridges with no significant deterioration and for which the material 
grade is known. The data on geometric parameters has been obtained from judgement 
and limited published data, for example [146]. 
7.3.4.2 Deterioration Parameters 
The probability distributions assumed for the deterioration parameters are shown in 
Table 22. A high coefficient of variation has been used for the corrosion coefficient to 
account for the uncertainty in the model to calculate the initiation time, the corrosion 
rate and the actual measurements on which the calculations are based. The probability 
distribution for the corrosion coefficient was taken from a statistical analysis of the 
deterioration data obtained from previous repair carried out on these crossbeams [143]. 
The probability distribution for the delamination rate was taken from a statistical 
analysis of data from four crossbeams on a different viaduct. 
7.3.4.3 Model Uncertainty 
The uncertainty in the analysis method used for calculating the load effect was 
accounted for by BQ. The distribution for this parameter was chosen from judgement 
and from comparison with published studies [145] and assumes that load effects are 
calculated using a good elastic "grillage" model of the bridge. 
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The uncertainty in the capacity equations given by the code has been taken into account 
through Bb for bending and BN for shear. The model uncertainty in bond capacity is 
expressed through the ß factor (bond coefficient) and the il factor for the delaminated 
bars. The distributions proposed for these are based on judgement. 
It is important to collect more information on the capacity uncertainty, particularly for 
shear and bond failure modes for which the capacity equations have been obtained by 
empirical fit (often lower bound) to test results. The model uncertainty in shear and 
bond is generally higher than that for flexure and also the probability of failure in these 
limit states is seen to be very sensitive to model uncertainty parameters. 
Variable Distribution Mean COV 
Live Loads Annual maximum live load effect Gumbel 0.85xHB25 0.04 
Impact Factor Normal 1.10 0.10 
Dead Loads Effect of deck load Lognormal Nominal 0.06 
Effect of beam load Lognormal Nominal 0.04 
Effect of surfacing load Lognormal l. lx nominal 0.20 
Effect of finishing load Lognormal 1. lx nominal 0.10 
Density of crossbeam Lognormal Nominal 0.05 
Material Strength of concrete ff Lognormal Nominal+l0Mpa 0.15 
Properties Strength of reinforcement f, /f,, Lognormal 1. lx nominal 0.06 
Geometrical Diameter of main reinforcement Normal Nominal 0.01 
Properties Area of shear reinforcement As, Normal Nominal 0.03 
Depth to main reinforcement dtr Normal Nominal a= 10 mm 
Depth of crossbeam section Normal Nominal a= 15 mm 
Spacing of shear reinforcement Normal Nominal a= 15 mm 
Model Load effect BQ Lognormal 1.0 0.0 
Uncertainties Bending calculation Bt, Lognormal 1.0 0.05 
Shear calculation B. Lognormal 1.0 0.10 
Bond coefficient, ß Lognormal 0.7 0.10 
Factor on delaminated bond strength, il Lognormal 032 0.15 
Deterioration Corrosion coefficient of main steel, C". Lognormal 7.0* 10' 0.91 
Model mm2/yr/bar 
Corrosion coefficient of shear links, C5 Lognormal 7.0* 10'4 mm2/yr 0.75 
Rate of delamination growth Normal 30 mm/yr. 1.50 
Uncertainty in measured delamination Normal 0.0 a=50 mm 
A auac f,, &. rl VUAUIllty U1SIUIUUl1UUS Ul 045U Vs1I7aUlC$ 
7.3.5 Reliability Analysis 
The probability of failure as expressed in Equation 3 was calculated in this case using 
FORM/SORM methods. These are a group of approximate analytical methods designed 
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to compute the failure probability very efficiently, and have become the most widely 
used methods in recent years. In a First Order Reliability Method (FORM) a linear 
approximation to the actual non-linear limit-state function is used, while in a Second 
Order Reliability Method (SORM), a quadratic approximation is used. 
The computational procedure of FORM/SORM methods 'is summarised in Appendix 3, 
see also [147]. The analysis gives the probability of failure pfand the "reliability index" 
P which is related to pfthrough, 
Pf =(D( ß) Equation 20 
where cX(. ) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable. 
A reliability analysis also provides "sensitivity factors" which express the relative 
importance of the uncertainty in each basic random variable to the computed probability 
of failure of the component. In addition, the gradients of the reliability index with 
respect to the mean value öß/äµ, and the standard deviation aß/öa, for each random 
variable X, can also be calculated. These gradients are normalised by the reliability 
index and are often termed as "elasticities of the mean and the standard deviation". The 
analysis also gives the "most-likely" combination of values of the variables, which 
would cause the failure of a component. 
In the analysis, computer routines were developed for calculating the load effects 
(bending moment and shear force) and crossbeam capacity under bending, shear and 
bond. These were linked with the general purpose reliability software STRUREL [148] 
to produce a tool for reliability analysis of the viaduct crossbeams. 
The results of reliability indices are presented and discussed in the next section. The 
results of the sensitivity factors are presented in section 7.6 
7.3.6 Results 
Reliability analysis was carried out for one specific geometrical type of reinforced 
concrete viaduct crossbeam for the limit-states of flexure, shear and bond. For each 
limit state, the most critical cross-section position along the crossbeam was selected. 
For the flexure limit state, the cross-section selected was close to the column of the 
middle span that was in hogging. For the shear limit state, a cross-section of the 
crossbeam in the middle span was chosen for the analysis. For the bond limit state, the 
cross-section selected was towards the centre of the middle span from the column 
supporting the middle span. 
For flexure, shear and bond limit-states, the analysis was performed for three conditions 
of the crossbeam: (i) as-built condition (ii) present condition with some loss of strength 
due to corrosion of reinforcement and delamination, and (iii) future condition with 
further corrosion of reinforcement and delamination in the future years. For the bond 
limit state, analyses were carried out for differing degrees of initial delamination in the 
present condition. In addition, a case was analysed assuming that the crossbeam was 
fully delaminated in its present condition. 
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The results from these analyses are presented below in the form of the change in 
reliability index over time. Since the input distributions were not accurate at this stage 
for all the variables (especially loading and deterioration), the reliability index was 
normalised by the as built reliability index instead of using the absolute results. 
7.3.6.1 Flexure Limit State 
The reliability of the crossbeam was calculated at different points in time in the future. 
The corrosion of longitudinal reinforcement over time was calculated using the 
deterioration model given in Section 7.3.3, assuming that corrosion initiated in 1986. 
The loss of concrete section in the compressive zone had only a marginal influence on 
bending capacity. 
Parametric reliability analyses were carried out to study the variation in reliability due 
to deterioration over time. The results for "low", "medium" and "high" rates of 
corrosion were assessed and are shown in Figure 13 (i. e. from -290mV (low) to -390mV 
(high)). These results revealed that the reliability decreased significantly with time in 
the first 5 to 10 years after the initiation of corrosion. The decrease in reliability was 
more pronounced only for the "medium" and "high" corrosion rate cases and showed 
almost no reduction when the corrosion rate was "low". These results, however, do not 
imply that the reliability will not decrease if the half-cell value is more positive than - 
250. This depends to some extent on the initial capacity ratio of the crossbeam and the 














Figure 13: Effect of Deterioration on the Reliability of the Future Condition of 
the Crossbeam: FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
7.3.6.2 Shear Limit State 
The reliability of the crossbeam at different points in time in the future was calculated 
for the shear limit-state. The corrosion of reinforcement over time was calculated using 
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the deterioration model given in Section 7.3.3, assuming that corrosion initiated in 
1986. The loss of concrete section in the compressive zone was not included. 
Parametric studies were carried out to study the variation in reliability due to 
deterioration over time. The effect of different corrosion rates on the reliability of a 
crossbeam, analyses were assessed for half-cell values ranging from -290mV (low) to - 
390mV (high). The results for "low", "medium" and "high" rates of corrosion, 
presented in Figure 14, showed that the decrease in reliability with time was of the same 
order for the shear case as the flexure case. The decrease in reliability was more 
pronounced for the cases of "medium" and "high" rate of corrosion. 
Figure 14: Effect of Deterioration on the Reliability of the Future Condition of 
the Crossbeam: SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
7.3.6.3 Bond Limit State 
The reliability of the crossbeam at different points in time in the future was studied for 
the bond limit-state using the deterioration model given in Section 7.3.3, assuming that 
corrosion initiated in 1986. The loss of concrete section in the compressive zone was 
not included. 
Parametric reliability analyses were carried out to study the variation in reliability due 
to deterioration over time. The results for "low", "medium" and "high" rates of 
corrosion, presented in Figure 15, showed that, for "medium" and "high" corrosion 
rates, the reliability dropped quite dramatically with time. For the "low" corrosion rate, 
however, the reliability stayed initially unaffected, then dropped quite suddenly once a 
critical level of delamination was reached with the crossbeam failing in bond. As the 
delamination exceeded the critical area, the reliability level stabilised. 
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Examination of the design point values of the variables showed that, if the anchorage 
zone was moderately delaminated, it was likely to result in a combination of 
bond and 
bending failure. The bars with the shortest minimum anchorage length (with respect to 
the considered section) were likely to fail by bond (slipping) but the bars with the longer 
minimum anchorage length were able to mobilise enough bond strength to resist 
slipping. The final failure of the section occulted by the yielding of the longer bars. 
The effect of high initial delamination was studied by considering the anchorage zone to 
be fully delaminated in its present condition. It was therefore evident that, when the 
initial area of delarnination was small, reinforcement bars mobilised their full tensile 
capacity and the failure was likely to be of flexure type. When the area of delamination 
increased gradually, there was a stage when the failure mode changed over to a bond 
type. The point at which this change over happened depended on the section being 
considered, the length of the bars and the force in the bars. The loss of shear links (not 
considered here) could have initiated an early change over to the bond failure mode, 
while the clamping of bars would have delayed it. However, when the corrosion rate 
was high, the failure was more likely to be one of flexure type with the reliability 













Figure 15: Effect of Deterioration on the Reliability of the Future 
the Crossbeam: BOND LIMIT STATE 





It became clear very early on that the governing decision factor, in the eyes of the 
identified decision-makers, was the probability of structural failure. The probability to 
be addressed related more to identifying a minimum acceptable, or target reliability, and 
scheduling repairs before the date at which the crossbeam was expected to reach that 
state. It did not involve significant trade-offs with the cost of repair and the cost of 
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interim measures. The cost of interim measures was obviously an important influence in 
the decision problem, there was in fact a very low tolerance to the implementation of 
interim measures, apart from propping. The route network under consideration was so 
significant that the prospect of imposing weight restrictions would have created such 
extreme traffic chaos that it was only considered acceptable as a last resort, in an 
emergency. The cost of repair and strengthening works was also considered only in 
terms of the effect it had on the remaining annual budget. Lower cost, lower risk 
projects may at times be brought forward to make the best use of the budget, if there 
was less benefit in bringing forward a more costly higher risk project. The values 
assigned to the decision criteria were, therefore quite clear. 
7.5 Selection of the "Best" Alternative 
Two problems remained before the best alternative could be selected: 
1. To identify the minimum acceptable reliability at which point the crossbeam would 
have to be strengthened, propped or restricted irrespective of cost or impact. 
2. To produce a rationale for deciding when it was beneficial to repair a crossbeam 
before its latest acceptable repair date and when it was better to leave it as long as 
possible until its latest acceptable repair date. 
7.5.1 Definition of a target reliability level 
In order to develop a reliability-based repair strategy, it is necessary to establish the 
latest intervention date by which the crossbeam must be repaired. For each crossbeam, 
a reliability profile can be produced by performing a number of reliability analyses 
corresponding to different points in time. The point in time when the computed 
reliability of a crossbeam falls below the target reliability level is taken as the 
intervention date. The minimum value from all limit states at the worst position in the 
crossbeam gives the latest intervention date for the crossbeam. 
Bridge codes and standards in the UK do not currently specify target reliability levels, 
therefore it is necessary to determine an acceptable level. The problem in choosing a 
target reliability level is determining how safe is safe enough. Complex technical, 
social, economical and political issues need to be considered rationally. Three main 
approaches are usually adopted for determining a target reliability level: 
" Socially acceptable risk levels derived from historical data. 
" Calibration to existing codes. 
" Economic optimisation combined with decision analysis. 
7.5.1.1 Historical failure statistics 
Historical failure data can be analysed to establish what level of risk has been accepted 
in the recent past. This then becomes a guide to what may be acceptable in the future. 
Where there is inadequate data, acceptance levels can be established by comparing risk 
levels implicit in different areas of activity such as driving by car, flying in an 
Caroline M Roberts Page 109 CASE STUDY 2 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
aeroplane, working on an offshore platform, etc. This approach was used by Menzies 
[149] to establish target reliabilities for short span bridges in the UK. 
There are a number of difficulties in using this approach: 
1. Identifying who has accepted the risk in the past (industry, government or 
general public) is a problem. What is acceptable to the industry may not be acceptable 
to the regulator or the government. What one group of the population deems acceptable 
may not be acceptable to other groups. Additionally, what has been accepted in the past 
may not necessarily be acceptable in the future. 
2. Defining what has been accepted is a problem. Historical failure data changes 
with time and shows abrupt changes in failure rates before and after a major accident. 
3. Historical data represents generic conditions therefore it is difficult to relate 
failure rates to the specific environments and operating and maintenance regimes under 
which a structure or facility operates at present. 
4. The methods of design and construction, and the operating and maintenance 
procedures have evolved over time. It is likely that the factors that contributed to a 
failure in the past are no longer relevant in the future. 
5. There are also additional philosophical difficulties in relating historical failure 
rates to failure probabilities computed from a reliability analysis. 
7.5.1.2 Calibration to existing codes and standards 
In this approach, the reliability level implicit in the existing deterministic codes and 
standards is first quantified by performing reliability analysis for a number of typical 
structures which are designed to the existing code requirements. The reliability level 
implicit in a code can then be taken as the target reliability for the design of structures in 
the future. This is one of the most widely used approaches for establishing target 
reliability levels. Most applications have been in the derivation of partial safety factors 
in limit state design codes to replace the older working stress codes for buildings, 
bridges and offshore structures. 
This approach assumes that existing codes have satisfactory levels of safety. Current 
practice is believed to be safe because it has evolved over a considerable length of time 
and would have changed if designs of structures had resulted in frequent failure. 
However, current practice may be too far on the safe side in which case it is not optimal. 
In recent years, studies have been carried out [150,151] to quantify the reliability levels 
implicit in the bridge assessment standard BD 21/84 [152]. The lowest values of 
reliabilities obtained for the different bridge types over a range of parameter variations 
are shown in Table 23. Note that there are some differences in the parameter variations 
and the probability distributions of the variables used in the WS Atkins and Imperial 
College studies that would influence the reliability values. 
From this table, it is clear that the current code provisions result in a wide variation in 
reliability values across different types of components and parameter variations. The 
resulting failure probabilities also seem to be very low. Some judgement would 
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therefore be required in choosing a target reliability value once the reliability values 
implicit in the current code provisions are quantified. 
Bridge Failure WS Atkins [1501 Imperial College [1511 
Component Mode 
Pf (3 Pf (3 
RC Slab Bending 10" 6.0 10" 5.7 
Shear <10'1° 6.5 - - 
RC Beam + Bending - <10-11 7.1 
RC Slab Shear - - 
Steel Girder Bending 10" 6.0 10 4.7 
+ RC Slab Shear 10-6 4.7 - 
PSC Beam + Bending <10-12 8.0 - 
RC Slab Shear 10-6 4.7 - - 
Table 23 Annual Reliability Levels implicit in BD21/84 
7.5.1.3 Economic optimisation 
The probability of bridge failures can be reduced to a very low value by increasing the 
partial safety factors. However, this incurs high costs and is hence uneconomical. On 
the other hand, a high target failure probability would result in bridges failing frequently 
during service with the related consequences of loss of life, traffic disruption, 
repair/rebuilding costs, etc., which again would be undesirable. It is therefore important 
to set the target reliability level that is optimal according to all important criteria. 
This would depend on its function, importance, initial construction costs and the 
consequences of its failure in terms of loss of life, injury, traffic disruption, repair/ 
rebuilding costs, and other economic losses. It is possible to calculate the optimal level 
of target probability of failure provided the value of the consequences of failure can be 
estimated although these are often difficult to calculate accurately. 
The Nordic Committee on Building Regulations [153] recommends target failure 
probabilities dependent on the nature and the consequence of failure as in Table 24. 
Ductile failure provides adequate warning before the whole structure fails, allowing 
mitigating action to be taken, hence a higher probability of failure is acceptable. 
Failure Type 
Failure Consequence Ductile 
strength 
with reserve Ductile with 
reserve strength 
no Brittle failure 
Not Serious 10" 3.09 10 3.71 10' 4.27 
Serious 10 3.71 10" 4.27 10 4.75 
Very Serious 10" 4.27 10, 4.75 10' 5.20 
Table 24 'target Reliabilities for Building Design in Nordic Countries [153] 
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Economic considerations are also important when setting target reliability levels for 
existing structures. The repair or strengthening of an existing structure can be 
considerably more expensive than the design of a new structure. Therefore, every effort 
should be made to minimise or avoid unnecessary strengthening without unduly 
increasing the risk to the public. This is evident in the development of the bridge 
assessment code used in Canada [154]. The annual target reliability used for 
assessment varies. between 2.25 to 3.75 (or Pf 104 to 10.2) depending on the nature of 
element failure, redundancy of the bridge and the level of inspection effort. In contrast, 
for the design of new bridges, a constant target reliability of 3.75 (Pf = 104) is used. 
Similar approaches have been used in other application areas, such as offshore 
structures. 
7.5.1.4 Recommendations for a target reliability 
The decision concerning how to set a target reliability is obviously a difficult one and is 
an issue that has remained unresolved by structural reliability engineers for many years. 
The method adopted in this project still had not been agreed upon by the time I left WS 
Atkins in Autumn 1997. However, the most preferred method is a combination of 
economic optimisation and calibration to existing codes and standards. Calibration to 
existing codes and standards on its own is too conservative and removes much of the 
benefits gained from using structural reliability methods in the first place. Economic 
optimisation is too unconservative and does not account for the risk tolerance (or 
intolerance) of users and the local community. Economic optimisation can be made 
more acceptable if it accounts for more than economics, such as the more qualitative 
issues including company image, social and political impacts, etc. through multi-criteria 
decision methods. Any target reliability set by economic optimisation must be 
compared with those implicit in existing codes to understand how conservative or 
unconservative it is and whether or not that is acceptable. 
7.5.2 Definition of a decision rationale 
Once the change in reliability over time of each crossbeam has been calculated, that still 
does not answer the question of how to schedule the necessary repair works within the 
budget. A completely separate decision rationale must be developed to identify the best 
time to repair each crossbeam and feasibility of fitting such a schedule within the 
budget. Figure 16 shows a proposed rationale for solving this problem, which is 
discussed in more detail below: 
The first task in evaluating each crossbeam is to determine the latest intervention date, 
based on the change in reliability over time and the target reliability as described in the 
previous section. It would also be possible to apply confidence limits to this date. 
It may not always be possible to fit all crossbeams needing repair in a specific year into 
one year's budget, and some may have to be deferred to the next year. Because they 
will have gone beyond their target reliability at that stage, it will be necessary to 
introduce interim measures. Therefore, the crossbeams needing deferment should be 
those with the lowest consequence of deferment. These are the Group B crossbeams 
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defined in Figure 16. The Group B crossbeams should have the lowest probability of 
failure, the lowest consequences of failure and the lowest consequence of implementing 
interim measures. This can be calculated for each crossbeam as an expected utility of 
deferring repairs, E(U) jnterim+repair(t+1): 
U(DCR) + U(CIM) + U(IIM) + Pf x (U(CF) + U(IF)) 
Equation 21 
Where, U(DCR) = The utility of the Discounted Cost of Repair at time t+l 
Where, DCR = CR/rt+1 
Where CR = The Cost of Repair (design, material, equipment and labour costs) 
at time t+1. 
r= the assumed interest rate 
U(CIM) = The utility of the Cost of Interim Measures (cost of labour, materials 
and equipment associated with propping or weight restrictions) until time t+l. 
U(IIM) = The utility of the Impact of Interim Measures (traffic disruption, 
delays, impact on drivers and on local inhabitants) until time t+1. 
Pf = The probability of the crossbeam failing before it is repaired 
U(CF) = The utility of the Cost of Failure (discounted cost of rebuilding, design, 
material, equipment and labour costs) before time t+1. 
U(IF) = The utility of the Impacts of Failure (loss of life and injury, traffic 
disruption, delays, its impact on drivers and on local inhabitants, due to failure) 
before time t+l. 
In some cases, the discounted cost of repair may give preference to deferring a 
crossbeam by one year. This would increase its priority for deferment, but in the overall 
interests of safety, if the budgets allowed, this crossbeam should still be repaired this 
year. Interim measures are still not as safe as carrying out a full repair. It may help to 
re-inspect any crossbeams that are to be deferred to update the predicted reliability 
before interim measures are designed. 
In other situations, all crossbeams needing repair in this year may be catered for with 
funds to spare, in which case the next most important group of crossbeams can be 
examined and prioritised. This is Group C crossbeams in Figure 16. These crossbeams 
have not yet reached their target reliability but are in a condition that is more efficient to 
repair now than to delay until the target reliability is reached. In other words the total 
expected utility of carrying out repairs now is less that the total expected utility of 
carrying out repairs at year n, where n is the latest intervention date: E(U)jnurim+rcpair(t+n) 
E(U), pt) such that: 
E(U)ý«ýM+Kýjr(I+n) = U(DCR) + U(CIM) + U(IIM) + Pf x (U(CF) + U(IF)) 
Equation 22 
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Where, U(DCR) = The utility of the Discounted Cost of Repair at time t+n 
U(CIM) = The utility of the Cost of Interim Measures until time t+n 
U(IIM) =The utility of the Impact of Interim Measures until time t+n 
Pf = The probability of the crossbeam failing before it is repaired at time t+n 
U(CF) = The utility of the Cost of Failure before time t+n 
U(IF) = The utility of the Impacts of Failure before time t+n 
E(U), 
ra,,. (, ) = 




Where, U(CR) = The Cost of Repair at time t 
Pf = The probability of the crossbeam failing before it is repaired at time t 
U(CF) = The utility of the Cost of Failure before time t. 
U(IF) = The utility of the Impacts of Failure before time t. 
The ratio of E(U) repajq) / E(U) j, u aIr(t nt can be calculated for all crossbeams in 
Group C, and the crossbeams with the lowest ratio can be brought forward into the 
current year. However, there is little benefit in bringing forward any other crossbearhs 
if funds remain. Any remaining crossbeams have an expected utility of repair at the 
latest intervention date lower than the expected utility of repair now. Of course, in real 
life, the number of crossbeams needing repair exceeds the budget, making this an 
unlikely situation. 
I developed this decision rationale independently of WS Atkins after I had left their. 
employment. However, I have since discovered that the methodology, which'. they, 
applied, was very similar. Firstly, a target reliability level was agreed between the 
decision makers, which gave the latest date by which each crossbeam should be 
repaired. This latest intervention was between the present time and the next 60 years for 
all crossbeams assessed. All crossbeams that were predicted to become critical within 
the next 5 years were then grouped into contracts for repair now. Whole life- cost 
principles were then adopted to identify the best time to repair each of the remaining 
crossbeams, using the latest intervention date as a constraint. 
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7.6 . Sensitivity Analysis 
A number of sensitivity results are provided as output to a structural reliability analysis. 
These indicate the importance of the different parameters and their uncertainties to the 
reliability values calculated. This allows the decision-maker to refine the models and the 
parameter distributions to increase confidence in the decision made. The sensitivity 
factors show the relative importance (expressed as a percentage) of the uncertainty in 
each variable to the reliability index. 
The elasticities of the mean values of the variables represent the change in reliability 
index due to a small change in the mean value of a variable (see Section 7.3.5 for 
definition). The elasticities are positive for those variables for which an increase in the 
mean value will increase the reliability of the component and will be negative for the 
other variables. 
The elasticities of standard deviation for the limit-state of bending represent the change 
in reliability index due to a small change in the standard deviation of a variable (see 
Section 7.3.5 for definition). The elasticities for all the variables are negative because 
increasing the standard deviation (a measure of scatter or spread) of any variable will 
decrease the reliability of the component. 
The following sections discuss the sensitivities for each failure mode and for three cases 
of the as-built condition, the present condition and the future condition. The actual 
graphs showing the results are presented in Appendix 4. 
7.6.1 Flexure limit state 
7.6.1.1 As-built condition 
The sensitivity results for flexure, for the as-built condition of the crossbeam revealed 
that the reliability index is very sensitive to the uncertainty in bending moment due to 
the live load and the impact factor. The yield strength of longitudinal reinforcement and 
the uncertainties in the models used for load effect analysis and capacity of the 
component were also very important. Uncertainty in other variables, such as the 
concrete cube strength, effective depth, diameter of longitudinal steel and dead load did 
not have a significant influence on the probability of failure. 
The elasticities of the mean values of bar diameter, yield strength of longitudinal 
reinforcement and effective depth of section were very important which is obvious for 
an under-reinforced section. The mean values of the analysis and capacity model 
parameters were also important. 
The elasticities of standard deviation of live load bending moment, impact factor, yield 
strength of reinforcement and model uncertainty parameters were very important for 
reliability. These were much lower than the elasticities of the mean values of these 
variables. This implied that it is more important to determine the mean values of the 
parameters accurately than the standard deviation. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 116 CASE STUDY 2 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
7.6.1.2 Present condition 
A "Base Case" analysis was carried out for a high corrosion rate determined by a- 
390mV half-cell value. Additional parametric studies were then carried out for lower 
values of half-cell potential. The results of sensitivity factors from the Base Case 
analysis revealed that the uncertainty in the corrosion coefficient, was the single most 
dominant variable when the corrosion rate is high. The contributions of other variables 
became insignificant. 
The elasticities of the mean values of bar diameter and corrosion coefficient were the 
most dominant. The yield strength of longitudinal reinforcement and the analysis and 
capacity model parameters were also important. 
The elasticity of the standard deviation of the corrosion coefficient dominated the 
reliability of the crossbeam under bending. 
In order to study the effect of different corrosion rates on the reliability of a crossbeam, 
reliability analyses were carried out for half-cell measurements ranging from -290mV 
(low corrosion rate) to -390mV (high). The sensitivity results for the low half-cell case 
were the same as those for the as-built case. In other words, the reliability is not 
sensitive to the corrosion parameters when the corrosion rate is low. 
7.6.1.3 Future condition 
The reliability of the crossbeam was also calculated at different points in time in the 
future. The results of sensitivity factors for the bending case corresponding to a "high" 
rate of corrosion showed that the uncertainty in the corrosion coefficient again 
dominated the crossbeam reliability. It was, however, found that, if the rate of 
corrosion was "low", the sensitivities were similar to those of the as-built condition. 
The results of elasticities of the mean and the standard deviation showed a similar trend 
as was evident from the sensitivity factors. The elasticities were in general similar to 
the corresponding values for the present condition. 
7.6.2 Shear limit state 
7.6.2.1 As-built condition 
The results of the sensitivity factors showed that the uncertainty in the capacity model 
dominated over all the other variables. The uncertainty in the analysis model and the 
impact factor were also very important. However, the uncertainty in concrete strength, 
yield strength of shear steel, live load effect and spacing of stirrups were less important. 
The elasticities of the mean values of the resistance model and analysis model 
uncertainties were high compared to other variables. These parameters were 
significantly more important for shear than for bending. The elasticity of standard 
deviation of the resistance model was much higher than all the other variables. 
7.6.2.2 Present condition 
A "Base Case" analysis was carried out for a high corrosion rate determined by a- 
390mV half-cell potential. The results of sensitivity factors from the Base Case 
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analysis showed that the uncertainty in corrosion rate for shear had a dominating 
influence on reliability for a high corrosion situation. The contribution from other 
variables became insignificant. 
The elasticities of the mean values of the resistance model and analysis model 
uncertainty were high compared to other variables. Also significant were the mean 
values of the area of shear steel and the corrosion rate of shear steel. The elasticity of 
the standard deviation of the corrosion rate of shear steel dominated. 
In order to study the effect of different corrosion rates on the reliability of a crossbeam, 
analyses were carried out for half-cell values ranging from -290mV (low) to -390mV 
(high). The sensitivity results for the lower levels of half-cell showed that the 
uncertainty in the corrosion rate had no influence on reliability in a low corrosion 
situation. The results were sensitive to the same uncertainties as for the as-built case. . 
7.6.2.3 Future condition 
The reliability of the crossbeam at different points in time in the future was calculated 
for the shear limit-state. The results of sensitivity factors corresponding to a "high" rate 
of corrosion over a 10-year period, showed the same trend as that of the present 
condition. The importance of the corrosion coefficient for shear steel was dominant for 
the high corrosion rate case and insignificant for the low corrosion rate case. 
The results of elasticities of the mean and the standard deviation showed a similar trend 
as was evident from the sensitivity factors. The elasticities were in general similar to 
the corresponding values for the present condition. 
7.6.3 Bond limit state 
7.6.3.1 As-built condition 
The results of sensitivity factors reflected those for the flexure limit state. This was 
because, in the as built condition, all the reinforcement bars developed their full tensile 
capacity and the failure mode was essentially one of flexure failure. 
The elasticities of the mean values of the yield strength of main reinforcement, the load 
effect analysis model and the diameter of the bars were high compared to other 
variables. 
The elasticities of the standard deviations of live load bending moment, impact factor, 
yield strength of reinforcement and model uncertainty parameters were found to be very important. 
7.6.3.2 Present condition 
The results of sensitivity factors for the case with "high" corrosion rate, showed that the 
reliability of the crossbeam was completely dominated by the uncertainty in corrosion 
rate. Because of a high loss of area of reinforcement, the tensile capacity of the bars 
was lower than their bond capacity (i. e. resistance to slip), and hence the failure mode 
was one of flexure. 
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The elasticities of the mean values and standard deviations of variables were also 
similar to those of the flexure case in the present condition. 
The sensitivity results for a low corrosion rate (-290mV half cell) and an initial 
delamination over 30% of the anchorage showed that the important variables were 
similar to those for bending failure. The concrete strength and the bond coefficient, 
also showed a significant influence. 
The effect of high initial delamination was studied by considering the anchorage zone to 
be fully delaminated in its present condition. The sensitivity results found that the most 
important variables were the factor 'n on delaminated bond strength, the bond 
coefficient ß and the concrete cube strength. From this it was clear that the capacity of 
the bars in the fully delaminated condition was limited by their bond strength and the 
failure was likely to occur by slipping of the bars. 
7.6.3.3 Future condition 
The reliability of the crossbeam at different points in time in the future was studied for 
the bond limit-state. It was observed that the sensitivities changed depending on the 
governing mode of failure. 
In the case of high corrosion rate (over a 10 year period), the failure type was bending 
and hence the reliability was governed by the uncertainty in corrosion rate. If, however, 
the rate of corrosion was "low", the sensitivity to the uncertainty in the delamination 
rate became the most significant. The uncertainties in the ß coefficient and the q factor 
on delaminated bond strength also became significant. The results of elasticities of the 
mean and the standard deviation showed a similar trend as was evident from the 
sensitivity factors. The elasticities were in general similar to the corresponding values 
for the present condition. 
Examination of the sensitivity factors showed that, for the "moderate" and "high" 
corrosion rate cases, the failure was one of flexure type and hence the variation of 
reliability with time was also similar to that of the flexure limit state. However, when. 
the corrosion rate was "low", the sensitivities change markedly with time as the failure 
mode changed from flexure to bond. The importance of yield strength and impact factor 
reduced once the failure mode changed from flexure to bond. 
7.7 Conclusions 
The key problem addressed by this case study was not whether to repair certain 
crossbeams or even when to repair them so much as which should be carried out first. 
A set budget was available for the work, which was going to be spent, but the important 
question was on which crossbeams. The uncertainties and the consequences of the 
selection decision were significant and severe in terms of the loss of life that could 
result from the failure of the crossbeam. This meant that the decision had to be made as 
carefully and thoroughly as possible. 
Due to the number of uncertainties involved, it was considered possible that a bridge 
component could fail from an adverse combination of extreme values of these variables. 
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These uncertainties arise from the inherent variability of loads and material resistance 
parameters, deterioration of bridge components over time, analysis models used for 
determining the load effects and capacities, and in measurement and inspection 
techniques. In order to decide when and how repair should be carried out, it was 
therefore necessary to consider the risk of the crossbeam failing, whether repair or 
maintenance is carried out or not. The risk was defined as: 
Risk = Probability of failure * Consequence of failure 
However, in this study, due to the consequences of crossbeam failure being 
approximately the same for all crossbeams, the probability of failure, only, was 
considered. In the current codes for design or assessment, using a number of partial 
safety factors to guard against extreme variations of the variables ensures the safety of a 
bridge component. However, structural reliability analysis methods were introduced to 
attempt to treat, in a rational manner, the various sources of uncertainties involved in a 
design or assessment process. In the reliability analysis, the partial factors were not 
used. Instead, the uncertain parameters were modelled using appropriate probability 
distribution functions and the probability of failure of the crossbeam was calculated. 
For each limit-state (or failure mode) of the crossbeam, a separate reliability analysis 
was carried out to evaluate the probability that this limit-state will not be reached. 
These results were then combined to calculate the overall reliability of the component. 
The resistance of the crossbeam was evaluated as a function of the uncertain material 
parameters (e. g. strength of concrete, yield strength of reinforcement, etc. ) and 
geometrical parameters (e. g. effective depth, area of steel, etc. ), which were considered 
as random basic variables and described using appropriate probability distributions. On 
the loading side, the dead load and the traffic load were treated as random variables. In 
addition, variables were introduced to model the uncertainty in the capacity calculations 
and in the analysis method used for calculating the load effects. 
Stakeholders were initially expected to be an issue due to the importance of the road 
network and the extremity of the risks. However, it soon became clear that for all 
parties maximising safety was the primary criteria. This removed any serious conflict 
of interests and allowed focus to be placed on ensuring a robust evaluation of safety. 
The set of basic alternatives was not difficult to identify as this covered all the 
crossbeams in the road network. The more difficult task in identifying alternatives 
involved considering how the different crossbeams could be combined into common 
repair packages to maximise the use of the budget and minimise traffic disruption. This 
was such a complex issue that a further process was developed beyond the risk-based 
decision model to formalise a structured approach. 
The most important decision criterion was the safety of the road network. Due to the 
significant uncertainties and the severe consequences of failure, all parties considered 
any crossbeam failure intolerable. This meant the risk analysis became the focus of the 
decision process such that the most dangerous crossbeams should be addressed first. 
Because of the importance of the risk as the basis for the decision-making, it was 
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essential that a thorough understanding of the risk and its evaluation be gained. Other 
factors that still had to be taken into account but more as secondary issues were using 
the budget the most efficiently and minimising the disruption to traffic. 
A decision analysis tree was constructed to try to gain increased understanding of the 
decision problem. However, the problem was far too complex for this simple method to 
bring much benefit. Therefore, a more detailed structural assessment was carried out by 
developing a decision rationale that would consider all of the important factors in the 
best context. The ability and opportunity to carry out such a detailed assessment of the 
decision issues within the risk-based decision model shows the flexibility of the model. 
It also proves its role as a guideline to support decision-making rather than dictate 
decision-making. 
The information necessary to evaluate the risks as a basis for the decision-making was 
determined primarily from developing the structural reliability models. The main data 
was gathered from historical inspection reports and test data. Preliminary structural 
reliability analyses allowed the sensitivity of the results to the parameter uncertainties to 
be evaluated. This highlighted areas where further information would be beneficial. 
The most important risk identified in this decision problem was the risk of any of the 
crossbeams failing before it could be repaired with catastrophic consequences. Because 
of the severe nature of the consequences, it was considered essential that the risks be 
quantified as clearly as possible. For this reason, detailed structural reliability analysis 
was carried out. The problem with structural reliability analysis however is what to do 
with the result. The probability of failure is not a very useful figure if there is not a 
maximum acceptable probability of failure to compare it with. Therefore, by 
establishing a maximum acceptable probability it was then possible to determine when 
each crossbeam was likely to pass that limit. This was then a constraint on the timing of 
when to repair the crossbeam. In this way, the risk assessment of each of the 
crossbeams was a direct input into the decision of when to repair. Such a detailed 
assessment of the probability of failure was appropriate to the problem because of the 
extreme importance placed on the results of the analysis. 
The only preference formally accounted for in the decision-making process was the 
unanimous preference for minimising the risk of crossbeam failure. This was therefore 
incorporated into the decision by being the main decision criterion. The development of 
the detailed decision rationale was then used to show clearly the process by which the 
decision was made to build consensus and provide an audit trail for future reference. By 
carrying out the risk assessment and developing the decision rationale as an independent 
third party, it was possible to show impartiality to the decision process, which helped 
build confidence and ownership of the results by the stakeholders. This was especially 
the case in the risk assessment as there was some scepticism amongst stakeholders that 
risk assessments could be tampered with to give the result the decision-maker was 
looking for. 
Following completion of this work, after I had left WS Atkins, the repair schedule that 
was finally recommended was adopted fully by the decision-makers. The decision- 
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makers found the support provided by the evaluation of such a complex decision to be 
extremely useful. They welcomed any support to give structure and meaning to the way 
in which this problem was solved. 
The main area that was important to carry out sensitivity analysis in this case was in the 
uncertainties of the parameters in the structural reliability assessment. The uncertainties 
were so significant in some parameters that it was important to establish their effect on 
the risk assessment results. This then gave the opportunity to gather more data and/or 
refine the engineering models as necessary. As there were no conflicting preferences 
accounted for in the decision, it was not necessary to establish their sensitivity. 
The use of the risk-based decision model to support this decision did not mean the 
introduction of risk analysis where it would not have normally been carried out. This 
was because it had already been decided that the risk of failure was the main issue. 
However, the risk-based decision model helped the decision-makers gain a clearer 
understanding of how to integrate the risk analysis results into the decision-making. 
This case study has clearly demonstrated that rigorous reliability analysis procedures 
can be developed and applied to the assessment of viaduct crossbeams. It has also 
shown that risk-based decision methods provide significant support to the way that 
scheduling maintenance decisions are made under such conditions of uncertainty and 
limited budgets. The sensitivity factors presented also provided considerable insight 
into the failure behaviour of deteriorating crossbeams and identified the relative 
importance of different variables to the reliability of the crossbeam. 
The decision problem addressed in this case was very heavily biased to risk assessment 
rather than any other aspect of decision-making. Furthermore, the decision model was 
not found thorough enough to give the recommended best option without further work, 
such as the development of a detailed decision rationale. However, if the model was 
more detailed then it would be too cumbersome for the more straightforward decisions. 
The model was still found to be very useful to ensure that all aspects of the decision 
were considered and evaluated and provided opportunities for the more detailed 
analyses to be carried out. 
The application of the risk-based decision model to this case study ensured that all 
aspects of the situation were considered. For example, in engineering decisions it is 
often very easy to forget to consider stakeholder issues (as is the case of the Brent Spar 
problem for Shell). By using the model, a conscious decision had to be made whether 
to formally address all stakeholders or not. In this case it was decided that it was not 
necessary but that did not mean that it was a waste of time. Instead, it provided a 
clearly argued case to be used in defence of the decision should there be any problems 
at a later stage. The use of the decision model also helped identify the role of the risk 
analysis in the decision and how to use its results. 
The use of a structured decision process to support the decision in this case helped the 
decision-makers identify the key issues to be addressed and the issues, which did not 
need to be addressed. It allowed the role of the risk analysis in the decision-making to 
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be clearly defined and the detail of analysis to be agreed upon. The use of the risk- 
based decision model brought the significance of the risks to the fore and meant that the 
assessment of risks was an integral part of the' decision process. The clear structure of 
the decision process promoted understanding and ownership of the way the decision 
was made, which gave support for the results that were implemented. In addition, as a 
government related organisation it provided the decision-makers with an audit trail to 
show the logic and thoroughness of the decision-making in case anything went wrong at 
a later stage. 
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8 CASE STUDY 3 
PLANNING OF PIPELINE REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT 
SCHEDULES 
8.1 Problem Definition 
8.1.1 Identify problem or opportunity 
Corrosion was found to have occurred in a client's main oil pipelines. However, the 
client preferred to avoid leaks by proactive repair or replacement of corroded pipelines. 
We were requested to perform a remnant life assessment (RLA) study of the field's two 
30" diameter main oil lines including the development of remnant life prediction 
software. This was then to be the basis for the ensuing decisions of how to optimise the 
extent and timing of repair or replacement for each pipeline. 
In the early part of year 29, the oil lines had been adapted to be able to take an 
intelligent PIG (Pipeline Inspection Gauge) for internal inspection. A Magnetic Flux 
Leakage PIG was used at the end of Year 29 to measure remnant wall thickness 
throughout the pipeline. The results of the inspection indicated significant areas of 
grooving corrosion characteristic of carbonic acid corrosion and localised pitting 
corrosion. Because of this, the client reduced the Maximum Allowable Operating 
Pressure (MAOP) from 1050 to 980 psig and set up a monitoring and inspecting 
schedule for the worst locations to ensure pipeline integrity at least every two years. 
In Years 30 and 31 external ultrasonic scans were carried out over localised areas of the 
pipe to monitor the worst areas of corrosion identified so far. In Year 32, another PIG 
inspection was carried out, this time an ultrasonic PIG was used. This survey also 
identified laminations and blistering characteristic of hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). 
It was therefore necessary to calculate the current capacity of the pipeline to ensure its 
current safety and the to determine the corrosion rate to which the pipeline was still 
subject to evaluate the remnant safe life of the pipeline. Once the remnant life was 
calculated it would then possible to use this information to rationally determine whether 
the pipeline should be repaired or replaced and when this should take place. 
8.1.2 Identify stakeholders In the decision 
Due to the significance of these oil lines to the production ability and capacity of the 
field (between 250 000 and 350 000 barrels per day) and due to the regional policy of 
zero tolerance to leaks, the decision to be made was significant to several groups of 
stakeholders. The decision, after all, had to be seen to minimise the capital and 
operational expenditure, the probability and consequence of lost production, the 
probability and consequence of any leaks. These consequences were in terms of costs, 
impacts on the environment, shareholders, and revenue. 
One of the first stages in the analysis, therefore, was to determine who was in the 
decision-making group and the extent each could and wanted to, influence the decision. 
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8.1.2.1 The external stakeholders 
The external stakeholders in this decision problem were identified to include users of 
the end product, environmental pressure groups and government officials. 
8.1.2.2 The internal stakeholders 
The internal stakeholders were identified as the asset manager and the asset 
management group members. The asset manager, responsible for the asset's day-to-day 
operation was the head of the client company's Quality Assurance department. 
The asset management group was the shareholder's board, responsible for allocating 
annual budgets for each asset. However, different shareholder groups were responsible 
for different budgets. The national oil company, who were majority shareholders in the 
client company were responsible for the operational and maintenance budget. 
However, any requirement for capital expenditure, had to be funded by both shareholder 
groups. This meant that around 40% of the shareholders wanted to avoid any capital 
expenditure, while the other 60% wanted to distribute the costs and therefore preferred 
capital expenditure to operational expenditure. Because of these strongly held 
preferences, it was important, for the client to cut through any politics and ensure the 
"best" decision was made, to ensure the maximum safety and productivity of the 
pipelines, while minimising total costs. 
Due to these politics the decision strategy for recommending repair or replacement was 
believed to be less important than determining the acceptability of the risk. However, a, 
rational assessment of the decision alternatives would provide a sound case to support 
the final recommendation and encourage consensus between shareholders. 
8.1.3 Identify viable alternatives 
This decision's alternatives involved selecting whether to repair the pipelines at the 
most corroded locations or to replace them. The key issues, therefore, were identifying 
and selecting the most important repair locations and judging the best repair time. 
8.1.4 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
The decision-makers did not explicitly articulate the decision criteria as the politics 
were too strong. However different criteria were inferred from discussions with the two 
main stakeholder groups. For the majority shareholders, responsible for the operational 
costs of the pipeline, the main decision criteria were in order of importance: 
" The safety of the pipeline 
" The total cost of operating the pipeline for the remaining life of the field (i. e. 
including operational and capital expenditure. 
" The probability and consequence of lost production due to shutting down the 
pipeline. 
For the minority shareholders, only responsible for the capital costs associated with the 
pipeline, the main decision criteria were in order of importance: 
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9 The safety of the pipeline 
" Minimal capital expenditure on the pipeline for the remaining life of the field. 
" The probability and consequence of lost production due to shutting down the 
pipeline. 
There was obviously conflict between the two stakeholder groups, and therefore it was 
necessary to build consensus. It was decided to base this on the criteria on which the 
two groups agreed, i. e. safety and productivity of the pipeline. In utility analysis 
(described later), these would receive the highest weightings as they were most 
important to most people. In this case, the pipeline safety was by far the most dominant 
criterion. Due to the time schedule for this project, the focus of the work was therefore, 
on the risk-based corrosion assessment of the pipelines to allow an evaluation of the 
remnant life. Due to the client's zero leak tolerance, any consequences of failure were 
deemed unacceptable, therefore only the probability of failure was calculated. 
8.2 Structural Analysis 
The structuring process supports the decision-maker in identifying all possible 
alternatives and outcomes, and to see all the decision paths open to him. Either a 
decision tree or an influence diagram can represent these. Although decision trees are 
most useful for tackling complex, sequential problems, they can also be useful for 
structuring simple ones. Figure 17 shows a decision tree for this decision problem. 
Cost of Replacement. Loss of Pipeline Survives Production during Replacement 
Cost of Replacement. Loss of 
Pipeline FaUs Production during Replacement Loss 
of Production after failure; Cost of Replace pipe lin second Replacement 
Pipeline Survive i Cost of Repairs 
DECISION 
pair worst Iocation(t7' Cost of Repairs; Loss of Production 
Pipeline Fats after failure; Cost of Replacement. 
Loss of Production during 
Replacement 
Leave pipeline aäýt b Loss of Production due to reduced Pipeline Surviv pressure 
Loss of Production due to reduced 
pipeline Fatls pressure; Loss of Production after 
failure; Cost of Replacement, Loss of 
Production during Replacement 
17: Decision Tree representing the decision pro 
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8.3 Uncertainty and Probabilistic Analysis 
The changes in inspection technology and hence in the preferred methods for and 
accuracy of surveys make it difficult to reconcile different sets of inspection results 
taken over the pipeline's lifetime. Sometimes earlier data may be ignored to rely on the 
findings of later inspections. The difficulty, therefore, lies in establishing a 
comprehensive framework within which the results from a number of disparate 
inspection campaigns can be properly reconciled while taking into account all the 
uncertainties associated with the pipeline condition. The method developed in this case 
study allows all the relevant inspection results to be analysed holistically, ensuring that 
optimal use is made of all available inspection data. 
The approach developed takes account of all sources of uncertainty associated with 
pipeline corrosion rate prediction. These include large-scale factors (transported fluid 
corrosivity and inhibition effectiveness), medium scale factors (temperature, pressure, 
flow regime) and small-scale factors (local pitting and inspection data uncertainties). 
The methodology was developed to allow continuous updating of corrosion predictions 
based on all available information including results from further general and local spot 
inspections, leak data, and knowledge of no leaks at any time. The resulting corrosion 
predictions are therefore always consistent with the known pipeline conditions. 
The assessment is based on the quantitative results of wall thickness measurements 
obtained through two internal intelligent pig inspection surveys. The first (magnetic 
flux) intelligent pig inspection was undertaken in Year 29. This survey reported 
approximately 32000 individual metal loss features having a depth in excess of 10% of 
wall thickness. The second (ultrasonic) pig inspection was undertaken in Year 32. This 
survey reported approximately 4000 individual internal metal loss features. The 
significant reduction in the number of individual features reported results from the 
accretion of many small defects into a smaller number of larger defects with more 
complex morphologies both through the way the defects were defined and through 
increased corrosion. In order to overcome the problem of inconsistent defect definition 
and reporting, it was necessary to obtain the basic metal loss data in matrix format. 
This allowed the re-definition of the defects in a consistent manner. 
8.3.1 Corrosion prediction 
The survey results revealed that significant corrosion was ongoing throughout the length 
of the two oil lines. The most severe metal loss defects were clustered within the first 
pipeline. Three sections (2,4, and 6) of the second pipeline also showed a significantly 
higher density of metal loss defects than the within this pipeline as a whole. 
Pipeline 1 had a negligible flow rate, resulting in near stagnant conditions with 
significant water dropout. Corrosion inhibition was not expected to be effective in this 
pipeline, and the high levels of metal loss in this location were therefore as expected. 
Analysis of the Year 29 and Year 32 intelligent pig data revealed local corrosion rates 
of up to 1.6 mm/year (average corrosion rate between surveys). 
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In Section 1 of Pipeline 2 the flow velocities were high enough to prevent water dropout 
at typical production rates therefore corrosion conditions were only expected during 
periods of low flow rate. The results of the Year 32 intelligent pig survey supported this 
hypothesis. Beyond the start of Section 2 both the flow regime in pipeline 2 downstream 
of the start of section 2 was intermittent (slugging two-phase flow) at all flow rates 
considered and corrosion conditions were therefore expected to occur frequently 
downstream of this location. The results of the Year 32 intelligent pig survey showed 
that the frequency of defects and corrosion rate did increase, and some defects had 
depths approaching those found in Pipeline 1. These variations were believed to be due 
to the local flow regimes in different parts of the pipeline. 
8.3.1.1 Hydrogen induced cracking 
Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC) was reported throughout the length of both 
pipelines. Both planar and bulging laminations were identified throughout the pipelines. 
External ultrasonic inspection identified that some laminations include a radial 
component indicative of the presence of stepwise cracking (which can form a leak path). 
It is difficult to draw precise conclusions about the time at which HIC occurred. 
Evidence from the surveys showed that at least one metal loss defect associated with a 
burst lamination was present at the time of the Year 29 survey. HIC can progress very 
rapidly when conditions favour it and may then be stabilised for long periods. 
HIC is driven by the diffusion of atomic hydrogen into the pipe wall. Atomic hydrogen 
is expected to be present in the system because of ongoing corrosion in the presence of 
H2S. It is therefore considered probable that the HIC is ongoing. 
HIC threatens the integrity of the pipeline in two ways. Firstly through the development 
of through wall leak paths as a result of stepwise cracking, secondly through the rapid 
formation of very large metal-loss features caused by the "bursting" of one or more 
blisters in a heavily blistered area of the pipe. 
HIC crack propagation does not proceed at a constant rate and it can be arrested 
completely before increasing again at an exponential rate. On this basis, the assessment 
of HIC type defects can only be performed on an "as-observed" basis as any prediction 
of future defect size and shape cannot be made with any degree of confidence. 
8.3.1.2 Corrosion modelling 
A predictive model for steel corrosion was developed by APA based on three corrosion 
models developed by de Waard, Lotz and Dugstad [155], de Waard and Lotz [156] and 
NORSOK [157], to take into account the combined effects of carbonic acid and 
hydrogen sulphide. These models were chosen because grooving corrosion attributed to 
carbonic acid was identified in the pipeline. All these models had been empirically 
developed. A number of correction factors were applied to these models to account for 
the effects of. 
" Non-ideality of the gas 
" H2S partial pressure on the fluid pH 
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" Formation water chemistry on the fluid pH 
9 The dependence of Henry's constant on the dissolved solids in the formation water 
In addition, of the likelihood of preferential oil wetting of the pipe wall was assessed. 
8.3.1.3 Comparison of calculated with observed corrosion rates 
The process conditions in the pipe were simulated using HYSYS commercial software. 
The predicted general corrosion rates for these analyses are shown in Table 25. These 
predictions compared well against observed general corrosion rates of 0.2 to 0.3 mm/yr. 
The general corrosion rate was seen to be further accelerated due to pitting corrosion. 
Model Predicted Corrosion Rate (mm/yr) 
Case 1 Case 2 
De Waard 93 0.20 0.21 
De Waard 95 0.10 0.10 
NORSOK M506 0.27 0.26 
Table 25 Corrosion Modelling Results 
Note 1. Flow velocity is below applicable range and therefore corrosion rate is underestimated 
Note 2. Shear stress is below applicable range, however, at low values the corrosion rate is relatively 
insensitive to this parameter and is therefore not significantly underestimated. 
The increased pitting corrosion rate observed at the individual defects identified by the 
intelligent pig surveys is determined by the remnant life software, described below, by 
factoring the general corrosion rate by an observed pitting rate. 
8.3.2 Basis of remnant life analysis for the oil lines 
The corrosion models described above were used with predicted process conditions 
within each pipe joint to determine a corrosion rate. The analyses assumed 
homogeneity of both the fluid and the steel substrate and therefore did not assess local 
factors such as the breakdown of inhibitor films, flow variations, metallurgical 
variations in the steel and fluid conditions within a pit. These factors result in a 
distribution of corrosion rates under identical global conditions and lead to the corrosion 
morphology actually seen. 
The remnant life assessment software described here, addresses these factors by 
modifying the global corrosion rate by a "localisation factor" determined for each 
corrosion defect based on the comparison between the predicted corrosion rate and the 
inspection data. For a pit to develop, the local corrosion rate must be higher than the 
prevailing general rate, thus the inclusion of this factor ensures that the corrosion rate at 
individual features is not underestimated. 
8.3.2.1 Survey accuracy 
The two sets of intelligent pig results were obtained using significantly different 
instruments. This means that the accuracy of the measurements obtained during the 
surveys is also significantly different. Because of this, a major obstacle in the 
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assessment of the survey data is the reconciliation of the two sets of findings. The 
accuracy claimed by the operators of the two types of pig is presented in Table 26. 
PIG type General corrosion Pitting corrosion Measurements within Measurement Implied standard 
reporting threshold reporting threshold confidence limit (%) confidence limits deviation 
Magnetic 10% wall thickness 30% wall thickness 80% ± 10% wall 1.038 mm 
Flux thickness (if wt=13.3mm) 
Ultrasonic 20mm diameter 95% t0.5mm 0255 mm 
base 
Table 26: Quantification of uncertainties associateu witti eacti riv type. 
8.3.2.2 Reconciliation of survey measurements 
The survey estimates of wall thickness are subject to random errors as described above. 
For some defects, the difference between the observed remnant wall thickness at two 
surveys is small enough that the measurement error bands overlap. Assuming complete 
independence between the statistical distributions therefore, cannot be justified, as this 
would lead to the possibility that the wall thickness increased between surveys. To 
avoid this outcome it is necessary to reconcile each pair of wall thickness observations 
by updating the probability distributions for the measurement errors. 
Each individual measurement was modelled as a normal distribution with a mean value 
equal to the observed value and a standard deviation appropriate to the survey 
technique. However, if the two measurements are considered together it is obvious that, 
irrespective of the actual values attributed to the measurements, the wall thickness for 
the first measurement must be equal to or greater than the wall thickness for the second 
measurement. The best estimates of the actual wall thicknesses at each survey are 
modified by the observed thicknesses and associated errors at the other survey. 
In practice, the effect of reconciling the two sets of survey results is to increase the 
median corrosion rate over that predicted in a deterministic assessment. This increase 
is greatest where two measurements are close (i. e. where the overlap in the error 
distributions is greatest). Because the standard deviation of the later ultrasonic 
measurements is smaller than that of the early magnetic flux measurements, the remnant 
wall thickness estimates at the later survey are relatively unaffected by reconciliation. 
The methodology used to reconcile the survey data uses a Monte Carlo simulation 
procedure to generate random wall thickness scenarios based on the survey data and the 
known uncertainties associated with the survey data. The random data sets representing 
the corrosion rate and wall thickness for each defect were then combined to create a set 
of scenarios for the progression of the corrosion at all defects considered. 
8.3.2.3 Variations in operating conditions 
Throughout a pipeline system, the occurrence of conditions required for corrosion 
(water wetting of the pipe wall) is dependent on both the flow velocity and flow regime. 
If flow velocities are high enough to prevent water dropout, corrosion will be negligible. 
If flow is slugging two-phase, corrosion conditions are expected. If flow rate is 
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negligible (near stagnant conditions), significant water dropout and hence corrosion will 
occur. Corrosion inhibition is the only protection against high levels of metal loss. 
The corrosion rate prediction model, described above, was used to estimate both the 
historic cumulative general corrosion over a specified time interval and the predicted 
future corrosion rate under assumed operating conditions. The difference between the 
predicted average corrosion rate between intelligent pig surveys and the predicted future 
corrosion rate based on assumed future operating conditions was used to modify the 
predicted failure dates to account for changes in the transported fluids' corrosivity. 
8.3.2.4 Availability of Corrosion Inhibition 
An additional random distribution was introduced into the analysis to represent the 
corrosion inhibition availability from the date of the last survey forward into the future. 
The corrosion inhibition availability must take a value between 0.0 and 1.0. For this 
reason, it was modelled using a Beta distribution with finite upper and lower tails. For 
the base case analysis, the Beta distribution parameters were selected to give a mean 
value of 0.9 and a standard deviation of 0.01. Modelling the inhibition availability as an 
uncertain quantity increases the variability of the calculated failure times. The small 
standard deviation was assumed to avoid an adverse influence on the base case 
assessment results. Modifying the appropriate parameters and repeating the analysis 
assesses the potential effects of higher or lower corrosion inhibition availability. 
8.3.2.5 Determining the remnant life of the oil lines 
For each scenario, (for this case study 3000 scenarios were considered) the date 
corresponding to either structural failure or through wall corrosion for each defect was 
determined. Once the failure dates were obtained, they were manipulated as follows: 
" By ranking the dates of the failure of a single defect across all of the scenarios, an 
estimate of the probability of failure of any defect at any date could be derived. 
" By selecting the earliest failure date from each scenario and then ranking them, the 
probability of the first failure of any defect at any date could be estimated. 
" By selecting the nth date from each scenario and then ranking them, the probability 
that the nth defect failure has occurred by any specified date could be estimated. 
" By excluding scenarios where one or more failures happen before a given date and 
reanalysing the remaining scenarios, the analysis was updated to reflect current 
knowledge of no failures. 
8.3.2.6 Data used in analysis 
An initial set of 30 defects with the smallest reported remnant wall thicknesses in the 
Year 32 ultrasonic intelligent pig survey were selected for the analysis. In order to 
establish the local corrosion rates effective between the dates of the two surveys it was 
necessary to establish the metal loss reported in the Year 29 survey at the corresponding 
location. Discrepancies in the reported locations between the two surveys meant that the 
Year 29 reported locations could not be used to identify the required wall thicknesses. 
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The process adopted involved comparison of pipe joint reported lengths to determine 
the equivalent pipe joint numbering for the two surveys and derivation of the distance of 
each reported defect from the start of the pipe joint in which it lies. For confidentiality 
reasons, the data on which this assessment was based cannot be presented. 
8.3.2.7 Through wall corrosion of pipeline 1 
Table 27 presents the results for Pipeline 1 in respect of through-wall corrosion. The 
analysis results indicate that the median estimate for the first leak date from the 30 
defects considered here is the middle of Year 35. The 5% and 95% confidence limits for 
the first leak date are the end of Year 34 and the middle of Year 36 respectively. The 
table also shows equivalent dates for the predicted second to fifth leaks. 
Probability First Leak Second Leak Third Leak Fourth Leak Fifth Leak 
5% Month 10 Year 34 
10% Month 12 Year 34 
Month 4 Year 35 
Month 5 Year 35 
Month 8 Year 35 
Month 9 Year 35 
Month 11 Year 35 
Month 1 Year 36 
Month 3 Year 36 
Month -5 Year 36 
25% Month 3 Year 35 Month 9 Year 35 Month 1 Year 36 Month 5 Year 36 Month 6 -Year 36 
50% Month 7 Year 35 Month 1 Year 36 Month 5 Year 36 Month 9 Year 36 Month -17-ear 37 
75% Month 12 Year 35 Month 5 Year 36 Month 10 Year 36 Month 3 Year 37 Month -7 -Year 37 
90% Month 4 Year 36 Month 10 Year 36 Month 3 Year 37 Month 8 Year 37 Month 1 Year 38 
95% Month 6 Year 36 Month 1 Year 37 Month 6 Year 37 Month 11 Year 37 Month 5 Year 38 
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Figure 18 shows the cumulative probability of through thickness corrosion for each of 
the 30 defects in Pipeline 1 plotted against time. The steepness of the curves indicates 
the corrosion rate associated with each individual defect. It is clear that there is 
significant variability between the median predictions of the through wall penetration 
date (i. e. Year 36 to Year 55). However, the Year 32 survey observed wall thicknesses 
cover a range of only 1.4 mm for all but one of the defects considered. 
Figure 19 shows the probability of through thickness penetration for Pipeline 1 by one, 
two, three, four and five of the defects plotted against time. 
Figure 20 shows the relative frequency for each of the defects of providing the initial 
through wall penetration. Defects 5 and 13 are dominant and together account for 55% 
of initial penetrations. An analysis of the differences between the Year 29 and Year 32 
wall thicknesses showed that defects 5 and 13 are statistical outliers. This means that 
the observed reduction in wall thickness at these sites between Year 29 and Year 32 is 
significantly greater than would be expected based on the observations at the other 28 
sites analysed. There is therefore evidence of inconsistency in the survey results at 
these two locations. 
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Probability of penetration for Pipeline 1, individual defects 
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Figure 19 Probability of penetration for Pipeline 1, all defects 
Year 54 
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Figure 20 Relative Frequency of Initial Penetration for Pipeline 1 
A sensitivity analysis of the results demonstrated that the analysis is relatively 
insensitive to the inclusion of these individual outlier defects (5 and 13). This is 
because within the sample considered, the defects all have approximately the same 
depth and corrosion rate. It is also due to the relatively large uncertainty in the observed 
corrosion rate, which is driven by the (relatively) large depth measurement uncertainty 
associated with MFL (magnetic flux leakage) inspection tools and the short time 
between the two surveys. 
8.3.2.8 Failure of ligament of pipeline 1 
The remnant life assessment described so far only considers through wall penetration of 
the defect and ignores the structural response of the defect ligament. In practice, the 
ligament may undergo structural failure before the defect penetrates through the full 
thickness. Whether or not this occurs depends on the state of stress in the pipeline and 
the criteria used to define failure. 
The methodology presented in the ASME B31.8 Fitness for Purpose Appendix [158] 
was used. The value of MAOP (Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure) used to 
calculate the safe operating pressure was the original design MAOP. This should not be 
adjusted to account for any de-rating that may have occurred. It follows that the safe 
operating pressure incorporates the original hoop stress safety factor used in design. A 
factor of 1.1 represents the difference between the specified minimum yield stress 
(SMYS) and the assumed flow stress of the material. The criterion assumes that the 
pipe wall remains ductile. In order to use the criterion to assess remnant life three 
modifications are required: 
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" The assessment should be based on a realistic assessment of the actual operating 
pressure rather than on the MAOP, which may never be reached. 
" The factor of safety implicit in the criterion must be removed. 
"A realistic failure stress must be used. 
Failure is defined as either when the stress calculated using the above formulation 
exceeds the hydrotest hoop stress or when the defect penetrates through thickness. 
The remnant life was analysed using the same data as before. As expected, the 
predicted remnant life is shorter than that for through thickness corrosion only. The 
results are given in Table 28, with the predicted through thickness corrosion dates only. 
Probability Critical Ligament Stress Through Thickness Penetration 
5% Month 9 Year 33 Month 10 Year 34 
10% Month 10 Year 33 Month 12 Year 34 
25% Month 1 Year 34 Month 3 Year 35 
50% Month 3 Year 34 Month 7 Year 35 
75% Month 7 Year 34 Month 12 Year 35 
90% Month 10 Year 34 Month -4 Year 36 
95% Month 1 Year 35 Month 6 Year 36 
fable 28: rredicted Hates of Critical Ligament stresses for ripeiine 1 
8.3.2.9 Corrosion assessment of pipeline 2 
Pipeline 2 was assessed section by section. The analysis performed was the same as 
that described above for Pipeline 1. The pipeline was sectioned into 6 sections as 
before for detailed analysis based on the local variations in metal loss frequency. 
Within each section, the 30 locations having the deepest corrosion were analysed as 
described previously. The results of the analysis (expressed in terms of the date of 
through thickness corrosion and structural failure) are given in Table 29 and Table 30. 
Section Median Estimate 5% Confidence 95% Confidence 
1 Month 7 Year 41 Month 7 Year 39 Month 3 Year 44 
2 Month 1 Year 38 Month 3 Year 36 Month 6 Year 40 
3 Month 5 Year 46 Month 10 Year 42 Month 3 Year 51 
4 Month 9 Year 37 Month 6 Year 36 Month 4 Year 39 
5 Month 1 Year 40 Month 3 Year 38 Month 5 Year 42 
6 Month 10 Year 37 Month 5 Year 36 Month 4 Year 39 
Table 29: Predicted Dates of Through Thickness Defect Penetration for Pipeline 2 
As expected, when considering structural failure the estimated remnant life is less than 
when considering through thickness penetration only. It should be noted however that 
there is more uncertainty associated with the ligament failure estimates because they 
depend not only on the data obtained in the various surveys but also on assumptions 
about the pressure in the pipeline and the failure stress in the ligaments. 
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Table 30: Predicted Dates of Critical Ligament Stresses for Pipeline 2 
8.3.3 Remnant life assessment conclusions 
The conclusions of this analysis and the consequential recommendations were presented 
to the stakeholders as a basis for their decision-making. Pipeline 1 and three of the six 
sections of Pipeline 2 were expected to develop through thickness corrosion defects by 
the start of Year 38. Pipeline 1 and five of the six sections of Pipeline 2 were expected 
to develop critical ligament stresses, assuming a net internal pressure of 600 psi, at 
corrosion defects by the end of Year 36. Within Pipeline 1 and each of the sections of 
Pipeline 2 there were found to be a large number of defects having the potential to 
develop to through thickness penetration or to give rise to critical ligament stresses. 
Because of the large number of potential leak sites, the installation of clamps at critical 
sections was not considered to provide a practical means of long-term mitigation. 
The client had stated that pipeline leakage could not be tolerated for safety, 
environmental and business reasons. In light of both the remnant life calculations and 
the effects of HIC on the pipeline, it was concluded that the condition of the two 
pipelines was not consistent with this stated aim. It was therefore recommended that 
two replacement (HIC resistant) pipelines should be installed as soon as possible. 
It was further recommended that the MAOP should be reduced. Limiting the pipeline 
pressure would extend the remnant life with respect to the development of critical 
stresses. Through wall defect penetration would then govern. The pipelines currently 
operate at pressures significantly below the derated MAOP of 980 psi. It was believed 
that a further reduction in MAOP might be achievable without affecting operations. 
Finally, it was recommended that intelligent pig inspections of the two pipelines should 
be undertaken every 18 months to 2 years until the pipelines are taken out of service. 
8.4 UtilityNalue Analysis 
The results of such a remnant life assessment and the above recommendations 
obviously require a reaction. With a minimum remnant life in one location of only one 
year, it is necessary to make a decision to repair or replace the pipeline. Such a decision 
can be highly contentious and political with different stakeholders pushing for different 
outcomes. Any intuitive decision is very difficult to justify. 
The use of utility analysis within a risk-based decision-making process allows 
alternatives to be considered by accounting for all consequences of failure such as the 
Section Median Estimate 5%. Confidence 95% Confidence 
I Month 11 Year 36 Month 9 Year 35 Month 4 Year 38 
2 Month 8 Year 36 Month 4 Year 35 Month 1 Year 38 
3 Month 3 Year 41 Month 7 Year 38 Month 6 Year 45 
4 Month 10 Year 35 Month 1 Year 35 Month 9 Year 36 
5 Month 8 Year 36 Month 5 Year 35 Month 1 Year 38 
6 Month 5 Year 36 Month 1 Year 35 Month 3 Year 38 
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loss of life, environmental damage or damage to company reputation in terms of a non- 
dimensional value. This accounts for: 
" the decision maker's attitude to risk 
" the value of the consequence in a convenient and meaningful dimension 
" any non-linearity between actual value and the effect of the value on the 
organisation 
" the relative importance of each factor to the stakeholders 
The opportunity did not arise to implement such an analysis explicitly, however, 
following discussions with the stakeholders, it was possible to qualitatively identify 
their preferences. These then directed how the final decision was made. 
As discussed in Section 8.1.2, the decision had to be seen to minimise capital and 
operational expenditure, the probability and consequence of any leaks and lost 
production. This decision problem was further complicated by the fact different 
shareholders were responsible for different budgets. This meant that approximately 40% 
of the shareholders were keen to avoid any capital expenditure, while the other 60% 
were keen to distribute the costs and therefore preferred capital expenditure to 
operational expenditure. Because of these strongly held preferences, it was important to 
cut through the politics and ensure the "best" decision was made, to ensure the 
maximum safety and productivity of the pipelines, while minimising total costs. 
It was decided to base the consensus on the criteria on which the two groups agreed, i. e. 
safety and productivity of the pipeline. This was in line with the methods of utility 
analysis, as these criteria would have received the highest weightings as they were most 
important to most people. The order of preference for the criteria specified by both 
shareholder groups, was presented in section 8.1.4. This showed that the pipeline safety 
was given the most importance by both groups. 
It therefore became clear that the governing decision factor, in the eyes of the identified 
stakeholders, was the probability of a leak. Therefore the results of the remnant life 
assessment showed very clearly that the probability of a leak in the two oil lines was 
significant and could not be ignored for very long. Furthermore, the number of leaks 
possible within the following couple of years meant that a program of repairs would not 
be cost effective. This meant that the minority shareholders were convinced that any 
proposal to repair the pipeline out of the maintenance budget was inefficient and highly 
risky, as the repair clamps proposed would not guarantee against a leak. 
Based on the indisputable facts presented from this remnant life assessment the 
shareholders were, able to agree on a strategy to replace the pipeline as soon as possible. 
Currently the shareholders are putting together a strategy to replace the pipeline with 
minimum disruption to production, and ensuring against leakage in the meantime 
through monitoring of the worst locations identified in this assessment. This risk-based 
remnant life assessment has therefore been key to providing the information necessary 
to help the shareholders form a decision by consensus within such a difficult problem. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
The problem addressed in this case study was very complex, mainly due to the political 
and extremely contentious nature of the situation. A small number of very powerful 
stakeholders were involved in and affected by the decision. Therefore, all voices wanted 
to be heard. The problem was also complicated by the significant uncertainties in the 
integrity and remnant life assessments and the consequences of pipeline failure. 
The stakeholders were therefore, a significant issue to be addressed in the decision- 
making. To address this problem the areas of conflict and the areas of agreement were 
identified. The areas of conflict were put to one side as secondary issues (e. g. which 
budget to use to pay for any remedial work). This meant that focus could be placed on 
the areas of agreement (e. g. safeguarding the revenue stream, limiting the risk of 
pollution, etc. ). This is a simple and logical way of building consensus. 
The alternatives were identified by discussion with the stakeholders. The minority 
shareholders, who were keen for the remedial work to be funded from the OPEX 
budget, proposed a number of repair options. However, the majority stakeholders, who 
were keen for the remedial work to be funded from the CAPEX budget, proposed 
options for replacement. Due to the conflicting views in the decision, the two sides of 
the argument were therefore well represented in the alternatives that were proposed. 
The criteria on which the decision was based were identified by discussion amongst the 
stakeholder group. As discussed above the two main stakeholder groups agreed on the 
integrity of the pipeline being the most important criterion, in terms of both maximising 
the revenue stream and minimising the risk of pollution. The other decision criteria 
which could not be agreed upon were the cost of remedial work, the budget that would 
pay for remedial work and the timing of remedial work. However, these secondary 
issues faded into unimportance following the results of the risk assessment, which 
showed that immediate and significant remedial action had to be taken. 
Structural analysis was not used to help understand the problem in this case as the 
stakeholders simplified the problem through tight constraints on the decision,. For 
example, as the company had a no leak policy, failure and therefore consequence of 
failure did not need to be considered in any detail. This meant that once failure of the 
pipeline had been discovered to be almost a certainty in the near future, the decision 
problem became a one of repairing or replacing the pipeline as soon as possible. 
The information required for the risk assessment was readily available from the 
company, due to the large number of inspections that had been carried out over the 
years. The company had been disciplined in maintaining records and therefore the 
information was straightforward to obtain. There were of course uncertainties in the 
data and more data would have reduced these uncertainties, however the risk analysis 
was designed to consider these uncertainties. 
The most significant risk, therefore that had to be accounted for was the probability of 
failure. This was dependent on uncertainties in the historic and future corrosion rate in 
the pipeline, the current condition of the pipeline and the operating conditions of the 
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pipeline. The risk assessment model that was developed within this case study was 
designed to consider these uncertainties in the assessment of the probability of failure of 
the pipeline over time. The level of engineering detail involved in the risk assessment 
was considered necessary to model the uncertainties as effectively as possible and to 
provide a robust prediction of the remnant life of the pipeline. This prediction had to 
withstand detailed scrutiny from both groups of stakeholders. The fact that the risk 
assessment had been carried out by an independent third party gave credibility to the 
results and re-assured the stakeholders that no bias had been included. Sensitivity 
analysis had also been carried out to determine the influence of some of the main 
assumptions on the results. This also gave credibility and reassurance to the 
stakeholders. Once the results of the risk assessment had passed this scrutiny, they 
became the main basis of the decision. 
The risk assessment therefore, succeeded in simplifying the issues by focussing 
attention on the severity of the problem. This made the decision quite clear. The 
number of locations along the pipeline with an unacceptable risk of failure both now 
and in the future meant that repair of the pipeline was not economically viable. This 
therefore forced the decision to a consensus on replacement. The presence of the third 
party risk analyst as a facilitator in the shareholder meeting, in which the final decision 
was made, gave further credibility and confidence to the decision. 
The purpose of the risk assessment therefore, was to clarify the issue and to force 
agreement from all stakeholders. The severity of the problem meant that the previously 
identified preferences held by the stakeholders became irrelevant, and the 
overwhelming agreement between stakeholder groups of not allowing leaks dominated 
the decision. The option of replacing the pipeline became the only effective way of 
achieving this objective. 
The clarity and overwhelming logic of the final recommendation meant that this was 
fully taken on board by all the stakeholders. The stakeholders gained confidence and 
reassurance in the decision from the detailed risk analysis and the structured manner in 
which the results were used. 
In this case study, the use of the risk-based decision model did not significantly 
influence the role of the risk analysis in the final decision. This was due to the 
significance of the risk and the consensus by the stakeholders to minimise the risk. In 
fact, the risk analysis dominated the decision above all other issues in the decision 
process. The expected problems with stakeholder issues were resolved as a result of the 
risk analysis and the selection of alternatives and decision criteria were governed by the 
risk assessment results. The use of the risk-based decision model did therefore, help the 
decision-makers gain a clearer understanding of how to integrate the results of the risk 
analysis into the decision-making. 
The decision problem addressed in this case was very heavily biased to risk assessment 
rather than any other aspect of decision-making. Even the stakeholder issues that were 
expected to cause a problem paled into insignificance in the light of the risk assessment 
results. However, the risk-based decision model was still found useful to ensure that all 
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aspects of the decision were considered and evaluated. It also provided opportunities 
for the more detailed risk analyses to be carried out and integrated into the decision. 
The application of the risk-based decision model to this case study ensured that all 
aspects of the situation were considered. Including enforced assurances that the 
stakeholder issues had been resolved. The use of the decision model also helped 
identify the role of the risk analysis in the decision. Furthermore, it clarified how the 
results of the analysis could be used and presented to the stakeholders. 
The use of a structured decision process to support the decision in this case helped the 
decision-makers identify the most important issues to be addressed and the issues, 
which did not need to be addressed. It allowed the role of the risk analysis in the 
decision-making to be clearly defined and the detail of analysis to be agreed upon. The 
use of the risk-based decision model brought the significance of the risks to the fore and 
meant that the assessment of risks was an integral part of the decision process. The 
clear structure of the decision process promoted understanding and ownership of the 
way the decision was made, which gave support for the results that were implemented. 
Furthermore, it provided the decision-makers with an audit trail to show the logic and 
thoroughness of the decision-making in case anything went wrong at a later stage. 
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9 CASE STUDY 4 
PRIORITISATION OF BRIDGE STRENGTHENING WORKS 
9.1 Problem Definition 
9.1.1 Identify problem or opportunity 
Due to the very tight limits on budgets, a consortium of bridge engineers from every 
borough in London, was faced with the difficult problem of selecting the most 
important bridges for strengthening and repair. Only a small selection of those bridges 
requiring repair and strengthening could be put forward for funding from the next year's 
budgets. The decision that had to be made was: "which bridge or bridges out of all 
those which had been assessed to 40 tonne loading but had failed, should be selected for 
funding to be brought up to 40 tonne capacity within the next year? " 
The client requested that decision should be simplified to consider the present year only, 
in isolation of any future year's decision. Any bridges that were selected for 
strengthening this year would not need to be submitted in the following year. Each year 
the list of bridges requiring strengthening would be updated to include the effects of 
deterioration. In other words, bridges left over from the previous year may have an 
increasingly deteriorated condition and additional bridges may have to be added to the 
list that have deteriorated to an insufficient capacity over the previous year. A more 
rigorous approach would have been to model the deterioration of the bridges 
stochastically and make a prediction of the future capacity of the bridge depending on 
different actions. It was felt that although this meant long term planning was not 
possible it terms of predicting the condition of the bridges in future years, neither was 
the prediction of future budgets possible. As there were so many uncertainties to 
account for, it was decided that a simple method of information gathering and bridge 
selection every year would be preferable to a detailed time dependent analysis of each 
bridge with a once off long-term strengthening and maintenance plan. This meant that 
the annual process of selection between alternatives would be more manageable. 
The problem of prioritising bridges for strengthening involves quantitative assessments 
of factors such as capacity of the bridge, traffic disruption and strengthening costs as 
well as subjective judgements of other less well defined issues such as impacts on the 
local community of traffic restrictions on the bridge. When such multiple criteria are 
used, certain "trade-offs" are required, as different bridges would score better in terms 
of different criteria considered in isolation. 
9.1.2 Identify stakeholders in the decision 
Due to the importance of London in terms of industry, commerce, tourism and politics a 
wide range of stakeholders had to be taken into account in the decision-making process. 
The decision, after all, had to be seen to be the best for London as a whole since the 
funding was supplied for London as a whole. Each borough of London represents very 
different cultures, different focuses and different economies; therefore, the views and 
perceptions of each of the stakeholders were very diverse. 
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When identifying the decision-makers and stakeholders, there can be a tendency to 
concentrate on the formal structure of an organisation. It is, however, necessary to 
identify informal decision-makers and stakeholder groups and to assess their 
importance. One of the first stages in preparing for the decision analysis, therefore, was 
to determine who was in the decision-making group and to what extent each person 
could and wanted to, influence the decision. 
9.1.2.1 The external stakeholders 
Discussions with borough council representatives indicated that the external 
stakeholders would include users of the bridge (private, commercial and industrial), 
environmental pressure groups (campaigning for improved facilities for environmental 
transport such as bus lanes, cycle lanes, etc. ) and government officials (Local 
Councillors, MPs from local constituencies, etc. ). In each of the boroughs, these groups 
of stakeholders would have different profiles, dynamics and powers. For example, in 
North West London, the local economies rely heavily on light industry and 
transportation (e. g. for supplying Heathrow airport). In South West London, the 
economies are driven by a combination of commerce and tourism. This means that very 
different priorities exist in the two areas. 
9.1.2.2 The internal stakeholders 
There are two main groups of internal stakeholders, the asset managers and the asset 
management group. 
The asset manager is the chief borough bridge engineer in each of the London boroughs 
who is responsible for the safety and maintenance of all bridges in that borough. This 
involves planning and allocating budgets to inspection, routine maintenance, repair, 
strengthening and upgrading of all bridges in the borough. 
The asset management group is the committee responsible for allocating annual budgets 
for each asset manager. In this decision problem, this was the London Bridge 
Engineering Group itself. This group consisted of four borough bridge engineers each 
elected to represent the group of London boroughs in each of the four quadrants of 
London, a separately elected chairman (also a borough bridge engineer) and a 
representative of the Governors of London who control the overall budget. Early on in 
the project it was necessary to identify what the dynamics of this group were, who held 
the power in the group, and how decisions were made and agreed within the group. 
In order account for all stakeholder views in the decision process, it would have been 
ideal to interview a number of borough bridge engineers and a number of 
representatives from other stakeholder groups. These would include representatives of 
the local chamber of commerce, the council representatives for public transport, figures 
from local industry, local members of parliament and representatives for environmental 
pressure groups. However, again due to restrictions on time, representatives of four borough councils were interviewed, these included borough bridge engineers and 
council representatives of constituency needs. 
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9.1.3 Identify viable alternatives 
The alternatives in this decision were the many bridges that required strengthening. 
However, there was the possibility that more than one bridge could be selected to ensure 
best use of the allocated budgets, therefore the number of alternatives was far more than 
the number of bridges requiring repair as a large number of combinations of bridges 
could also be selected. 
The client had already dictated that each bridge submitted for funding should propose a 
fully costed repair schedule. Therefore, by the time the bridges were considered for 
prioritisation, the repair/strengthening option had already been defined. This therefore 
could not be considered as part of the decision alternatives. A more rigorous approach 
would have been to formally determine the best repair/strengthening strategy for each 
bridge then to determine which bridges to strengthen in the next financial year. This 
however would have been extremely complex (as more than 150 bridges were under 
consideration) and time consuming. 
Each borough bridge engineer was asked to provide a list of bridges in their boroughs 
requiring strengthening work and they were given a questionnaire to complete for each 
bridge to evaluate each bridge against the given criteria. These criteria are discussed 
below. 
9.1.4 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
The final part of defining the decision problem was identifying the criteria on which the 
decision was to be based. The decision criteria were identified very early on in the 
analysis by interviewing experienced bridge engineers and other council representatives 
who were representing the views of external stakeholders (such as local business and 
industry). In addition, previous work for the Scottish Office [108] was reviewed as 
were other prioritisation systems already in existence, such as those at Hertfordshire and 
Essex Councils. 
A comprehensive list of factors was produced and this was then refined and condensed 
through discussions with a number of boroughs. However, some of these criteria (such 
as social impacts) were not straightforward to measure. Therefore hierarchies of criteria 
were developed that would enable the top-level criteria to be evaluated. Again, this was 
carried out in discussion with the area representatives. For each top-level criterion, a 
brainstorming session identified all the factors that were needed to be able to calculate a 
value for the parent criteria. All of these sub-criteria were then discussed in detail. 
Some sub-criteria were discarded if it was felt that they were duplicated elsewhere. 
Other sub-criteria were identified as contributing to another sub-criterion, so these were 
demoted to a lower lever in the hierarchy. This process of discussion and evaluation 
continued until it was felt that the families of criteria were independent, complete and 
measurable. The proposed hierarchies of criteria are defined below. The Analytic 
Hierarchy process [100] was used to help the decision maker to arrange the criteria into 
some sort of hierarchy so that the lowest level criteria are measures for the criterion in 
the next level above. This can work towards being able to score each of the bridges 
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against the identified criteria, since it was not possible to directly measure each bridge 
for some of the criteria. The main criteria on which the bridge prioritisation decision 
was to be based were found to be: 
" The cost of carrying out strengthening work 
" The risk of bridge failure if strengthening work is not carried out 
" The cost of interim measures such weight restrictions, or propping if strengthening 
work is not carried out immediately, 
9 The impacts on the local society if the work is not carried out 
" The additional benefits that can be gained by carrying out bridge improvement and 
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Figure 21: The proposed main criteria for deriving bridge strengthening priorities 
These criteria are defined with their sub-criteria in more detail below: 
9.1.4.1 Cost of strengthening works 
Since the main issue in prioritising the bridges is the optimal allocation of resources 
from the annual budget, the cost of carrying out the strengthening work on each bridge 
should be taken into account. 
The factors that were identified to evaluate the cost of strengthening works are shown in 
Figure 22. These are the cost of carrying out the work (labour, material, equipment), as 
stated in the works budget, the cost of traffic management schemes (lighting, signing, 
cones, etc. ), and the cost of traffic delays (imaginary cost), during the works. 
The cost of works was taken directly from the estimate for the strengthening work made 
by the assessing engineer. The cost of implementing the necessary traffic management 
schemes during the strengthening work was also provided by the assessing engineer's 
estimates. The costs associated with the traffic disruption caused by the strengthening 
works was taken from look-up tables for costs of diversion and delays based on the 
assessing engineer's estimate of the likely traffic flows, the make up of those flows, 
diversion lengths, road types, etc. 
Since all of these factors are measured in terms of cost, they can be aggregated directly 
into an overall cost to represent the cost of strengthening for the particular strengthening 
project under consideration. 
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Figure 22: The proposed sub criteria for deriving the cost of carrying out 
strengthening works 
9.1.4.2 Cost of interim measures 
The prioritisation system was intended to consider only bridges that have failed the 
structural assessment, so until the strengthening work was completed, it may have been 
necessary to implement certain interim measures. These could include weight 
restrictions, lane restrictions, propping, etc. The costs of implementing such interim 
measures would be saved if strengthening work was carried out. 
The costs associated with implementing interim measures included costs associated 
with traffic disruption (real and imaginary costs due to delays and diversions) incurred 
by the implementation of weight or lane restrictions on and around the bridge. In 
addition, the costs of implementing and maintaining interim measures such as road 
signs and markings to indicate weight or lane restrictions or the cost of strengthening 
work (e. g. propping, etc. ) was also considered. Figure 23 below shows the hierarchy of 
these costs. 
The costs associated with the traffic disruption caused by the implementation of interim 
measures were taken from look-up tables for costs of diversion and cost of delays based 
on the assessing engineer's estimate of the likely traffic flows, the make up of those 
flows, diversion lengths, road types, etc. The cost of implementing and maintaining the 
interim measures was taken directly from estimates made by the assessing engineer. 
Since all of these factors are measured in terms of cost, they can be aggregated directly 
into an overall cost to represent the cost of interim measures for the particular 
strengthening project under consideration. 
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Figure 23: The proposed sub criteria for deriving the cost of carrying out interim 
strengthening works 
9.1.4.3 Risk of bridge failure 
Despite a bridge failing an assessment, it is not feasible in all cases to implement 
interim measures, such as weight restrictions, to maintain safety. In these cases, the risk 
of bridge failure can be high. In other situations, the risk of the bridge failing under 
standard operation is considered acceptable. Calculating the probability of the bridge 
failing under standard operation and assessing the failure consequences provides a 
comparison with the cost of interim measures. This is because a bridge without interim 
measures will have both a higher probability of failure and higher consequences of 
failure (e. g. more traffic would continue to use the bridge subjecting more people to the 
risk). This therefore should be taken into account in establishing bridge priorities. 
Obviously, this risk will be greatly reduced if the strengthening works are carried out. 
The risk of bridge failure was evaluated as a function of the probability of failure and its 
consequences. The consequences of failure included the costs of emergency repairs, the 
cost of traffic disruption caused by the closure of the bridge, costs associated with any 
fatalities, injuries, and the environmental damage that may have occurred because of 
bridge collapse. These factors are shown in Figure 24. The probability of failure was 
calculated as a risk index based on the assessed capacity of the structure based on 
Reference [108]. This is described in more detail in Section 9.3. 
The probability of failure was evaluated by defining a base probability of failure from 
the current restricted capacity ratio based on a look up chart. Modifying factors were 
then applied to account for the road type, effect of impact, span length, live load, any 
reserve strength and redundancy considered by the assessing engineer and any proposed 
inspection regime. These factors were all determined by using look-up charts based on 
the data provided by the assessing engineer. 
The consequences of failure were evaluated by combining the following costs: 
" The costs associated with the traffic disruption caused by the failure of the bridge. 
These were taken from look-up tables for costs of diversion and cost of delays based 
on the assessing engineer's estimate of the likely traffic flows, the make up of those 
flows, diversion lengths, road types, etc. 
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" The cost of emergency repairs to the bridge following collapse. This was taken 
directly from the assessing engineer's estimate. 
" The cost of human fatalities and injuries. This was determined from a look-up table 
based on data supplied by the assessing engineer on traffic flow, span length, 
number of lanes, the type of failure and the warning expected of any failure. 
The final combination of probability of failure and cost consequences of failure resulted 
in an overall cost assessment of risk for the particular bridge-strengthening project 
under consideration. 
Risk of Bridge 
Failure 
Probability Consequence 
of Failure of Failure 
Capacity Road Impact Live Reserve Inspection Lane 
Ratio Type Effect Load Strength Schedule Width 
Figure 24: The proposed sub criteria for deriving the risk of bridge failure 
9.1.4.4 Social impact of restrictions 
The less tangible factors that needed to be considered in establishing bridge priorities 
were grouped together under the heading "social impact" of the route. This covered all 
of the non-costed impacts on the local community of the traffic restrictions on the 
bridge such as, the inconvenience of bus routes being diverted away from their usual 
stops and the discomfort of HGVs being diverted through residential areas. The 
inconvenience of a closed bridge to cyclists and pedestrians who will take much longer 
to take another route was also accounted for. These impacts depended on the type of 
traffic and the daily traffic flow on the route, the type of route and the availability of 
alternative routes and would not occur if the strengthening works were carried out. 
The sub-criteria on which the impact on society was to be based were, therefore, divided 
into two groups: the category of the route and the importance of the route. The category 
of the route was evaluated from the daily traffic flow on the route and the type of route 
(i. e. Primary Route, Borough Principal Route, etc. ). The importance of the route was 
based on the type and numbers of vehicles using the route and the availability of 
alternative routes for each type of vehicle. This hierarchy is shown in Figure 25 below. 
The category of the route was evaluated from the data supplied by the assessing 
engineer for the daily traffic flow on the route and the type of route (i. e. primary route, 
Borough Principal Route, etc. ) An importance weight was applied to each type of route 
by asking each expert to make comparisons between each pair of route types in a similar 
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way to that presented in Section 9.4. The appropriate weight will then be multiplied by 
the daily traffic flow to give a score for the route category. 
The importance of the route will be evaluated by firstly identifying the importance of 
the route for each type of user. This will be done by identifying the code for the amount 
of use by that category of user, from the flow code and the possible alternative routs 
available for that category of user. These are available from the data provided by the 
assessing engineer. To calculate a score for the possible alternative routes, the experts 
will be asked to make comparisons between each pair of alternative route types in terms 
of inconvenience and discomfort to the community, in the manner presented in Section 
9.4. The appropriate score was then determined by mapping the alternative route code 
onto the consensus set of scores. A similar method was applied to determine scores for 
each of the flow codes for each of the different types of users. The scores for the type of 
alternative route and the flow for each type of user were combined to give a score for 
the importance of the route for each type of user. 
Again, the experts were asked to compare the importance of each type of user in terms 
of the inconvenience and discomfort to society so that each score could be aggregated in 
terms of its importance to obtain an overall score for the route importance. Weights 
were then determined from interviews with the experts, to rank the route category 
against the route importance to evaluate a score overall for the social impact of the 
route. 
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Figure 25: The proposed sub criteria to derive the social impact of the restrictions 
9.1.4.5 Bridge improvement benefits 
When strengthening works are carried out on a bridge, work is also often carried out to 
remove some substandard features identified under the Upgrade and Improvement 
clause of the 15-year Rehabilitation Programme. If these upgrading works are carried 
out in parallel with the strengthening work, funded by a separate budget, not only is the 
functionality and safety of the bridge further improved but also savings are made in 
traffic management cost, etc., from combining the works. 
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The benefits of bridge improvement works depend on the types of bridge improvement 
works that are carried out. These were identified are from a list of all the proposed 
upgrading works specified in the data form by the assessing engineer. The types of 
works considered were strengthening for HB vehicles, carriageway widening, footway 
widening, provision of additional services, and improvement of sight distance and 
strengthening of the parapets. In addition, any improvements that fulfil the London 
wide strategy for cycle lanes, bus lanes, etc. are also considered. These are shown in 
Figure 26. 
At this stage, all that was required from the assessing engineer was a yes/no statement 
of whether each type of upgrading work was proposed. For this reason, all types that 
were proposed were scored 1 and all types that were not proposed were scored 0. 
Weightings were obtained, again by interviewing the experts, to identify the relative 
importance of each type of upgrading work. The score for the work was then multiplied 
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Figure 26: The proposed sub criteria for deriving additional benefits due to bridge 
improvements 
9.2 Structural Analysis 
In most decisions, it is necessary to break the main decision into smaller parts (this is 
the benefit of decision analysis). Depending on the decision problem in question this 
can mean subdividing the decision on different bases, depending on which most helps 
solve the problem. In these situations, the structuring process supports the decision- 
maker in the identification of all possible alternatives and all possible outcomes, and to 
see all the decision paths open to him. Either a decision tree or an influence diagram 
can represent these. An influence diagram, provides a simple graphical representation of 
a decision problem. The elements of a decision problem: the decision to be made, 
uncertain events and the value of outcomes, are shown in influence diagrams as 
different shapes. These shapes are then linked with arrows to show the relationships 
among the elements [24]. Influence diagrams are particularly useful for the structuring 
phase of problem solving and for representing large or complex problems. Decision 
trees show more of the detail of the problem, but can, therefore become confusing and 
out of hand, [99]. Whichever method of representation is selected does not affect the 
ultimate decision, as either structure can be converted to the other. Figure 27 shows the 
influence diagram representing this decision problem. 
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Figure 27: Influence Diagram representing decision problem 
9.3 Uncertainty and Probabilistic Analysis 
The probability of bridge failure is influenced by uncertainties in the determination of 
the extreme traffic loads, the inherent randomness of the material properties and 
uncertainties in the analysis methods used for determining load effects and capacities. 
Modem structural reliability methods [104] are now widely accepted as a rational 
method of accounting for uncertainties in these parameters. Although such advanced 
reliability and risk analysis methods are available for evaluating the risk of a bridge 
failure (see case study 2), they are generally not suitable for use on a routine basis. This 
is due to their complexity and the general lack of expertise in risk analysis among 
bridge assessment engineers. This is especially pertinent when considering a wide 
range of bridge types as those represented in the London area. 
The client therefore requested that only a simplified approach to risk quantification be 
adopted again due to pressures of time and availability of information. A more rigorous 
approach would have been to develop probabilistic loading and strength models for 
each bridge under consideration. The probability scoring system adopted is similar to 
that presented in [108]. 
The aim of the probability scoring system was to enable reliability assessment to be 
carried out quickly and simply for all bridge types. This enabled the probability 
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information concerning bridge failure to be used more rationally in the decision-making 
process. 
The probability score was calculated by first defining a base level score as a function of 
the capacity ratio. This was then modified by factors that account for bridge specific 
features as presented below: 
1. Road type: Based on the class of the road over the bridge and the number of vehicles 
using it per day. 
2. Impact effect: Based on the dynamic characteristics of the bridge and the vehicles 
using it, and on the surface roughness and pavement condition. 
3. Reserve strength: Based on the ratio of the ultimate capacity of the bridge and the 
capacity of the component considered. 
4. Inspection schedule: Based on the level of inspection to which the component is 
subjected and the amount of warning of failure expected to be given. 
5. Live load: Based on the significance of the live load compared to the total load to 
which the bridge is subjected. 
6. Lane width: Based on the amount of traffic than can be carried over the bridge in 
contra-flow situations. 
9.4 UtilityNalue Analysis 
It was considered very likely that bridge managers would consider one criterion more 
important than the other. The bridge manager was also very likely to have some idea of 
the relative importance that should be given to each of the main factors in considering 
the various bridge strengthening projects. For example, the risk of the bridge collapsing 
was probably going to be considered more *important than the cost savings that can be 
gained from combining the strengthening project with upgrading work. However, the 
problem was how to quantify the weighting that should be given to each criterion. 
Obviously, this was a judgmental issue, and the best approach was felt to ask the 
decision-makers. However, deriving the relative weights for each criterion meant that 
the "trade-off' issues had to be accounted for arising from the multiple criteria nature of 
the decision problem. It was necessary for the relative weights to reflect the preferences 
of the decision-makers (bridge managers) for each criterion in relation to the other 
criteria. However, it can be very difficult to directly assign such weights to each factor 
in a rational manner. More consistent responses can be obtained when opinions are 
sought about the relative importance of pairs of criteria. This is because the human 
mind finds it very difficult to visualise more than two or three criteria/situations at one 
time. In this study therefore, bridge managers were interviewed to obtain the relative 
importance they attached to pairs of criteria according to the Analytic Hierarchy 
process. This would be formally carried out as in the following example: 
To compare two factors such as the risk of failure and the cost of strengthening, the 
decision maker would be asked to state, which is considered more important. If there 
was no preference then the next comparison would be made. If, however, the decision- 
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maker had a preference between the factors this would be indicated on the following 
scale: 
1 Equally preferred 
3 Weak preference 
5 Strong preference 
7 Very strong preference 
9 Absolute preference 
Intermediate values of 2,4,6,8 may also be used 
I 
{ 
It was felt that asking each bridge manager to make his or her comparisons directly on 
the scale specified by Saaty would be difficult and time consuming. In addition, the use 
of a subjective non-dimensional scale such as Saaty's was likely to result in inconsistent 
evaluations between interviewees. One person's strong preference could be anther's 
very strong preference. Engineers, also tend to have a natural aversion to non- 
dimensional scoring systems, they like to know the meaning and the effect of the 
numbers. This natural discomfort with such methods results in the bridge managers 
becoming impatient, agitated and disillusioned. Therefore, I developed an extension to 
this method to support the comparisons. 
9.4.1 Definition of criteria ranges 
First each criteria was banded such that, for example "high risk of failure" was 
quantified. This was based on expert opinion and was carried out with this specific 
bridge selection problem in mind. Table 31 - Table 35 present the definition of each 
criterion bands. 
Cost of Strengthening Works v. low low med. high V. high 
Cost of work £100k £200k £500k £800k ; Elm 
Cost of traffic delays £900k £4m £45m £180m £380m 
Table 31 Definition of criteria ranges for -cost of strengthening works" 
Cost of interim measures v. low low med. high v. high 
Daily < £5k £25k £250k Lim £2m 
Annual cost < £1.8m £9m £90m £350m £750m 
Table 32 Definition of criteria ranges for "cost of interim measures" 
Risk of bridge failure v. low low med. high v. high 
Capacity ratio 0.95 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 
Chance of failure 1 in 10 1 in 10 1 in 10 7 in 10 1 in 000 
No of fatalities 0 0 1 5 15 
Cost of traffic delays £500k £5m £50m £100m £300m 
Table 33 Definition of criteria ranges for "risk of bridge failure" 
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Social impact of restrictions v. low low med. high v. high 
Type of road Local Local Primary/ Primary/ Primary/ 
access distributor Borough Borough Borough 
road road principal principal principal 
road road road 
No of vehicles per day 5000 12000 15000 20000 30000 
No of buses & trucks per day 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 
Importance for fire engines & access access important very very 
other emergency vehicles only only route important important 
route route 
Table 34 Definition of criteria ranges for "social impact of restrictions" 
Bridge improvement benefits low med. high 
Type of bridge improvement works Strengthen for Strengthen Widen footway 
HB vehicles parapets Provide 
Widen Increase sight additional 
carriageway distance services 
Table 35 Definition of criteria ranges for "bridge improvement benefits" 
If there had been more time and interest from the final users, then Fuzzy logic could 
have been used to quantify these bands, making the boundaries between the bands more 
flexible. 
9.4.2 Definition of scenarios 
Once these bands had been defined, a series of decision scenarios were defined that 
considered one pair of criteria at a time. These scenarios were defined as if there were 
two almost identical bridges that only differed with respect to the two criteria currently 
under consideration. For example, for the pair wise comparison of the criterion "social 
impact of restrictions" with the criterion "cost of strengthening works", the decision 
maker would first be asked which out of two almost identical bridges, A and B, would 
he choose to fund for strengthening. Initially bridge A was defined as having a very 
high cost of strengthening but a very low social impact if restricted, and bridge B had a 
very high social impact if restricted but a very low cost of strengthening. The 
definitions of very low, low, medium, high, and very high, as shown previously, were 
displayed for each criteria at all times. It is obvious at this stage that if all else were 
equal, bridge B would be strengthened first. The scenario would then be changed such 
that the bridge selected previously (i. e. Bridge B) would have a reduced first criterion 
and an increased second criterion. 
The bridge not selected would stay the same. In other words, the second comparison 
would be between bridge A still with a very high cost of strengthening and a very low 
social impact if restricted, and bridge B now with a high social impact if restricted and a 
low cost of strengthening. Again, the decision-maker would be asked to choose a 
bridge for strengthening. These scenarios would continue along the scales, until the 
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decision-maker reached a crossover point where, the initially preferred bridge ceased to 
be preferred. 
All of the choices were marked on a response sheet (as shown in Appendix 5) and this 
crossover point then implied a degree of preference between criteria. This process was 
repeated for all pairs of criteria until a full pair-wise comparison matrix could be 
completed. 
This process was repeated for each group interviewed to ensure that a full representation 
of each individual's views was obtained. Four different interviews were carried out in 
total with different groups of decision-makers. Group 1 involved a borough bridge 
engineer, a traffic planner and a council representative. In this group, the whole 
interview took nearly three hours, as there was significant disagreement between the 
three representatives. The borough bridge engineer was most concerned with safety, the 
traffic planner was most concerned with traffic disruption and the council representative 
was most concerned with the impacts on society and local businesses. Because of these 
differences in personal priorities, it took quite a while, in some comparisons, for the 
three to reach a consensus. Group 2 consisted of one borough bridge engineer alone. In 
this case, the interview took almost as long as the Group 1 interview, but for different 
reasons. In this interview, the bridge engineer had no one to bounce his ideas off and 
therefore it took a while for him to come to a conclusion in some questions. The last 
two groups consisted of two engineers each, Group 3 was a borough bridge engineer 
and a traffic planner, and group 4 was a borough bridge engineer and a council 
representative. Both of these groups found the questions much easier to answer as they 
consisted of people with similar priorities. 
9.4.3 Processing of results 
The results of this questionnaire were processed to determine relative weights for each 
"family" of criteria. The relative weights were evaluated by constructing a conversion 
scale from the interview results to Saaty's 1 to 9 scale. This scale is shown in Table 36. 
This scale was then applied in the following manner. The decision maker could state, 
for example, that Bridge A with very high risk and very low cost of strengthening was 
of the same priority for strengthening as Bridge B with very low risk and very high cost 
of strengthening. This would mean that the two criteria must be of equal importance. 
This means this comparison would score a "1" on Saaty's scale. Alternatively, the 
decision maker could give Bridge A the priority until it had a low risk of failure and 
very low cost of strengthening and Bridge B remaining constant. This comparison 
would then score a 7. If the crossover occurred between two comparisons then that 
would give an intermediate score. 
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Saaty's Scale 12 3 45 67 89 
Dominant Bridge very high high med. low very low 
Criterion 1 
Dominant Bridge very low very low very low very low very low 
Criterion 2 
Secondary Bridge very low very low very low very low very low 
Criterion 1 
Secondary Bridge very high very high very high very high very high 
Criterion 2 
Table 36 Scheme used to interpret interview responses 
A set of pair-wise comparison matrices was constructed for each family of criteria : 
1. The top level family of criteria i. e.: 
" Risk of failure, Cost of strengthening works, etc. 
2. Three families of criteria for the evaluation of the social impact of restrictions i. e.: 
" Route importance versus Route category 
" Primary Route, Borough Principal Route, etc. 
9 Fire Engines, Emergency Vehicles, etc. 
3. One family of criteria to determine the benefit of bridge improvement works i. e.: 
" High benefit (strengthen to 40t), medium benefit (increase sight distance), etc. 
Two sets of results were generated, the first was created from the interviews at the time 
of the project; the second (shown in parentheses) was generated more than a year later 
from the same interview documentation. This was to see how much my own 
interpretation of the results differed between the two independent occasions, and how 
that affected the outcome. These are shown in the following set of tables. 
9.4.3.1 Top level family of criteria 















Cost of Strengthening Works 1 1/6 (1/6) 1/9(1/9) 1/7 (1/7) 1/3 (1/3) 
Cost of interim measures 6(6) 1 1/7 (1/6) 1/5(1/5) 5(6) 
Risk of bridge failure 9(9) 7 (6) 1 6 (6) 8(7) 
Social impact of restrictions 7(7)-- (7) 5 (5) 1/6 (1/6) 1 6 (5) 
Bridge improvement benefits 3 (3) 115(116) 1/8 (1/7) 1/6 (1/5) 1 
Table 37 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 1 hierarchy (group 1 results) 
Caroline M Roberts Page 155 CASE STUDY 4 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 















Cost of Strengthening Works 1 1/3 (1/2) 1/7 (1/5) 1/3 (1/2) 2(2) 
Cost of interim measures 3(2) 1 1/6 (1/4) 1/4 (1/3) 3 (3) 
Risk of bridge failure 7(5) 6(4) 1 4(4) 8(6) 
Social impact of restrictions 3 (2) 4 (3) 1/4 (1/4) 1 4(4) 
Bridge improvement benefits 1/2 (1/2) 1/3 (1/3) 118(116) 1/4 (1/4) 1 
Table 38 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 1 hierarchy (group 2 results) 















Cost of Strengthening Works 1 1/5 (1/6) 1/8 (1/8) 1/7 (1/7) 9 (6) 
Cost of interim measures 5 (6) 1 1/7 (1/7) 1/6 (1/8) 9(7) 
Risk of bridge failure 8(8) 7 (7) 1 6(6) 9(9) 
Social impact of restrictions 7 (7) 6 (8) 1/6 (1/6) 1 9 (8) 
Bridge improvement benefits 1/9 (1/6) 119(117) 119019) 1/9 (1/8) 1 
Table 39 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 1 hierarchy (group 3 results) 















Cost of Strengthening Works 1 1/5 (1/6) 119(118) 1/7 (1/7) 4 (5) 
Cost of interim measures 5(6) 1 1/8 (1/8) 1/4(1/5) 6(7) 
Risk of bridge failure 9(8) 8 (8) 1 7 (7) 9(9) 
Social impact of restrictions 7 (7) 4 (5) 1/7 (1/7) 1 8 (8) 
Bridge improvement benefits 1/4 (1/5) 116(117) 119(119) 1/8 (1/8) 1 
Table 40 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 1 hierarchy (group 4 results) 
9.4.3.2 First family of criteria for evaluating the social impact of restrictions 
Group 1 Results Route Importance Route Category 
Route Importance 1 1/3 (1/4) 
Route Category 3(4) 1 
Table 41 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 2 hierarchy (group 1 results) 
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Group 2 Results Route Importance Route Category 
Route Importance 1 5 (6) 
Route Category 1/5 (1/6) 1 
Table 42 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 2 hierarchy (group 2 results) 
Group 3 Results Route Importance Route Category 
Route Importance 1 1/6 (1/6) 
Route Category 6 (6) 1 
Table 43 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 2 hierarchy (group 3 results) 
Group 4 Results Route Importance Route Category 
Route Importance 1 3 (3) 
Route Category 1/3 (1/3) 1 
Table 44 Pair wise comparison matrix for level 2 hierarchy (group 4 results) 
9.4.3.3 Second family of criteria for evaluating the social impact of restrictions 






Primary Route 1 1 6 (8) 6 (8) 
Borough Principal Route 1 1 6 (8) 6 (8) 
Distributor Route 1/6 (1/8) 1/6 (1/8) 1 1 
Local Access Route 1/6(1/8) 1/6(1/8) 1 1 
Table 45 Pair wise comparison matrix for 1" level 3 hierarchy (group 1 results) 






Primary Route 1 1 6 (7) 6 (7) 
Borough Principal Route 1 1 6 (7) 6 (7) 
Distributor Route 1/6(1/7) 1/6(1/7) 1 1 
Local Access Route 1/6 (1/7) 1/6 (1/7) 1 1 
Table 46 Pair wise comparison matrix for 1" level 3 hierarchy (group 2 results) 






Primary Route 1 1 7 (7) 7 (7) 
Borough Principal Route 1 1 7(7) 7 (7) 
Distributor Route 1/7 (1/7) 1/7 (1/7) 1 1 
Local Access Route 1/7(1/7) 1/7(1/7) 1 1 
Table 47 Pair wise comparison matrix for 1 level 3 hierarchy (group 3 results) 
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Primary Route 1 1 7(7) 7 (7) 
Borough Principal Route 1 1 7 (7) 7 (7) 
Distributor Route 1/7 (1/7) 1/7 (1/7) 1 1 
Local Access Route 1/7(1/7) 1/7(1/7) 1 1 
Table 48 Pair wise comparison matrix for 1" level 3 hierarchy (group 4 results) 
9.4.3.4 Third family of criteria for evaluating the social impact of restrictions 
Group 1 Results Fire Engines Emergency 
Vehicles 
Buses HGVs Cyclists Pedestrians 
Fire Engines 1 1 (1) 3 (3) 5 (5) 8(8) 9(9) 
Emergency 
Vehicles 
1 (1) 1 3(4) 5 (5) 8(8) 9(9) 
Buses 1/3(1/3) 1/3(1/4) 1 4(4) 6(7) 7(8) 
HGVs 1/5 (1/5) 1/5 (1/5) 1/4 (1/4) 1 5 (6) 6 (7) 
Cyclists 118(118) 1/8 (18) 1/6 (1/7) 1/5 (1/6) 1 2(2) 
Pedestrians 119(119) 119(119) 1/7 (1/8) 1/6 (1/7) 112(1 /2) 1 
Table 49 Pair wise comparison matrix for Z- level a hierarchy (group 1 results) 
Group 2 Results Fire Engines Emergency 
Vehicles 
Buses HGVs Cyclists Pedestrians 
Fire Engines 1 1 (1) 5 (5) 7 (6) 9(8) 9(9) 
Emergency 
Vehicles 
1(1) 1 5 (5) 7 (6) 9(8) 9(9) 
Buses 115(115) 115(115) 1 6(5) 7(7) 8(8) 
HGVs 1/7 (1/6) 1/7 (1/6) 1/6 (1/5) 1 6 (6) 7 (7) 
Cyclists 119(118) 119(118) 1/7 (1/7) 1/6 (1/6) 1 2 (2) 
Pedestrians 119(119) 119(119) 1/8 (1/8) 1/7 (1/7) 1/2 (1/2) 1 
fable su fair wise comparison matrix for 2 -' level 3 hierarchy (group 2 results) 
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Group 3 Results Fire Engines Emergency 
Vehicles 
Buses HGVs Cyclists Pedestrians 
Fire Engines 1 1 (1) 1/5 (1/6) 1/5 (1/6) 4(8) 5(9) 
Emergency 
Vehicles 
1 (1) 1 1/5 (1/6) 1/5 (1/6) 4(8) 5(9) 
Buses 5 (6) 5(6) 1 1 (1) 8 (7) 9 (8) 
HGVs 5 (6) 5 (6) 1 (1) 1 8 (7) 9 (8) 
Cyclists 114(118) 114(118) 1/8 (1/7) 1/8 (1/7) 1 2 (2) 
Pedestrians 115(119) 115(119) 1/9 (1/8) 1/9 (1/8) 112(112) 1 
Table 51 Pair wise comparison matrix for 2"" level 3 hierarchy (group 3 results) 
Group 4 Results Fire Engines Emergency 
Vehicles 
Buses HGVs Cyclists Pedestrians 
Fire Engines 1 1 (1) 8 (7) 5 (6) 9(9) 9(9) 
Emergency 
Vehicles 
1 (1) 1 8 (7) 5 (6) 9(9) 9(9) 
Buses 1/8 (1/7) 1/8 (1/7) 1 1/6 (1/6) 7 (8) 7 (8) 
HGVs 1/5 (1/6) 1/5 (1/6) 6 (6) 1 9 (9) 9 (9) 
Cyclists 1/9(1/9) 1/9(1/9) 1/7 (1/8) 1/9 (1/9) 1 1 (1) 
Pedestrians 119(119) 119(119) 1/7 (1/8) 1/9 (1/9) 1 (1) 1 
Table 52 Pair wise comparison matrix for 2"" level 3 hierarchy (group 4 results) 
9.4.3.5 First family of criteria for evaluating bridge improvement works 
Only one set of results is presented for the following, as these questions were asked 
directly of the interviewees, and therefore were not open to interpretation. 
Group 1 Results High Benefit Medium Benefit Low Benefit 
High Benefit 1 7 9 
Medium Benefit 1/7 1 2 
Low Benefit F 1/9 1/2 1 Table 53 Pair wise comparison matrix for the level 2 hierarchy (group 1 results) 
Group 2 Results High Benefit Medium Benefit Low Benefit 
High Benefit 1 5 7 
Medium Benefit 1/5 1 3 
Low Benefit 1/7 1/3 1 
Table 54 Pair wise comparison matrix for the level 2 hierarchy (group 2 results) 
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Group 3 Results High Benefit Medium Benefit Low Benefit 
High Benefit 1 3 6 
Medium Benefit 1/3 1 3 
Low Benefit 1/6 T 1/3 1 
Table 55 Pair wise comparison matrix for the level 2 hierarchy (group 3 results) 
Group 4 Results High Benefit Medium Benefit Low Benefit 
High Benefit 1 5 9 
Medium Benefit 1/5 1 7 
Low Benefit 1/9 1/7 1 
Table 56 Pair wise comparison matrix for the level 2 hierarchy (group 4 results) 
The first step in synthesising the judgements presented in this pair wise matrix is to 
reduce the matrix to a comparison vector. This is done by the Eigenvector method. The 
principal eigenvalue is first calculated (this also gives an indication of the level of 
consistency between answers), the corresponding Eigenvector gives an estimate of the 
relative preferences. The elements of this vector are then normalised to sum to unity. 
MathCad was used to carry out this analysis, as it had the capacity for matrix 
mathematics. A bi-product of this method is a measure of consistency between the 
elements of each pair wise comparison matrix. This is calculated as the relative 
deviation from the principal Eigenvector of each original element. The larger the 
relative deviation, the larger the inconsistency of the subjective opinion that generated 
the elements. The spreadsheets for these evaluations are shown in Appendix 6. 
9.4.4 Reaching a consensus between experts 
A set of relative weights was determined for each group interviewed. It was then 
necessary to combine the different sets of weights to produce a consensus set of 
weights. An algorithm, called the "modified median consensus algorithm" [159] was 
used for this purpose. However, this would have been useless if the different sets of 
weights were very diverse (e. g. due to wide variances in policy and culture within each 
authority). The modified median consensus algorithm therefore, also provides a 
measure of the group cohesiveness, to indicate how closely each of the individual 
experts agrees. The consensus was evaluated by using the following procedure for each 
family of criteria: 
1. The scores for each interview group were placed in the columns of a table to form a 
matrix with the criteria as shown in Table 57 below: 
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Risk of Failure 0.566 0.532 0.553 0.594 
Social Impacts of Restrictions 0.236 0.21 0.271 0.225 
Cost of Interim Measures 0.123 0.122 0.105 0.11 
Cost of Strengthening 0.028 0.082 0.048 0.047 
Bridge Improvements 0.048 0.053 0.022 0.023 
Table 57 Matrix of results for each group for the top-level criteria 
2. Each row of the table was then rearranged in ascending orders of the scores, as 
shown in Table 58 and each newly formed column was summed: 
Risk of Failure 0.532 0.553 0.566 0.594 
Social Impacts of Restrictions 0.21 0.225 0.236 0.271 
Cost of Interim Measures 0.105 0.11 0.122 0.123 
Cost of Strengthening 0.028 0.047 0.048 0.082 
Bridge Improvements 0.022 0.023 0.048 0.053 
Total 0.897 0.958 1.02 1.123 
fable 58 Matrix of rearranged results for the top-level criteria 
3. The final step was to interpolate between the two columns of score whose totals 
bracket a sum value of 1.0, i. e. between columns 2 and 3. This gave consensus 
weights as shown in Table 59. 
Risk of Failure 0.56 
Social Impacts of Restrictions 0.23 
Cost of Interim Measures 0.12 
Cost of Strengthening 0.05 
Bridge Improvements 0.04 
Table 59 Calculated consensus weights for the top-level criteria 
The consensus weights and individual group weights for each family of criteria are 
presented in the next section for each group of criteria. All four decision groups arrived 
at similar weightings for most criteria despite different cultural and political viewpoints. 
9.5 Discussion of the Results 
Figure 28 to Figure 32 and Table 60 to Table 64 show the individual and consensus 
weights for each family of criteria for both the original and revisited (in parentheses) 
evaluations of interview responses. Figure 28 and Table 60 show the results for the top- 
level criteria used to determine the overall Bridge Priority Index. This shows a very 
close consensus of views from the different interviewees for both evaluations and 
between the two evaluations. 
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Consensus 
Risk of Failure 0.584 (0.566) 0.554 (0.532) 0.555 (0.553) 0.612 (0.594) 0.57 (0.56) 
Social Impacts o 
Restrictions 
0.233 (0.236) 0.224 (0.21) 0.254 (0.271) 0.212 (0.225) 0.23 (0.23) 
Cost of Interim Measures 0.11(0.123) 0.112 (0.122) 0.112 (0.105) 0.105 (0.11) 0.11(0.12) 
Cost of Strengthening 0.028 (0.028) 0.065 (0.082) 0.058 (0.048) 0.046 (0.047) 0.05 (0.05) 
Bridge Improvements 0.045 (0.048) 0.045 (0.053) 0.02 (0.022) 0.025 (0.023) 0.04 (0.04) 
i ante ou inuiviuuai anu consensus weignts for i me mop-ievei criteria "the bridge 
priority index" for the original and revisited evaluations of interview responses 
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Figure 29 and Table 61 show the results for the second level criteria used to determine 
the social impact of restrictions. Due to different interpretations of the criteria, this does 
not show a very close consensus of views from the different interviewees. After some 
discussion, it was agreed that it was very difficult to separate the two criteria and that 
they should be considered of equal importance. This then matched the predicted 
consensus weights. 
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Consensus 
Route Importance 0.25 (0.2) 0.833 (0.857) 0.143 (0.143) 0.75 (0.75) 0.50 (0.48) 
Route Category 0.75 (0.8) 0.167 (0.143) 0.857 (0.857) 0.25 (0.25) 0.50 (0.53) 
Table 61 Individual and consensus weights for the seconu-level criteria -, tne social 
impact of restrictions" for the original and revisited evaluations of responses 
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Figure 29 Individual and consensus weights for the second-level criteria "the social 
impact of restrictions" for the original and revisited evaluations of responses 
Figure 30 and Table 62 show the results for the third level criteria used to determine the 
route category. This once more shows a very close consensus of views from the 
different interviewees. 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Consensus 
Primary Route 0.429 (0.444) 0.429 (0.438) 0.438 (0.438) 0.438 (0.438) 0.43 (0.44) 
Borough Principal Route 0.429 (0.444) 0.429 (0.437) 0.437 (0.437) 0.437 (0.437) 0.43 (0.44) 
Local Distributor Route 0.071 (0.056) 0.071 (0.063) 0.063 (0.063) 0.063 (0.063) 0.07 (0.06) 
Local Access Route 0.071 (0.056) 0.071 (0.062) 0.062 (0.062) 0.062 (0.062) 0.07 (0.06) 
Table 62 Individual and consensus weights for the third-level criteria "the route 
category" for the original and revisited evaluations of responses 
d00/ " .ý". 
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Figure 30 Individual and consensus weights for the third-level criteria "the route 
category" for the original and revisited evaluations of responses 
Third Level Criteria to evaluate Route Category as a sub 
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Figure 31 and Table 63 show the results for the third level criteria to determine the route 
importance. This shows another disagreement between interview groups. Post 
evaluation discussions showed that group 3 had misunderstood the implication of the 
questions for this criterion and asked for their results to be ignored. The other three 
groups' responses reflected the cultures of the regions that they represented. Groups 1 
and 2 represented commerce dependent areas and so gave buses more importance than 
HGVs, while group 4 represented an industry dependent area giving HGVs more 
importance. 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Consensus 
Fire Engines 0.336 (0.325) 0.359 (0.355) 0.101 (0.114) 0.361 (0.362F 0.34 (0.33) 
Emergency Vehicles 0.336 (0.352) 0.359 (0.355) 0.101 (0.114) 0.361 (0.362) 0.34 (0.35) 
Buses 0.178 (0.175) 0.16 (0.159) 0.366 (0.36) 0.072 (0.076) 0.16 (0.16) 
HGVs 0.091 (0.094) 0.074 (0.081) 0.366 (0.36) 0.163 (0.157) 0.10 (0.11) 
Cyclists 0.034 (0.031) 0.027 (0.029) 0.037 (0.03) 0.022 (0.021) 0.03 (0.03) 
Pedestrians 0.024 (0.023) 10.021 (0.021) 0.027 (0.022) 0.022 (0.021) 0.02 (0.02) 
Table b3 lnatvlaual ana consensus weignis for ine inira"level criteria evaluating 
the route importance for original & revisited evaluations of interview responses 
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Third Level Criteria to evaluate Route Importance as 
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Figure 31 Individual and consensus results of the weights for the third-level 
criteria evaluating route importance for original & revisited evaluations of 
interview responses 
Finally, Figure 32 and Table 64 show the results for the second level criteria used to 
determine the bridge improvement benefits for the original and revisited (in 
parentheses) evaluations of interview responses. This shows a very close consensus of 
views from the different interviewees both between interviewees and between 
evaluations. 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Consensus 
High benefit 0.793 (0.793) 0.731 (0.731) 0.655 (0.655) 0.722 (0.722) 0.72 (0.72) 
Medium benefit 0.131 (0.131) 0.188 (0.188) 0.25 (0.25) 0.227 (0.227) 0.20 (0.20) 
Low benefit 0.076 (0.076) 0.081 (0.081) 0.095 (0.095) 0.051 (0.051) 0.08 (0.08) 
Table 64 Individual and consensus results of the weights for the second-level 
criteria to evaluate the bridge improvement benefits for the original and revisited 
evaluations of interview responses 
i ý t 
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These consensus weights were then put forward to be used in the actual evaluation of 
the alternative bridges requiring strengthening work. 
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Figure 32 Individual and consensus results of the weights for the second-level 
criteria to evaluate the bridge improvement benefits for the original and revisited 
evaluations of interview responses 
9.6 Selection of "Best" Alternative 
Before a decision could be made between the different alternatives, the scores for each 
of the main factors had to be transferred to a common scale. If the attributes were 
valued in their simplest units (e. g. cost of strengthening and cost of interim measures in 
pounds, risk in the form of a function of pounds, social impact and bridge 
improvements in the form of a subjective score), then it is very difficult to evaluate the 
trade-offs between them i. e. comparing money with lives lost. 
Each score had to be mapped onto a scale from 0 to 100 to represent the performance of 
the specific bridge strengthening project under consideration according to each factor. 
For each of the main factors the worst imaginable score for that factor was assigned a 
zero and the best imaginable was assigned a 100. For each factor, a linear (or 
logarithmic) relationship was then defined between the calculated score and the 
performance rating. This section of the work was carried out predominantly by another 
member of the project team, with some support, advice and ideas from me. For this 
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reason, it is not described fully here. Once the performance ratings had been determined 
for each of the main factors, the overall priority score was calculated by summing the 
products of the importance weightings and the performance weightings for each factor. 
The overall priority scores for each bridge strengthening project under consideration 
could then be considered to allow project selection. The final order of priority of the 
bridges requiring strengthening work was commercially sensitive information that has 
been withheld by WS Atkins. 
9.7 Conclusions 
The problem addressed in this case study was extremely political and contentious in 
nature. A large number of stakeholders were involved in and affected by the decision. 
Therefore, all voices were trying to be heard. The problem was further complicated by 
the significant uncertainties involved in the integrity assessments of the large number of 
bridges and the consequences of bridge failure. Furthermore, the decision had to be 
made with as much consensus as possible in a very short time-scale. 
This meant that the stakeholders were a very significant issue to be addressed in the 
decision-making. To address this problem, I interviewed representatives of all 
stakeholder groups as an independent third party to identify their preferences so that 
these could be built into a consensus and used to help solve the decision problem. The 
weights achieved for the four groups were very consistent. This showed agreement 
across the stakeholder groups of the important factors to be considered when allocating 
resources to bridge strengthening. All parties that were interviewed agreed that the risk 
of the bridges failing in service was the most significant factor to be considered when 
prioritising between bridges. This process helped the stakeholder groups explore the 
problem and come to a more detailed understanding of the important factors. It also 
provided a clear means for building consensus between the conflicting stakeholder 
groups. 
The alternatives in this decision were the more than 150 bridges that required 
strengthening. However, there was the possibility that more than one bridge could be 
selected to ensure best use of the allocated budgets. Therefore, the number of 
alternatives was far more than the number of bridges requiring repair as a large number 
of combinations of bridges could also be selected. This vast series of alternatives 
therefore meant a very thorough investigation of the problem could be carried out with a 
better chance of identifying the best option. 
The decision criteria were identified very early on in the analysis by interviewing 
experienced bridge engineers and other council representatives who represented the 
views of external stakeholders. A comprehensive list of factors was produced and this 
was then refined and condensed through discussions with other boroughs. The main 
criteria on which the bridge prioritisation decision was to be based were therefore: 
" The cost of carrying out strengthening work 
" The risk of bridge failure if strengthening work is not carried out 
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" The cost of interim measures such weight restrictions, or propping if strengthening 
work is not carried out immediately, 
" The impacts on the local society if the work is not carried out 
" The additional benefits that can be gained by carrying out bridge improvement and 
upgrading works at the same time. 
These criteria were measured in their most natural units to ensure clear communication 
of the decision process, and a clear audit trail to prove the systematic and unbiased 
manner in which the decision was made. This again promoted understanding and 
ownership of the decision by all stakeholders. 
Structural analysis was used to construct an influence diagram of the problem, which 
helped elicit the important issues to be addressed from discussions with the different 
stakeholder groups. However, the most benefit to the decision in terms of structural 
analysis came from developing the hierarchy of criteria, which helped in the 
measurement of the alternatives in terms of each criterion. It also helped in the 
identification and quantification of preferences between the criteria. This also promoted 
understanding and ownership of the decision by all stakeholders. 
The information that was required to help solve the decision problem was identified 
through the help of the criteria hierarchies developed previously for each bridge 
requiring strengthening. A questionnaire was constructed to help each borough bridge 
engineer evaluate each bridge against the given criteria for the list of bridges requiring 
strengthening work in their boroughs that they had identified. For most of the criteria, 
this questionnaire was as thorough as possible, gathering as much real and relevant data 
as possible. 
However, due to the limited information available for each bridge in terms of the 
structural assessment of the bridge and due to the tight time-scale, the method for 
evaluating risk had to be simplified. The idea of the risk index was introduced as a 
representative value embodying as much information as possible in the risk evaluation. 
This was sufficient for the decision-making at hand and ensured all bridges were treated 
fairly and evaluated against risk consistently. However, risk was found to be the most 
important decision factor. It was therefore felt that a more rigorous evaluation of risk 
for the bridges at the top of the prioritisation list could provide "finer tuning" of the 
final ranking. The risk evaluation that was carried out was an integral part of the 
decision process and the importance of the risk in the decision reflected the importance 
placed on it by the stakeholders. 
As mentioned above these importances were assessed by interviewing representatives of 
all stakeholder groups as an independent third party. This was the first time that the 
analytic hierarchy process had been used to rank bridges according to multiple criteria. 
A new method for eliciting preferences from bridge managers based on Saaty's pair 
wise comparisons was developed to make the method more user friendly and therefore 
more accessible to all bridge engineers. The individual importances were then built into 
a consensus through mathematical models and further group discussion and used to help 
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solve the decision problem. The weights achieved for the four groups were very 
consistent. This showed agreement across the stakeholder groups of the important 
factors to be considered when allocating resources to bridge strengthening. This 
interview and discussion process helped the stakeholder groups explore the problem and 
come to a more detailed understanding of the important factors. It also provided a clear 
means for building consensus between the conflicting stakeholder groups. The presence 
of the third party facilitator ensured that the stakeholders understood the decision 
problem in an unbiased manner giving confidence to the stakeholders that their 
viewpoints would be fully represented. The set of consensus importances were then 
used to weight the criteria and hence the scores for each bridge, thus fully integrating 
the stakeholder preferences into the decision process in a clear, auditable and logical 
manner. 
Sensitivity analysis was carried out to evaluate the robustness of the method adopted for 
interpreting the interview results. This showed very little difference on the consensus 
weightings even using the extremes of the interpretation bands. This showed that 
consensus was robust and logical, which further encouraged ownership of the results by 
the stakeholder groups. 
Of the two bridges recommended by the decision process for immediate strengthening, 
one was completely expected by all parties, the other was not. However, detailed 
consideration of the latter bridge against the decision criteria showed that it was the 
logical second choice. Therefore, since all stakeholders had been involved so 
thoroughly in the decision process and hence agreed to its logic, they agreed to the logic 
of the decision. 
The use of the risk-based decision model meant that risk was clearly accounted for in 
the decision that was made. It is very likely that in the absence of such a model, normal 
practice would have been to evaluate the alternatives based on cost and possibly load 
capacity only. This would not have been able to single out one or two bridges as top 
priority and therefore would not have solved the problem. The risks involved are 
significant and therefore have a significant impact on the final decision. 
The application of the risk-based decision model to this case study has showed that for 
this decision all stages of the process were relevant and helpful. Some of the important 
issues in this decision may not have automatically been identified and accounted for, 
however the decision process prompted thorough investigation of every issue ensuring 
the decision was as thorough and robust as possible. For this decision, however, the 
originally defined structural analysis in terms of developing a decision tree or an 
influence diagram, was not particularly helpful. A decision tree would have been 
unmanageable in size and the influence diagram shed little additional light on the 
problem. However, by extending the definition of structural analysis to include the 
development of criteria hierarchies this stage in the process became probably one of the 
most valuable in terms of developing understanding and consensus. 
The use of a structured decision process to support the decision in this case helped the 
stakeholders identify the most important issues to be addressed and allowed the 
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important decision criteria and alternatives to be identified, agreed and ranked. It also 
supported the understanding of other's opinions and perceptions and helped build 
consensus in the final decision. The decision process also allowed the important data on 
which the decision should be based to be identified and gathered in an accessible but 
meaningful form. 
The use of the risk-based decision model brought the significance of the risks to the fore 
and meant that the assessment of risks was an integral part of the decision process. The 
consideration of all of these issues meant that a clear audit trail could be produced of the 
way the decision was made. This could then be re-visited, understood and if necessary 
re-addressed at a later stage. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 170 CASE STUDY 4 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
10 CASE STUDY 5 
REVIEW OF RISK-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN APA 
10.1 Introduction 
APA normally becomes involved in engineering decision-making after the high value 
field development (concept selection) decisions have been made. The operator has 
already determined decisions such as the field development type, the pipeline 
requirement and sometimes even the pipeline operating conditions before APA are 
commissioned to design the pipelines. Therefore APA is left with the lower value, 
lower complexity decisions in preliminary and detailed pipeline design. The earlier 
decisions made by the operator and the contract strategy can severely restrict the way 
design decisions are made by APA, causing APA to produce, at times, sub-optimal 
designs and restricting their contribution to high value decisions. This can cause 
problems for the client or operator and reflect badly on APA. This document reviews 
some risk-based decisions made in preliminary engineering design at APA, when the 
decision-maker is faced with the most significant risks and consequences to be endured 
for the structure's remaining life. The objectives of this case study were: 
" To identify the types of engineering decisions made by APA now and in the past, and 
the types of decisions made by others that APA would like to make. 
" To compare the decisions with the methods developed within this research. 
" To draw conclusions on how reality can be improved to take advantage of theory. 
A number of recent engineering projects were identified and reviewed in detail to 
establish the types of engineering decisions that APA generally make. Also identified 
were the decisions that APA did not make that were made already by the contractor or 
the operator. For every key decision, an indication of the main decision-makers, the 
important decision criteria and any constraints on the decision were identified. 
Some of APA's senior engineers and managers were interviewed about how they made 
these decisions. In addition, more general questions were asked on the usual approach 
to engineering decision-making. The interview outline used is presented in Appendix 7. 
The following discussion describes the types of decisions made throughout the stages of 
a pipeline design and management life cycle and the discussion is illustrated with 
examples of some of the real life decisions identified and evaluated through the 
interviews. 
10.2 Life Cycle Decision-making 
The following identifies the typical stages of a pipeline's life cycle and discusses some 
of the typical decisions faced at each stage. Brief mention is also made of some of the 
decisions investigated in detail through the desktop study and interviews. 
10.2.1 Field identification 
The need or opportunity for an investment in a structural asset has to be identified or 
justified before it can be approved. In the oil and gas industry, the need or opportunity 
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to produce oil and/or gas from a new field development has to be justified before field 
development options can be investigated. Decisions at this stage are taken at a high 
level in the operator's organisational structure with some degree of expert advice from 
in-house specialists and external consultants. The key tasks for the decision maker in 
these situations are to establish the extent of oil/gas reserves in the field and to identify 
any potential risks associated with its economical extraction. Time spent identifying 
any unknowns/uncertainties and trying to evaluate these can significantly support any 
decision-making. The decisions made at this stage are based on limited data, subjective 
judgements and predictions of capacity, turnover, whole life cost and profit. 
APA do not tend to be involved in decisions at this stage, therefore it is not considered 
appropriate to elaborate any further on this stage here. 
10.2.2 Feasibility assessment 
Having identified a field with a potential for development, it is then necessary to 
determine the technical feasibility of the possible development scenarios. Of interest to 
APA at this stage would be the feasibility assessment of the available options for 
transporting produced gas/oil from the field, which could include the use of a tanker or 
a subsea pipeline tied in to an existing trunk line. At this stage the decision-making 
would still be controlled by the operator, although consultants like APA may be asked 
to provide expert advice, or supporting assessments to aid the feasibility assessment. 
Significant uncertainty would still be involved at this stage, for example, in the design 
capacity, in potential environmental impacts, etc. One significant task at this stage, 
therefore, would be to validate the reserve levels, before excessive expense is made. 
As with the previous stage, APA do not tend to be involved in decisions made at this 
stage apart from producing supporting calculations and offering expert advice. 
10.2.3 Conceptual design 
Conceptual design is the time when the preferred development option is selected based 
on the results of the feasibility assessment. For example, if the pipeline concept was 
found to be most feasible, then the important issues to be considered here would include 
the method and location of pipeline tie in and the proposed capacity. During this stage 
the design proposal is developed, to identify all key design features to be incorporated 
in the detailed design so that the detailed design can be put out to tender with the 
operator confident of receiving a design that meets all the necessary requirements. 
Although APA are not often involved at this stage, the results of the decisions made can 
be observed from the project work performed by APA. For example, in two of the 
projects investigated, the operator had already carried out the conceptual design and had 
identified the use of a pipeline as the most appropriate transportation method. In one of 
the projects it had already been decided to develop the wells subsea then to tie them 
back by subsea flowlines to a new platform located adjacent, and bridge linked, to a 
second platform. Flowline lengths from the two satellite wells had also been 
established. In addition to the flowlines, the development included wellhead protection 
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structures and electro-hydraulic multiplexed control umbilicals between the platform 
and satellite wells. 
In the second project, the operator had decided to install a new export pipeline to 
replace the existing line, to a different platform owned by a different third party 
operator who had offered to transport the oil at a lower tariff. According to Interviewee 
3, "the original line had been buried under a mountain of rock so the operator wanted 
to leave this pipeline on the seabed. The operator worked on a conceptual study to 
demonstrate that the line could be left on the seabed. " 
The third project involved an operator who wanted to expand a transmission pipeline to 
accommodate increased throughput from third party operators, which was originally 
available through a number of pipeline `Tees'. The whole purpose of this project was 
therefore to carry out a conceptual study of the proposal to install a new parallel loop 
over a length of the line. This would be carried out by first installing a new tee, to 
provide the upstream connection for the new loop and to select an appropriate existing 
tie-in point for the downstream connection. The loop would increase the main 
transmission line capacity but a series of detailed process analyses were required to 
evaluate the available flow rates from the various original third party entrants to the 
pipeline system. Then a hydraulic and thermal analysis evaluated the flow capacity that 
may be obtained at various positions along the pipeline system, for a range of loop 
lengths and diameters. As Interviewee 1 said, "the operator gave us the conceptual 
work to look at where the gas was coming from, what flow rates and pressures, and so 
what diameter of pipeline should be used for the detailed design. " 
On the project management side, the conceptual design stage would also involve the 
operator obtaining agreement in principal to commercial issues and determining the 
appropriate contracting strategy for awarding the detailed design and installation work. 
In recent years, the trend has been for operators to award "EPIC" contracts to 
installation contractors to Engineer, Procure, Install and Commission the installation for 
a fixed fee. Any design work that the installation contractor is unable to perform would 
then be sub-contracted to design consultants such as APA. 
The first two projects described above were carried as EPIC contracts within which 
APA was subcontracted to the installation contractor to carry out the design work. The 
third project, following the conceptual design stage, was put out to tender to carry out 
the front-end engineering phase. According to Interviewee 7, "Two installation 
contractors decided to bid jointly and asked us to bid to them. The project was set up 
with a conceptual phase and a detailed design phase, still within the FEED. At the end 
of this we were to have a well-defined design that could be costed correctly. " This 
would then have allowed the development work to be awarded as an EPIC contract had 
it continued. 
10.2.4 Preliminary/front end engineering design (FEED) 
The preliminary or front end engineering design phase involves making a number of 
influential design decisions which then dictate the way the detailed design will be 
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carried out. These decisions could typically include the routing of the pipeline, the 
diameter and wall thickness of the line pipe, the locations of spools and crossings, types 
of valves and pigging facilities, methods for protecting the spools and valves, pipeline 
coatings and other corrosion inhibitors. 
For the first project, APA was employed by the operator to carry out the preliminary 
design engineering (front-end engineering) including providing subsea control services 
on a reimbursable basis with an upper budget limit. The issues addressed included 
carrying out the initial hydraulic analysis and designing the pipeline route. 
The hydraulic analysis was carried out based on the best estimates of operational and 
design temperature as the upper bound for the mechanical design. This was a risk but 
no well data was available. If the pipeline was designed for too high a temperature then 
the design, procurement and installation cost would be excessive. If the pipeline was 
designed for too low a temperature then the operational conditions would have to be 
reduced to keep the pipe from failing. This could increase the corrosion problems and 
stop the field from being cost-effective. 
APA designed the pipeline route to avoid a region of significant sand waves which 
would have been encountered had a straight line been taken. According to interviewee 
2, "during the front end engineering work APA recommend avoiding the sand waves on 
the basis that it was considered the lowest cost option. " 
The front-end engineering work for the third project involved a number of analyses and 
decisions in order to determine the suitability of carrying this project through to contract 
award. These issues included selecting the best pipeline expansion loop configuration. 
This included the loop length and route and the valving requirements to allow safe hot 
tap operation, independent isolation of the loop and pigging. It also involved 
identifying the best protection solution at the tie-in point. 
The second project moved straight from conceptual design to detailed design via an 
EPIC contract. 
10.2.5 Bid engineering 
At the bid engineering stage, the decision-making moves initially to the prospective 
installation contractors who, in EPIC contracts, have to identify a suitable method of 
approach and evaluate a fixed price at which to bid the work. To aid them in their 
decision-making, they will do some preliminary analyses. These could include 
identifying a suitable pipe wall thickness (so that pipe costs can be calculated) and 
evaluating the propensity for upheaval buckling and the critical span length (so that post 
installation mitigation costs can be calculated). Design consultants such as APA are 
required to run preliminary analyses at this stage to provide "ball park" figures to 
support the contractor's decision-making. Furthermore, they are required to bid to the 
contractors to receive the design work, if the contractor wins the overall contract. The 
contractor therefore has to make decisions concerning the design and installation 
strategy and the bidding strategy (e. g. low cost low risk or high cost high risk) at this 
stage. 
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APA has contributed to the bid engineering for a number of different contractors and 
development projects. These usually include confirming the best diameter pipeline to 
meet the required flow rate base on the proposed operating conditions. They also 
consider the proposed wall thickness and operating conditions to determine the 
propensity for upheaval buckling and the stability of the pipeline on the seabed. 
10.2.6 Contract award 
Once the contractors have submitted their bids to the operator, the operator has to make 
a very significant decision - who to award the contract to. The impact of this decision, 
good or bad, can reach throughout the whole life of the field development. 
In the first project, the operator decided to progress the detailed design in the form of an 
EPIC contract as a way of controlling costs and risk as the costs of the conceptual 
design had risen out of control. However, such a contract restricts the communication 
process between the operator, the contractor and the design consultant due to the way all 
decision-making power is handed over to the installation contractor with the EPIC 
contract. In this project, this meant that APA was not able to rationally support the 
operator in their design decision-making. 
In the second project, the operator invited bids for EPIC contract to design and install a 
pipeline on the seabed. However, the installation contractor selected by the operator 
could not guarantee to install a pipeline on the seabed. This is because they could only 
reel lay pipe and therefore could not use concrete coating (which had been the basis for 
most of the conceptual design assessment). Because of the low cost installation method, 
they were the most competitive on price and therefore won the work. However, they 
could not achieve the conceptual design. As interviewee 2 said, "the contractor had bid 
for the work saying, "this is our price for an untrenched pipeline, but if in the remote 
chance our consultant tells us that it does need to be trenched, then this will be 
additional to our bid price ". " At this late stage, the operator had some checks done and 
initiated some testing which suggested that installing a non-concrete coated pipe could' 
work. Thus in the belief that concrete coated pipe and uncoated pipe were similar, the 
operator had evaluated all the bids based on not trenching and therefore, according to 
interviewee 2, did not take into account the real cost of this contractor's bid. 
In the third project, the FEED stage was put out to tender and the operator awarded the 
work to two installation contractors who had decided to bring an edge to their proposal 
by bidding it as a joint venture. They then carried out the work as an integrated project 
team consisting of the operator, the two main contractors, APA as a design consultant 
and a couple of other contractorstconsultants. 
10.2.7 Detailed design 
By the detailed design stage, the investment has been estimated and nearly approved. 
This stage aims to design the pipeline for safety and whole life cost through the 
selection of dimensions and materials suitable for safety and durability. Protective 
measures are identified and additional data is gathered if necessary. These decisions are 
governed less by uncertainty (although some uncertainties inevitably remain, such as 
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operating conditions and as built conditions), and more by engineering predictions of 
safety, based on detailed analysis, specification of appropriate equipment and testing. 
This is one of the most significant stages in the pipeline life cycle for APA (in terms of 
revenue) and they are able to contribute to the decision-making concerning the finer 
detail of the design. However, there is no doubt that these are lower value decisions. 
In the first project reviewed, the main decisions made at this stage included finalising 
the pipeline route and dimensions. However, as soon as the EPIC contract was 
awarded, the chosen contractor recommended changing the pipeline route from that 
identified at the FEED stage to run through the sand waves hence reducing line pipe 
costs. They recommended that it would be more cost effective to trench through the 
sand waves after laying the pipeline and then mitigate for any remaining out of 
straightness features, rather than pre-sweep and dredge before pipe lay. The operator 
agreed to take on the risk of the mitigation costs. In other words, despite being involved 
at the FEED and detailed design stages; the decisions were made without reference to 
APA. 
In the second project, the contractor who won the EPIC contract awarded APA a fixed 
price contract to undertake detailed design of the subsea pipeline system. The 
contractor had already specified the line pipe and APA was asked to verify the 
suitability of this selection. However, there was no opportunity to optimise the design 
since the line pipe had already been ordered. According to Interviewee 3, "In order to 
keep their costs to a minimum, the contractor chose the minimum wall thickness that 
they could get away with. A thicker pipe wall would have been more robust and may 
have allowed them to leave the pipeline on the seabed, but that would have increased 
steel costs. 
Interviewee 3 said, "We were tasked to look at the feasibility of leaving the pipeline on 
the seabed. This included the acceptability of the likelihood and consequences of the 
pipe being hit by fishing gear. The operator gave us a set of test results showing the 
feasibility of leaving a concrete coated pipe on the seabed but with inconclusive tests 
for a non-coated pipe. We had a meeting with the contractor who asked us whether the 
pipeline could remain untrenched. We thought not, but we did the calculations to verify 
this. However you looked at it, a large number of vessel crossings were going to occur. 
In fact, the entire route survey already showed evidence of trawl scars. The operator 
had proposed 60-70 start-ups and shutdowns a year. The likelihood of a leak was 
calculated as 1/100 and that was ignoring the likelihood of dents on welds or kinked 
dents. We would have left the operator a legacy of inspecting the pipeline every year. " 
The operator finally agreed to trench the pipeline. 
APA was then asked to design the trenched pipeline. Interviewee 4 said, "the 
contractor bid a very low price for rock based on it having minimal insulation effect on 
the line. However, the operator's independent design work found this wasn't the case. " 
The insulating effect of the trench would, therefore keep the temperature higher in the 
pipeline for longer, increasing the propensity for upheaval buckling. As Interviewee 3 
said, "to mitigate against buckling required huge amounts of rock which further 
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increased the temperature. The potentially large requirement of rock would be a direct 
cost to the contractor. " 
Interviewee 3 said, "we thought of every possible method to mitigate against upheaval 
buckling, but the contractor was only prepared to consider some options, which were 
passed to the operator for comment. The other alternatives were rejected because they 
involved increasing the pipe-lay costs, intermittent rock cover, or making the pipe 
thicker. All these were removed from the list before the operator saw them. The 
contractor wanted to minimise their own costs. " Therefore, APA investigated a limited 
range of cooling solutions. These included applying a flame sprayed aluminium coating 
on the spool piece, use of FBE coated pipe, PP coating and half moon shaped cooling 
fins attached to the top half of the spool piece. Interviewee 3 said, "the calculations 
were driven to maximise the temperature drop with no consideration of the operability. " 
The contractor decided on a flame sprayed aluminium coated spool designed to drop 
30degC over the spool piece. This removed most of the big upheaval buckling 
problems and brought the contractor back to their base cost. 
10.2.8 Manufacturelprocurement 
At this stage, the proposed design and the investment have been approved. Fewer 
decisions are required here, but they are still significant and can be heavily influenced 
by different stakeholders (e. g. preference for certain contractors/suppliers). APA would 
not normally be involved at this stage unless the installation contractor required expert 
advice on materials and fabrication specifications. 
10.2.9 Installation 
The decisions concerning the installation and construction schedule are very important. 
They govern the timeliness and accuracy of construction, and hence the need for post- 
installation remedial works. These decisions influence the commission date, the whole 
life cost and profit of the project. These decisions are dominated by uncertainties in the 
manufacture completion/ delivery of components and environmental conditions. These 
decisions would be initially made by the operator to establish an overall schedule for 
first production; however, the installation contractor would decide the finer detail of 
how this is achieved. APA would not be involved at this stage. 
10.2.10 Pre-operation testing and inspection 
Pipelines can be exposed to a higher than average probability of failure when they are 
hydrotested before commissioning. Therefore, it is imperative that the best decisions 
possible are made at this time to ensure minimum risk of structural failure. This is the 
time when maximum investment has been made, but before the return on investment 
has begun. These decisions are also affected by uncertainties in environmental 
conditions and the accuracy with which operational and test conditions can be 
monitored and controlled. In addition to the hydrotest, inspections are carried out 
following installation to evaluate the as-built condition of the pipeline. This would 
normally identify any dents, buckles, spans or other subsea features, which could affect 
the integrity of the pipeline. If the hydrotest or the inspection identified any defects 
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then it would be necessary to make decisions concerning any required remedial actions 
and the fitness for purpose of the pipeline. APA can become involved in supporting 
these decisions with the relevant engineering analysis. 
For example, in the first project, APA carried out an Out of Straightness analysis after 
the lines had been laid. This calculated the amount of rock cover required to mitigate 
against upheaval buckling of the pipeline at places where the seabed was uneven. 
However, the measurements were taken less frequently than required and were also very 
noisy making it difficult to identify the true measurements. These factors led to a very 
conservative upheaval buckling assessment. This can mean even more mitigation costs. 
Interviewee 3 was not happy with this situation saying, "we ended up designing 
upheaval buckling mitigation within the sand waves, but sand waves move so what is 
mitigated now may not need mitigation in 2 years time. The sand waves won't be where 
they were, but somewhere else and need mitigation of spanning or buckling there. " 
10.2.11 Inspection, maintenance and repair strategy 
All industries rely heavily on well-maintained structural assets to ensure safety of 
personnel and the environment, efficient operation and maximum service and profit. 
Maintenance strategies have to be decided to minimise downtime and costs. These 
decisions are affected by uncertainties in inspection results and deterioration models. 
At the design stage, it is common practice to incorporate an inspection, maintenance and 
repair strategy to manage the whole life integrity and fitness for purpose of the pipeline. 
This can then be updated through the pipeline's life based on the results of each 
inspection and maintenance action undertaken. APA have been involved in both 
recommending suitable IMR strategies and in updating the strategies based on new 
results. 
10.2.12 Requalification/life extension 
When a pipeline is requalified, its design is reassessed under changed design conditions. 
This may be initiated by changes in operational parameters, excessive deterioration, 
unexpected damage, such as cracks, weld defects or corrosion, or due to a need to 
extend the pipeline's life. These decisions are affected by uncertainties in historical and 
inspection data, and uncertainties/vagueness in the future design requirements. The 
decision maker would be the operator at this stage, but would also be affected by the 
opinions of the regulatory authorities and consultants such as APA (who could be 
required to carry out a remnant life assessment to support the decision-making). 
10.2.13 Decommissioning 
When a structure is no longer required for operations, it has to be decommissioned. The 
main objective of decommissioning is to take the structure out of operation to a safe 
state. Uncertainties in the current condition, environmental conditions and future 
requirements have to be accounted for. Although the operator is the decision maker in 
this situation they will be very heavily influenced but the regulatory authorities, 
environmental groups and the government, who will often have very strict 
decommissioning policies. Design consultants such as APA can be brought in at this 
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stage to provide supporting analysis to the decision-making to ensure all stakeholders 
are satisfied. 
10.2.14 Project management 
At every stage in the life cycle, the work carried out by APA also involves important 
project management decisions. These decisions can affect the effectiveness of the 
design work, the influence of APA in the design decisions and the overall success (in 
terms of cost and schedule) of the project. 
For example, in the first project APA identified a very experienced engineer to be their 
project manager for the FEED stage, according to interviewee 2, "in recognition of his 
relationship with the operator's project manager. " Although it is also believed that 
there was no one else available to take the responsibility. According to interviewee 1, 
"the job was structured and bid with 4 very experienced engineers, who were 
unfortunately all contract personnel, which was not cost-effective and was difficult to 
control. " The work was expected to expand to other fields and other developments, and 
so it was a strategic decision. 
However, according to interviewee 2, "there was a mismatch of expectations between 
APA's project manager and the operator with regards to the level of analysis detail 
required and so it became very difficult to control the project execution and 
relationships became strained. " 
Because of this problem, APA became behind on invoicing. The operator was unaware 
of the cost build up and APA did not notice that it had exceeded the original budget 
until an additional 30%was charged. These issues affected the relationship with the 
operator for the remainder of the design project. 
In the third project, APA was invited to join their own project team with the overall 
integrated project team based full time at one of the contractor's offices. APA 
management decided that this was not a cost-effective option due to the additional costs 
of transporting staff to the offices and the amount of time that the team would not be 
paid on the project and yet could not be made reimbursable to other work. APA's 
project team therefore participated on an "ad hoc" basis according to the client's 
requirements. However interviewee 7 believed that, "ideally APA should have sent 
people full time to the integrated project team to allow a more significant input to 
project decisions. " 
10.3 An Evaluation of Real-life Decision-making in APA 
The following discussion compares the real life decisions made within APA with the 
proposed risk-based decision process developed as part of this research. General 
conclusions from the detailed project evaluations and interviews are drawn with 
examples to illustrate the discussion. Quotes from interviews are presented in italics. 
10.3.1 Identify problem or opportunity 
Common sense suggests that the first task in evaluating a decision problem is to identify 
what the problem is. It does not take much insight to sense the waste, inefficiency and 
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difficulties for the decision-maker if the basic need that the decision is to fulfil is not 
identified and understood. 
Without the knowledge or experience of the proposed decision process, decisions can be 
made subconsciously, without even realising at times that a decision is required. This 
problem is more pronounced in project management decisions, where "non-decisions" 
are made by "drifting" into a solution of an unidentified problem. In these situations, 
the decision-maker often has no awareness or understanding of the problem or 
opportunity that lies before him/her and therefore does not recognise the alternative 
solutions available to maximise the benefit from the situation. 
An example of this was the decision, in the third project, to withhold project members 
from full participation into the integrated project team. It appears that this was more of 
a non-decision because of the management wanting to avoid the logistical problems of 
seconding staff out of the office. It is unlikely that the management made a definite 
decision to limit their influence to the project team. The question can even be raised of 
whether the right problem was addressed. The problem that was addressed was how to 
maximise the project margin with minimum disruption to other projects. If the problem 
had been identified as how to best contribute to this project, at maximum margin and 
minimum disruption to other projects, then other alternatives may have arisen. 
A similar issue arose in the first project, in the decision to select a project manager for 
APA's engineering work, which was how the problem was identified. However, it can 
be argued that the real problem was how to best meet the client's needs at maximum 
profit without disrupting other projects or clients. 
Some project management decisions were, however, more clearly identified such as the 
need for the operator to control costs and risks by awarding the project as an EPIC 
contract in the first and second projects. 
This situation is less severe for the design decisions, as there is more frequently a 
recognised engineering problem to be solved, which is recognised by the design 
engineer responsible. For example in the first project the process engineers identified 
the need to clearly identify the basis of the design in terms of expected operating 
temperatures, whether best estimates should be used or more detailed data gathering 
should be carried out. Also the decision concerning the routing of the pipeline was 
clearly identified both at the conceptual design stage and readdressed at the detailed 
design stage, due to the impact it would have on the rest of the pipeline design. In the 
second project the key design decisions were determining the pipeline wall thickness, 
determining whether the pipeline should be trenched or not and identifying a suitable 
cooling system for the pipeline to prevent upheaval buckling. As will be discussed 
later, if the second decision had been made before the first, then the third decision may 
not have been necessary. This is because the third decision addresses the problem that 
arose from the decision to trench the pipeline and the decision to trench the pipeline 
arose from selecting a minimum wall thickness. The trench would insulate the pipeline, 
maintaining its temperature for longer, increasing the propensity for upheaval buckling. 
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In the third project, due to the conceptual nature of the work each decision was very 
clearly identified and evaluated. The main decisions here were identifying what pipe 
diameter the expansion loop should be, selecting the best pipeline expansion loop 
configuration including the loop length and route and the valving requirements to allow 
safe hot tap operation, independent isolation of the loop and pigging. 
10.3.2 Identify stakeholders in the decision 
There are very few decisions that should be reached by a single decision-maker with 
total disregard for others' views and so often, if they are, they result in poor decisions. 
Even where the formal procedures of an organisation dictate that an individual has 
responsibility for making the decision, the views of interested parties usually need to be 
accounted for. On a formal level, a committee can be formed consisting of 
representatives for different interests. Committees may still, however be influenced by 
other external parties who would also need to be consulted. This results in all members 
of the decision body (whether a committee or a set of independent advisors) having 
different degrees of influence in the decision. The decision body also interprets the 
organisation's objectives into evaluation criteria, which means that the decision 
stakeholders not only make the choice itself but can also control the options and 
information considered. 
However, the absence of the decision process in the real life decisions evaluated here 
meant that quite often, the best solution was not sought on behalf of all stakeholders. 
This problem is magnified by the current trend in industry to subcontract design and 
maintenance decisions to contractors. These contractors benefit from the decisions in 
the short term only, through reduced risk and costs and increased profits, therefore they 
have no incentive to make the decisions for the long-term benefit of the owner/operator. 
In none of the decisions evaluated here, was a formal identification of stakeholders and 
decision makers carried out. For some decisions, a third party was asked for advice, or 
offered advice unasked, but overall the decision maker made the decision unaided. For 
example in the first project, the decision to base the design on best estimates of 
temperature involved the operator, the design consultant and the installation contractor 
as stakeholders. The operator had to pay for the data retrieval, the design consultant had 
to justify the importance of the data to a successful pipeline design and the installation 
contractor had to carry the operational risk for the first two years. However, the 
operator made the final decision influenced mostly by their own preferences, with 
minimal input from the others. In the decision to change the pipeline route to pass 
through sand waves the stakeholders were the operator, APA and the installation 
contractor. APA made a recommendation at the conceptual design stage, however, the 
installation contractor made the final decision based on his own requirements without 
consulting APA. 
In the second project, the installation contractor made the selection of the pipeline wall 
thickness without seeking advice from APA except to check the selected wall thickness 
met the design code. The decision to trench the pipeline and bury with rock was made 
under significant consultation from APA; however, it was so dependent on the decision 
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already made concerning the pipeline wall thickness, that there was only one feasible 
alternative. This was also the case for the decision to use a flame sprayed aluminium 
cooling spool to lower the fluid temperature after it was insulated by the rock cover and 
trenching. If the pipeline had not needed to be trenched, it would not have needed a 
cooling spool, therefore, the consideration and evaluation of all stakeholder influences 
and preferences could have stopped the contractor from installing an inoperable pipeline 
just because of the low installation costs. 
In the third project, due to the conceptual nature of the work, there was more 
opportunity to identify and consult the different stakeholders. For example, the very 
first decision, to introduce an expansion loop into the export system was the whole 
purpose of the conceptual study and this therefore involved consultation with technical 
and commercial personnel within the operator and current and prospective third party 
operators. Prospective suppliers, contractors, consultants and environmental groups 
were also consulted through the conceptual design. 
Within the more fundamental conceptual design decisions, stakeholders were 
considered more, but not always consulted. For example, in selecting the proposed 
pipeline expansion loop diameter, the different parties considered included the operator 
(who made the final decision), the design consultant (APA who advised the best option) 
the third party operators (who needed the increased capacity) and the installation 
contractors (who would have to install the expansion loop). However, the only 
stakeholders with an input at this stage were the operator and APA. Similarly, in the 
selection of best pipeline expansion loop configuration and in the decision to select a 
protection design for. the expansion loop, the stakeholders considered included the 
operator, third party operators, installation contractors, materials and equipment 
suppliers, design consultants, regulatory and environmental bodies. However, these. 
groups were not consulted. 
The project management decisions were also made without clear consideration of the 
stakeholders. In the first two projects, the decision to award an EPIC contract to carry 
out the work was probably the most significant decision in that it handed all the 
decision-making power and the short term risk to the installation contractor, but kept the 
responsibility for long-term risk in house. In making the decision of who to award the 
EPIC contract to, the operator is not aware of the design preferences of the installation 
contractors and therefore cannot knowledgeably influence the future design and 
operation of the pipeline from that point forward. 
10.3.3 Identify viable alternatives 
The decision alternatives are the available courses of action between which the decision 
group must choose. Unless there is more than one way to proceed, there is no choice 
and therefore no decision. The whole purpose of decision analysis is to select the best 
alternative from the set of available alternatives. However, it is common for the real 
problem in decision-making to stem from a failure to produce sufficient feasible 
alternatives. 
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Evaluating the real life decisions made in APA has revealed the problems that arise 
when an assessment of the alternatives is not carried out. It is almost guaranteed that 
sub-optimal decisions will result. One or two of the design problems even involved 
some form of brainstorming to try to identify more design alternatives. However, even 
experience is not always an aid in these decisions. It can blinker the decision maker to 
only consider what has been experienced before (even if the situation is different), and 
act as a hindrance to innovation and creativity. 
In the first project, the decision to base the design on best estimates of temperature 
considered two main alternatives. Either to issue the design consultant with process 
data from neighbouring fields which could be similar to the conditions in the field in 
question or to fund the retrieval of data specific to this field. In addition to this, other 
"half way" alternatives could have been considered, such as just gathering data on the 
most important design variables. Similarly, in the decision to change the pipeline route 
to pass through sand waves only two viable alternatives were considered: to route the 
pipeline through or around the region of sand waves. There were, however a number of 
sub-options that could also be included in these alternatives. For example, if routing the 
pipeline through the sand waves, the installation contractor could choose to pre-sweep 
the area to remove the sand waves, before laying the pipeline. They could trench the 
pipeline, either in advance of, or after, laying the pipeline. They could also backfill the 
trench naturally, mechanically or with rock. 
In the second project, the decision to select the pipeline wall thickness involved the 
contractor only identifying the minimum wall thickness allowed within the pressure 
containment design criterion. The contractor did not consider the possibility of leaving 
the pipe on the seabed and so did not consider the thicker, more robust walled pipe. 
Consequently, in the decision to trench the pipeline and bury it with rock, the operator 
was fixed into a single solution. If the operator had awarded the contract to a different 
installation contractor, then the options would have included a concrete coated 
untrenched pipeline and an uncoated trenched pipeline. However, the installation 
contractor selected could only choose between trenching the uncoated pipeline or not. 
Once the untrenched pipeline was proved unsafe, it had to be trenched whatever the 
consequences. Finally, the decision to use a FSA spool piece to cool the pipe did 
address a number of alternatives through brainstorming and a pros/cons assessment. 
However, according to Interviewee 4, "the different options mainly involved different 
coatings, the spool piece configuration did not change. " These options were then 
limited further, as interviewee 3 said, "the contractor insisted on having a first pass at 
the report and deleted the options they did not want' 
In the third project, because of its conceptual nature, more effort was put into 
identifying all the alternatives available to ensure the best -decision was made. As 
Interviewee 6 said concerning the decision to select of the proposed pipeline expansion 
loop diameter, "we looked at the effect of different diameter options, because they gave 
different back pressures at inlet. If you took that back pressure as fixed, then the 
different diameters would give different capacities for the system. " In addition, in the 
decision to select the best pipeline expansion loop configuration, as many design 
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alternatives as possible were generated to ensure the best design decisions were made. 
As Interviewee 7 said, "we brainstormed all possible options in terms of piping layout, 
numbers of valves, etc. This was to get the best economic functional solution for the 
operator, during the project phase and over the pipeline life. We looked at about 14 
options including drawing schematics to help evaluation. " A very similar approach was 
also adopted in the decision to select a protection design for the expansion loop. 
Significant effort was put into generating all the design alternatives ensure the best 
design decision. As Interviewee 7 said, "we brainstormed many different protection 
solutions and drew them up. These included standard steel subsea structures, square 
boxes with piles, raking sides, roofs to provide over-trawlability. We looked at non- 
symmetrical systems with different angles. We looked at plate/cone type structures, 
truncated cones and a half sphere. We also looked at concrete structures and, a 
composite, GRP structure with a steel frame. It had to be piled, because a gravity 
structure wouldn't have worked for these trawl boards. " 
Despite all the detailed engineering assessment of each design decision, there was doubt 
raised over the rationality of the decision to introduce an expansion loop into the export 
system at all. Additional alternative solutions to the problem on insufficient capacity 
were not seen to have been considered. As Interviewee 8 said, "I don't know to what 
extent they ever considered the alternative options for getting more gas through the 
system. For example one might have expected uprating the operating pressure to be 
fairly simple. " 
This problem of failing to identify all viable alternatives is even more pronounced in the 
project management decisions due to the more evolutionary manner in which these 
decisions are made. For example, in the first and second projects, the decision to 
subcontract the project, as an EPIC contract was restricted both in terms of the types of 
designs that were invited for tender and in the choice of preferred contract strategy. In 
the case of the first project, the operator had to be persuaded by APA to consider 
concrete coated pipe as well as reeled pipe, to allow a rational comparison of all 
available options to be made. In the case of the second project, the operator asked for 
bids for an untrenched pipeline and therefore did not carry out a thorough comparison of 
the trenching and non-trenching options. For both projects, other contracting options 
were also available, such as contracting individual tasks to different companies, to 
ensure the right people influenced the important issues. 
Project management decisions are also constrained by circumstance, for example in the 
first project, the decision to select the project manager for APA's engineering work was 
severely constrained by the availability of suitable staff at the time of the decision. In 
the third project, the decision to withhold project staff from the integrated project team 
was also constrained by the availability of staff to be relocated away from the home 
office. This was magnified by the fact that the client was only willing to reimburse staff 
for the time worked on the project, which was not full time and they were not willing to 
reimburse relocation expenses. The cost implication of agreeing to such a strategy was 
therefore an important factor. 
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10.3.4 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
The final part of defining the decision problem is identifying the criteria on which the 
decision is to be based. The decision criteria are comprehensive and measurable 
representations of the decision-maker's objectives used to describe the different 
alternatives. They can be objective (e. g. considering the cost of repair and the risk of 
failure resulting in death or injury) or subjective (considering environmental damage 
and company image). 
The formulation of decision objectives supports the decision process by forcing the 
decision group to think about the requirements for an acceptable solution and 
stimulating interest by providing a feeling of accomplishment. It also serves as a 
reference against which possible solutions can be measured and provides consensus on 
what is trying to be achieved. 
Analysis of real life decisions identified that without the support of the decision process, 
the decision criteria tend to be short-term risks and costs. They are short-term 
evaluations because it is very difficult to quantify these consequences in the longer 
term, without any decision support, especially since the uncertainties increase with time. 
Only risk and costs are considered because they are the easiest to quantify without an 
understanding of multi-criteria methods. However, such a limitation on decision criteria 
can result in a sub-optimal decision with extensive consequences beyond costs, such as 
environmental, social or political, which were not identified in the decision. 
In the first project, the decision to base the design on best estimates of temperature 
should have been based on the cost-benefit of each alternative. However the costs of 
the two options were straight forward to obtain, but the risks associated with basing the 
design on either alternative were not so easy to quantify. 
The installation contractor based the decision to change the pipeline route to pass 
through sand waves on minimising steel costs and initial installation time and investing 
the savings in any necessary remedial measures. As interviewee 1 said, "The contractor 
managed to persuade the operator to focus their money on the problem rather than 
spending extra money trying to avoid the problem because they would have the problem 
anyway. " These criteria were different to those adopted by APA in the original decision 
As interviewee 3 said, "APA based their decision on the fact that sand waves move, so 
what is mitigated now may not need mitigation in 2 years time. The sand waves won't 
be where they were, but they might be somewhere else and need mitigation of spanning 
or buckling there. " Also as interviewee 2 said, "We made the original decision 
assuming that it would be cheaper to lay the pipeline around the sand waves than to pay 
for the mitigation of laying it through them. However we did not have any accurate 
costs, so it was not a well informed decision. " 
In the second project, the contractor based the selection of the pipeline wall thickness on 
minimising steel cost and hence wall thickness. This was based on the contractor's best 
interest (who had bid for the work based on minimum cost, in order to sand the best 
chance of winning it), not in the operator's best interest. This was highlighted further 
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when it was later proven necessary to trench the pipeline and bury it with rock. This 
later decision was based on analysis, which according to Interviewee 5, "was to 
determine for the whole life cycle, whether the proposed pipeline would be able to 
withstand the pipe wall damage sustained from interaction with trawl gears. " 
Interviewee 4 said, "the decision was influenced by safety to some extent due to the 
trawl exclusion zone around any manned installations. However, any problem would 
have happened in an unmanned part of the ocean. There is an associated risk to fishing 
vessels, although a fishing vessel is unlikely to hook onto a pipeline of that size, but a 
subsequent release could be a problem. There was an environmental issue, although 
the operator's acceptance criteria of that were unknown. The criterion was asset 
protection, which is fundamentally financial. " In the end, the decision was financial. 
Having met the basic code requirement the decision was between minimising the height 
of cover and the cost of installation. 
When it came to the decision to use a cooling spool to cool the pipe, the decision 
objective was still primarily minimising the contractor's cost. Interviewee 3 said, 
"Operability did not affect the design at all, it was only once the design was complete 
that we had to show that it would work. " This decision was CAPEX driven, which is 
typical for installation contractors, who have no interest in operational costs, except in 
terms of fulfilling the 2 year warranty period following installation, as part of the EPIC 
fixed price contract. This is expected based on the current contractual arrangements in 
the industry. However, according to modern management theory, as part of the 
operator's value chain, the installation contractor plays a very significant role in 
ensuring the future success of the project. Without understanding the long-term 
consequences of the decision and without incentive from the operator to consider the" 
design issues in such a manner, the decision to use a cooling spool resulted in major 
operational problems. The cost of these operational problems was not significant when 
compared against the cost savings of the new pipeline, but they unnecessarily reduced 
the pipeline operating profits, which may in turn restrict future opportunities. 
In the third project, despite the decisions being considered at a conceptual level, there 
was surprisingly little consideration of the decision criteria. For example, in the 
decision to introduce an expansion loop into the export system interviewee 8 said, "I 
was never aware of any criteria being used to help decide the best option. " The 
decision was more in terms of installing an expansion loop or not. Even in the decision 
to select the proposed pipeline expansion loop diameter, as interviewee 6 said, "The 
main trade-off was in capacity versus diameter (long term revenue versus short-term 
costs). " Similarly in the decision to select the best pipeline expansion loop 
configuration, the predominant decision criterion was financial with minimal 
consideration of other factors. Interviewee 7 explained, "a matrix was written for pros 
and cons, relative costs and functionality for each. Because of that, we developed a 
simple sort of scoring system, based on money. The pros and cons considered were 
mainly economic such as the price of each type of valve, the cost of shutting down the 
line for future tie-in and the cost of shutting the line down for pigging. Safety was taken 
for granted. " Again, in the decision to select a protection design for the expansion loop, 
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the main decision criterion was the cost of manufacturing and installing each design. 
As Interviewee 7 said, "We had to ensure functionality for inspections and tie-ins, but 
then it was based on cost and what the contractor wanted to install. The contractor 
wanted to maximise their vessel utilisation and minimise the structure weight. " 
Even in the project management decisions, the decision criteria were not comprehensive 
or clearly identified. Often they were more significantly influenced by constraints than 
by positive criteria. For example, in the first project, the decision to select the project 
manager for APR's engineering work should have been based on identifying the project 
manager with the best track record for communication and good client relationships, for 
budget and schedule control and for an ability to view the bigger picture. However, the 
decision was constrained by the availability of suitably qualified staff at the time. A 
similar problem was the basis for the decision in the third project to withhold project 
staff from the integrated project team. The main decision criterion was the constraint on 
the team members' availability for full time project commitment. 
In the first and second projects, the decision to subcontract the work as an EPIC 
contract was based on the operator's desire to minimise capital expenditure and risk. 
However using an EPIC contract left the operators no control over the design. The 
operators chose EPIC contracts to avoid taking the risk themselves and to pay someone 
else to carry the risk. Once the work was awarded to the installation contractors the 
decision maker changed from the operator to the contractor, this meant that the design 
objectives changed from minimising cost and risk for the operator to minimising cost 
and risk and maximising revenue for the contractor. The focus became very biased 
towards short-term issues. 
10.3.5 Structural analysis 
In many decisions, it is necessary to break the main decision into smaller parts (this is 
the benefit of decision analysis). Depending on the decision problem this can mean 
subdividing the decision on different bases, depending on which most helps to solve the 
problem. There could be a series of decisions to be made over time, where each sub- 
decision requires a follow-up action. Alternatively, the selection of one alternative 
could open up a whole series of other alternatives or events. A decision matrix, a 
decision tree or an influence diagram can represent these. 
The review carried out in this case study revealed how rarely such powerful tools are 
applied in practice despite the benefits and clarity it can bring. There is no example 
from experience to show the use of these techniques without prompting from the 
proposed decision process. However, there is evidence in nearly all of the examples, of 
the decisions not being clearly formulated or communicated and therefore resulting in 
sub-optimal decisions. 
Several of the examples showed that the timing of decisions was not used to the best 
advantage and decisions were made before all the information was available. In some 
cases, this occurred even in the knowledge that the information would become available 
later. However, the schedule required that the decision must be made before the 
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information was available. The consequence of this was a number of sub-optimal 
decisions. Therefore, although it appears initially to be a very small consideration 
within the whole decision process, accounting for the timing of the decisions can play a 
very significant role in determining how well the decision is made. 
There were also a number of cases where the decision was made without using all the 
available information or even without identifying all the information that was available. 
This means that, in hindsight, the decision appears to be illogical and certainly sub- 
optimal. It is clear, therefore, how important it is to base a decision on the maximum 
available information, and then to evaluate the cost benefit of obtaining further 
information if necessary. 
One of the key examples of this was in the first project in the decision to base the design 
on best estimates of temperature. This whole decision concerned the availability of 
information and the timing of the decision. The risks of design failure could not be 
easily quantified, but a subjective evaluation could have helped this decision. A risk- 
based decision tree could have been constructed to show the "expected cost" of each 
alternative. This would have included the cost of data collection, the probability of an 
unsuccessful design based on the available data and the cost of remedying the design or 
operating below the original design. This may have shown that decision was dominated 
by the cost of 'delay to first revenue and therefore prefer making a decision based on 
sub-optimal data, or it could have highlighted an unbearable risk of failure without the 
data. As interviewee 2 said, "the design sensitivity to these parameters should have 
been evaluated. " This would have allowed the best decision to be made if there was 
sub-optimal data. 
The decision to change the pipeline route to pass through sand waves was also based on 
very little data and many assumptions and uncertainties. A formal consequence 
evaluation of each alternative would have put this decision's significance into 
perspective, which would also have helped identify the key information. However, 
from the contractor's viewpoint, the decision was based on their own financial risk, not 
on the overall project risk, therefore from their perspective they made the best decision. 
In other words, the contractor succeeded in minimising his own costs while the operator 
took on all the risk. 
In the second project, the contractor's decision criteria in the decision to select the 
pipeline wall thickness were a subset of the full decision criteria that the stakeholders 
would have wanted to be applied. Therefore, the contractor did not worry that the 
pipeline could not remain untrenched since he excluded it as a risk by passing it back to 
the operator. Therefore, the consequences of selecting such a thin wall thickness were 
not considered from the operator's perspective. The contractor had considered the 
potential of upheaval buckling problems due to trenching the line (required by the thin 
wall thickness), but had underestimated the cost of rock required and the insulation 
consequences of installing the rock cover. However, because the contractor had wanted 
to win the work, they had minimised their own costs and passed the risk back to the 
operator. A different choice by the operator at contract award could have changed 
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everything. However, the decision to award the contract and allow thin walled pipe 
meant that the decision to trench the pipeline and bury it with rock then had to follow. 
This decision made by the operator, therefore, was not structured, because although the 
consequences of not trenching the pipeline were identified and fully evaluated, the 
consequences of trenching it were not. The mitigation against the consequences of not 
trenching the pipeline was not considered, so the overall best option could not be 
identified. However, at the conceptual stage, the operator had collected all the 
information they had on the existing line, how it worked, on the fishing activities, the 
seabed soils etc. They even carried out impact tests on concrete coated pipe, but not 
uncoated pipe. The contractor believed they had sufficient information to prove the 
pipeline had to be trenched. This unstructured decision-making by the operator 
continued through to the decision to use a cooling spool. The consequences of 
sufficiently cooling the pipe contents to mitigate against the upheaval buckling were not 
considered. The consequences of insufficient information in the cooling spool design 
can be seen in the subsequent operational problems now experienced by the operator. 
In the third project the conceptual evaluation of the design meant that more time could 
be spent evaluating the decisions and gathering necessary information. For example, in 
the decision to introduce an expansion loop into the export system interviewee 2 said 
that, "they had to go to their partners with a realistic detailed costing of the proposed 
system. That meant that they had to involve an installation contractor and give a 
commitment to them to do it at that price". However, interviewee 8 felt that no 
structural analysis was carried out of this decision but that "they made the decision at a 
very high, simplistic level. " 
In the decision to select the proposed pipeline expansion loop diameter, interviewee 6 
said, "the effect of different diameter options was considered, also later on, the risk of 
frost heave was raised. That could have had further risks associated with it. It could 
have been a much lower temperature than we had predicted, or it could have been 
higher and then we would have had no problems. There was quite a lot of money riding 
on that, because they were talking about installing a heater. If we had predicted low 
temperatures and they hadn't occurred then they would have spent two million pounds 
on something they did not use. " The information needed to support this decision was 
identified. However, as Interviewee 6 said, "at the design stage, the project manager 
presses us to get results out to the client, even if we haven't got the right information. 
We can do the analysis, but the results are uncertain. We have to make assumptions. " 
In the decision to select the best pipeline expansion loop configuration and in the 
decision to select a protection design for the expansion loop significant effort was put 
into gathering enough information to rationally evaluate each alternative. This meant 
the decision consequences were well understood. 
In the project management decisions, there also seemed to be little consideration of the 
information required to support the decisions, the consequences of those decisions or 
methods for controlling those consequences, such as in the first project, in the decision 
to select the project manager for APA's engineering work. This was also the case in the 
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third project in the decision to withhold project staff from the integrated project team. 
These decisions were necessarily more influenced by the strong external constraints of 
staff availability than an assessment of decision consequences. 
In the first and second project decisions to subcontract the work as an EPIC contract, , 
there was some consideration of available information presented in the proposal _ 
documents issued by each potential contractor. However, structural analysis would: _ 
have identified the consequences of the decision and may have identified the 
contractor's own agenda for the project. 
10.3.6 Uncertainty and probabilistic analysis 
Since uncertainty is such a critical element of many decisions that are faced, it is 
necessary to consider this in the decision modelling process. This, however, is one of 
the most difficult stages of the decision process. 
The decisions evaluated as part of this case study showed that an evaluation of all 
possible outcomes does not always take place as a number of decisions have resulted in. 
outcomes that were totally unexpected at the design stage. These are obviously 
unwanted and can be very expensive especially for the long-term operator of the asset. 
For example, in the first project, the decision to base the design on best estimates of 
temperature involved significant uncertainties that should have been accounted for. No, 
attempt was made to evaluate the likelihood of the estimated data being incorrect and 
having an adverse effect on the design's operability. 
The interviews carried out also identified that the decision-maker ignored some risks, 
which were not of low probability or of low consequence. The decision-maker did not 
want to acknowledge these risks, to save the problem of mitigating against them. 
However, problems arose later when some "unexpected" outcomes occurred, creating, 
additional costs for the operator to cover. These should have been identified, evaluated 
at the time of the decision to allow the operator to understand fully the implications of 
the risk to mitigate against them. 
For example in the decision to change the pipeline route to pass through sand waves, the 
installation contractor was aware of the consequential risks of upheaval buckling, but 
passed these risks back to the operator. However, the operator made no consideration of 
how to quantify or control them. As interviewee 1 said, "they came back to us with the 
out of straightness profile, which had a lot of noise on it from the way that they had 
measured it. The measurements were taken sporadically almost as if they did not care 
about the data quality, because the installation contractor had allowed for risk in the 
. analysis. Ultimately, it was their risk to some extent as they were trying to impress the, 
client by showing they had made the right decision. However, the better the data 
quality, the better the analysis quality and maybe the savings that they could haves 
made. But a large amount of required mitigation was due to the noise level. " 
Similarly, in the second project, in the decision to select the pipeline wall thickness, the 
contractor did not care that the pipeline might not be able to remain on the seabed, since 
they had already passed the risk back to the operator. This led to the decision to trench 
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the pipeline and bury it with rock, which was based on a detailed risk assessment by 
APA of the pipeline based on the pipeline being dented by fishing gear with a very 
smooth dent. However, as interviewee 5 said, "there was no formal risk quantification 
just an assessment based on expert opinion and available information. " Interviewee 3 
continued, "the main risk considered for the non-trenched case was the loss of 
containment due to pipeline fatigue and denting. There was limited data on the fatigue 
life of dents in welds and of kinked dents. The likelihood of a leak was calculated as 
1/100. " Interviewee 5 said, "APA were also at risk; because if we had said that it could 
be installed untrenched when it could not, then the pipeline would have failed 
prematurely. We would have been sued by Contractor 2, and our reputation would 
have suffered. " This then led to the decision to introduce the cooling spool, to minimise 
contractor's costs, which resulted in a practically inoperable pipeline. The risks of the 
cooling spool not working were not considered. Interviewee 4 thought, "the risks to the 
contractor weren't ignored, but it was assumed that they could be negated in the design 
process. " The problem was that different stakeholders were carrying different risks. 
The installation contractor was responsible for the installation costs, and therefore had 
to cover the cost of rock and/or the cooling spool. The operator carried the operational 
risks, but they were not under his control. If a risk evaluation had been made of the 
decision, on behalf of all stakeholders, even when the decision to trench had been made, 
these consequences may have been foreseen and the optimal decision may have been for 
the operator to pay for the extra rock costs if it was going to improve the design. 
Instead, the operator now has a very expensive long-term problem if the pipeline is to 
remain in use. 
Even in the third, conceptual design project, the decision to introduce an expansion loop 
into the export system did not evaluate the risks of the expansion spool not fulfilling its 
design objective or of it not being the best option available. 
However, in the design level decisions to select the proposed pipeline expansion loop 
diameter and the best pipeline expansion loop configuration a number of risks and 
uncertainties were identified. As Interviewee 6 said, "there was a risk of capacity being 
different to that predicted We had to base the design on a given flow rate and pressure 
drop, but you don't know if that is wrong until you can validate the model against the 
pipeline system. The risk of frost heave was taken seriously because of the serious 
consequences of pipeline failure. " The probabilities of these hazards were also assessed 
according to interviewee 8, through a number of coarse HAZOP exercises. 
However, when it came to the decision to select a protection design for the expansion 
loop, the risks associated with each option were not identified or evaluated. This should 
have been a significant part of the decision due to the different risks involved in the 
installation of each design. In addition, each design would have had a different 
effectiveness in terms of protecting the pipeline from trawl gear impact. 
In the project management decisions, there was also no consideration of the 
uncertainties and risks involved. For example in the first project's decision to select the 
project manager for APA's engineering work, the uncertainty in the success of the 
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project under the selected manger may have been considered. These may not have been 
avoidable (due to the lack of alternatives), however they could have been controlled, 
through monitoring and feedback, to ensure the project was a success according to its 
original objectives. Similarly in the third project's decision to withhold project staff 
from the integrated project team, the consequences of being separate to the integrated 
project team were not investigated or understood. 
Finally, in the first two projects' decisions to subcontract the work as an EPIC contract, ' 
the operator did not assess the risks involved. Hindsight showed that no safeguards' 
were in place to control the risks of the contractor ignoring the operators design 
preferences. 
10.3.7 Utilitylvalue analysis 
Once the decision problem has been formulated, it is necessary to evaluate each 
alternative in the light of the decision criteria, so that the "best" alternative can be 
chosen. There are two types of preferences to be considered in the decision analysis; ' 
one is the decision-makers' preference between the decision criteria, i. e. the criteria'' 
weightings. The other type of preference is the decision maker's tolerance to the 
decision consequences, i. e. the value/utility of the consequences. 
Evaluation of the real life decisions in this case study revealed that the main decision 
criteria were identified by the decision maker in accordance with their own preferences, 
without consultation with other, often important, stakeholders such as the operator., 
Frequently, it was also noted that some decision criteria, even if they were important,:, 
were ignored if they were difficult to quantify. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of any quantification of preferences. However, 
there was evidence of deliberate preferences being introduced by the decision maker, 
for example preferences for minimising short term costs rather than long term costs and 
minimising short term risks rather than long term risks. 
For example, in the first project, in the decision to base the design on best estimates of . temperature, APA was keen to have the best possible data to ensure the most effective' 
design. However, according to interviewee 1, "the operator wanted to proceed the' 
work prior to having definite information available but the installation contractor 
refused to carry the risk associated with this decision and passed it back to the 
operator. " As mentioned before, a sensitivity analysis of the important parameters and 
their influence on the overall design would have helped make the best decision under 
such constrained circumstances. 
In the decision to change the pipeline route to pass through sand waves, APA's 
preference had already been made clear at the conceptual design stage when they 
recommended avoiding the sand waves. According to interviewee 2, "the risks assessed 
very subjectively based on experience. We made the decision to avoid the sand waves 
assuming it was the lowest cost option. I do not think the operator had any preference 
at that stage, and were relying on our recommendation. However, the contractor 
disagreed with our assumptions. " In the end the decision was based on the installation 
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contractor's preference with no account made of either the design consultant's or the 
operator's preferences. 
In the second project, the decision to select the pipeline wall thickness was based on the 
contractor's preference to minimise their own cost and maximise their revenue. They 
wanted to minimise their own risk, both now and through later design decisions. As the 
design progressed to the decision to trench the pipeline and bury it with rock, these 
preferences remained dominant with no account of any other stakeholders' preferences. 
Finally, in the decision to use a cooling spool, the contractors preference was clear, as 
interviewee 3 said, "when the cooling spool was being designed everyone knew that the 
contractor wanted a cooling spool to be as long as possible to reduce the temperatures 
to minimise rock costs. " However, the operator's preferences were not accounted for. 
Even in the third project, the preferences of other stakeholders were not accounted for. 
In the decision to introduce an expansion loop into the export system, the only real 
decision maker was the operator. As Interviewee 2 said, "the oil companies tend to 
keep a lot of information very close to their chests. To them, although they are 
technically under-resourced, knowledge is power. They do not tell you the full story 
because they want to be able to influence the outcome. Maybe if you worked closely 
with them for years, you might be able to build a proper relationship where you can 
understand their objectives, that would be much better. " 
The decision to select the proposed pipeline expansion loop diameter was significantly 
influenced by the operator's preferences (especially the commercial department). As 
Interviewee 6 said, "the operator knows the revenues, they know where they're going to 
sell it, and they know the lay schedules, so they make the decision, we just made some 
design recommendations. There is a lot of politics involved in the decision-making. 
The contractors want to be involved at every stage to look more important. The project 
managers are more concerned with hitting their project milestone, than with making 
sure the best possible design decision is made. The project managers can be completely 
schedule driven and not worry about the consequences of making ill-informed design 
decisions. " 
According to Interviewee 7, the decision to select the best pipeline expansion loop 
configuration involved a number of preferences and biases, which were well accounted 
for in the design process. "The decision-making was an evolutionary process involving 
the team at all stages. An external peer review was also carried out to demonstrate the 
decision process and to get feedback. " 
Finally, the decision to select a protection design for the expansion loop was heavily 
influenced by the installation contractor's preferences. As Interviewee 7 said, "the 
installation contractor wanted to minimise the component's size and weight to be able 
to use a smaller installation vessel. They could do it more cheaply, with a higher 
margin, with their small vessel instead of hiring a bigger vessel. " 
A similar lack of consultation seemed to take place in the project management decisions 
such as the first project's decision to select the project manager for APA's engineering 
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work and the third project's decision to withhold project staff from the integrated 
project team. Different stakeholders had different preferences concerning these 
decisions who, if they had been consulted may have had more understanding and 
ownership of the final decision, whether they agreed with it or not. 
In the first two projects' decisions to subcontract the work as an EPIC contract, the 
operator made himself very vulnerable by not identifying the biases and preferences of 
the contractors that they were considering. 
10.3.8 Selection of "best" alternative 
Once the attributes have been evaluated, the best alternative needs to be identified in the 
most rational manner. 
The decisions, which were investigated here, were often based more on preferences and 
perceptions of cost and risk than any clear optimisation of calculated values despite 
carrying out detailed calculations in some cases. Therefore, although the best decision 
may have been considered to be made at the time, these were often based on non-ideal, 
or even biased criteria, which meant that the best decision overall, for all stakeholders, 
was not always made. It can, therefore, be seen to be very important to continue the 
logic of the decision-making process right to the conclusion of the decision and to 
ensure the best option is selected based on the specified criteria. 
For example, in hindsight it is obvious that in the first project's decision to base the 
design on best estimates of temperature the best decision was not made. The operator 
decided not to fund the retrieval of local information but to carry the risk of basing the 
design on estimated data. As interviewee 1 explained, "at the end of the job, when we 
were doing upheaval buckling analysis, the actual flowing temperatures were above 
what our design temperatures were. " This meant that increased mitigation measures 
were required at additional expense. 
It is very difficult to know whether the installation contractor feels that the right 
decision was made changing the pipeline route to pass through sand waves. It is also 
difficult to know yet whether the right decision was made for the operator or not. That 
will become more apparent if the transient seabed begins to cause spanning and 
buckling problems later. 
In the second project, it is very clear that the best choice of the pipeline wall thickness 
was not made for the operator. The contractor chose a pipe wall thickness that based on 
the risk analysis was found to be unsuitable to remain on the seabed. The decision to 
trench the pipeline earned the contractor additional fees for trenching the pipeline, so, 
the contractor finished the project financially very well. However, the pipeline was then 
found to be over insulated, resulting in the need to reduce temperature. However, as 
interviewee 4 said, "APA knew during the design process that the cooling spool wasn't 
a good design, it works, but not very well. " The resulting operational problems show a 
very poor train of decisions for the operator, but the contractor minimised their costs 
and were paid extra for trenching the pipeline. 
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Interviewee 4 felt, "the contractor probably wouldn't do it differently if they did it 
again, because they did very well out of the job. They believe the cooling spool was a 
robust option, because their decision was not OPEX based. A reasonable solution for a 
reasonable cost, in the period allowed, is a success. However, the operator would do it 
differently, because they know what they have ended up with. It wasn't a conceptually 
difficult design, but they've ended up with an expensive solution. " 
It is very difficult to judge whether the best decisions were made in the third project, as 
it was not carried through to completion. However, it would be very difficult to prove 
that decision to introduce an expansion loop into the export system was the best with no 
other alternatives considered and no results on which to evaluate it. The selection of the 
proposed pipeline expansion loop diameter was at least carried out rationally and 
thoroughly so it stands a good chance of being successful had the project moved 
forward to completion. The same can be said for the selection of the best pipeline 
expansion loop configuration. As Interviewee 7 said, "The option we chose wasn't the 
cheapest but it had increased functionality for the field life, so it was a good trade-off 
against price. " Finally, the decision to selection a protection design for the expansion 
loop was also considered workable and had been made rationally. As Interviewee 7 
said, "We would have taken the composite structure solution further had the project 
gone onto the next phase. Any of the options would have been more than adequate for 
the field life. " 
The project management decisions are very difficult to evaluate in this way because 
they involve much softer issues and become quite personal. However, it is believed that 
although the selection of the project manager for APA's engineering work on the first 
project was the only decision possible it did result in a number of problems that 
indicated that it was not best. Additional project controls could have helped stop this 
problem from escalating in the way that it did. A similar conclusion can be drawn for 
the decision to withhold project staff from the integrated project team in the third 
project. Again, this decision was made because no other suitable alternative could be 
identified, however, as interviewee 7 said, "We had much less input to the team. The 
main lesson is that if you have the chance to be a part of an integrated project team 
then you should take the best possible advantage of it. " 
It is difficult to determine whether the best contractor selection decisions were made. 
However, the projects did result in design and operational problems that may have been 
avoided had the operator had more control on the design decisions. 
10.4 Conclusions 
This case study has reviewed some real life risk-based decisions made in conceptual and 
preliminary engineering design at APA. APA's senior engineers and managers 
identified previous projects where the main design decision basis was known. 
This review has revealed that APA's clients make many major conceptual design 
decisions before APA is commissioned with the task of completing the design. These 
decisions and the contracting strategy then restrict the way that APA can complete the 
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designs, which can result in sub-optimal solutions. This causes problems for the client 
or the operator and reflects badly on APA. 
The main decisions that have been evaluated can be grouped together into project 
management issues and design issues. The conclusions for these two areas are quite 
different and therefore will be addressed separately. 
10.4.1 Project management issues 
The following decisions investigated were dominated by project management issues: 
1. To select the project manager for APA's engineering work. 
2. The decision by the client to subcontract the work via a contractor. 
3. The decision to award the work as an EPIC contract to Contractor 2 
4. To introduce an expansion loop into the export system. 
5. To withhold project staff from the integrated project team. 
6. To base the design on best estimates of temperatures. 
7. To change the pipeline route to pass through the sand waves. 
8. The decision to trench the pipeline. 
The first five decisions within the project management group are clearly project 
management issues, however it could be perceived that the sixth, seventh and eighth 
decisions are more related to design issues as they are the selection design input 
variables. Project management issues however, motivated these decisions. 
Analysis of these decisions has shown that the problem is not always correctly 
identified or understood which can cause significant problems both through the ensuing 
decision-making and in the implementation of the decision, which either becomes sub- 
optimal, or the key criteria are not controlled. For example in decision 1, the problem 
was not to select a project manager but to ensure the project was controlled and 
executed in the best way. In decisions 2 and 3, the problem was how the operator 
should control cost and risk, but by passing over all responsibility, neither was 
controlled. In decision 4, the problem was not to introduce an expansion loop, but how 
best to increase capacity. In decision 5, the problem was not how to maximise the' 
project margin with minimum disruption to other projects but how to best contribute to 
the project, at maximum margin and minimum disruption to other projects. The 
decisions 6,7 and 8 were, however more fully identified due to the design basis of the 
decision-making. 
Stakeholders were an issue (both individual and corporate) in all of these decisions. 
Different stakeholders were interested in different decision outcomes. However, the 
stakeholders' views were not taken into account. In decision 1, some viewpoints were 
assumed (wrongly), while others were not even considered. In decision 2, the decision- 
maker seemed unaware of the stakeholders trying to influence the decision to benefit 
themselves. In decision 3 at least two groups of stakeholders were also significantly 
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influencing the decision with biased information. In decision 4 too, A large number of 
stakeholders both internal to the operator and external third party organisations were 
interested in and some even influencing the decision. In decisions 5 and 6, a large 
number of stakeholders apart from the decision-maker were affected, but none of their 
views were taken into account. In decision 7, the stakeholders with the most knowledge 
and experience were not consulted at all and the decision was biased by the decision- 
maker's preferences. Finally, in decision 8, the operator was the long-term stakeholder 
but due to the contract they had set up, they excluded themselves from being part of the 
decision-making. An identification of the stakeholder issues in any of these decisions 
would have helped the decision-makers to be more logical in their decision-making. 
In decision 1 there were no other suitable candidates available, however the options 
should have included controlling the risks. For decisions 2 and 3, the operator did not 
appear to fully identify and consider all the alternatives available, both in terms of 
contractual options and in terms of limiting the design options, however it is quite 
possible that these contracts were dictated by company policy. It was felt by those- 
interviewed that very little consideration was made in decision 4 of the alternative 
solutions available in addition to the introduction of an expansion loop. In decisions 5, 
6,7, and 8 only two main alternatives were identified. Variations and sub-options on 
these main alternatives should have been developed. The lack of alternatives for most 
of these decisions certainly influenced the decision made. Most of these decisions 
could have been improved upon had more attention been paid to generating as many 
viable options as possible. 
Decision 1 was significantly restricted by the lack of available alternatives, however the 
decision criteria could have been more clearly identified to allow control of the 
achievement. Decisions 2 and 3 were purely based on minimising capital cost and risk 
to the operator. However, once the work had been awarded to the installation contractor 
the decision maker changed and so the design objectives changed from minimising the 
cost and the risk for the operator to minimising the cost and risk and maximising the 
revenue for the contractor. The issues became very short term in focus. In decision 4, 
very little consideration was made of what the criteria the decision should be based on. 
Decision 5 was also made on very short-term issues, such as the current staff 
availability rather than the long-term benefit to the project and the company. Decision 6 
was also made in terms of cost only, the benefit of each option was not considered. 
Decision 7 was based on minimising known capital costs and using any savings to 
offset unknown remedial costs. However, because these were unknown and no attempt 
was made to quantify them, this decision became less rational. Decision 8 was also 
made on purely financial grounds in terms of minimising the rock cover height and the 
installation cost. Although most of these decisions were made on purely financial 
grounds, none was affected by costs alone. Other criteria should have been considered, 
such as risks to other stakeholders, whole life costs, operating life and environmental 
impacts, to enable the best decision to have been made for all. 
No structural analysis was carried out for any decision in the section. This meant that 
there was no formal consideration of the long-term effect of these decisions. Structural 
Caroline M Roberts Page 197 CASE STUDY 5 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
analysis is a powerful tool for getting a "bigger picture" of the whole situation. If 
structural analysis had been made of the decision there may have generated some 
appreciation of the decision consequences and the factors influencing them could be 
gained. In some decisions, the decision-maker may have become aware of other 
stakeholders' agendas. In addition, some decisions may have been recognised as being 
more significant than was otherwise credited to them. 
In decision 1, the only information available to support the decision-making was 
personal opinions and experiences, but these should have provided a warning of the 
likely risks, to ensure sufficient controls were put in place. In decisions 2 and 3, there 
was no consideration made of the information required to support the decision-making, 
except what was asked for in the proposal documents, but this blinkered the operators to 
the risks that they were exposing themselves to. In decision 4, the identification of data 
requirements had been carried out to some limited extent. Decision 5 did not involve 
any investigation or collection of support data, because the decision makers were so 
constrained by costs into selecting one alternative. Decisions 6 and 7 were based on 
very little data and many assumptions and uncertainties; however, sensitivity analysis of 
the main parameters would have identified the important issues to allow them to be 
controlled. In decision 8, significant amounts of data had been collected, but the 
problem the decision-maker faced was how to use the information rationally to support 
the decision-making. The proposed decision process would have ensured that the need 
for information had been taken seriously in all of these decisions, but also that the 
information was used in a structured manner to the best use possible. 
In decision 1, the uncertainties and risks involved were identified, but there was no' 
effort to control them. This meant that the project developed out of control, at the 
expense of client relationships, and profitability. In decisions 2 and 3, the operator did 
not assess the risks involved in awarding the EPIC contract the contractor. Therefore, ' 
no safeguards were put in place to control the risks of the contractor ignoring the ` 
operators design preference. In decision 4, there was no consideration of the risks of the ° 
alternative not fulfilling its design objective. Decision 5 was so strongly constrained by, 
the risk of financial failure, that there was only the one option sensibly available. ` 
Decision 6 also involved a significant degree of uncertainty that should have been 
accounted for, but sensitivity analysis of the design parameters this could have been 
better understood. The installation contractor did not try to quantify the risks when they ' 
made decision 7; instead, they passed all the risk back to the operator, who also failed to 
consider its implications. In decision 8, the risk assessment identified uncertainties 
more thoroughly however, one alternative was considered in much more detail to the 
other. Most decisions, therefore, involved significant risks and uncertainties, which 
were not investigated or rationally and fairly accounted for in the decision. On the; 
occasion that they were identified they were used in a biased manner to manipulate the 
decision. The risk-based decisions process would have helped identify all the risks and 
use them in a rational manner to support the decision-making. 
In decision 1, the stakeholders' preferences were not assessed by consultation but by 
assumption, especially in terms of who the client would accept as project manager. 
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Unfortunately, the assumptions were wrong, this influenced the decision and its 
acceptability to the stakeholders. In decisions 2 and 3, no attempt was made whatsoever 
to identify or evaluate the stakeholders' biases in the decision, which left the operator 
exposed to the risks, which they were trying to pass over. The decision-maker of 
decision 4 only considered his own preferences; none of the other stakeholders was 
considered. In decision 5, the stakeholders other than the decision-maker could see both 
sides of the decision and identify which was the best. However, the decision-maker 
could only see the decision biased by his preferences, which meant the best decision 
was not made. Decisions 6,7 and 8 were also heavily influenced by the contractor's 
preferences, with little recognition of anyone else's preferences, including the 
operator's. The problem with all of these decisions, ignoring the stakeholder 
preferences meant that the decision was often not best for the most important 
stakeholder, the operator, neither was it supported by the stakeholders who had to make 
it work. This results in below optimum designs. The risk-based decision process would 
have ensured that these issues were considered and even accounted for. 
It can be seen quite clearly that none of these project management decisions, whether 
taken internally to APA or externally by operators or contractors, were made on an 
entirely rational basis. Comparison with the proposed decision process presented in 
Chapter 2 shows that these decisions did not always address the true problem and that 
they made very little recognition of stakeholder influence, no generation of viable 
alternatives, limited availability of information and no risk or consequence assessment. 
Furthermore, the decisions were made on very strong decision-maker biases. The lack 
of rationality in these decisions was revealed in the consequences that became clear 
after each decision. These consequences were made more severe by the lack of 
feedback and control through the implementation of the decisions; in terms of ensuring 
the decision objectives were met. 
Therefore, it is not possible in any of these decisions to say that the best decision was 
definitely made. In some decisions, it is clear that the best decision was not made. 
Other decisions were so poorly evaluated that it is impossible to tell whether it was the 
right decision or not, without reanalysing the whole process. This would involve 
identifying all the stakeholders, alternatives and decision criteria, collecting enough 
information to support the decision and evaluating the risks and stakeholder 
preferences. Unfortunately, this is not possible so long after the decisions were made. 
The information and sometimes even the decision-makers are no longer available. Such 
a reanalysis of the decision is a form of very detailed sensitivity analysis. If such an 
analysis had been carried out at the time of the decision, as prompted by the risk-based 
decision process, there would have much more confidence in the final decision. 
10.4.2 Design issues 
The remaining decisions that were investigated, listed below, were found to be 
predominantly design issues, although the first two were driven by the fixed price 
contract strategy: 
1. The selection of a minimum pipe wall thickness 
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2. The selection of a pipeline cooling method. 
3. Selection of the diameter for the proposed pipeline expansion loop. 
4. Selection of best pipeline expansion loop configuration. 
5. Selection of a pipeline expansion loop protection design. 
In all of these decisions, there would have been a number of stakeholders either 
influencing or influenced by the decision although in none of the decisions were they 
formally identified and accounted for. The only stakeholder involved in making the 
decision in each of these cases was the installation contractor, although advice or 
reassurance was sought from APA in each decision and from the operator in decisions 3 
and 4. This means that the best decision was not necessarily made for the right people. 
In decision 1, there was no attempt to generate enough alternatives apart from 
minimising the wall thickness against the design criteria, although this ensured that the 
contractor's goal of minimising his own costs was met. In decision 2, the options were 
considered very briefly in terms of the design concepts but they were assessed at a very 
high level and quickly discounted. In decisions 3,4 and 5, significant effort was put 
into identifying all the alternatives available through brainstorming and quantitative 
evaluation to ensure the best decision was made. Only in these last three decisions can 
the stakeholders have any confidence in the decision, knowing that the option selected 
had to win against so many other alternatives. 
In decision 1 and 2, the overall decision objective was to minimise the design's capital 
cost to the contractor. No attempt was made to evaluate the alternatives against whole 
life costs, operability, design life or safety, which are also important factors in design 
from the operator's perspective, but not from the contractor's perspective. In decision 
3, a number of decision criteria were identified and considered; in addition, rough costs 
were put to each option to allow a comparison of cases. In decisions 4 and 5, the 
alternatives were evaluated quite rationally although the predominant criterion was still 
financial with minimal consideration of other factors. 
Because of the limited decision criteria used by the contractor in decision 1, there was 
no consideration of the decision consequences; this was because the contractor had 
passed all risks back to the operator's account. In addition, in decision 2, no formal 
decision problem structuring was carried out. In neither decision did the decision- 
maker, who was the contractor, demonstrate any openness to the negative consequences 
of their decisions, as the operator carried all these. In decision 3, no formal structural 
analysis was carried out of the decision alternatives and possible outcomes; however, 
the effect of different diameter options was considered. In decision 4, the design 
decision consequences were fairly well evaluated and understood due to the quantitative 
analysis. In decision 5, there was no evaluation of each option's performance. Such an 
ad hoc view of evaluating the consequences of such significant design decisions does 
not support the decision-maker in arriving at the best decision for all stakeholders. 
In decision 1, clearly there was not sufficient information on which to base the decision 
because if a complete mapping had been made of the decision, the risk of upheaval 
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buckling caused by trenching the line would have been better understood, it was 
identified, but qualified out against an estimated cost of rock mitigation. The 
consequences of not having enough information in the cooling spool design can be seen 
in the subsequent operational problems that the operator is experiencing now. In 
decision 2, some consideration was made of the information needed to make this 
decision as rationally as possible. However not all the information needed was 
available so assumptions had to be made. In decisions 3,4 and 5a significant amount 
of effort was also put into ensuring enough information was gathered to be able to 
rationally evaluate each alternative. This meant that a thorough comparison of each 
option could be made. 
In decision 1, the contractor was not willing to accept the risk of the pipeline not being 
robust enough to remain on the seabed. Therefore, the risks of selecting a thinner wall 
thickness were transferred to the operator. In decision 2, there was also no evidence of 
the contractor considering the risks of the cooling spool not working, as these were also 
transferred to the operator. Although current contracting strategy does not encourage 
the installation contractor to be concerned with long term design consequences, this 
would add considerable value to the decision-making for the operator and ensure the 
implementation of much more successful designs. In decisions 3 and 4, significant 
effort was put into identifying and evaluating the risks. An attempt was also made to 
quantify the probabilities of these risks. However, in decision 5 there was however, no 
identification or evaluation of the risks associated with each option. 
Decision 1 was dominated by the installation contractor's preferences to minimise their 
own costs and risks, as were decisions 2 and 5. In none of these decisions, were the 
long-term operator's preferences accounted for. This resulted in design solutions with 
which the operator was not necessarily happy. In decision 3, however, the decision was 
entirely dominated by the operator's preferences. Even so, this did not mean that the 
technical issues were considered rationally without bias. This is because the operator's 
commercial department heavily influenced the decision, with minimal input from the 
technical department. Decision 4 was the only decision out of this group of decisions 
that is described by the interviewees as being made rationally by recognising and taking 
into account the preferences and biases of all stakeholders. 
It can be seen that decisions 1 and 2 were not made in the operator's best interest but the 
contractor's. If the decision analysis process had been adopted in these designs, then all 
stakeholder values would have been taken into account. This would have allowed 
consensus to be built and the decisions to be made in the best interest of all parties. In 
decisions 3,4 and 5 it is not possible to determine whether the best decisions were made 
or not, since the project was not brought to completion. However, both decisions were 
evaluated in a logical and thorough manner, with detailed assessments of all the 
alternatives. The solutions may have changed, if more thorough risk and stakeholder 
preference assessments had been made as recommended in the proposed design process. 
As concluded in the previous section, it is not possible to say for certain that the best 
decision was made in any of these decisions. In some decisions, it is clear that it was 
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not. Other decisions were so poorly evaluated that it is impossible to tell whether it was 
the right decision or not, without reanalysing the whole process. This would involve 
identifying all the stakeholders, alternatives and decision criteria, collecting enough 
information to support the decision and evaluating the risks and stakeholder 
preferences. Unfortunately, this is not possible so long after the decisions were made. 
The information and sometimes even the decision-makers are no longer available. Such 
a reanalysis of the decision is a form of very detailed sensitivity analysis. If such an 
analysis had been carried out at the time of the decision, as prompted by the risk-based 
decision process, then there would have much more confidence in the final decisions. 
Overall, these design decisions were made under significant uncertainty and were 
susceptible to the decision-makers' preferences and experience, but they were made 
much more rationally than the project decisions. There was evidence of processes 
similar to the proposed decision process being applied. 
At this early stage of the structure's life, the decision-maker is faced with the most 
significant risks, with the consequences having to be lived with for the structure's 
remaining life. Risk-based decision-making can help to fulfil these requirements. 
There are several benefits of using risk-based decision methods to support concept 
selection, conceptual and preliminary engineering design of new structural assets. The 
strengths and weaknesses of each concept can be considered fully in the design problem 
context. This allows for a wide number of factors to be the decision basis (and allows 
project as well as design issues to be accounted for). In other words, the lowest cost 
concept would not necessarily be selected if it had a very high risk of failing. Similarly, 
the opinions of a wide number of stakeholders can also be accounted for. By taking 
account of the uncertainties in different concepts (unknown operating environments, 
unknown demand of supply etc. ), the best decision for the most likely combination of 
situations can be made while protecting against the largest loss. Finally, by introducing 
a final step in the proposed risk-based decision process, to include feedback, monitoring 
and control of the decision implementation, the risks and decision objectives can be 
controlled to ensure that the best decision is implemented to its fullest potential. 
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11 DISCUSSION 
The work presented in this thesis was initiated following the identification of a potential 
need in the management of engineering structures. It was suggested that support in 
making the decisions about the management of such assets would result in a better 
allocation of resources and help maximise the benefits that could be obtained from the 
limited resources available. 
Based on a review of the literature (concentrating on classical decision theory and on 
previous attempts to use decision-making techniques in this area), a generic decision 
process was proposed. This process was then applied to four real-life case studies, 
drawn from problems current at the time of the work. This means that the whole 
exercise was entirely realistic, in terms of the availability of information, the 
interactions and politics between the stakeholders and the deadlines for recommending 
solutions. A fifth case study examined how real-life unsupported decisions had been 
made within the sponsoring company and compared these against the proposed decision 
process. 
Following each of the case studies, lessons were learnt concerning the usefulness and 
completeness of the decision process. As a consequence, the process was reviewed and 
improved. The final proposed risk-based decision process is now quite different to that 
outlined by Keeney and Raiffa [23]. The two models are compared in figure 33 below, 
with the enhancements shown as shaded boxes. This figure highlights where the new 
proposed risk-based decision process has been enhanced from Keeney and Raiffa's 
process. It now includes stakeholder analysis, early formulation of decision criteria and 
objectives, identification of preferences between decision criterion in addition to 
preferences between outcomes, sensitivity analysis, the opportunity for re-analysis if 
necessary and the monitoring and control of risks and objectives during implementation. 
The enhanced process provides a much more thorough evaluation and implementation 
of decision-making, than was considered possible at the beginning of this research. 
The case studies examined varied widely in terms of when the decisions were made in 
the structure's life cycle as well as in the way they fitted the proposed decision process. 
For example, the influence of stakeholders, risk, uncertainty and the availability of 
supporting information varied between case studies. 
Table 65, which follows the figure, compares each of the case studies in terms of the 
proposed decision process, and therefore allows a number of conclusions to be drawn. 
The subsequent sections compare the five case studies with each stage of the proposed 
decision process. The first four case studies are considered separately and compared 
with the fifth case study, from which different lessons can be learnt. 
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Keeney & Raiffa's process New proposed risk-based decision process 
Identify problem or Pre-analysis Identify problem or 
opportunity 
I opportunity 
Identify viable alternatives 
Model problem structure 
Establish timing of Establish information 
decisions required 
.................... _............ ............ _............... ...... 
Identify poss ble outcomes 
Un1ertainty 
of each alternative analysis 
Assign probabilities to each 
outcome 
ecision rmulate d 
F-objFoectl 
ves and criteria 
Assign preferences to each 
outcome 
Choose best alternative 
based on expected utility 
Identity viable alternatives 
Model problem structure 
Establish timing of II Establish information 
decisions required 
Identify possible outcomes of 
each alternative 
Assign probabilities to each II 
outcome 
Identify preferences for each 
outcome 
Choose best alternative 
based on expected utility 
Yes 
Figure 33: Comparison between Keeney & No 
Raiffa's decision process and the new risk- 
based decision process proposed here 
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Comparing the first four case studies in terms of the proposed decision 
process shows that the decision problem was recognised and addressed 
by the primary decision-maker in each situation. In case study 1 
(feasibility of re-using subsea facilities in new developments), the 
decision-maker was the installation contractor rather than the operator 
because of the timing of the decision. The installation contractor, in 
preparing two separate tenders to two separate operators, identified the 
opportunity of reusing one operator's facilities in the second operator's 
development. 
In case studies two to four (developing a maintenance strategy for 
viaduct crossbeams, planning pipeline repair & replacement schedules and prioritising 
bridge strengthening works) the operator identified the problem as a result of 
discovering, through routine inspections and assessments, that the structure no longer 
conformed to the statutory codes and standards. The structures therefore required some 
form of remedial attention. The decision-maker was then faced with at a least two 
initial alternative actions, which appeared complex and conflicting. This raised 
awareness of the need to address the problem rationally. 
Comparing these four cases against case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making 
in APA) reveals that without knowledge or experience of the proposed decision process, 
decisions are often made subconsciously, without even realising at times that a decision 
is required. This problem is more pronounced in the project management decisions, 
where "non-decisions" are made by "drifting" into a solution of an unidentified 
problem. In these situations, the decision-maker often has no awareness of the problem 
or opportunity that lies before him/her and therefore does not recognise the alternative 
solutions available to maximise the benefit from the situation. An example of this was 
the decision to withhold project members from full participation into the integrated 
project team. It appears that this was more of a non-decision because management 
wanted to avoid the logistical problems of seconding staff out of the office. It is 
unlikely that management made a definite decision to limit the input to the project team. 
An even worse situation occurs when the wrong problem is identified, as in the decision 
to select a project manager. This was not the decision problem. The problem was one 
of how to control the project to satisfy the clients needs at maximum margin for APA 
and with minimum disruption to other projects and clients. If the problem had been 
identified clearly, different alternatives might have arisen and it would have been 
possible to control and attain the objectives. This situation is less severe for the design 
decisions, as there is typically a real engineering decision to be made and thus is 
recognised by the design engineer responsible. 
Project management decisions, being less quantitative than design decisions, are more 
likely to be made through some form of evolution rather than by a clearly evaluated 
selection. The presence of the proposed risk-based decision process and experience of 
its use can prompt decision-makers to recognise problems and opportunities before a 
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potentially sub-optimal solution evolves. It can therefore be concluded that the 
availability of the risk-based decision process helps the decision-maker to recognise the 
problem or opportunity facing them. It also to gives an indication, even at such an early 
stage, of how to gain the most benefit from the identified decision. 
11.2 Identify Stakeholders in the Decision 
It can be seen from Table 65, that the effort involved in the 
identification and evaluation of the stakeholders in the decision 
3 depends on the position within the life cycle. It also depends on the 
s number and strength of conflicting opinions that are influencing the 
°a 6b decision, especially where environmental or political issues are key. In a 
case study 1 (feasibility of re-using subsea facilities in new 
developments), the decision was very conceptual and was taken at a 
early on in the life cycle. The decision was therefore made on 
12 qualitative information and expert opinion. Making the decision at a 
L_1 3_J level also removed the politics from the decision, since the 
stakeholders did not perceive it as final. This meant that the stakeholders were not a 
major consideration in this decision. For case studies 2,3 and 4, the decisions were 
taken much later on in the structure's life and more information was therefore available. 
This meant that the stakeholders were considered in more detail. In contrast, in case 
study 2 (developing a maintenance strategy for viaduct crossbeams), initial assessment 
revealed a straightforward consensus between the stakeholders concerning minimising 
risk of failure and total cost, it followed that detailed stakeholder analysis was not 
required. In case study 3 (planning pipeline repair & replacement schedules) there was 
initially some political disagreement. However, focus on the common decision criteria 
allowed consensus to be built. Case study 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening works) 
involved far more conflict and therefore required a detailed process for building 
consensus amongst the conflicting stakeholders. The risk-based decision process 
allowed this to be carried out in an open and auditable manner, creating ownership of 
the decision at all levels. For conceptual level decisions therefore, it is rarely necessary 
to consider stakeholder influences, however for detailed decisions these factors become 
more important. Figure 34 shows a matrix to help the decision facilitator determine 
when to account for stakeholder influences. 
These case studies have showed that the use of the risk-based decision process provides 
a prompt for stakeholder issues to be considered. It also helps determine whether a 
more detailed assessment of influences and preferences should be made. Case study 5 
(review of risk-based decision-making in APA) highlighted this benefit further. The 
absence of the decision process while these decisions were made meant that the best 
solution was not sought on behalf of all stakeholders. This shortcoming was further 
magnified by the current trend in industry to delegate design and maintenance decisions 
to contractors. Typically contractors benefit from the decisions they make in the- short 
term only, through reduced risk and costs and increased profits. They do not have, 
therefore, any incentive to make decisions for the long-term benefit of the owner or 
operator. Although the operator also benefits from control of the CAPEX and by 
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minimising the exposure to installation risk, he is also exposed to operational costs and 
risks throughout the lifecycle. For example in the decision of whether to trench the 
pipeline or not, the consideration and evaluation of all stakeholder influences and 
preferences would have stopped the contractor from installing an inoperable pipeline 
just because of the low installation costs. It can be concluded, therefore, that it is the 
availability of the risk-based decision process that prompts the consideration and 
evaluation of stakeholders' influences and preferences in the decision. This allows the 






Figure 34 Matrix for determining stakeholder influences 
11.3 Identify Viable Alternatives 
Experience from the first four case studies showed that it was not 
always possible to identify all of the available alternatives, and even 
when it was possible it was not always necessary or even desirable. In 
e, 
S 
eb some cases, such as case studies 2 (developing a maintenance strategy 
' for viaduct crossbeams) and 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening F 9 
works), there were a near infinite number of combinations of actions 
-; -- that could have been identified. These case studies begin to approach 
ý12 the "design" type decision problems described in the literature review, 
which could be solved by using optimisation algorithms. In practice, 
L -J the difficulties associated with developing a suitable optimisation 
algorithm can be prohibitive; and decision-makers frequently prefer to adopt evaluation 
techniques for design decision problems. In an evaluation decision problem each 
alternative can be clearly defined and can therefore be evaluated in the context of the 
environment of the problem. This stage in the decision process, therefore, requires the 
decision-maker to realise the alternatives available and identify a strategy for 
considering them. The more alternatives that can be identified, the greater will be the 
Caroline M Roberts Page 209 DISCUSSION 
Low High 
Significance of political or 
environmental factors 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
opportunity to optimise the decision in terms of risk and therefore fulfil the ALARP 
criteria. Experience from the case studies indicate that the most successful methods for 
generating alternatives are the range of brainstorming techniques presented in Chapter 
4, this conclusion is supported by the literature, for example [85]. 
In case study 2 (developing a maintenance strategy for viaduct crossbeams), a 
supporting decision rationale had to be developed. This was required to take account of 
a number of different factors such as the timing, the budgeting and the cost benefit of 
carrying out repairs sooner rather than later. In contrast, for case studies 1 (feasibility of 
re-using subsea facilities in new developments) and 3 (planning pipeline repair & 
replacement schedules), the alternatives were considered at a more conceptual level to 
establish the most appropriate concept to adopt. This allowed more detailed evaluation 
of the "sub-alternatives" later. Case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in 
APA) revealed the problems that arise when an assessment of the alternatives is not 
carried out. In such cases it is almost guaranteed that sub-optimal decisions will result. 
Even if the decision-maker has significant experience of similar situations, it does not 
follow that past solutions will be the best in a new situation. The problems associated 
with a failure to identify appropriate alternatives were more pronounced in the project 
management decisions than in the design decisions. This was due to the decision-maker 
holding a limited view of the problem in hand. Some of the design problems did 
involve some form of brainstorming to try to identify more design alternatives. 
Experience is not always an advantage in these decisions. It can blinker the decision- 
maker to only considering alternatives that have been experienced before (even if the 
situation is different). Experience and expertise may, therefore, constrain innovation 
and creativity. The benefit of the risk-based decision process is that it encourages the 
decision-maker to step outside his/her limited experience and to consider the decision 
problem with creativity (through lateral thinking, brainstorming, etc. ). This makes it 
more likely that many, if not all, of the possible alternatives are taken into account in 
the decision. 
The simpler methods for generating alternatives, such as attribute listing and 
brainstorming tend to be the most appropriate in these "evaluation" type decisions as 
they involve little methodology for a potentially high output. In addition, the 
availability of interactive software to support brainstorming helps to make the process 
less tedious for the decision-makers involved. Screening methods can then be used to 
reduce the set of alternatives again to remove any that are unfeasible, unacceptable or 
dominated by others. 
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11.4 Identify Decision Objectives and Criteria 
Based on the limited experience from the five case studies, it would 
appear that, more often than not, decisions are made in terms of cost 
and safety risk only. Often, this is because the consequences of failure 
S are almost automatically quantified in terms of cost. I think that this 
is 
8a Bb because it appears to be a more straightforward approach due to the a 
way that problems have been tackled in the past. Decision-makers 
, 
frequently, do not feel confident at quantifying all consequences in 
terms of cost. Doing so is an inherently difficult and possibly 512 
contentious task and, given the opportunity, the decision-makers would 
' quantify the consequences in their natural units for as long as possible. L 
F_ 
This was evident in case study 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening works). Each of the 
stakeholders interviewed for their preferences found it easier to quantify acceptable 
consequences in terms of their natural units. In addition, they also found reassurance in 
the way the consensus was built up. They could see that the different criteria were 
accounted for and weighted according to the preferences of each of the stakeholders. In 
case study 4, due to the political and contentious nature of the problem, there was a 
clear desire by the stakeholder to take the more qualitative factors into account, 
therefore multi criteria decision methods were of real benefit. The number and type of 
decision criteria to be used to solve a decision problem can be determined based on this 
experience. For structural management decisions, the number and type of decision 
criteria depend on the range and severity of the consequences of failure and the strength 
of stakeholder influences as shown in the matrix in Figure 35. 
Case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) showed how the default 
decision criteria, without the support of the decision process, tend to be short-term risks 
and costs. They are short-term evaluations because it is very difficult to quantify these 
consequences in the longer term, without any decision support, especially since the 
uncertainties increase with time. However, the considered risks are only short term 
because often these are the only risks that affect the decision maker (who is often the 
installation contractor), all long term risks are transferred to the operator who has no 
influence in the decisions. Only risks and costs are considered because they are the 
easiest consequences to quantify without an understanding of multi-criteria methods. 
Such limitations on decision criteria can result in sub-optimal decisions with extensive 
consequences beyond financial costs. For example, the environmental, social or 
political consequences, none of which were identified in the decision and all of which 
affect a wide range of stakeholders. Alternatively, the adverse consequences of a 
decision may only become apparent in the longer term. This was so in the case of the 
pipeline design where a cooling spool was introduced. The increased cooling rate 
resulted in major operational problems. The ability of the risk-based decision process to 
allow a more diverse range of decision factors therefore brings more clarity to the 
decision process. It also brings more flexibility for those decision-makers who have 
previously been constrained to trying to quantify all consequences in terms of cost. 
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Strength of stakeholder influences 
Figure 35 Matrix for determining the number of decision criteria 
In 1993 the HSE examined the use of quantitative risk assessments in supporting 
decision-making [160]. The paper reviewed the criteria used in decision making and it 
was suggested that decisions are made by qualitatively accounting for societal risk in 
addition to individual risk. The criteria that were considered to affect the tolerability of 
risk included: 
" The nature of the risk. 
" The nature of the human consequences. 
" Potential economic benefits. 
" The nature of the risk assessment. 
" Factors affecting the risk generator. 
" Public attitudes towards the risk. 
" Public confidence in the authorities. 
The working party responsible for this paper concluded that a large number of 
qualitative criteria are accounted for in the decision process. Although their work was 
focussed on the nuclear industry, a number of the major decisions they investigated 
were from other industries including transport and oil and gas. The HSE made no 
attempt in their work to recommend methods for quantitatively accounting for these 
factors but they did suggest that this was necessary to make these decisions more 
rational and auditable. 
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11.5 Model Problem Structure 
The case studies have shown that a decision tree can be a useful tool for 
the definition of a problem. However, it is not always necessary to use 
one. For example, in case studies 2 (developing a maintenance strategy 
for viaduct crossbeams) and 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening works), 
7 the numbers of alternatives available were too great for any benefit to 
ä be gained from the huge decision trees that would have resulted. 
--'° Decision trees were found to be beneficial in considering the 
decision 
11 -12 problems conceptually, but could not be used to solve the problems. 
 Case studies 1 (feasibility of re-using subsea 
facilities in new 
developments) and 3 (planning pipeline repair & replacement 
schedules), having much fewer alternatives, benefited much more from using decision 
trees to evaluate each alternative and each consequence. Case study 1 was in fact 
solved entirely with a decision tree. Case study 1 was such a straightforward decision 
in terms of alternatives. However, because of the number of possible outcomes over 
time, the tree still grew to a size that was only just manageable. It can be seen therefore, 
that there is a size limit above which a decision tree becomes too cumbersome to be 
useful although the availability of computer software provides some support. 
An alternative to using a decision tree is to use an influence diagram, described in 
Chapter 4. This approach was found to be very useful for representing the main 
concepts of even the most complex decision problems and identifying all interactions 
between decision criteria, uncertainties and input values. The influence diagram was 
found to help the decision-maker articulate the decision problem and identify all the 
alternatives, even though it does not represent the same level of detail as a decision tree. 
This was found to be especially true for case study 4. 
Both of these structuring methods have been found to be extremely useful for 
communicating the decision problem to other stakeholders and gaining their input into 
the problem formulation. Figure 36 shows a matrix to help the decision facilitator select 
the most appropriate method for structuring the decision problem. 
Case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) revealed how rarely these 
powerful tools are applied in practice despite the benefits and clarity they can bring. 
There is evidence in nearly all of the examples of the decisions not being clearly 
formulated or communicated and therefore resulting in sub-optimal decisions. It can 
therefore be concluded that by using the proposed risk-based decision process, the 
decision-maker is prompted to formulate the decision with the use of the decision 
tree/influence diagram. This then ensures a logical and thorough formulation, which 
can be clearly communicated, to the stakeholders. It is however, only in simple 
decisions that the decision tree/influence diagram can be used to solve the decision 
problem. In most decisions they are the tools through which the issues are collated, 
clarified and communicated to the stakeholders before the detailed analysis is carried 
out. 
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Figure 36 Matrix for the method of structuring the decision problem 
11.6 Establish Timing of Decisions 
I 
This stage of the decision process is one of the steps recommended by 
Z Keeney and Raiffa [23]. During the design stage, the timing of 
decisions is key to the effectiveness of their implementation. If they 
6 are delayed, then it can be very difficult to have the identified features 
included. Most of the decisions evaluated in case studies 1 to 4 were 
e -- mid life decisions, at these stages, timing does not always have such a 
+o _ major role 
to play in the decision, but when it does, the difference to 
-; 2- the decision is significant. For example, most mid-life decision 
problems are not identified until it is already time to make the decision. 
13 Case studies 2,3 and 4 all addressed problems which needed an action 
immediately, but were also affected by timing. Case study 2 (developing a maintenance 
strategy for viaduct crossbeams) needed an immediate decision of the safety of the 
bridge crossbeams, but a delayed decision of the time for maintenance. Obviously, 
those that were already considered unsafe needed the repair decision to be made 
immediately, but for those that were still safe a provisional repair scheduling decision 
could be made and revised following further inspections. Such timings if accounted for 
in the decision process help optimise the allocation of resources over time. 
In case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA), several of the examples 
showed that the timing of decisions was not used to the best advantage and decisions 
were made before all the information was available. In some cases, this occurred even 
in the knowledge that the information would become available later. The consequence 
of this was a number of sub-optimal decisions, which might have had better outcomes if 
they had been made later once the information was available, although this may have 
then affected the project schedule with resultant financial consequences. Therefore, 
although it appears initially to be a very small consideration within the whole decision 
process, accounting for the timing of the decisions can play a very significant role in 
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determining how well the decision is made. This is therefore a very important step in 
the decision process that should not be ignored. 
11.7 Establish Information Required 
This stage in the decision process is very closely linked with the 
previous stage, in that obtaining necessary information on which to 
base the decision can affect the timing of the decision and timing 
determines what information is available. Information is the key to all 
1 ea - decision-making and risk assessment. It is therefore essential to assess 
_ 
the information required to support the decision-making and examine 
ö the benefits that specific pieces of information will bring. Case studies 
_+±ýý 
1 to 4 all considered the information that was easily available and the 
12 information that could be obtained, sometimes at a cost, if it were 
required. In case study 1 (feasibility of re-using subsea facilities in 
new developments) the decision was based on expert opinion, since this was considered 
to be sufficient at that point in the project life-cycle. The decision process did, however, 
identify that there would be value in obtaining further information in some areas. Case 
studies 2 and 4 followed a similar pattern where a preliminary evaluation allowed the 
requirements for a more detailed assessment to be identified. Once a decision is made, 
it is possible to assess the need for further information such as new inspection data, at a 
later date, to update the analysis and even, if necessary, to modify the decision. This 
was the situation in case study 3 (planning pipeline repair & replacement schedules) 
where a decision on the need to replace the pipeline could be made on currently 
available data. However further inspection and monitoring were required to provide 
confidence in the pipeline's continued operation until a replacement could be installed. 
In case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) there were a number of 
occasions where decisions were made without using all the available information or 
even without identifying all the information that was available. This means that, in 
hindsight, the decision appears to be illogical and certainly sub-optimal. It is clear 
therefore, that it is important that a decision should be based on the maximum available 
information, and that the cost benefit of obtaining further information should be 
examined. Only if this activity is undertaken is it possible to demonstrate that the final 
decision is robust. 











Identifying the possible outcomes for each alternative involves 
answering the question "what could go wrong and how wrong could it 
go? " Experience from the first four case studies revealed how 
important it is to identify and assess all significant failure modes and 
the consequences of those failure modes. This allows the right 
emphasis to be placed on either mitigating against failure or providing 
contingency in the case of failure. In case study 1 (feasibility of re- 
using subsea facilities in new developments) it was sufficient to 
identify the risks based on expert opinion since the decision was made 
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at a very conceptual level and involved a number of operational risks as well as 
structural risks. In case studies 2 to 4 however, the risks were far more significant, 
involving more complex failure modes and potential consequences which included loss 
of life. Structured brainstorming techniques were found to be useful at this stage to 
draw on the experiences of a wide number of experts and ensure that as many potential 
risks as possible are identified and accounted for in the decision. These methods were 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
Case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) revealed that an evaluation 
of the outcomes does not always take place. A number of the decisions have resulted in 
outcomes that were totally unexpected at the design stage. Unexpected outcomes are 
generally unwelcome and can be very expensive, especially for the long-term operator 
of the asset. In the case of the decision to trench the pipeline and then to introduce a 
cooling spool, the outcome was a pipeline with impaired operability. If a full risk 
evaluation undertaken, even after the decision to trench had been made, these 
consequences may have been foreseen and the decisions modified accordingly. Instead, 
the operator has a long-term operability problem as long as the pipeline remains in use. 
This situation makes the point very clear and highlights the absolute necessity of 
seeking to identify and account for all possible failure modes and consequences of the 
decision before it is too late. The need for thorough and detailed risk identification 
tools is therefore essential. 
11.9 Assign Probabilities for each Outcome 
Of equal importance to the identification of all possible outcomes is the 
assessment of the probability of each outcome. Once again, the detail 
with which this is carried out depends on the type of decision and the 
ei eb amount of 
information available. In case study 1 (feasibility of re- 
using subsea facilities in new developments), because the decision was 
9 -- made at a conceptual level, it was sufficient at this stage to base the 
probabilities on experience. It would have been appropriate to refine 
E5E'" these estimates if the decision had been taken further. For case studies 
13 
2 (developing a maintenance strategy for viaduct crossbeams) and 3 
(planning pipeline repair & replacement schedules) safety was a very 
important issue. It was therefore, necessary to demonstrate confidence in the evaluation 
of the probabilities. The detailed reliability analysis based on the statistical data that 
was available provided a thorough evaluation of the probability of failure for each 
failure mode. In case study 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening works) safety was again 
a significant issue. However, the amount of effort that would have been required to 
carry out detailed reliability analysis of each alternative was prohibitive (due to the 
many different structural forms and hence failure modes). The risk scoring system 
provided a useful approximation based on the deterministic code assessment results and 
provided a level of accuracy appropriate to the context of the problem. Figure 37 shows 
a matrix which gives guidance to when a detailed reliability analysis is required and 
when a more subjective assessment is considered acceptable. 
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Once the evaluation of the probability of failure has been made, irrespective of how 
subjectively, it is possible to remove certain outcomes from the assessment, to simplify 
the problem. These outcomes should only be removed if they have a very low 
probability and a very low consequence. In case study 5 (review of risk-based decision- 
making in APA), the decision-maker ignored some risks, which were not of low 
probability or of low consequence, or transferred them to another stakeholder. The 
decision-maker (often the contractor) preferred not to acknowledge these risks, in order 
to avoid the need to mitigate against them, and transferred them back to the operator. 
Problems arose later when unexpected outcomes occurred, creating additional costs for 
the operator to cover. These should have been identified and evaluated at the time the 
decision was made in order to allow the operator to fully understand the implications of 
the risks and to mitigate against them. 
The risk-based decision process, in involving all stakeholders throughout each stage of 
the decision, ensures that the consequences and probabilities of all possible outcomes 
are evaluated in the interest of all stakeholders. This provides a full understanding by 







10 Number of Failure Modes 
Figure 37 Matrix for the method of evaluating probability of failure 












It is not always necessary to quantify specific weightings for each 
decision criteria, especially when only one or two criteria are 
considered. In these cases, gaining consensus from the stakeholders of 
which criteria, if any, should dominate is a useful clarification of the 
decision process. In case study 1 (feasibility of re-using subsea 
facilities in new developments) the decision was made at such a 
conceptual level, based on only two decision criteria, that these criteria 
were taken as having equal importance. Similarly, in case studies 2 
(developing a maintenance strategy for viaduct crossbeams) and 3 
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(planning pipeline repair & replacement schedules), it became clear very quickly, from 
discussion with the stakeholders, that the dominant criterion was risk, with cost being a 
constraint. It followed that it was not necessary to quantify weightings for the criteria. 
In contrast, in case study 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening works) five main decision 
criteria were considered, plus additional sub-criteria. There were also a large number of 
conflicting stakeholder views. It was therefore important, in order to build consensus, 
to evaluate in detail the relative importances of the criteria through detailed consultation 
with the stakeholders. This was time consuming, as each stakeholder interview took on 
average 2 hours, and interview preparation and post-processing took around a week to 
complete. However, the overall decision-maker considered this effort worthwhile, since 
it achieved consensus and thereby ensured buy-in for the final decision. 
Case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) revealed that the decision- 
makers identified the main decision criteria in accordance with their own preferences, 
without consultation with other, potentially important stakeholders, such as the operator. 
Frequently, decision criteria, even if they were important, were ignored if they were 
difficult to quantify. 
The risk-based decision process causes the decision-maker to actively consider which 
decision criteria to use and how to quantify their relative importances. This means that 
identified decision criteria will be ignored only following an explicit decision to do so, 
and that such decisions would be auditable. Figure 38, shows how different numbers of 
stakeholder views and different numbers of decision criteria affect the way in which 






Figure 38 Matrix for identifying the relative importance of decision criteria 
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11.11 Identify Preferences for each Outcome 
The identification of preferences for each outcome can be a very 
3 
complex stage in the decision process. Consequently it is often left out. 




in the values of the outcomes of the decision. For example, 
whether there is a preference for a low probability of a high 
- consequence or a high probability of a low consequence. Alternatively, 
there may be more of a preference for a low risk to a higher risk or a 
12 lower cost to a higher cost. Such an assessment was only carried out in 
one of the case studies. In case study 4 (prioritising bridge 13 
strengthening works), because all criteria values were transferred to a 
non-dimensional scale, a non-linear relationship was derived for value and risk, 
although all other criteria were mapped onto linear scales. For all other case studies, the 
decision-makers were not interested in identifying value preferences, except in some 
cases specifying minimum or maximum acceptance levels. 
In case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) there was no evidence 
of any quantification of preferences. However, there was evidence of subconscious 
preferences being introduced by the decision maker, for example preferences for 
minimising short term costs rather than long term costs and minimising short term risks 
rather than long term risks. 
The value of the decision-making process is enhanced by raising awareness in both the 
decision-maker and the stakeholders of any subconscious preferences and biases. This 
allows them to be identified and evaluated. If they are significant then this can be 
quantified in the formulation and assessment of the decision problem. The tools for 
quantifying these preferences were described in Chapter 4 and were found to be tedious, 
difficult and time consuming. These methods will help in the decision-making process, 
but only if the decision maker is committed to this level of quantification. He has, 
therefore, to be convinced that the result will be worth the effort. This is a very 
important area for further development. The possibility of developing simpler, more 
efficient methods should be established and if possible, further development work 
should be carried out to support this stage of the process more effectively. 
11.12 Choose Best Alternative based on Expected Utility 
flo 
It is not always necessary to evaluate the decisions in terms of a non- 
dimensional utility, for example, it need not be done if the decision is 
to be made on one main criterion. In case study 1 (feasibility of re- 
using subsea facilities in new developments) the decision was based on 
minimising the expected cost (i. e. the sum of the probabilities of failure 
and the costs of failure). Similarly, in case study 3 (planning pipeline 
repair & replacement schedules), the decision was based on minimising 
the risk of failure. In case study 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening 
works), because of the multiple criteria on which the decision was 
evaluated, in was necessary to maximise the utility of each alternative. 
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In case study 2 (developing a maintenance strategy for viaduct crossbeams), however, 
due to the complications of scheduling and deterioration, a more complex decision 
rationale had to be adopted. 
The decisions which were investigated in case study 5 (review of risk-based decision- 
making in APA) were often based more on preferences and perceptions of cost and 
safety risk than any clear optimisation of calculated values. Despite carrying out 
detailed calculations of costs and risks in some cases, these values were sometimes 
ignored when it came to the final decision, as the risks, where possible, were transferred 
back to the operator. Therefore, the best decision, at least from the operator's 
perspective was not always made. Figure 39 presents a matrix to help the decision 
maker identify the most appropriate basis for the final decision depending on the 





Figure 39 Matrix for the method of selection of the best alternative 
11.13 Conduct Sensitivity Analysis 
Due to the uncertainties inherent in all decision-making, it is necessary 
2 to establish the effects of the assumptions and of parameter 
uncertainties on the selected solution. In case study 1 (feasibility of re- 
am Ob using subsea 
facilities in new developments), the uncertainties were 
7 determined subjectively based on expert opinion; the sensitivity 
-ä -- analysis analysed the extremes of the experts estimates to assess 
.. whether the selected alternative would change. In case studies 2 to 4, however, the probabilities were defined more objectively therefore 
different sensitivities were important. In case studies 2 (developing a 13 
L -J maintenance strategy for viaduct crossbeams) and 3 (planning pipeline 
repair & replacement schedules) the decision was based mainly on the probability of 
failure, therefore the sensitivity of the selected option to the uncertainties in the 
probabilities was of greatest importance. In case study 4 (prioritising bridge 
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strengthening works) the decision was based on the weighted criteria scores, therefore 
the sensitivity of the selected option to the criteria weights needed to be determined. 
Despite the importance of sensitivity analysis, it was not performed in every case study. 
In some cases the client insisted on making the decision on the first pass results. It is 
concluded that there is a need for decision-makers to be educated about the benefits of 
sensitivity analysis and the dangers of not carrying it out. 
Case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) revealed that sensitivity 
analysis was not used in any of the decisions investigated. This meant that it was not 
possible to demonstrate any confidence in the final decisions. It seems common for 
decision-makers, once they have made a decision, to stick with it and move straight into 
implementation. This can be done without any checks to ensure that the assumptions 
and estimates either were correct, or did not affect the final decision in any way. This 
can lead to a poor decision. However, even where the decision is appropriate, the lack 
of robust evidence to demonstrate confidence in the decision can adversely affect 
motivation during the implementation stage. 
Sensitivity analysis does therefore make a significant contribution to the decision 
process. Even if only at a qualitative level. It helps to avoid poor decisions and by 
building confidence in good decisions produces motivation during implementation. 













Carrying out further analysis is perceived to be expensive and is 
therefore often neglected. As experience from case studies 1 to 4 
shows, that, despite recommendations being made for additional data 
gathering and re-analysis of the decision, this recommendation was not 
put into practice, in any of the cases. It seems that the application of 
the risk-based decision process to support the decision-making in these 
four cases was so revolutionary and made the decision-making process 
appear to be so logical that the decision makers had complete 
confidence in the recommended solutions. They could perceive no 
additional benefit that might be derived from additional analysis. 
In case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA), since none of the 
decisions involved any sensitivity analysis, no re-analysis using either revised data or 
assumptions or additional data was performed. 
If the decision facilitator was convinced of the benefit of carrying out additional 
analysis, then they should provide a clear quantitative demonstration of the benefit of 
using additional data and analysis to improve the problem solution. In cases where 
there is little difference between two alternative solutions, then such a demonstration 
may be straightforward to achieve. However, if one option is clearly better than any 
other, then it is likely to be difficult to convince a decision-maker to pay more for 
information, which is unlikely to change the decision. 
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11.15 Implement the Chosen Decision 
teb 
12 
Evaluation of case studies 1 to 4 shows that in all four cases the 
decision recommended by the decision facilitator as a result of using 
the risk-based decision process was accepted by the decision-maker 
and subsequently implemented. The risk-based decision process had 
made the decision-making transparent to all stakeholders who could 
then understand and accept the reasons for the selected options. This 
promoted ownership of the decisions, which in turn motivated all 
parties to contribute to the implementation of the solution. 
In case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) 
significant evidence was found for decisions being made without 
consensus between stakeholders and even with clear conflicts remaining unresolved. 
This led to solutions being implemented without agreement and support and even 
encouraged a culture of blame when the solutions were found not to be the best for all 
parties. The other significant problem found in case study 5 was the lack of feedback 
and control during the implementation of the decision, which led to risks developing out 
of control and therefore decision objectives not being met. For this reason, it was 
considered that the feedback loop should be incorporated into the decision process. 
The implementation stage therefore is a significant step in the risk-based decision- 
making process. It is obviously important to ensure that the decision is acted on and not 
left as a document on the shelf. However, it is also important that the decision is 
implemented in accordance with the consensus of all stakeholders and monitored and 
controlled to ensure that risks are controlled and that the consensus decision objectives 
are fulfilled. This plays a very significant role in ensuring a successful decision. 
11.16 Decision Facilitation 
One consideration in the use of the decision process, which has not yet been addressed, 
is the use of a facilitator in the decision process. Each of the decisions described in the 
first four case studies was facilitated to varying degrees by myself as a third party 
consultant. This had a number of benefits, each of which made the decision-making 
more thorough, rational and unbiased. Firstly, being separated from the decision-maker 
and any of the stakeholders meant that the decision problem could be viewed 
independently and without bias. It also meant that the decision facilitator saw the 
problem as part of the bigger picture, above the prejudices and possible blinkered 
experiences of the decision-maker. This enabled increased creativity and lateral 
thinking in terms of identifying stakeholders, alternative solutions and risks. 
Another key role and benefit of the third party facilitator in decision-making is as an 
independent judge in conflict resolution. When stakeholders hold strong but conflicting 
views about the way the decision is made and about the preferred final decision, the 
facilitator can arbitrate between opposing sides. This can help to bring about a better 
understanding between parties and build a consensus between them. The symptoms of 
conflict can be identified very early on in the decision process. These include poor 
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communication between stakeholders, hostility and jealousy between stakeholder 
groups, interpersonal friction and low morale. Without conflict resolution through a 
third party facilitator, stakeholders could adversely affect the decision by controlling or 
distorting information by using informal communication and negotiation channels and 
by controlling rewards. The facilitator, being independent of the problem, has the best 
opportunity to turn the conflict into a state of collaboration or fruitful argument (the 
fruitful discussion of differences) [161]. Through trying to understand the reasons for 
the conflict, the facilitator can neutrally promote the agreed goals of the decision in 
order to overcome the disagreements between stakeholder groups. This was 
experienced through consensus building as in case study 4. 
Mintzberg [162] developed a set of ten roles, which, he proposed, were involved in the 










Figure 40 Ten management roles proposed by Mintzberg 11621 
Cooke and Slack [85] took this further and suggested that, since the key role of 
management is decision-making, these ten roles should play a part in the decision- 
making process. Figure 41 shows the way in which Cooke and Slack mapped these 
roles against the generic decision process. I believe that in order to maximise the 
effectiveness of the decision-making, five of these roles can be best performed by a 
third party facilitator. These five roles are highlighted in the figure (bold text). 
The role of leader provides direction, guidance and motivation to the decision group, 
ensuring that the decision process is followed and committed to by all in the decision 
group. A third party facilitator here helps to overcome cynicism and mistrust at an early 






Caroline M Roberts Page 223 DISCUSSION 
---fin 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
particular significance in case studies 1 and 4 where stakeholders had to be motivated to 
participate in rigorous evaluations. 
The role of liaison is to build and maintain links and contacts with groups and 
individuals outside the decision group. This role of stakeholder liaison also benefits 
from the independence and impartiality of a third party facilitator. This role was 
evident to some extent in all four case studies. It was crucial to the success of case 
study 4 where the stakeholders not only had to be consulted but also had to be reassured 
that their views were being represented. 
The role of the disseminator is to pass information into the organisation from outside 
and to pass on information generated by the decision group. If this role is carried out by 
a third party facilitator then, there can be confidence that information is communicated 
and represented fairly and honestly without bias and prejudice that can come from being 
too closely involved in the decision. This role was important in all the case studies, but 
particularly in case studies 2,3 and 4 where a significant amount of analysis had to be 
carried out to support the decision. The decision-makers had to be confident that this 
was done objectively and rationally. 
The spokesman's role is very similar to that of disseminator and involves transmitting 
information out into the environment. For the same reasons as before, this benefits 
from being carried out by a third party facilitator. In all case studies, the analysis results 
had to be presented to the decision-makers with recommendations for the best decision. 
Finally, the role of disturbance handler is concerned with controlling the, often 
involuntary, problems and conflicts, which are outside management's control. This is 
the role of conflict resolution and, as already discussed, provides impartiality and order 
if carried out by a third party facilitator. This role was most significant in case study 4. 
If the analysis in case study 3 had been less conclusive, then it is likely that a 
disturbance handler would have been needed to assist in reaching a decision. 
The decision facilitator's experience in using decision analysis methods provides 
assistance in applying the various models used in the risk-based decision process. 
Experience provides guidance for the selection of appropriate methods of analysis and 
can ensure that the information available is used to the best advantage. An experienced, 
independent decision facilitator also brings confidence to the decision-making, both the 
primary decision-maker and for the other stakeholders. Through his experience, the 
decision facilitator, can impart confidence in the process and its application to the 
problem, while through his independent unbiased view he can provide confidence in the 
fairness and rationality of the decision process. This encourages ownership and support 
for the decision and motivation for its implementation. 
The traditional role of the facilitator is to ensure the appropriate application of the 
process. When facilitating this decision process, his role is much richer. The facilitator 
must be sensitive to the issues and complexities of the decision problem. There must 
also be a flexible balance between the 5 key roles and in the application of the decision 
tools at each stage, even to the extent of intervening in the evaluations to ensure all 
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views are represented. If the right balance of roles is not achieved, for example if the 
leader role dominates, then a wrong or insensitive decision may be made. 
Recognise need for decision I Liaison I Monitor I Entrepreneur 
Leader Monitor 
Define the problem 
Liaison Diccominm 
Determine the options I Leader I Disseminator I Negotiator 
Evaluation 
Making the choice 
Disturbance handler 
Implementation and monitoring Leader -r-- -- Resource allocator 
Monitor 
Figure 41 The involvement of Mintzberg's roles in decision-making, proposed 
by Cooke and Slack [85] 
It is not always necessary to use a third party decision facilitator for every decision. 
The facilitator brings the greatest benefit in decisions involving stakeholder conflict, or 
requiring creativity either in the approach or in the generation of alternatives. Decisions 
involving stakeholder conflict are typically decisions with significant environmental or 
political consequences, such as the decisions considered in case studies 3 and 4. Case 
study 2 is a good example of a decision requiring creativity in the way it was solved. 
Another class of decision that could benefit from a third party facilitator is those that 
involve a significant amount of subjective evaluation. Subjective evaluations, by their 
very nature, involve biases and perceptions. These can affect the decision that is made. 
By using a third party facilitator the stakeholders can be guided in their subjective 
evaluations in order to ensure that the effect of biases and perceptions is kept to a 
minimum. Case study 1 was an example of this type of decision. Decisions involving 
minimal stakeholder influence, based predominantly on cost and safety issues do not 
need a third party facilitator and can be managed directly by the decision maker. 
However, the decision-maker should have an understanding of and experience in 
decision analysis and risk assessment methods to be able to make the decision without 
external support. 
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11.17 General Discussion 
A number of points can be made by comparing the supported decision making of the 
first four case studies with the unsupported decision making of the fifth case study. 
Firstly, the use of the decision process makes the decision-making feel easier to carry 
out. By breaking the process down into a number of steps, each individually 
manageable, the decision becomes less daunting and is therefore made with more 
confidence. The decision-maker feels that each step is logical and fits with the other 
steps. The decision-maker can see that every aspect of the decision is_ logically 
accounted for. This helps the decision-maker to feel that the decision is being made as 
rationally and logically as possible. 
One of the initial research questions was "does the decision-making process make 
decision-making easier? " This depends on the definition of easier. To the layperson, 
decision-making methods appear to make decision-making more difficult, because it is 
perceived to be time consuming and to involve many difficult evaluations and 
assessments. However, as was stated in the very beginning of this thesis, the decision- 
making process, breaks the decisions up into small manageable pieces, which each 
individually become easier to handle and more logical to address. 
I was only given the opportunity of evaluating case studies 1 to 4 with risk-based 
decision methods because they were each perceived to require very strategic decisions 
involving high risks, high costs and/or high levels of stakeholder conflicts. For this 
reason, the decision makers were willing to avail sufficient time to analyse the decisions 
fully. Case study 5 showed a very similar pattern, in that the decisions which were 
made at the conceptual stage, were perceived to be of high strategic value, were 
allocated more time in which to identify and evaluate alternatives than was the case for 
the detailed design decisions. This does not mean that the risk-based decision process is 
only appropriate for high level decisions, although it obviously does bring significant 
benefit to them. In lower level decisions, when used as a check list or a diagnostic, the 
risk-based decision process can ensure that all decisions are considered and evaluated 
rationally and at a level of detail appropriate to the given situation. 
This will help decision-making overall become more rational, but does it help make 
better decisions? The answer to this question depends on the definition of a good 
decision. Is a good decision a decision with a good outcome, irrespective of how it was 
made? Is it a decision made in a thorough and rational manner irrespective of the 
outcome? Alternatively, is it a decision made in a thorough and rational manner with a 
good outcome? I would suggest that since decisions are made under uncertainty, it is 
not right to grade the quality of a decision on its eventual outcome. In my view, a 
decision should be classified as a good decision if it has been made in a thorough and 
logical manner taking account of all factors, all preferences and all uncertainties. In 
which case, the risk-based decision process does help to promote better decisions. 
Not only does the risk-based decision process help to make better decisions but it also 
helps in the implementation of the decision. Through the logical and thorough process, 
a clear audit trail is built up allowing the whole process to be inspected and assessed 
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later. Furthermore, the integration of stakeholder views into the decision process 
creates ownership from all parties throughout the decision process. This promotes 
consensus building and motivates all parties both to work together to find a workable 
solution and to implement it. It also encourages accountability to the stakeholders in the 
way the consensus decision is implemented. This was clearly demonstrated in case 
study 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening works), which showed how differences of 
opinion and political conflicts were resolved such that all stakeholder groups ended up 
working together towards the same goals of overall cost efficiency and safety. Finally, 
the feedback loop ensures that all risks are monitored and controlled in order to ensure 
that the decision objectives continue to be met. 
The research reported in this thesis has applied the risk-based decision process to four 
very different decision scenarios and compared thirteen further unsupported decisions 
with the proposed decision process. The experience gained from both of these groups 
of case studies has indicated that the risk-based decision process either helped or would 
have helped, if it had been used, in the way the decision was made. It is not possible, 
based on the five case studies, to say that using the decision process to support decision- 
making is beneficial for every decision problem. In fact, if it was used in a rigid 
prescriptive manner it would probably hinder good decision-making in some situations. 
However, I would suggest that the process is a support to all decision-making if it is 
used initially as a systematic checklist. Each stage of the decision process can then be 
considered in the context of the decision at hand to establish the level of detail with 
which the assessment should be-made. The matrices presented in figures 34 to 39 can 
help the decision-maker in these stages; the other stages being evaluated in terms of the 
available information and experience. Because it can be applied at various levels of 
detail and allows for choices of methods within its different stages, the proposed 
decision process is inherently flexible and is suitable for application to a very wide 
range of problems. The strength of the process lies in its ability to help the decision- 
maker identify and consider all factors which affect the decision and then to provide a 
range of models to evaluate the more complex stages of the process. 
The framework proposed by UKOOA [123], reviewed in Chapter 4 divided all possible 
decision scenarios into 3 general types, based on a set of common drivers and issues, 
and recommended basing the different decisions types on different types of assessments 
and information (see Figure 11). For example standard, "run of the mill", low risk 
decisions, with minimal economic or stakeholder implications, should be based 
predominantly on codes and standards, good practice and engineering judgement. 
Decisions involving business or life cycle risks, some uncertainty or deviation from 
standard practice and some significant economic implications should be based on the 
same three methods supplemented by cost benefit analysis, quantitative risk assessment 
and an understanding of company values. Finally, very novel or challenging decisions 
involving strong stakeholder views, significant risks, uncertainties, economic 
implications and a lowering of safety standards should be based on company and 
societal values with input from cost benefit analysis or quantitative risk assessment. 
sA 
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The UKOOA approach therefore implies that it is not appropriate to use risk-based 
decision-making in everyday decisions and hence that it is not necessary to calculate 
risks or stakeholder values. However, this could lead to risks being accidentally 
overlooked or accidentally introduced, by assuming that the decision is similar to many 
previous decisions based on code assessments. There may, in fact, be subtle differences 
which mean the code is not directly applicable, or that the context of the decision 
introduces uncertainties and risks. Codes may also incorporate hidden assumptions, 
which can mean that a slightly innovative design may not fit the code or be suitable to 
be judged against the code. These issues have the potential to introduce additional 
risks, which may remain hidden, without prompting from a formalised decision process. 
I therefore disagree with UKOOA's view and suggest that risk is involved in every 
decision, but that it is better understood in some decisions than others. In common with 
the UKOOA framework, the decision process recommended in this thesis suggests that 
it may not always be necessary to carry out a QRA or evaluate stakeholder views. 
However, rather than trying to band all decisions into three general types, the proposed 
risk-based decision process takes the decision maker through the decision one step at a 
time, initially as a checklist to ensure that the decision maker considers every aspect of 
the decision at hand. This allows the decision-maker to identify the relevance, benefit 
or importance to calculate risk, evaluate stakeholder views, use multiple criteria and 
quantify preferences, to the decision at hand. Then, through the applicability matrices 
presented in Figures 34 to 39, it helps the decision-maker to achieve a decision, with the 
support of the recommended models appropriate to the context of the problem. 
If all decisions could be easily grouped into the three general decision types proposed 
by UKOOA's framework, then both UKOOA's framework and my proposed decision 
process would look quite similar, as shown in figure 42. This figure also helps clarify 
the level of effort required by the decision process for different types of decisions based 
on the applicability matrices presented previously. However, decision problems do not 
all fall neatly into the three general types, but may have characteristics from any type. 
The risk-based decision process recommended by my research is therefore less 
prescriptive and more flexible than the framework presented by UKOOA, since it 
allows each decision to be evaluated independently of anything else. 
The risk-based decision process proposed in this research is able to support all decision- 
making by ensuring that all factors are accounted for explicitly rather than assuming 
that some factors can be ignored as would be the case with UKOOA's framework. This 
therefore provides a full audit trail with which to justify the decision at a later stage to 
prove that all factors were considered explicit. The step by step process and resulting 
audit trail gives confidence to decision makers at every level in the corporate hierarchy 
and helps more junior decision-makers justify their decisions to their seniors. 
The additional benefit of the work described in this thesis, over the framework proposed 
by UKOOA, is that this thesis has identified, developed and applied a range of decision 
tools and models to support each stage of the decision process. 
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Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
12 CONCLUSIONS 
The work presented in this thesis is based on real life decision problems in the form of a 
series of five case studies. The model that has been proposed is based on well- 
established models found in the literature. These have been enhanced to account for the 
complexities of real life decision-making identified in the evaluation of the generic 
decision problem in Section 3. The case studies showed that these enhancements were 
essential to the effective application of the model, in terms of the availability of 
information, the interactions and politics between the stakeholders and the frequently 
short deadlines. Figure 33 in Chapter 11 shows the difference between the final 
proposed risk-based decision process and that presented by Keeney and Raiffa [23]. 
The proposed enhancements and developments include: 
" the addition of stakeholder analysis, 
" the early formulation of decision criteria and objectives, 
" the identification of preferences between decision criterion in addition to preferences 
between outcomes, 
" sensitivity analysis, 
" the opportunity for re-analysis if necessary, 
" the monitoring and control of risks and objectives during implementation. 
This has provided a more thorough evaluation and implementation of decision-making, 
than was considered possible when this research began. A number of conclusions have, 
therefore, been drawn concerning the benefit and applicability of the proposed risk- 
based decision process based on the evaluation of the five cases studies. These are 
presented below, in the context of the original research questions shown in Chapter 5. 
12.1 Do risk-based decision methods allow the problem to be fully 
explored and understood? 
The risk-based decision process has been shown to help ensure that the decision 
problem is fully explored and understood. It helps the decision-maker to recognise the 
problem or opportunity faced and shows how to gain the most benefit from the decision. 
Case study 5 (review of risk-based decision-making in APA) showed that in the absence 
of a formal decision process, problems go unnoticed or wrongly defined until a solution 
(often sub-optimal) evolves such as in the decision to select a project manager. 
Experience from the four decision scenarios shows that applying the decision process 
requires the decision-maker to step outside his/her limited experience and consider the 
decision problem with creativity. This ensures that all possible alternatives are 
accounted for in the decision in some way. This was illustrated in case study 2 
(developing a maintenance strategy for viaduct crossbeams), where an entire decision 
rationale had to be devised to support the identification of all combinations of repair 
types and repair dates for all crossbeams in the decision process. Case study 5 showed 
that in many cases, without decision support, decision-makers did not take the time to 
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explore all the available alternatives and therefore arrived at sub-optimal solutions such 
as in the decision to minimise the pipeline wall thickness. 
The proposed risk-based decision process allows a more diverse range of decision 
factors, or criteria, to be taken into account in decision-making. This brings more 
clarity to the decision process in the way the alternatives are compared. It is also less 
restrictive for decision-makers who were previously constrained by trying to quantify 
all consequences in terms of cost. This benefit was particularly evident in case study 4 
(prioritising bridge strengthening works), where the use of diverse criteria such as social 
impacts and traffic disruption helped build consensus between conflicting stakeholders. 
In case study 1 (feasibility of re-using subsea facilities in new developments), a decision 
tree was successfully used to solve the problem. In general, decision trees were found 
to be beneficial in considering either complex decision problems at a conceptual level, 
or simple problems at a detailed level. The alternative to using a decision tree is to 
develop an influence diagram (described in Chapter 4). This has been found to be very 
useful for representing the main concepts of even the most complex decision problems 
in that it allows all interactions between decision criteria, uncertainties and input values 
to be analysed. The influence diagram helps the decision-maker articulate the decision 
problem and define a strategy for identifying all the alternatives, as in case study 4. By 
using the proposed risk-based decision process, the decision-maker is prompted to 
formulate the decision with the use of the appropriate structuring method. This then 
ensures a logical and thorough formulation, which can be clearly communicated, to the 
stakeholders. It is however restricted by the knowledge and creativity of the analyst and 
stakeholders involved. 
Experience from case studies 2 and 3 (planning pipeline repair & replacement 
schedules) shows that decisions involving structural deterioration are best made once 
reliable information is available for the estimation of the speed of deterioration, but 
obviously need to be made before the deterioration has progressed too far. Decisions 
involving scheduling and budgeting are also heavily influenced by timing, from one 
budgetary term to another, as in case study 4. Case studies 2,3 and 4 also show that 
decisions involving the possibility of updating data based on new inspection results also 
have an important time and information aspect to be considered. Establishing the 
timing of decisions and the information required are therefore significant in most 
decisions. Decisions involving risk mitigation design are most effective when taken as 
early on in the life cycle as possible, before other design factors have been finalised. 
12.2 Do risk-based decision methods support the identification, 
evaluation and quantification of all significant risks? 
The risk based decision process does help to ensure that all significant failure modes 
and consequences are identified and accounted for in the decision. However, the 
process is not a panacea and comprehensive identification, evaluation and quantification 
is necessarily dependent on the knowledge and experience of the analysts involved and 
the availability of tools to support risk identification. Identifying the possible outcomes 
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for each alternative allows the right emphasis to be placed on either mitigating against 
failure or providing contingency in the case of failure. 
The process supports the quantification of risk to the level of detail appropriate to the 
context of the decision problem. For example, it was considered adequate in case study 
4 to evaluate the risks based on a simplified risk scoring system rather than carrying out 
a detailed structural reliability analysis of every bridge under consideration. The risk- 
based decision process, in involving all stakeholders throughout each stage of the 
decision, ensured that the consequences and probabilities of all possible outcomes were 
evaluated in the interest of all stakeholders. This provided a full understanding by all 
parties and helped to build consensus in the decision. This was particularly true in case 
studies 1 and 4, where different risks were identified to affect different stakeholders. 
In case studies 2 and 3, due to the inherent uncertainties, it was found necessary to 
establish the effect of the assumptions and parameter uncertainties on the selected 
solution. Sensitivity analysis was therefore an important stage, even at a qualitative 
level, to build confidence and motivation for the implementation of the decision. 
In one of the decisions in case study 1 there was very little difference between two 
alternative solutions, therefore it was recommended that further analysis be carried out. 
However, conducting further analysis can be expensive and as the decisions were made 
at a conceptual level they were not taken any further. It is therefore necessary to 
quantitatively evaluate the benefit of additional data and analysis to improve the 
problem solution before this is recommended to the decision-maker. 
12.3 Do risk-based decision methods support the identification and 
agreement of a preferred course of action? 
The risk-based decision process has been shown to support the identification and 
agreement of a preferred course of action. However, the detail involved in identifying 
and evaluating stakeholder preferences in the decision has been found to depend on the 
time within the life cycle. It also depends on the number and strength of conflicting 
opinions affecting the decision. Generally, these "softer" decision-making issues are 
only considered when there is time and motivation to consider them, such as at the 
conceptual design stage or when considerable stakeholder conflict needs to be resolved, 
as in case studies 1 and 4. The use of the risk-based decision process provided a prompt 
for stakeholder issues to be considered and allowed an evaluation to be made of whether 
more detailed assessment of influences and preferences should be undertaken. This 
helped the overall best decision to be made to suit all parties involved. Decisions made 
without the support of the decision process did not recognise stakeholder issues, and 
therefore took no account of the sometimes subtle effect of stakeholder preferences and 
biases. This was found to be true in many of the decisions evaluated as part of case 
study 5, especially when objectives differed between contractors and operators. 
It is not always necessary to quantify specific weightings for each decision criteria, 
especially when only one or two criteria are considered. In these cases, gaining 
consensus from the stakeholders concerning the dominant criterion, was found to be a 
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useful clarification of the decision process, such as in case study 3 (planning pipeline 
repair & replacement schedules), where safety was considered the dominating criterion. 
The risk-based decision process causes the selection of decision criteria and the 
quantification of the relative importances of the criteria to be carried out systematically 
in a way that is auditable after the event. In case study 4 (prioritising bridge 
strengthening works) a thorough evaluation was considered imperative to build 
consensus and understanding between all stakeholder groups, and to ensure that all were 
satisfied that the funds were allocated fairly amongst their requirements. 
The identification of preferences for each outcome can be a very complex stage in the 
decision process and therefore is frequently not carried out. It is important for the 
decision-maker to consider whether there are preferences concerning the values of the 
outcomes of the decision. This allows them to be identified, evaluated and if significant 
quantified in the decision problem formulation and assessment. The only case study in 
which this was carried out was case study 4 (prioritising bridge strengthening works), 
again because of the need to satisfy all stakeholders that all risks were considered fairly. 
12.4 Can risk-based decision methods make engineering decision-making 
easier? 
The decision-making process makes engineering decision-making easier by breaking 
the decisions up into small manageable sections, each of which when considered 
individually become easier to handle and more logical to address. The decision process 
provides a checklist to help the decision maker consider all factors pertinent to the 
decision. The applicability matrices guide the decision-maker to understand the best 
approach to use to solve the decision at each stage. The decision then becomes less 
daunting and hence is made with more confidence. Each step forms a logical process 
and each step fits together with the rest. The decision-maker can then see that every 
aspect of the decision is accounted for in a logical manner. The use of the decision 
process has, therefore, been shown to make the decision-making easier to carry out, 
however, it does not necessarily make decision-making quicker to carry out. 
12.5 Can risk-based decision methods help make more rational 
engineering decisions? 
The risk-based decision process has been shown to make decision-making more rational 
by supporting the identification of all factors influencing the decision. It also ensures 
that the most suitable models are used to evaluate each relevant factor in terms of the 
required decision. The alternatives are therefore fully quantified, which means that the 
decision-maker can compare the alternatives to select the one that most fully meets the 
decision objectives. This detailed evaluation process helps the decision-maker to make 
the decision as rationally and as logically as possible. 
12.6 Can risk-based decision methods help make engineering decisions 
more auditable? 
The systematic risk-based decision process encourages consideration of everything 
important to the decision. When this process is documented at each stage to explain 
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what was considered, why and what methods of evaluation were adopted, a thorough 
history of how the decision was made and justification for the adopted solution is 
provided. Such a document is then available for future consultation, to prove the 
rationality of the decision that was made. This is a very thorough audit trail, which can 
be kept for as long as necessary to provide the explanation and justification for the 
decision, it can also serve as a basis for learning lessons in the future. 
12.7 Can risk-based decision methods help build consensus and 
ownership in engineering decisions? 
The risk-based decision process makes the decision-making transparent to all 
stakeholders who can then understand and accept the reasons for the selected options. 
The integration of stakeholder views into the decision process creates ownership from 
all parties throughout the decision process. This promotes consensus and motivates all 
parties to work together to find a workable solution and to implement it. It also 
encourages accountability in the way the consensus decision is implemented. 
12.8 When is it appropriate to use risk-based decision methods in 
engineering decision-making? 
The experience gained from applying the decision process and comparing it against 
unsupported decisions has indicated that the risk-based decision process either helped, 
or would have helped if it had been used, in all decisions studied. If the risk-based 
decision process was used in an overly prescriptive manner, it might in some situations 
hinder good decision-making and --the --time - required would often -be- prohibitive. 
However, the process is a support to all decision-making if it is used initially as a 
systematic checklist. The matrices presented in Figures 34 to 39 help the decision- 
maker to establish the level of detail required. The various levels of detail and the 
choices of methods at the different stages of the decision process bring a great deal of 
flexibility to the process and make it suitable for a very wide range of problems. The 
strength of the process lies in its ability to help the decision-maker identify and consider 
all pertinent factors and then to provide a range of models to evaluate the more complex 
stages of the process. The flexibility of this process was highlighted in the range of 
decisions evaluated in this thesis. For example, case study 1 was carried out at a very 
high, conceptual level. Case studies 2 and 3 involved very detailed reliability analysis, 
due to the severity of the risks involved. Finally, case study 4, involved very detailed 
stakeholder analysis, due to the significant stakeholder conflict. 
Each of the first four case studies was supported to varying extents by a third party 
facilitator. This had a number of effects, which helped the decision-making to be more 
thorough, more rational and more unbiased. Firstly, the decision facilitator was able to 
view the whole decision problem independently. The decision facilitator also saw the 
problem as part of the bigger picture, without the prejudices and possible blinkered 
experiences of the decision-maker. This enabled increased creativity and lateral 
thinking in terms of identifying stakeholders, alternative solutions and risks. The 
decision facilitator's experience in the use of decision analysis methods also helped in 
applying the various models within the risk-based decision process and knowing when 
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different methods of analysis were more appropriate than others. It also ensured that the 
information available was used to the best advantage. The decision facilitator, through 
experience, showed confidence in the process and its application to the problem. The 
decision facilitator, through independent unbiased views, brought confidence in the 
fairness and rationality of the decision process to all stakeholders. This encouraged 
ownership and support for the decision and motivation for its implementation. 
The risk-based decision process has been shown to provide support and guidance at 
every stage of decision-making for every type of decision considered here. The degree 
of benefit depends on the decision complexity, but the benefit is significant for all 
decisions considered as the process prompts consideration of issues and factors which 
may not otherwise be taken into account. Issues such as stakeholder influences, risks 
and multiple decision criteria that would often be pushed aside as irrelevant or difficult 
to handle can be incorporated into the decision process with clarity and fairness. The 
availability of an experienced and independent facilitator is of equal importance to 
ensure a rational and fair decision is made for all parties in decisions involving conflict. 
12.9 Contributions to Risk-based Decision-making 
The research presented in this thesis has made a significant contribution to the support 
of risk-based decision making for the management of structural assets in a number of 
areas. These are summarised schematically in Figure 43 and are discussed below. 
12.9.1 Enhancement of the decision process 
A number of shortcomings were identified in the decision processes described in the 
literature, for example, Keeney and Raiffa's decision process. These gaps included: 
" Failure to identify and involve stakeholders in the decision; 
" Not identifying and evaluating decision objectives and criteria; 
" Not accounting for preferences between criteria and decision outcomes; 
" Not evaluating the effect of important parameters on the final decision; 
" Failure to monitor and control the implementation of the decision to ensure that 
objectives are met and risks are controlled. 
A more comprehensive model was developed to address these issues. The additional 
steps are shown as shaded boxes in Figure 43. The enhanced model was used as the 
basis for applying the methods to real life decision problems. 
12.9.2 Application of the decision process to real life decision problems 
The enhanced decision process is based on a theoretical analysis of the generic decision 
making problem. The application of the process to a number of real life decision 
problems has demonstrated the usefulness of the model in practice. It has brought 
significant benefit and understanding in four very disparate case studies. Case study 5 
has, in contrast, shown the weakness of decision making without the support of a 
rational systematic process. The successful application of the proposed enhanced 
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decision process to the solution of real life decision problems, in a way that fully 
accounts for all the important issues, is a significant contribution to this field. 
12.9.3 Applicability of decision tools to real life case studies 
Within each case study analysed, it was necessary to apply appropriate tools and 
techniques at each stage in the decision process. These tools and techniques had been 
identified by the literature review, however some had been found to be more useful than 
others for different types of decision problems. The experience from the case studies 
has allowed general guidelines to be developed to help decision-makers identify the 
levels and type of analysis most appropriate to different types of decision problems. 
The guidelines have been developed in the form of applicability matrices, as shown in 
Figures 34 to 39 and are summarised in Figure 43. The guidelines mean that the 
decision-makers can readily identify the resources appropriate to any particular decision 
problem without the need for detailed analysis. 
12.9.4 Support cf risk based decision making through facilitation 
In each of the case studies, the potential benefits of third party facilitation have been 
assessed. This has been done in terms of the different roles that a facilitator might 
undertake. The roles considered here, of leader, liaison, disseminator, spokesman and 
disturbance handler, have all been found to be a significant part of decision facilitation 
and can often provide benefit if provided by an independent third party. The balance 
between these five roles within the decision process was also found to be important, as 
shown in Figure 43, to ensure the decision is not dominated by the facilitator. 
12.10 Limitations of Research 
This thesis has demonstrated the benefits that risk based decision methods can bring to 
the management of structural assets. It has not, however, exhaustively addressed every 
aspect of risk based decision making and is therefore subject to a number of limitations. 
These limitations are discussed below: 
12.10.1 Limited use of decision tools 
The literature review carried out at the start of this research identified a number of 
decision tools available to support every identified stage of the decision process. Only a 
fraction of these have been applied in the case studies as part of this research. The 
selection of appropriate tools was made for each case study based on the amount of 
information available, the timescale for the decision and the level of detail required. 
Some of these tools are well developed and provide a thorough understanding of the 
problem at that stage, such as tools for quantifying probability of failure. Other tools, 
for example, Saaty's analytic hierarchy process, were modified thoroughly as part of 
this research to make them more applicable to the problem. Because of the limited 
number of case studies, there was limited opportunity to use and evaluate some of the 
tools. Many of the tools not used within the case studies may themselves require 
similar modification to make them fully applicable. 
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Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
12.10.2 Application to limited decision types 
The case studies analysed in this research were limited by the decision opportunities 
that arose during the period of the research and only addressed evaluation type decision 
problems (i. e. where there is a finite set of possible alternatives from which to select the 
best option). The other type of decision problem, described in Chapter 2, is the design 
type, which involves the identification of an optimum solution based on an infinite set 
of alternatives. These decisions are less common in structural asset management as 
most alternatives are constrained into discrete values. 
The research presented here has also only addressed two main application areas, the 
management of bridges and the management of subsea oil and gas pipelines. Significant 
opportunity exists to expand this research into new fields, as discussed below. 
12.10.3 Applicability to real life decision problems 
The research presented in this thesis has demonstrated the applicability of the proposed 
decision methods to real life decision problems. It has also demonstrated the potentially 
significant benefits associated with the way in which decisions are evaluated and 
implemented. However, this raises the question of why these methods are not already 
being used to solve engineering decision problems today. Based on my experience 
from undertaking this research, I would suggest firstly, that the majority of decision 
methods are not familiar to engineering decision makers. When they are known, there 
is frequently a perception that the methods are difficult and time consuming to apply. 
Within the context of the case studies, this has been proven to be wrong. The successful 
implementation of a poorly evaluated decision can take much longer than would be the 
case with a well-evaluated decision. Another barrier to using these methods is the 
failure of the decision-maker to recognise the availability of alternatives. Case study 5, 
shows how there is a danger of decisions evolving without ever being formally 
identified. Often the problem can be that the decision-makers are aware of the 
procedures involved in decision analysis, but these appear to them to significant detailed 
analysis. What is needed also, therefore, is an understanding of how to carry out each 
stage to see the efficiency with which the problem can be evaluated. This is the benefit 
of the applicability matrices developed in this thesis. 
The case studies have shown that people exposed at first hand to these methods are keen 
to use them again. They have learnt the benefits brought to the decision making process 
in terms of increased confidence in the solution and consensus in its selection. A 
limitation of this research and an opportunity for further research, is the evaluation of 
both the learning process and the cultural change that an organisation has to undergo in 
order to introduce these methods as a standard tool in decision making. It is my belief 
that those exposed to these techniques in this research will be ambassadors for them in 
their companies and look for opportunities to use them again in the future. 
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12.11 Recommended Areas for Further Work 
The limitations identified in this work above, provide a number of opportunities for 
further work to be carried out. These will be summarised here. 
12.11.1 Recommended further development of tools 
A number of the available tools lack efficiency, either in terms of ease of use or in terms 
of thoroughness. These are predominantly the identification tools. These tools are 
currently limited in effectiveness by the limited vision of the decision group as they all 
rely on brainstorming type methods. The success of these stages of the decision process 
relies entirely on the underlying knowledge of the decision group and its ability to 
conceptualise the problem and see what might happen. For example, tools for 
identifying viable alternatives are basically brainstorming based methods that rely on 
the creativity of the decision group and its capacity for lateral thinking. This makes it 
likely, especially in novel areas or with an uninspired decision group, that potentially 
good alternatives could be missed. The development of a knowledge based 
brainstorming tool could support the identification of experience, learning from 
experience and support the brainstorming of alternatives based on these. Such a tool 
could additionally use generic creativity and lateral thinking techniques. This could 
support the generation of a more thorough set of alternatives on more informed basis. 
The other type of tools which would benefit from further development are risk 
identification tools. Current methods such as FMECAs (Failure Modes and Effects 
Criticality Analysis), HAZIDS (Hazard Identification Studies) and HAZOPS (Hazard 
and Operability Studies) are based on brainstorming techniques. The success in 
identifying all risks is dependent on the experience and expertise of the analysts 
involved. These tools would benefit from further development in order to introduce an 
element of knowledge and learning as well as creativity and lateral thinking. 
The third area in which there is opportunity to develop further tools is in the 
identification of preferences for different outcomes. This very complex and time- 
consuming stage is frequently neglected as not being worth the required effort. The 
method of multi attribute utility theory proposed by Keeney and Raiffa [23] is the most 
widely known method but also the most time consuming and difficult to evaluate. The 
simplified version of this developed by Edwards [109] is more straightforward to apply 
but there is still a gap between the theories and the practicality of using them. Further 
work should therefore be carried out to make these methods even more straightforward 
to use, to require less demanding quantified comparisons and less time to evaluate. This 
could be used to determine when such evaluations would bring benefit to the decision- 
making process and when they would not. 
Finally, at a slightly higher level, there is the potential for the whole risk-based decision 
process to be converted in to a computer-based diagnostic tool itself. This tool would 
not make the decisions on behalf of the decision maker. This was stated very early on 
in the thesis not to be the purpose of decision analysis. However, through a series of 
questions and check boxes, a diagnostic tool could guide the decision maker through the 
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risk-based decision process, to help identify the 
level of analysis required at each stage 
and select the most appropriate tools to support each stage. This 
is a step on from the 
idea of using the process as a checklist and incorporates the recommendations 
encompassed in the applicability matrices presented 
in the discussion. Such a 
computer-based diagnostic could help make the risk-based decision process more 
attractive and easier to use in a wider range of decision problems. 
12.11.2 Recommended further application areas 
As already stated, the research presented in this thesis has only addressed evaluation 
type decision problems. A further extension to the research would be to apply the 
methods to design type decisions. These decisions would not fit directly into the risk- 
based decision process presented here due to the iterative optimisation process usually 
adopted to solve these problems. The decision process would, however, serve as a 
valuable checklist to ensure all factors were accounted for, but might have to be 
modified further if it was to support these decisions at a more detailed level. 
The research could also be expanded to address similar problems of high cost, high risk 
and high stakeholder values in many different application areas, which could also 
benefit from this work. For example, high value high profile construction projects such . 
as the Millennium dome and the London Eye raise a large number of stakeholder issues, 
but also involve significant project and design risk. Applying these methods to these 
decisions would ensure all stakeholders and all risks were accounted for and provide an 
audit trail of the whole project to prove the rationality of the decisions. This is 
obviously of further benefit for projects that also have a high political profile. 
Another high risk, high cost, high profile application area, although not involving risk 
of structural failure in the engineering sense, is the area of large IT projects. Again, 
these projects involve significant project and design risks and a large number of 
significant stakeholder issues, especially if these projects are for government 
departments or large utility providers. 
There are many areas of potential application for these risk-based decision methods. In 
all areas of life and business difficult decisions impacting on varying groups of 
stakeholders have to be made under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Although the 
types of risks may vary together with the methods for quantifying them, the risk-based 
decision process presented here can provide support in order to ensure fairer, more 
rational and more auditable decisions. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 240 CONCLUSIONS 










1 UKOOA. Industry issues: Piper Alpha. 
http: //www. ukooa. co. uk/issues/PiperAlpha/v0000864. htm. (13th December 1999). 
2 Shell Expro. Brent Spar homepage. 
http: //www. shellexpro. brentspar. com/shell/brentspar/home. html. (13`h December 
1999). 
3 BBC Education. Disaster: The Challenger shuttle. 
http: //www. bbc. co. uk/education/archive/disaster/challeng. shtml. (13th December 
1999). 
4 Smith, N. J. (ed. ) (1996). Engineering project management. ment. Blackwell Science. 
5 Edwards, C., Ward, J. and Bytheway, A. (1995). The essence of information 
2nd Edition. Prentice Hall, Hemel Hempstead. systems. 
6 The Royal Society (1992). Risk: analysis, perception and management. The Royal 
Society, London. 
7 Belton, V. (1990). Multiple criteria decision analysis - practically the only way 
to choose. In: Hendry, L. C. and Eglese, R. W. (eds), Operational research tutorial 
papers. Operational Research Society. 
8 Goodwin, P. and Wright, G. (1991). Decision analysis for managerial iudgement. 
John Wiley and Sons, Chichester. 
9 Simon, H. (1957). Administrative Behaviour. Macmillan. 
10 Dearborn, D. C. and Simon, H. A. (1958). Selective perception: The 
identifications of executives. Sociometry, vol. 21,140-144. 
11 Maslow, A. H. (1970). A Theory of human motivation. In: Vroom, V. H. and 
Deci, E. I. (eds. ), Management and motivation, Penguin. 
12 Bern, D. J. (1970). Beliefs, attitudes and human affairs. Brooks-Cole. 
13 England, G. W. (1967). Personal value systems of American managers. 
Academy of management journal. March 1967, p54. 
14 Lindsay, P. H. and Norman, D. A. (1972). Human information processing. 
Academic press. 
15 Lee, W. (1971). Decision theory and human behaviour. John Wiley & Sons, New 
York. 
16 Marshall, A. (1920). The principles of economics: An introductory volume, 8th 
Edition. Macmillan, London. 
17 Ramsey, F. P. (1931). The foundations of mathematics. Harcourt Brace, New 
York. 
18 Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of games and economic 
behaviour. Princeton University. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 241 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
19 Mosteller, F. and Nogee, P. (1951). An experimental measurement of utility. 
Journal of political economy, vol. 51,371-404. 
20 Davidson, D., Suppes, P. and Siegel, S. (1957). Decision-making: An 
experimental approach. Stanford University, California. 
21 Friedman, M. and Savage, L. J. (1948). The utility analysis of choices involving 
risk. Journal of political economy, 279-304. 
22 Raiffa, H. (1968). Decision analysis: Introductory lectures on choices under 
uncertainty. Addison Wesley. 
23 Keeney, R. L. and Raiffa, H. (1976). Decisions with multiple objectives: 
preferences and value trade-offs. John Wiley and Sons. 
24 Clemen, R. T. (1991). Making hard decisions. PWS-Kent Publishing Company. 
25 Brams, S. J. and Kilgour, D. M. (1988). Game theory and national security. 
Blackwell. 
26 Haywood, O. G., Jr. (1954). Military decision and game theory. Operations 
research, no. 2,365-385. 
27 Ravid, I. (1990). Military decision, game theory and intelligence: An anecdote. 
Operations research, vol. 38, no. 2,260-264. 
28 Royal Military College of Science (1997). A military appreciation. In: Decision 
analysis course notes, Department of Applied Mathematics and Operational 
Research, School of Defence Management, RMCS. 
29 Coyle, R. G. (1989). A mission orientated approach to defence planning. 
Defense analysis, vol. 5, no. 4,353-367. 
30 Krishnakumar, K. (1992). Genetic algorithms: An introduction and an 
overview of their capabilities. AIAA guidance navigation and control 
conference, Report no. AIAA-92-4462-CP, 728-738. 
31 Goldberg, D. E. (1989). Genetic_ algorithms in search, optimisation and machine 
learning. Addison Wesley Publishing Co. 
32 Callahan, K. J. and Weeks, G. E. (1992). Optimum design of composite 
laminates using genetic algorithms. Composite en ineering, vol. 2, no. 3,149- 
160. 
33 Frank, M. V. (1990). Deciding among risk reduction measures in the face of 
uncertainty. AIAA space programs and technologies conference, AIAA 90-3878, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 
34 Bath, U. et. al. (1995). Pilot methods, integration of methods of task 3.1 with 
tasks 3.2 and 3.3. BRITE-BE 5935 Report TEC-T3 4 01. 
35 Holst, 0., Sorensen, B. (1984). Combined scheduling and maintenance 
planning for an aircraft fleet. Operational research '84.474-486, Elsevier 
Science. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 242 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
36 Lee, K. R. and Reno, R. W. (1978). Aircraft maintenance scheduling. 
AGIFORS symposium proceedings, vol. 18,235-256. 
37 Konig, P. (1976). Short-term aircraft assignment. AGIFORS symposium, vol. 
16,165-193. 
38 Dekker, R. (1996). Applications of maintenance optimisation: A review and 
analysis, Reliabili engineering and systems safety, no. 51,229-240. 
39 Barlow, R. E. and Proschan, F. (1965). Mathematical theory of reliability. John 
Wiley, New York. 
40 McCall, J. J. (1965). Maintenance policy for stochastically failing equipment: 
A survey. Management science, no. 11,493-524. 
41 Mayer, R. RE. (1960). Problems in the application of replacement theory. 
Management science, no. 6.. 303-3 10. 
42 Turban, E. (1967). The use of mathematical models in plant maintenance 
decision-making. Management science, no. 13,342-358. 
43 Davidson, D. (1970). An overhaul policy for deteriorating equipment. In: 
Jardine, A. (ed), Operational research in maintenance. Manchester University 
Press. 
44 Mahon, B. H. and Bailey, R. J. M. (1975). A proposed improved replacement 
policy for army vehicles. Operations research quarterly, no. 26,477-494. 
45 Pierskalla, W. P. and Voelker, J. A. (1979). A survey of maintenance models: 
The control and surveillance of deteriorating systems. Naval research logistics 
uarterl , no. 23,353-388. 
46 Anderson, R. T. and Neri, L. (1990). Reliability centred maintenance. 
management and engineering methods. Elsevier Science, London. 
47 Vatn, J., Hokstad, P. and Bodsberg, L. (1996). An overall model for 
maintenance optimisation. Reliabili engineering and system safety, no. 51, 
241-257. Elsevier Science. 
48 Vesely, W. E., Belhadj, M. and Rezos, J. T. (1994). PRA importance measures 
for maintenance prioritisation applications. Reliabili , engineering and system 
safety, no. 43,307-318. Elsevier Science. 
49 Gore, B. F., Vo, T. V. and Simonen, F. A. (1989). Development of risk-based 
inspection guidance. 1989 winter annual meeting of the american society of 
mechanical engineers, 115-120. ASME. 
50 Hontelez, J. A. M., Burger, H. H. and Wijnmalen, D. J. D. (1996). Optimum 
condition-based maintenance policies for deteriorating systems with partial 
information. Reliability engineering and system safety, no. 51,267-274. Elsevier 
Science. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 243 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
51 Legat, V., Zaludova, H., Cervenka, V. and Jurca, V. (1996). Contribution to 
optimisation of preventive replacement. Reliability engineering and system 
safely, no. 51,259-266. Elsevier Science. 
52 Aven, T. (1996). Condition based replacement policies -A counting process 
approach. Reliability engineering and system safe, no. 51,275-281. Elsevier 
Science. 
53 Dekker, R., Smit, A. and van Rijn, C. (1994). Mathematical models for the 
optimisation of maintenance and their application in practice. Maintenance, 
no. 9,22-26. 
54 Fand, F., Johnston, D. W., Rihani, B. S. and Chen, C. J. (1994a). Feasibility of 
incremental benefit-cost analysis for optimal budget allocation in bridge 
management systems. Transportation research record no. 1442: Maintenance of 
highway infrastructure, 77-87. National Academy Press, USA. 
55 Farid, F., Johnston, D. W., Laverde, M. A. and Chen, C. J. (1994). Application of 
incremental benefit-cost analysis for optimal budget allocation to 
maintenance, rehabilitation and replacement of bridges. Transportation 
research record no. 1442: Maintenance of highway infrastructure, 88-100, 
National Academy Press, USA. 
56 Augusti, G., Borri, A. and Ciampoli, M. (1992). Optimal allocation of resources 
in repair and maintenance of bridge structures. Proceedings of the 6th ASCE 
speciality conference on probabilistic mechanics, and structural and geotechnical 
reliabili . 
57 Weissmann, J., Harrison, R., Burns, N. H. and Hudson, W. R. (1990). Selecting 
rehabilitation and replacement bridge projects. In: Maupin Jr., G., Brown, B. 
and Lichtenstein, A. (eds), Extending the life of bridges, ASTM STP 1100,3-17, 
ASTM, USA. 
58 Thoft-Christensen, P. (1993). Reliability-based expert systems for optimal 
maintenance of concrete bridges. Proceedings of the symposium on structural 
engineering in natural hazards mitigation. 1053-1058, ASCE, USA. 
59 Lindley, D. V. (1976). Introduction to probability and statistics from a Bavesian 
viewpoint, vol. 1 and 2, Cambridge University Press. 
60 Sommer, A. M., Nowak, A. S. and Thoft-Christensen,. P. (1993). Probability 
based bridge inspection strategy. Journal of structural engineering, vol. 119, no. 
12,3520-3535, ASCE, USA. 
61 Cesare, M.; Santamarina, J. C.; Turkstra, C. J.; Vanmarcke, E.; (1992). Modelling 
bridge deterioration with Markov chains. ASCE journal of transportation 
engineering, vol. 118, no. 6,820-833, ASCE. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 244 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
62 Cesare, M.; Santamarina, J. C.; Turkstra, C. J.; Vanmarcke, E., (1993). Risk- 
based bridge management. Journal of transportation engineering, vol. 119, no. 5, 
ASCE. 
63 Cesare, M.; Santamarina, J. C.; Turkstra, C. J.; Vanmarcke, E., (1994). Risk- 
based bridge management: Optimisation and inspection scheduling. Canadian 
journal of civil engineering, vol. 21, no. 6,897-902. 
64 Frangopol, D. M. and Estes, A. C. (1997). Lifetime bridge maintenance 
strategies based on system reliability. Structural engineering international, no. 
3,193-198. 
65 American Petroleum Institute (1993). Recommended practice for planning. 
designing and constructing fixed offshore platforms. API RP2A, 20th ed., API. 
66 Banon, H. (1994). Assessing fitness for purpose of offshore platforms. II: Risk 
management, maintenance and repair. Journal of structural engineering, vol. 
120, no. 12,3613-3633. ASCE, USA. 
67 Wirsching, P. H. and Torng, Y. (1989). Optimal strategies for design, 
inspection and repair of fatigue sensitive structural systems using risk-based 
economics. Proceedings of the 5th international conference on structural safety 
and reliability, ICOSSAR'89,2107-2114. 
68 Harris, D. O. (1992). Probabilistic fracture mechanics with application to 
inspection planning and design, Reliability Technology, AD vol. 28,57-76, 
ASME, USA. 
69 Jiao, G. (1992). Reliability analysis of crack growth with inspection planning. 
Proceedings of the symposium on offshore mechanics and arctic engineering, 
OMAE'92, vol. II, 227-235, ASME, USA. 
70 Tanaka, H. and Toyoda-Makino, M. (1998). Cost-based optimal relation 
between inspection time and assessment time for random fatigue crack 
growth. Probabilistic engineering mechanics, vol. 13, no. 2,69-76. Elsevier 
Science. 
71 Platform Reliability Inspection Scheduling & Maintenance Ltd. (1994). RISC - 
reliability based inspection scheduling for fixed offshore platforms: A 
knowledge based system incorporating reliability based inspection planning 
methods, Promotion of energy technologies for europe, no. 187, CEC, Brussels. 
72 Dharmavasan, S., Peers, S. M. C., Faber, M. H., Dijkstra, 0. D., Cervetto, D. and 
Manfredi, E. (1994). Reliability based inspection scheduling for fixed offshore 
structures. Proceedings of the symposium on offshore mechanics and arctic 
en ing eering, OMAE'94, vol. II, 227-235, ASME, USA. 
73 Faber, M. H., Dharmavasan, S. and Dijkstra, 0. D. (1994). Integrated analysis 
methodology for reassessment and maintenance of offshore structures. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 245 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
Proceedings of the symposium on offshore mechanics and arctic engineering, 
OMAE'94, vol. II, 237-244, ASME, USA. 
74 Dijkstra, O. D., van Foeken, R. J. and Dharmavasan, S. (1994). Fracture 
mechanics limit states for assessment and maintenance planning of offshore 
structures. Proceedings of the symposium on offshore mechanics and arctic 
engineering, OMAE'94, vol. II, 245-252, ASME, USA. 
75 Goyet, J., Faber, M. H., Paygnard, J. -C. and Maroini, A. (1994). Optimal 
inspection and repair planning: case studies using IMREL software. 
Proceedings of the symposium on offshore mechanics and arctic engineering, 
OMAE '94, vol. II, 325-333, ASME, USA. 
76 Enevoldsen, I. and Sorensen, J. D. (1994). Reliability-based optimisation in 
structural engineering, Structural Safety, no. 15,169-196. Elsevier Science. 
77 Faber, M. H., Kroon, I. B. and Sorensen, J. D. (1996). Sensitivities in structural 
maintenance planning, Reliability engineering and system safety, no. 51,317- 
329. Elsevier Science. 
78 Kiefner, J. F., Vieth, P. H., Orban, J. E. and Feder, P. I. (1990). Methods for 
prioritisinpipeline maintenance and rehabilitation. American Gas Association. 
79 Muhlbauer, W. K. (1992). Pipeline risk management manual. Gulf Publishing 
Company, Texas. 
80 Concord Environmental Corporation (1993). Risk assessment techniques for 
pipeline systems, prepared for the Pipeline Environmental Committee of the 
Canadian Association of Pipeline Producers, Calgary, Canada. 
81 Hill, R. T. (1992). Pipeline risk analysis. Institute of chemical engineers 
symposium series, no. 130,637-670. 
82 Urednicek, M., Coote, R. I. and Coutts, R. (1992). Optimising rehabilitation 
process with risk assessment and inspection. Proceedings of the international 
conference on pipeline reliability, Calgary, 11-12-1 to 11-12-14. 
83 Kirkwood, M. G. and Karam, M. (1995). Priority rating scheme guides 
maintenance, rehab decisions. Pipeline and gas industry, July 1995,21-28. 
84 Nessim, M. A. and Stephens, M. J (1995). Risk-based optimisation of pipeline 
integrity maintenance. Proceedings of the symposium on offshore mechanics 
and arctic en ineering, OMAE'95, vol. V, 303-314, ASME, USA. 
85 Cooke, S. and Slack, N. (1984). Making management decisions. Prentice Hall. 
86 Von Winterfeldt, D. and Edwards, W. (1986). Decision analysis and behavioural 
research. Cambridge University Press. 
87 Belton, V. and Pictet, J. (1996). A framework for group decision using a MCDA 
model: Sharing, aggregating or comparing individual information. University of 
Caroline M Roberts Page 246 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
Strathclyde, Glasgow, Management Science, Theory, Method and Practice 
Working paper 96/16. 
88 De Bono, E. (1982). De Bono's thinking course. Pitman Press. 
89 Gardiner, P. C. (1977). Decision spaces. IEEE transactions on systems, man and 
cybernetics, vol. SMC-7, no. 5, May 1977. 
90 Walker, W. (1988). Generating and screening alternatives. In: Miser, H. and 
Quade, E. (eds), Handbook of systems analysis: Craft issues and procedural 
choices. Wiley. 
91 Gescha, H., Schaude, G. R. and Schicksupp, H. (1973). Modern techniques for 
solving problems. Journal of Chemical Engineering,, August 1973. 
92 Pearl, J. (1977). A framework for processing value judgements. IEEE 
transactions on systems, man and cybernetics, vol. 7,349-354. 
93 Friend, J. and Hickling, A. (1987). Planning under pressure. Pergammon Press. 
94 Howard, N. (1971). Paradoxes of rationality: Theory of metagames. MIT Press, 
London. 
95 Bennett, P. G. and Huxham, C. S. (1982). Hypergames and what they do: A soft 
`OR Approach'. Journal of the operational research society, 33,41-50. 
96 Rosenhead, J. (ed) (1989). Rational analysis for a problematic world. Wiley. 
97 Howard, R. A. (1988). Decision analysis: Practice and promise. Management 
science, 34,679-695. 
98 Waters, C. D. J. (1989). A practical introduction to management science. Addison 
Wesley Publishing. 
99 Hauge, I. H. and Wright, J. F (1995). A multi-criteria risk management model. 
46th international astronautical congress, 2-6 October 1995, Oslo Norway. 
International astronautical federation report IAF-95-IAA. 6.2.06. 
100 Saaty, T. L. (1990). How to make a decision: The analytic hierarchy process. 
European journal of operational research, vol. 48,9-26. 
101 Luce, R. D. and Raiff a, H. (1957). Games and decisions. Wiley, New York. 
102 Hertz, D. B. (1964). Risk analysis in capital investment. Harvard business 
review. Jan/Feb 1964,95-106. 
103 Melchers, R. E. (1987). Structural reliability analysis and prediction. John Wiley 
and Sons. 
104 Thoft-Christensen, P. and Baker, M. J. (1982). Structural reliability theory and its 
applications. Springer Verlag, Germany. 
105 Ditlevsen, O. and Madsen, H. O. (1996). Structural reliability methods. John 
Wiley and Sons. 
106 RCP GmbH (1997). SYSREL - Structural systems reliability analysis software. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 247 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
107 Benjamin, J. R. and Cornell, C. A. (1970). Probability, statistics and decision for 
civil engineers. McGraw-Hill. 
108 Shetty, N. K., Chubb, M. S. and Halden, D. (1996). An overall risk-based 
assessment procedure for substandard bridges. In: International symposium on 
safe of bridges, Institution of Civil Engineers, London. 
109 Edwards, W. (1977). How to use multi-attribute utility measurement for social 
decision-making. IEEE transactions on systems, man and cybernetics, vol. SMC- 
7, no. 5, May 1977. 
110 Lagreze, E. J. and Shakun, M. F. (1984). Decision support systems for semi- 
structured buying decisions. European journal of operational research, no. 16, 
48-58. 
111 Rohrbaugh, J. and Wehr, P. (1978). Judgement analysis in policy formulation: 
A new method for improving public participation. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
no 43,521-532. 
112 Roy, B. (1973). How outranking helps multiple criteria decision-making. In: 
Cochrane, J. L. and Zeleny, M. (eds), Multiple criteria decision-making, 
University of South Carolina Press. 
113 Roy, B. and Hugonnard, J. C. (1982). Ranking of suburban line extension 
projects on the Paris metro by a multi-criteria method. Transportation 
research, no. 16A, 301-312. 
114 Brans, J. P., Mareschal, B. and Vincke, P. H. (1986). How to select and how to 
rank projects: The PROMETHEE method. European journal of operational 
research, no. 24,228-238. 
115 Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of 
chances. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Societv, vol. 53,370-418. 
116 Howard, R. A. (1970). Risk preference. In: Howard, R. A. and Matheson, J. E. 
(eds), Readings on the principles and applications of decision analysis, Vol. 2: 
Professional Collection. Strategic Decisions Group 1984, USA. 
117 Adams, E. W. (1960). Survey of Bernoullian utility theory. In Solomon, H. (ed), 
Mathematical thinking in the measurement of behaviour. The Free Press. 
118 Wald, A. (1950). Statistical decision functions. Wiley, New York. 
119 Savage, L. J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. Wiley, New York. 
120 Laplace, P. S. (1951). A philosophical essay on probabilities. Dover, New York. 
121 Hausner, M. (1954). Multidimensional utilities. In: Thrall, R. N., Coombs, C. H. 
and Davis, R. L. (eds), Decision processes, 167-180, Wiley, New York. 
122 Ingersoll, J. E. (1987). Theory of financial decision-making. Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 248 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
123 UKOOA, (1998). A framework for risk related decision support. A draft report 
by the united kingdom offshore operators association, August, 1998. 
124 Highways Agency, (1995). BD44/95, The assessment of concrete highways 
bridges and structures. Design manual for roads and bridges. Vol 3b: Hi hg, ways 
structures inspection and maintenance. section 4: Assessment. Part 14. HMSO. 
125 Kennedy-Reid, I. L. (1996). Motorway viaducts - risk-based strategy: Discussion 
document'on bond. WSA ref.: AU2225/15/064/2/D1. 
126 Martin, H., Rausen, A., Schiessl, P. (1975). Carbonation of concrete made with 
different types of cement. Colloquium on the behaviour in service of concrete 
structures, Liege. 
127 Klopfer, H. (1981). The carbonation of external concrete and how to combat 
it. One day conference on the repair of concrete structures, Imperial College, 
London. 
128 Parrott, L. J. (1987). A review of carbonation in reinforced concrete. Cement 
and concrete association & building research station, UK. 
129 Mallett, G. P. (1994). Repair of concrete bridges: A state-of-the-art review. 
Thomas Telford, UK 
130 Wood, J. G. M. (1990). Predicting future decay in concrete structures. In: 
Somerville, G. (ed. ), Colloquium on the design life of structures, Blackie, 
Glasgow, UK. 
131 Cady, P. D., Weyers, R., E. (1992). Predicting service life of concrete bridge 
decks subject to reinforcement corrosion. In: Chaker, V. (ed. ), ASTM STP 
1137: Corrosion forms and control for infrastructure. p328-338, ASTM, 
Philadelphia, USA. 
132 Somerville, G. (1986). The design life of concrete structures. The structural 
engineer, Vol. 64A, No. 2, Feb 1986, p 60-71, Institution of Structural Engineers. 
133 Rostam, S., Geiker, M. (1993). Prediction of residual service life: conversion from 
theory to practical engineering. COWlconsult, Denmark. 
134 Skaarup, J., de Fontenay, C. (1987). The influence of exposure conditions on 
the rate of carbonation of different concretes in Bahrain. 2nd international 
conference on deterioration and repair of reinforced concrete in the Arabian Gulf, 
October, 1987. 
135 Pocock, D. C., Gibbs, B. (1986). Diagnosis, prevention and repair of 
deterioration in concrete bridges - an overview. Sino-British highways and 
urban traffic conference, Beijing, Institution of Highways and Transportation. 
136 Thoft-Christensen, P., Jensen, F. M., Middleton, C. R., Blackmore, A. (1996). 
Revised rules for concrete bridges. International symposium on the safety of 
Caroline M Roberts Page 249 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
bridges: flexibility, risks and options in design, assessment & management, 4-5 
July, 1996, Thomas Telford, London. 
137 Miyagawa, T. (1991). Durability design and repair of concrete structures: 
chloride corrosion of reinforcing steel and alkali-aggregate reaction. 
Magazine of concrete research, Vol. 43, No. 156, Sept 1991, p 155-170. 
138 Rodriguez, J., Ortega, L. M., Casal, J., Diez, J. M. (1996). Assessing structural 
conditions of concrete structures with corroded reinforcement. In: Dhir, R. 
K., Jones, M. R. (eds. ) Concrete repair. rehabilitation and protection, E& FN 
Spon, London. 
139 Wood, J. G. M. (1996). Durability design: Applying data from materials 
research and deteriorated structures. In: Harding, J. E., Parke, G. A. R., Ryall, 
M. J. (eds. ) Proceedings of the 3rd international conferefence on bridge 
management. p 723-731, E and FN Spon, London, UK. 
140 Wood, J. G. M., Wilson, J. R., Leek, D. S. (1989). Improved testing for chloride 
ingress resistance of concretes and relation of results to calculated behaviour. 
3rd international conference on deterioration and repair of reinforced concrete in 
the Arabian Gulf, October, 1989. 
141 Chatterji, S. (1995). On the applicability of Fick's second law to chloride ion 
migration through portland cement concrete. Cement and concrete research, 
Vol. 25, No. 2, p 299-303, Elsevier Science Ltd. 
142 Gonzalez, J. A., Andrade, C., Alonso, C., Feliu, S. (1995). Comparison of rates 
of general corrosion and maximum pitting penetration on concrete 
embedded steel reinforcement. Cement and concrete research, Vol. 25, No. 2, p 
257-264, Elsevier Science Ltd. 
143 G. Maunsell and Partners (1996). Motorway viaducts - reliability-based repair 
strategy: deterioration modelling framework document. 
144 Cooper, D. I. (1996). Interim short span bridge assessment loading: Appendix 
1: Amendments to BD 21/93: Preliminary draft proposals. In: International 
symposium on safely of bridges, Institution of Civil Engineers, London. 
145 Kennedy, D. J. L. et al (1992). Canadian highway bridge evaluation: load and 
resistance factors. Canadian journal of civil engineering, Vol. 19. 
146 Joint Committee on Structural Safety (1996). Eurocode random variables 
project. JCSS Working Document, Confidential. 
147 Madsen, H. 0., Krenk, S. and Lind, N. C. (1986). Methods of structural safety. 
Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 
148 RCP GmbH (1994). STRUREL: A structural reliability analysis program. Version 
4.2, Copyright RCP GmbH, Germany. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 250 REFERENCES 
Risk-based Decision-making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
149 Menzies, J. B. (1997). Bridge failures, hazards and societal risk. In: Das, P. 
(ed. ), Safety of Bridges, Thomas Telford, London. 
150 Shetty, N. K. (1997). Motorway viaducts - risk-based repair strategy: 
Methodology for level 5 assessment. WS Atkins AST/AU2766/Level 5, 
Confidential. 
151 Chryssanthopoulos, M. K., Micic, T. V. And Manzocchi, G. M. (1997). 
Reliability evaluation of short span bridges. Das, P. (ed. ), Safety of bridges, 
Thomas Telford, London. 
152 Department of Transport (1984). The assessment of highway bridges and 
structures. Departmental standard BD21/84, HMSO London. 
153 Nordic Committee on Building Regulations (1978). Recommendations for 
loading and safety regulations for structural design. NKB report no. 36. 
154 Allen, D. E. (1992). Canadian highway bridge evaluation index. Canadian 
journal of civil engineering, Vol. 19. 
155 de Waard, C., Lotz, U. and Dugstad, A. (1995). Influence of liquid flow velocity 
on CO2 corrosion: a semi-empirical model. NACE Corrosion 95. Paper no. 128. 
156 de Waard, C. and Lotz, U. (1993). Prediction of CO2 corrosion of carbon steel. 
NACE Corrosion 93, Paper No. 69. 
157 NORSOK (1998). NORSOK M-506. CO, corrosion rate model, Version 2.1, 
May 1998. 
158 Rosenfeld, M. J., Kiefner, J. F. (1995). Proposed fitness-for-purpose appendix to 
the ASME B31.8 code for pressure piping - Section B31.8: Gas transmission and 
distribution systems, Kiefner and Associates, Worthington, Ohio, Jan. 1995. 
159 Royal Military College of Science (1997). Formalising subjective judgements, 
In: Decision analysis course notes. Note 285. Department of Applied Mathematics 
and Operational Research, School of Defence Management. 
160 Health and Safety Executive (1993). Quantified risk assessment: Its input to 
decision-making, HMSO, London. 
161 Handy, C. B. (1985). Understanding organisations, 3rd Edition, Penguin Business. 
162 Mintzberg, H. (1973). The nature of managerial work. Harper and Row. 
Caroline M Roberts Page 251 REFERENCES 
Risk Based Decision Making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
APPENDICES 
LIST OF APPENDICES 1 
APPENDIX 1 REVIEW OF DESIGN TYPE DECISION MAKING ..................... 
2 
A1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 2 
A1.2 Identify viable alternatives .................................................................................................... 2 
A1.3 Formulate decision objectives and criteria ... » ..................................................................... 2 
A1.4 Utility/Value Analysis ............................................................................... »........................... 2 
A1.5 Selection of "best" alternative ................................................................................................ 2 
APPENDIX 2 DETAILED DECISION TREES USED FOR EVALUATING CASE 
STUDY 1 .................................................................................................... 
4 
APPENDIX 3A SUMMARY OF THE COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE OF 
FORM/SORM METHODS ................................................................................ 14 
APPENDIX 4 GRAPHS SHOWING THE SENSITIVITY RESULTS FOR EACH 
FAILURE MODE. (CASE STUDY 2) ................................................................ 
17 
A4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 17 
A4.2 Flexure Limit State ................................................................................................................ 17 
A4.3 Shear Limit State ................................................................................................................... 23 
A4.4 Bond Limit State ................................................................................................................... 17 
APPENDIX 5 INTERVIEW RESPONSE SHEET FOR DERIVING CRITERION 
WEIGHTS IN CASE STUDY 4 ......................................................................... 
34 
A5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 34 
A5.2 The Main Criteria for Prioritisation .................................................................................. 34 
A5.3 The Sub-Criteria for Calculating the Main Criteria ......................................................... 35 
A5.4 Evaluating Sub-Criteria Relative Weights .......................................................................... 37 
A5.5 Evaluating the Relative Weights of the Main Criteria ...................................................... 40 
A5.6 What Next .............................................................................................................................. 44 
APPENDIX 6 MATHCAD SPREADSHEETS FOR EVALUATION OF 
WEIGHTINGS IN CASE STUDY 4 ................................................................... 45 
APPENDIX 7 OUTLINE OF THE INTERVIEW USED IN CASE STUDY 5 ..... 48 
A7.1 Interview Approach ....................................... ....... ....................... ........................................ 48 
A7.2 Interview Questions Concerning Specific Project Experience .......................................... 48 




Caroline M Roberts Page Al LIST OF APPENDICES 
Risk Based Decision Making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
APPENDIX 1 REVIEW OF DESIGN TYPE DECISION MAKING 
A1.1 Introduction 
Design type decision problems are concerned with identifying the preferred alternative 
from a potentially infinite set of alternatives defined by a set of constraints. This is 
"Multiple Objective Decision Making" and is usually solved by mathematical 
programming. 
A 1.2 Identify viable alternatives 
In design type decision problems, even if the alternatives are not immediately obvious 
when the decision is defined, it is still straightforward to identify all possible 
alternatives, simply due to the way the mathematical programming solves the problem. 
A 1.3 Formulate decision objectives and criteria 
For design type decision problems, it is likely that decision objectives and criteria will 
be known, and these will be used in mathematical programming to define the possible 
decision alternatives. If, however, the decision criteria are not known, but the objectives 
are, then the criteria will have to be defined based on achieving the decision objectives. 
A1.4 Utility/Value Analysis 
Design type decision problems differ from evaluation type problems in that the 
alternatives are not defined explicitly, but implicitly by constraints. Most methods used 
to solve these problems involve mathematical programming. Multiple objective 
programming and Goal programming are the most widely used approaches. Objective 
functions are defined according to the objectives and preferences of the decision maker, 
for example to minimise cost, maximise capacity, etc. These objective functions are 
then optimised according to the constraints. If required, penalty functions can be 
defined instead of constraints, where alternatives can only exceed certain criteria values 
at a cost. 
A 1.5 Selection of "best" alternative 
Objective functions created within design type decision problems are usually solved 
with calculus-based methods to find local extrema in the non-linear equations resulting 
from setting the objective function gradient to zero. However, this approach is not 
entirely robust as the optima sought are the best in the current point's neighbourhood. If 
the search starts in the wrong place, it could miss the main peak and converge on a 
lower peak. The search can be randomly restarted to improve the solution however this 
is still unreliable. 
Enumerative search methods consider individual objective function values at each point. 
This is a very simple method unlikely to miss an optima, however, it is very inefficient. 
A third and very popular method is random search, yet these are hardly more efficient 
than enumerative methods, if the final result requires a reasonable level of confidence. 
A more successful type of random choice is the use of genetic algorithms [1,2]. These 
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are search algorithms based on natural selection mechanics and natural genetics. They 
combine survival of the fittest with a structured yet randomised search algorithm. In 
every iteration, a new set of alternatives is generated using the fittest parts of the old set 
and adding occasionally a new part. They efficiently exploit historical information to 
speculate on new search points with expected improved performance. 
Interactive methods have also been developed to take the decision maker "on a tour" of 
non dominated alternatives. At each stage, the decision maker identifies preferences 
until the most preferred alternative is identified. 
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APPENDIX 2 DETAILED DECISION TREES USED FOR 
EVALUATING CASE STUDY 1 
Page 
1. Evaluation of production risers option 1(too large and cumbersome to be included) 
2. Evaluation of production risers option 2 A5 
3. Evaluation of gas lift risers option 1 A6 
4. Evaluation of gas lift risers option 2 A8 
5. Evaluation of dynamic umbilicals option 1 A9 
6. Evaluation of dynamic umbilicals option 2 Al 1 
7. Evaluation of flowline umbilical options 1,2 and 3 A12 
8. Evaluation of structures options 1 and 2 A13 
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APPENDIX 3A SUMMARY OF THE COMPUTATIONAL 
PROCEDURE OF FORM/SORM METHODS 
In order to assess the reliability of a structural component, a limit-state or a set of limit- 
states is identified which determine the performance of the component. These limit-states 
could be either ultimate limit-states or serviceability limit-states. For each limit-state a 
reliability analysis is carried out to determine the probability that this limit-state will not be 
reached. The reliability of the structural component is then defined as the probability that 
none of the limit-states will be reached within the specified service life of the structure. 
Reliability formulation for a single limit-state (sometimes referred to as a "failure 
element") of a component is presented below. 
The first step in a reliability analysis is to identify a set of basic random (or uncertain) 
variables that influence the failure mode or limit-state under consideration. Let in the 
following X= (X1, X2, ..., X) represent such a vector of n "basic variables". 
Next, a "safety margin" expression is formulated in terms of the basic variables as (see 
Madsen et al (1986)). 
M gFx) = 9(X1, A2,..., X. ) (A-i) 
Where M is the safety margin. The equation is formulated in such a way that g(x)>O 
implies that the component is in the "safe domain" and g(x)<O indicates that the 
component is in the "failure domain". The function g(. ) is referred to as the "limit-state 
function" and it relates the basic variables to the safety margin. g(x)=O defines an (n-1) 
dimensional surface dividing the safe domain and the failure domain and is called the 
"failure surface" or "limit-state surface". 
The reliability or the probability that the limit-state will not be reached is then expressed as 
R= 1-pf = 1-PIM_<01 = 1- 
f f-x(x)dx (A"2) 
where f-() is the joint probability density function of the n basic variables and pf denotes 
probability of failure. The n-dimensional integral is defined over the failure domain. 
The reliability as expressed in Eq. A-2 can be evaluated using one of the three following 
-approaches: 
1. Numerical integration; 
2. . Monte-Carlo simulation; 
3. FORM/SORM methods. 
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Direct numerical integration is only feasible if the number of basic variables is less than 
about 5. Monte-Carlo method becomes computationally expensive if the failure 
probabilities are very small, which is typical of bridge components. In recent years a 
number of techniques, such as "importance sampling", "directional simulation", etc. have 
been developed to improve the efficiency of the simulation method. The third category of 
methods are approximate analytical methods designed to compute the failure probability 
very efficiently. These methods are also known in some circles as "advanced Level II 
methods". These methods will be used in the current study and are summarised below. 
The vector of basic variables X, described by the joint probability density function f-, is 
z 
first transformed to a standard normal space (also called as "u-space'), in which the 
variables are statistically independent and each variable is normally distributed with zero 
mean value and unit standard deviation. This transformation maps the failure surface g(x 
)=O in the original space to a surface gu (u)=O in the u-space, see Fig. A-1. Using an 
iterative technique, the point on the failure surface that is closest from the origin in the 
transformed space is located. This point is called as the "design point" or the "most-likely 
failure point". In the First Order Reliability Method (FORM), the actual non-linear failure 
surface is approximated by a hyperplane having the same gradients as the actual failure 
surface at the design point. In the Second Order Reliability Method (SORM), the failure 
surface is approximated by a quadratic surface with the same curvatures as the actual 
failure surface at the design point. The integral over the failure domain bounded by a 
hyperplane or a quadratic surface can then be evaluated using simple analytical 
expressions. 




safe domain I safe 
domain design point 
E[X] x2 
1 E[U] U2 
FORM 
Figure A-1: Illustration of FORM and SORM 
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In reliability literature it is now more common to use the term "reliability index ß" instead 
of the probability of failure. Reliability index is the distance from the origin to the design 







where u;. are the coordinates of the design point. 
The reliability index is formally related topf through 
pf= c(-ß) (A-4) 
where P(. ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. This relationship is 
exact when the basic variables are normally distributed and the limit-state function is 
linear. In other cases it is only approximate. 
In the special case of a linear limit-state function and normal probability distributions for 
basic variables, the reliability index can be evaluated very easily 
9= 9M (A"5) 
where M is the safety margin from Eq. A-1. 
In addition to the reliability index, a FORM/SORM approach also provides what are 





The gradients are evaluated at the design point u*. The vector a represents a unit vector 
normal to the failure surface at the design point. The numerical value of a is thus a 
measure of the sensitivity of the reliability index to uncertainties in the variable U;. 
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APPENDIX 4 GRAPHS SHOWING THE SENSITIVITY RESULTS 
FOR EACH FAILURE MODE. (CASE STUDY 2) 
All Introduction 
Reliability analysis was carried out for one specific geometrical type of reinforced 
concrete viaduct crossbeam for the limit-states of flexure, shear and bond. For each 
limit state, the most critical cross-section position along the crossbeam was selected. 
For the flexure limit state, the cross-section selected was close to the column of the 
middle span that was in hogging. For the shear limit state, a cross-section of the 
crossbeam in the middle span was chosen for the analysis. For the bond limit state, the 
cross-section selected was towards the centre of the middle span from the column 
supporting the middle span. 
For flexure, shear and bond limit-states, the analysis was performed for three conditions 
of the crossbeam: (i) as-built condition (ii) present condition with some loss of strength 
due to corrosion of reinforcement and delamination, and (iii) future condition with 
further corrosion of reinforcement and delamination in the future years. For the bond 
limit state, analyses were carried out for differing degrees of initial delamination in the 
present condition. In addition, a case was analysed assuming that the crossbeam was 
fully delaminated in its present condition. The results from these analyses are 
presented in the following. Since the input distributions were not accurate at this stage 
for all the variables (especially loading and deterioration), the results of reliability 
indices are not presented and only the sensitivity factors are provided. It is believed that 
the results of sensitivity factors will not change significantly when the input 
distributions are revised. 
A1.2 Flexure Limit State 
APPENDIX 5 As-built condition 
The results of sensitivity factors show the relative importance (expressed as a 
percentage) of the uncertainty in each variable to the reliability index. The sensitivity 
results for flexure, for the as-built condition of the crossbeam, shown in Figure A-2, 
revealed that the reliability index is very sensitive to the uncertainty in bending moment 
due to the live load and the impact factor. The yield strength of longitudinal 
reinforcement and the uncertainties in the models used for load effect analysis and 
capacity of the component were also found to be very important. Uncertainty in other 
variables, such as the concrete cube strength, effective depth, diameter of longitudinal 
steel and dead load were not seen to have a significant influence on the probability of 
failure. 
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Figure A-2: Sensitivity factors for the as-built condition of the crossbeam - 
FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
The elasticities of the variables' mean values represent the change in reliability index 
due to a small change in the variable mean value. The flexure case results, shown in 
Figure A-3, show that the mean values of bar diameter, longitudinal reinforcement yield 
strength and section effective depth were very important. The mean values of the 
analysis and capacity model parameters were also important. The elasticities , are 
positive for those variables for which an increase in the mean value will increase the 
reliability of the component and will be negative for the other variables. 
Figure A-3: Elasticities of the mean values for the as-built condition of the 
crossbeam - FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
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The elasticities of standard deviation for the bending limit-state represent the change in 
reliability index due to a small change in a variable's standard deviation. The elasticities 
for all variables are negative because increasing the standard deviation of any variable 
will decrease the reliability of the component. The flexure case results show that the 
standard deviations of live load bending moment, impact factor, yield strength of 
reinforcement and model uncertainty parameters were very important for reliability. 
The elasticities of standard deviation are shown in Figure A-4. These were much lower 
than the elasticities of the mean values of these variables. This implied that it is more 
important to determine the mean values of the parameters accurately than the standard 
deviation. Fortunately, in the context of yield strength, the mean value can be 
determined accurately using a smaller number of samples than would be required to 
evaluate the standard deviation to the same level of accuracy. Using statistical analysis 
techniques the number of samples required for a given level of confidence in the 
estimation of the mean and the standard deviation can be calculated. 
Figure A-4: Elasticities of the standard deviation for the as-built condition of the 
crossbeam - FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
APPENDIX 6 Present condition 
For the present condition, the reliability of the crossbeam was calculated assuming that 
the longitudinal reinforcement had undergone some corrosion damage. The corrosion of 
longitudinal reinforcement over time was calculated using the deterioration model given 
in Chapter 6, assuming that corrosion initiated in 1986. The loss of concrete in the 
compressive zone was not included as it had a marginal influence on bending capacity. 
A "Base Case" analysis was carried out for a high corrosion rate with -390mV half-cell 
value. Additional parametric studies were then carried out for lower half-cell potential. 
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Figure A-5 shows the sensitivity factor results from the Base Case analysis. The 
corrosion coefficient uncertainty used to calculate the loss of reinforcement area was the 
most dominant variable for a high corrosion rate. The other variables are insignificant. 
Figure A-5: Sensitivity Factors for Present Condition of the Crossbeam (High 
Corrosion Rate) - FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
Figure A-6 shows the mean value elasticities for the flexure limit state. The bar diameter 
and corrosion coefficient mean values dominate. The longitudinal reinforcement yield 
strength and the analysis and capacity model parameters are also important. At first 
glance, there may be surprise that the elasticity of the corrosion rate is positive, since an 
increase in the mean should result in a decrease in the reliability index. However since 
the mean value of the corrosion rate is negative, the ratio, aß/öµr is positive. 
Figur e A-6: Elasticities of mean values for the present condition of the crnsshP n 
(high corrosion rate) - FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
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The elasticities of the variables' standard deviation, in Figure A-7, showed that the 
corrosion coefficient variability dominated the crossbeam reliability under bending. 
Figur 
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re A-7: Elasticities of the standard deviation for the present condition (high 
corrosion rate) - FLEXURE LIMIT 
The effect of different corrosion rates on crossbeam reliability is evaluated through 
reliability analyses for half-cell measurements ranging from (low corrosion rate) to - 
390mV (high). Figure A-8 shows the sensitivity results for the -290mV case. These 
factors are the same as for the as-built case, i. e. corrosion parameters are not important. 
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Figure A-8: Sensitivity Factors for the Present Condition of the Crossbeam (Low 
Corrosion Rate) - FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
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APPENDIX 7 Future condition 
The reliability of the crossbeam was also calculated at different points in time in the 
future. The corrosion of longitudinal reinforcement over time was calculated using the 
deterioration model given in Chapter 6, assuming that corrosion initiated in 1986. 
Again, the loss of concrete was not modelled. 
The results of sensitivity factors for the bending case are shown in Figure A-9. These 
correspond to a "high" rate of corrosion and show that the uncertainty in the corrosion 
coefficient dominates the reliability of a crossbeam as in the case of the present 
condition. It was however, found that if the rate of corrosion was "low", the 
sensitivities were similar to those of the as-built condition. 
others 
Figure A-9: Sensitivity factors for the future condition of the crossbeam (high 
corrosion rate) - FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
The results of elasticities of the mean and the standard deviation showed a similar trend 
as was evident from the sensitivity factors. The elasticities were in general similar to 
the corresponding values for the present condition. These results have not, therefore, 
been shown here. 
Parametric reliability analyses were also carried out to study the variation in reliability 
due to deterioration over time. The results for "low", "medium" and "high" rates of 
corrosion were assessed and are shown in Figure A-10. These results revealed that the 
reliability decreased significantly with time in the first 5 to 10 years after the initiation 
of corrosion. The decrease in reliability was more pronounced only for the "medium" 
and "high" corrosion rate cases and showed almost no reduction when the corrosion rate 
" was "low". These results, however, do not imply that the reliability will not decrease if 
the half-cell value is more positive than -250. This depends to some extent on the initial 
capacity ratio of the crossbeam and the proportion of live load carried by the crossbeam. 
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Figure A-10: Effect of Deterioration on the Reliability of the Future Condition of 
the Crossbeam - FLEXURE LIMIT STATE 
A1.3 Shear Limit State 
APPENDIX 8 As-built condition 
The results of the sensitivity factors for the as-built condition of the crossbeam, for the 
limit-state of shear, as in Figure A-11. 
Figure il . -11: Sensitivity factors for the as-built condition of the crossbea m 
SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
The elasticities of the mean values of the variables, shown in Figure A-12, were high for 
the mean values of the resistance model andanalysis model compared to other variables. 
Also it is worth noting that these parameters were significantly more important for shear 
than for bending. 
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Figure A-12: Elasticities of the mean values for the as-built 
condition of the crossbeam - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
The elasticities of standard deviation are shown in Figure A-13. It can be seen that the 
elasticity of the resistance model was much higher than all the other variables. The 
elasticities of the standard deviation were in general considerably lower than the 
elasticities of the mean values. 
Figu r the 
APPENDIX 9 Present condition 
For the present condition, the corrosion of longitudinal and shear reinforcement over 
time was calculated using the deterioration model given in Chapter 6, assuming that 
corrosion initiated in 1986. The loss of concrete section in the compressive zone was 
not included. A "Base Case" analysis was carried out for a high corrosion rate 
determined by a -390mV half-cell potential. 
Caroline M Roberts Page A24 APPENDIX d 
crossbeam - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
Risk Based Decision Making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
The results of sensitivity factors from the Base Case analysis, shown in Figure A-14, 
showed that the uncertainty in corrosion rate for shear had a dominating influence on 
reliability for a high corrosion situation. The contribution from other variables became 
insignificant. 
Figure A-14: Sensitivity factors for the present condition of the crossbeam (high 
corrosion) - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
The elasticities of the mean values, given in Figure A-15, were high for the mean values 
of the resistance model and analysis model compared to other variables. Also 
significant were the mean values of the area of shear steel and the corrosion rate of shear 
steel. 
Figur am 
(high corrosion rate) - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
The elasticities of the variable standard deviations, in Figure A-16, showed that the 
standard deviation of shear steel corrosion rate dominates the uncertainty importances. 
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Figure A-16: Elasticities of standard deviation for the present condition of the 
crossbeam (high corrosion rate) - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
The effect of different corrosion rates on the crossbeam reliability was studied by 
carrying out analyses for half cell values from -290mV (low) to -390mV (high). The 
sensitivity results are given for the -290mV half-cell in Figure A-17. These showed that 
the uncertainty in the corrosion rate had no influence on reliability in a low corrosion 
situation. The results were sensitive to the same uncertainties as for the as-built case. 
Figure e A-17: Sensitivity factors for the present condition of the crossbeam (Low 
corrosion) - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
APPENDIX 10 Future condition 
The crossbeam reliability at different future times was calculated for the shear limit- 
state basing the reinforcement corrosion on the deterioration model given in Chapter 6, 
assuming corrosion initiated in 1986. The sensitivity factors for a "high" corrosion rate 
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over 10 years, presented in Figure A-18, showed the same trend as the present 
condition. The corrosion coefficient for shear steel dominated for high corrosion rates 
and was insignificant for low corrosion rates. The results of the mean and standard 







Figure A-18: Sensitivity factors for the future condition of the crossbeam (High 
corrosion) - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
The results of parametric studies carried out for "low", "medium" and "high" corrosion 
rates, to study the variation in reliability over time are presented in Figure A-19. The 
decrease in reliability with time was of the same order as the flexure case. The decrease 
in reliability was more pronounced for the "medium" and "high" corrosion rate cases. 
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Figure A-19: Effect of Deterioration on the Reliability of the Future Condition of 
the Crossbeam - SHEAR LIMIT STATE 
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A10.1 Bond Limit State 
APPENDIX 11 As-built condition 
The sensitivity results for the as-built condition, in Figure A-20, revealed similar results 
to the flexure limit state. This is due to the reinforcement developing full tensile 
capacity hence causing a flexure failure mode. 
Figure A-20: Sensitivity factors for the as-built condition of the crossbeam 
BOND LIMIT STATE 
The elasticities of the variable mean values, presented in Figure A-21, were high for the 
main reinforcement yield strength, the load effect analysis model and the bar diameter s. 
Figur the 
The elasticities of the standard deviations are shown in Figure A-22. These show that 
the standard deviations of live load bending moment, impact factor, yield strength of 
reinforcement and model uncertainty parameters were found to dominate reliability. 
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Figure A-22: Elasticities of the standard deviation for the as-built condition of the 
crossbeam - BOND LIMIT STATE 
APPENDIX 12 Present condition 
For the present condition, the corrosion of longitudinal and shear reinforcement over 
time was calculated using the deterioration model in Chapter 6, assuming that corrosion 
initiated in 1986. About 30% of the anchorage zone of the crossbeam was assumed to be 
delaminated. The loss of concrete in the compressive zone was not included. 
The sensitivity results for the "high" corrosion rate case, in Figure A-23, showed that 
the crossbeam reliability was dominated by the corrosion rate uncertainty. Because of a 
high loss of reinforcement area, the tensile capacity was lower than the bond capacity 
(i. e. resistance to slip), hence a flexure failure mode. 
Figure A-23: Sensitivity factors for present condition of the crossbeam (high 
corrosion) - BOND LIMIT STATE 
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The elasticities of the variable mean values and standard deviations, in Figure A-24 and 





The sensitivity results for the low corrosion rate (-290mV half cell) case with initial 
delamination over 30% of the anchorage, in Figure A-26 showed similar important 
variables to those for bending failure. However, the concrete strength and bond 
coefficient, ß also show a significant influence on the reliability. The design point 
values showed that if the anchorage zone was moderately delaminated, it was likely to 
result in a combination of bond and bending failure. The bars with the shortest 
minimum anchorage length (for the considered section) were likely to fail by bond 
(slipping) but the bars with the longer minimum anchorage length were able to mobilise 
enough bond strength to resist slipping. The section failed by yielding the longer bars. 
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Figure A-26: Sensitivity factors for the present condition of the crossbeam (low 
corrosion rate) - BOND LIMIT STATE 
To study the effect of high delamination, a fully delaniinated anchorage zone was 
considered. The sensitivity results in Figure A-27 show that the factor q on delaminated 
bond strength, the bond coefficient ß and the concrete cube strength dominate. The 
delaminated bar capacity was limited by bond strength hence slipping failure. 
Figs ure A-27: Sensitivity factors for the fully delaminated present conditi 
crossbeam (low corrosion rate) - BOND LIMIT STATE 
ion of the 
When the initial delamination area was small, reinforcement bars mobilised full tensile 
capacity causing flexure failure. When the area of delamination increases gradually, the 
failure mode changes over to a bond type. The point at which this change over 
happened depended on the section considered, the length of the bars and the force in the 
bars. The loss of shear links (not considered here) could have initiated an early change 
over, while the clamping of bars would have delayed it. For high corrosion rates, flexure 
failure was more likely with the reliability dominated by corrosion rate uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX 13 Future condition 
The crossbeam reliability at different future times was studied for the bond limit-state. 
The sensitivities changed depending on the governing failure mode. For high corrosion 
rates (over 10 years), the failure mode was flexure, hence the reliability was governed 
by the corrosion rate uncertainty (Figure A-28). However, for "low" corrosion rates, the 
delamination rate uncertainty dominated (Figure A-29). Uncertainties in ß coefficient 
and ii factor on delaminated bond strength also became significant. The results of mean 
and the standard deviation elasticities were in general similar to the present condition. 
Figure A-28: Sensitivity factors for the future condition of the crossbeam (high 
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r figure A-h : sensitivity factors for the future condition of the crossbeam (low 
corrosion rate) - BOND LIMIT STATE 
Parametric reliability analyses carried out for "low", "medium" and "high" corrosion 
rates to study the variation in reliability over time are shown in Figure A-30. For 
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"medium" and "high" corrosion rates, the reliability dropped dramatically with time. 
For the "low" corrosion rate, the reliability was initially unaffected, then dropped 
suddenly once a critical delamination level was reached, the reliability level then re- 
stabilised. The sensitivities showed flexure type failure for the "moderate" and "high" 
corrosion rate cases, giving a similar variation of reliability with time to the flexure limit 
state. 
Figure A-30: Effect of Deterioration on the Reliability of the Future Condition of 
the Crossbeam - BOND LIMIT STATE 
For a "low" corrosion rate, the sensitivities change as the failure mode changes from 
flexure to bond (Figure A-31). Before 1997 the delamination was small, implying 
flexure failure, hence yield strength and impact factor dominated. After this, the 
delamination rate uncertainty became important until a critical delamination level was 
reached. As the delamination stabilised, the reliability was governed by the uncertainty 
in ß coefficient and il factor on delaminated bond strength. 
Figure E k-31: Variation of dominant sensitivities with time (low corrosion 
BOND LIMIT STATE 
rate) 
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APPENDIX 5 INTERVIEW RESPONSE SHEET FOR DERIVING 
CRITERION WEIGHTS IN CASE STUDY 4 
A5.1 Introduction 
This questionnaire uses the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [3] to compare between 
the important criteria so that relative weights can be determined. This ultimately allows 
a "Bridge Priority Index" (BPI) to be calculated for each bridge, by aggregating each 
bridge's scores for each main criterion to define the relative weights with this 
questionnaire's results. 
A5.2 The Main Criteria for Prioritisation 
A5.2.1 Defining the Main Criteria 
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Figure A-32: Proposed main criteria for deriving bridge strengthening priorities 
A5.2.1.1 Cost of Strengthening Works 
The factors that have been identified to evaluate the cost of strengthening works are the 
cost of works, the cost of traffic management measures, and the cost of traffic delays 
during the works. 
A5.2.1.2 Cost of Interim Measures 
The cost of interim measures would include the costs associated with implementing, 
weight restrictions, lane restrictions, propping, traffic delays and diversions. 
A5.2.1.3 Risk of Bridge Failure 
The risk would be evaluated as a function of the probability of failure and its 
consequences. The consequences of failure include the costs of emergency repairs, the 
cost of traffic disruption caused by the closure of the bridge, costs associated with 
fatalities, injuries, and environmental damage that may occur due to bridge collapse. 
A5.2.1.4 Social Impact of Restrictions 
This covers all of the non-costed impacts on the local community of the traffic 
restrictions on the bridge such as, the inconvenience of bits routes being diverted away 
from their usual stops and the discomfort of HGVs being diverted through residential 
areas, etc. These impacts would depend on the type of traffic and the daily traffic flow 
on the route, the type of route and the availability of alternative routes. 
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A5.2.1.5 Bridge Improvement Benefits 
The types of works considered are strengthening for HB vehicles, carriageway and 
footway widening, provision of additional services, improving sight distance and 
strengthening parapets. 
A5.2.2 Ordering the main Criteria 
The first task, then is to decide the order of preference for these five criteria starting 
with the most important. 
- Cost of Strengthening 
- Social Impact of Restrictions 
- Risk of Failure 
- Bridge Improvement Benefits 
- Cost of Interim Measures 
1.2.3.4.5. 
WHY? 
A5.3 The Sub-Criteria for Calculating the Main Criteria 
Within two of the main criteria are sub-criteria that need to be ordered and weighted to 
allow scores for these two main criteria to be calculated. These criteria are 1) impact on 
society due to restrictions and 2) bridge improvement benefits. 
A5.3.1 Social Impact of Restrictions 
A5.3.1.1 Defining the Sub-Criteria 
The sub-criteria on which the impact on society is to be based are divided into two 
groups: the category of the route and the importance of the route. The category of the 
route will be evaluated from the daily traffic flow on the route and the type of route (i. e. 
Primary Route, Borough Principal Route, etc. ). The importance of the route will be 
based on the type and numbers of vehicles using the route and the availability of 
alternative routes for each type of vehicle. 
A5.3.1.2 Ordering the Sub-Criteria 
Route Category vs. Route Importance 
Firstly, the order of preference for the two main groups has to be determined. Which 
should carry more weight in your opinion, the type of route (and total number of 
vehicles using it daily), or the importance of the route to different types of special users? 
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Ordering the criteria for Route Category 
Within the criteria for route category, it is necessary to decide the order of preference for 
the following route types starting with the most important. 
- Local distributor route 
- Borough principal route 
- Primary route 
- Local access route 
ööö 
Ordering the criteria for Route Importance 
4. 
Within the criteria for route importance, it is necessary to decide the order of preference 
for the different users according to the availability of alternative routes. 
- Cyclists 
- Buses 
- Fire engines 
- Pedestrians 
- HGVs 
- Other emergency vehicles 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
000000 
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A5.3.2 Bridge Improvement Benefits 
A5.3.2.1 Define the Sub-Criteria 
The benefits of bridge improvement works depend on the types of bridge improvement 
works that are carried out. The types of works being considered are strengthening for 
HB vehicles, carriageway widening, footway widening, provision of additional services, 
improvement of sight distance and strengthening of the parapets. If a certain type of 
improvement work is proposed it will score a one, if not, it will score a zero. 
A5.3.2.2 Order the Sub-Criteria 
Some bridge improvement works will be more beneficial than others, so this order of 
preference has to be determined, starting with the most important. 
- Footway widening 
- Strengthening for HB vehicles 
- Provision of additional services 
- Improvement of sight distance 
- Strengthening of the parapets 
- Carriageway widening 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
WHY? 
A5.4 Evaluate Sub-Criteria Relative Weights 
Bridge managers are interviewed to determine the relative importance they attach to 
criteria pairs. The AHP method calculates the relative weights from these comparisons. 
For each pair of criteria, the bridge manager is presented with a pair of example bridges. 
Each pair of bridges will be almost identical except for the two criteria that are being 
considered. For each pair of criteria the bridge manager will be asked to select which 
bridge would be funded. 
Within two of the main criteria are the groups of sub-criteria that need to be weighted to 
allow scores for these two main criteria to be calculated. 
A5.4.1 Evaluate Sub-Criteria Relative Weights: Bridge Improvement Benefits 
The score for bridge improvement benefits is based on all of the upgrading works 
proposed to be carried out along with the bridge strengthening works. The assessing 
engineer just states yes/no to include each upgrading type. All proposed works score 1 
and all that are not proposed score 0. 
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To calculate the weightings for the different improvements, each type of improvement 
will have to be compared. The decision maker is asked to state which is considered 
more important. If there is no preference for one over the other, the two improvements 
will be considered to be equally important. If, however, there is a preference between 
them, then the decision maker is asked to indicate the `strength' of their preference on 
the following scale: 
1 Equally preferred 
3 Weak preference 
5 Strong preference 
7 Very strong preference 
9 Absolute preference 
Pair comparisons Dominant improvement Strength of Dominance 
(a) (b) type (a or b) (from weighting table) 
Strengthen for HB or Sight distance or Footway 
Additional services width 
Carriageway width or Strengthen for HB or 
Strengthen Parapet Additional services 
Sight distance or Carriageway width or 
Footway width Strengthen Parapet 
Ab. 4.1 tvaiuare quo-u nrena rieiauve vveignts: Social impact of Restrictions 
The sub-criteria for impact on society are divided into: route category and route 
importance. The way in which each of these is to be evaluated will be considered first. 
A5.4.2.1 Evaluating Sub-Criteria Relative Weights: Route Category 
PrimaryBorough Principal Route vs. Local DistributorlAccess Route 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Primary/Borough Principal road, >25000 vpd Local distributor road, <15000 vpd 
2 Primary/Borough Principal road, 20000-25000 vpd Local access road, <10000 vpd 
3 Primary/Borough Principal road, 10000-20000 vpd 
A5.4.2.2 Evacuating Sub-Criteria Relative Weights: Route Importance 
PSVs vs. HGVs 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 >3000 PSVs /day : <1000 HGVs /day >3000 HGVs /day : <1000 PSVs /day 
2 2000-3000 PSVs /day : <1000 HGVs /day 2000-3000 HGVs /day : <1000 PSVs /day 
3 1000-2000 PSVs /day : <1000 HGVs /day 1000-2000 HGVs /day : <1000 PSVs /day 
4 <1000 PSVs /day : <1000 HGVs /day <1000 HGVs /day : <1000 PSVs /day 
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Fire Engines/Emg. Vehicles vs. PSVs/HGVs 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Very important for Fire Engines/Emergency Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency 
Vehicles <1000 PSVs or HGVs day Vehicles > 3000 PSVs or HGVs /day 
2 Important for Fire Engines/Emergency Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency 
Vehicles <1000 PSVs or HGVs /day Vehicles 2000-3000 PSVs or HGVs /day 
3 Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency 
Vehicles <1000 PSVs or HGVs / day Vehicles 1000-2000 PSVs or HGVs /day 
4 Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency 
Vehicles <1000 PSVs or HGVs per day 
PSVs/HGVs vs. Cyclists/Pedestrians 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Not important for cyclists or pedestrians London Cycle Network or very important 
>3000 PSVs or HGVs /day for pedestrians <1000 PSVs or HGVs /day 
2 Not important for cyclists or pedestrians Important for cyclists or pedestrians <1000 
2000-3000 PSVs or HGVs /day PSVs or HGVs /day 
3 Not important for cyclists or pedestrians Not important for cyclists or pedestrians 
1000-2000 PSVs or HGVs /day <1000 PSVs or HGVs /day 
4 Not important for cyclists or pedestrians 
<1000 PSVs or HGVs /day 
Fire Engines/Emg. Vehicles vs. PSVs/HGVs 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Very important for Fire London Cycle Network / important for pedestrians 
Engines/Emergency Vehicles Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency 
Not important for cyclists/pedestrians Vehicles 
2 Important for Fire Important for cyclists or pedestrians 
Engines/Emergency Vehicles Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency 
Not important for cyclists/pedestrians Vehicles 
3 Not important for Fire Not important for cyclists or pedestrians 
Engines/Emergency Vehicles Not important for Fire Engines/Emergency 
Not important for cyclists/pedestrians Vehicles 
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A5.4.2.3 Route Category vs. Route Importance 
The sub-criteria for impact on society are divided into: route category and importance: 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Route Category is v. high (Primary/Borough Route Importance is v. high (>3000 PSV or 
Principal road, >25 000 vpd) HGV, v. important for F. E. s & Emg. Veh) 
Route Importance is v. low Route Category is v. low 
2 Route Category is high (Primary/ Borough Route Importance is high (2000-3000 PSV / 
Principal road, 20 000-25 000 vpd) HGV, v. important for F. E. s & Emg. Veh) 
Route Importance is v. low Route Category is v. low 
3 Route Category is med (Primary/ Borough Route Importance is med (1000-2000 PSV 
Principal road, 10 000-20-000 vpd) or HGV, important for F. E. s & Emg. Veh) 
Route Importance is v. low Route Category is v. low 
4 Route Category is low (Local Distributor Route Importance is low (1000-2000 PSV 
road, less than 15 000 vpd) or HGV, no Fire Engines or Emg. Veh) 
Route Importance is v. low Route Category is v. low 
5 Route Category is v. low (Local Access road, Route Importance is v. low (<1000 PSV/ 
less than 10 000 vpd) HGV, no Fire Engines/Emg. Vehicles) 
Route Importance is v. low Route Category is v. low 
A5.5 Evaluating the Relative Weights of the Main Criteria 
A5.5.1 Risk of failure vs. Cost of interim measures 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Risk of failure is v. high (Cap. Ratio=0.6; Interim measure cost is v. high (daily = 
Failure prob. =1 in 100; Fatalities=15; Traffic £2m; annual cost = £750m) 
delay cost >£300m) Risk of failure is v. low 
Interim measure cost is v. low 
2 Risk of failure is high (Cap. Ratio=0.7; - Interim measure cost is high (daily = £lm; 
Failure prob. ==1 in 103; Fatalities=5; Traffic annual cost = £350m) 
delay cost =£100m) Risk of failure is v. low 
Cost of interim measures is v. low 
3 Risk of failure is med(Cap. Ratio =0.8; Interim measure cost is med (cost = £250k; 
Failure prob. =1 in 104; Fatalities=l; Traffic annual cost = £90m) 
delay cost =£50m) Risk of failure is v. low 
Cost of interim measures is v. low 
4 Risk of failure is low (Cap. Ratio =0.9; Interim measure cost is low (cost = £25k; 
Failure prob. =1 in 105; Fatalities=0; Traffic annual cost = £9m) 
delay cost =£5m) Risk of failure is v. low 
Cost of interim measures is v. low 
5 Risk of failure is v. low (Cap. Ratio =0.95; Interim measure cost is v. low (cost< £5k; 
Failure prob. ==1 in 106; Fatalities=0; Traffic annual cost < £1.8m) 
delay cost =£500k) Risk of failure is v. low 
Cost of interim measures is v. low 
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A5.5.2 Risk of failure vs. Social impact of restrictions 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Risk of failure is v. high (Cap. Ratio=0.6; Social impact of restrictions = v. high 
Failure prob. =1 in 100; Fatalities=15; Traffic (Primary/B. P. road, 30k vpd, 4k PSV/HGV, 
delay cost >£300m) v. imp. F. E. & Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Risk of failure is v. low 
2 Risk of failure is high (Cap. Ratio =0.7; Social impact of restrictions is high 
Failure prob. ==1 in 103; Fatalities=5; Traffic (Primary/ B. P. road, 20k vpd, 3k PSV/HGV, 
delay cost =£100m) v. imp. F. E. & Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Risk of failure is v. low 
3 Risk of failure is med (Cap. Ratio =0.8; Social impact of restrictions is med 
Failure prob. ==1 in 104; Fatalities=l; Traffic (Primary/ B. P. road, 15k vpd, 2k PSV/HGV, 
delay cost =£50m) imp. F. E. & Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Risk of failure is v. low 
4 Risk of failure is low (Cap. Ratio =0.9; Social impact of restrictions is low (Local 
Failure prob. ==1 in 105; Fatalities=0; Traffic Distributor road, 12k vpd, 1k PSV/HGV, no 
delay cost =£5m) F. E. & Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Risk of failure is v. low 
5 Risk of failure is v. low (Cap. Ratio =0.95; Social impact of restrictions is v. low (Local 
Failure prob. ==1 in 106; Fatalities=0; Traffic Access road, 5k vpd, 500 PSV/HGV, no 
delay cost =£500k) F. E. & Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Risk of failure is v. low 
A5.5.3 Cost of Interim measures VS. Social impact of restrictions 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Cost of interim measures is v. high Social impact of restrictions = v. high (Primary/ 
(daily = £2m; annual cost = £750m) B. P., 30k vpd, 4k PSV/HGV, v. imp. Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Cost of interim measures is v. low 
2 Cost of interim measures is high (daily Social impact of restrictions is high (Primary/ 
= Elm; annual cost = £350m) B. P., 20k vpd, 3k PSV/HGV, v. imp. Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Cost of interim measures is v. low 
3 Cost of interim measures is med (daily Social impact of restrictions is med (Primary/ 
= £250k; annual cost = £90m) B. P., 15k vpd, 2k PSV/HGV, imp. Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Cost of interim measures is v. low 
4 Cost of interim measures is low (daily Social impact of restrictions is low (Local Dist. 
= £25k; annual cost = £9m) road, 10k vpd, 1k PSV/HGV, no Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Cost of interim measures is v. low 
5 Cost of interim measures is v. low Social impact of restrictions is v. low (Local Acc. 
(daily < £5k; annual cost < £1.8m) road, 5k vpd, 500 PSV/HGV, no Emg. Veh) 
Social impact of restrictions is v. low Cost of interim measures is v. low 
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A5.5.4 Cost of Interim measures vs. Cost of Strengthening 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Cost of interim measures is v. high (daily = Cost of Strengthening is v. low (Work cost 
£2m; annual cost = £750m) = £100k, Traffic delay cost = £900k) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Cost of interim measures is v. low 
2 Cost of interim measures is high (daily = Cost of Strengthening is low (Work cost = 
Elm; annual cost = £350m) £200k, Traffic delay cost = £4m) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Cost of interim measures is v. low 
3 Cost of interim measures is med (cost = Cost of Strengthening is med (Work cost 
£250k; annual cost = £90m) £500k, Traffic delay cost = £45m) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Cost of interim measures is v. low 
4 Cost of interim measures is low (cost = £25k; Cost of Strengthening is high (Work cost = 
annual cost = £9m) £800k, Traffic delay cost = £180m) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Cost of interim measures is v. low 
5 Cost of interim measures is v. low (cost< Cost of Strengthening is v. high (Work cost 
£5k; annual cost < £1. Sm) _ Elm, Traffic delay cost = £380m) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Cost of interim measures is v. low 
A5.5.5 Social Impact of Restrictions vs. Cost of Strengthening 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Social impact of restrictions = v. high (Primary Cost of Strengthening is v. low (Work 
/B. P., 30k vpd, 4k PSV/HGV, v. imp Emg Veh) cost = £100k, Traffic delay cost = £900k ) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
2 Social impact of restrictions is high (Primary/ Cost of Strengthening is low (Work cost = 
B. P., 20k vpd, 3k PSVIHGV, v. imp. Emg Veh) £200k, Traffic delay cost = £4m) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
3 Social impact of restrictions is med (Primary/ Cost of Strengthening is med (Work cost 
B. P., 15k vpd, 2k PSV/HGV, imp. Emg. Veh) _ £500k, Traffic delay cost = £45m) 
Cost of Strengthening is Y. high Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
4 Social impact of restrictions is low (Local Dist Cost of Strengthening is high (Work cost 
road, l0k vpd, lk PSV/HGV, no Emg. Veh) = £800k Traffic delay cost = £180m) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. high Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
5 Social impact of restrictions is v. low (Loc. Ace Cost of Strengthening is v. high (Work 
road, 5k vpd, 500 PSVIHGV, no Emg. Veh) cost = £lm, Traffic delay cost = £380m) 
Cost of Strengthening is v. low Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
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A5.5.6 Social Impact of Restrictions vs. Bridge Improvement Benefits 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Social impact of restrictions = v. high(Primary/ Bridge improvement benefits are high 
B. P., 30k vpd, 4k PSV/HGV, v. imp. Emg Veh) (Increase sight distance/Footway widening) 
Bridge improvements are low Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
2 Social impact of restrictions is high (Primary/ Bridge improvement benefits are medium 
B. P., 20k vpd, 3k PSV/HGV, v. imp. Emg Veh) (Carriageway widening/Strengthen parapet) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
3 Social impact of restrictions is med (Primary/ Bridge improvement benefits are low 
B. P., 15k vpd, 2k PSV/HGV, imp. Emg. Veh) (Strengthen for HB / Additional services) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low Social impact of restrictions is v. low 
4 Social impact of restrictions is low (Loc. Dist. 
road, 10k vpd, lk PSV/HGV, no Emg. Veh) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low 
5 Social impact of restrictions is v. low (Loc. Acc. 
road, 5k vpd, 500 PSV/HGV, no Emg Veh) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low 
A5.5.7 Cost of Strengthening VS. Bridge Improvement Benefits 
Case Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
1 Cost of Strengthening is v. low (Work cost = Bridge improvement benefits are high 
£100k, Traffic delay cost = 900k) (Increase sight distance/Footway widening) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low Cost of Strengthening is v. high 
2 Cost of Strengthening is low (Work cost = Bridge improvement benefits are medium 
£200k, Traffic delay cost = £4m) (Carriageway widening/Strengthen parapet) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low Cost of Strengthening is v. high 
3 Cost of Strengthening is med (Work cost = Bridge improvement benefits are low 
£500k, Traffic delay cost = £45m) (Strengthen for HB / Additional services) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low Cost of Strengthening is v. high 
4 Cost of Strengthening is high (Work cost = 
£800k, Traffic delay cost = £180m) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low 
5 Cost of Strengthening is v. high (Work cost = 
Elm, Traffic delay cost = £380m) 
Bridge improvement benefits are low 
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A5.6 What Next 
The results of this questionnaire will be processed to determine relative weights for each 
"family" of criteria in the hierarchy of factors affecting the decision between bridge 
strengthening bridges. A set of relative weights will be determined for each bridge 
manager interviewed. 
When a number of bridge managers from the different London Boroughs have been 
interviewed, it will be necessary to. combine the different sets of weights to produce a 
consensus set of weights. An algorithm, called the "modified median consensus 
algorithm" [4] can be used for this purpose. The modified median consensus algorithm 
also provides a measure of the group cohesiveness, to indicate how closely each of the 
individuals agree. 
If there is wide disagreement (e. g. due to wide variations in policy and culture within 
each authority), multi-dimensional mapping can be used to identify the key differences. 
This will establish if there is just one or two individuals with very different views to the 
rest of the group, or if the whole group is widely spaced. An understanding of the 
differences can help to solve them, for example by ensuring all of the criteria have been 
properly understood, by understanding the reasoning of the individuals and by 
discussing the implications of these differences in a meeting where all parties are 
present. This will help to achieve a consensus among all parties. 
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APPENDIX 6 MATHCAD SPREADSHEETS FOR EVALUATION 
OF WEIGHTINGS IN CASE STUDY 4 
Use of Saaty's "Eigen Value" Method to determine relative preference weight from pairwise 
comparisons, Saaty (1980) 
1. Evaluation of the judgement matrix for the top level family of criteria to determine relative 
weights for the overall bridge priority index 
Group 1 
Mi : =1 
1 
1 1 1 
9 st of Strengthening 
5 8 7 
5 1 
1 1 
8 st of Interim 
7 6 
8 7 1 6 9 isk of failure 
7 6 1 1 9 
6 3ocial 
1 1 1 1 
9 9 9 9 
1 ridge Improvements 
i =0.. 4 
Find the eigen values of matrix M 
u1 : =eigenvals(M 1) 
6.335 
0.233 + 2.814i 
u1= 0.233 - 2.8141 
-0.901 + 0.7171 
-0.901 - 0.7171 
Find the eigen vector corresponding to the principle eigen value 
v1 : =eigenvec(M it 1 
) 
of 
Cost of Strengthening 
0.094 
0.18 Cost of Interim 
v1=0.89 Risk of failure 
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Find the normalised principle eigen vector 





This gives the relative weights for the top level criteria to determine the overall bridge priority 
index as follows: 
Cost of Strengthening 
0.058 
0.112 Cost of Interim 
v n1 = 
0555 Risk of failure 
0.254 Social Impact 
nm L "'-- -1 Bridge Improvements 
A measure of inconsistency, µ can be calcualted to be used as a comparison between different 
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2. Evaluation of the judgement matrix for the first family of criteria to determine relative weights 
for the social impact of restrictions 
1 Route Importance 
1- 
M26 
61 Route Category 
i =0.. 2 
Find the eigen values of matrix M 
u2: = eigenvals (M 2) 
u2=1 
of 
Find the eigen vector corresponding to the principle eigen value 
) v2 : =eigenvec(M 2, u 2 of 
Route importance 
v2_ý0.164) 
0.986 Route Category 





This gives the relative weights for the top level criteria to determine the overall bridge priority 
index as follows: 
Route Importance 
Vý _(0.143 0.857) Route Category 
f 
A measure of inconsistency, µ can be calcualted to be used as a comparison between different 




µ2 =0 J 
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APPENDIX 7 OUTLINE OF THE INTERVIEW USED IN CASE 
STUDY5 
A7. I Interview Approach 
A number of recent conceptual and preliminary engineering design projects have been 
identified and reviewed in detail to establish the types of decisions that APA generally 
make in a these types of design project [5]. Also identified were the decisions that APA 
did not make, that were made already by the contractor or the operator. For every key 
decision, an indication of the main decision makers, the important decision criteria and 
any constraints on the decision were identified. As a result of this a selection Senior 
engineers and managers within APA will be identified to be interviewed about the way 
they make decisions in conceptual and preliminary engineering design projects. 
The specific conceptual and preliminary engineering design projects that have been 
identified will be explored in depth with the project managers and lead engineers that 
worked on these projects. In addition, project managers and senior engineers will be 
asked more generally on the usual approach to conceptual and preliminary engineering 
design decision making and the types of decisions usually encountered. Finally, a 
number of representatives from contractors and operators will be interviewed on how 
they see the conceptual design decision making process and to understand how they see 
us contributing further in the future. 
All interviewees will be asked for permission to record the interviews, to ensure that no 
important information is lost and that the interviewer can concentrate on leading the 
interview rather than on taking notes. 
A7.2 Interview Questions Concerning Specific Project Experience 
A number of recent conceptual and preliminary engineering design projects have been 
identified and reviewed in detail to establish the types of decisions that APA generally 
make in a design projects. Also identified were the decisions that APA did not make, 
that were made already by the contractor or the operator. For every key decision, an 
indication of the main decision makers, the important decision criteria and any 
constraints on the decision were identified. As a result of this a selection Senior 
engineers and managers within APA have been identified to be interviewed about the 
way they made decisions in these conceptual and preliminary engineering design 
projects. The purpose of the interviews is to try to "paint a picture" of how and why 
each major decision was made and the issues and risks that were accounted for in it. 
The following questions will be asked: 
A 7.2.1 Identification of the goals 
" For the project under consideration, what were the goals ... 
" of the design of the end product? 
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" of each project execution phase? 
" Why were these goals considered the most important? 
" Who specified these to be the goals? 
" How were the goals communicated to others within the project team (and other 
stakeholders? ) 
" When in terms of the overall project schedule, were these goals identified and 
communicated? 
A7.2.2ldentifcation of the decisions 
" What were the most important decisions? 
" Concerning the project management of the design process? (project issues) 
" Concerning the actual design of the end product? (design issues) 
" Why were they the most important? 
" Were these typical or special cases of this type of project? 
" Were they handled in a typical manner, or were they handled in a special way? 
" If they were handled in a special way describe also the typical way of handling them? 
" When were these decisions made? 
Considering each of these decisions separately... 
" What risks were involved in the decision? 
" Were they project risks or design risks? 
" How were the risks evaluated? 
" What tools/methods were used to assess the risks? 
" How was risk defined? (probability, consequence or both? ) 
" Were risks in financial, safety and environmental terms considered? 
" How were they accounted for in the decision? 
" Were any risks ignored or considered negligible? 
" What was the consequence of ignoring these risks? 
" Were any trade-offs specifically made? 
" What trade-offs were made? 
" Why were trade-offs made? 
" How were trade-offs made? 
" Who were the Decision makers? 
" Whose opinions were accounted for in the decision? 
" To what degree were the different parties influential in the decision? 
" Were preferences for certain factors or consequences included in the decision, either 
subjectively or objectively? 
" When were the different parties consulted for their opinions? 
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" With the benefit of hindsight, should anyone else have been consulted who was not 
included in the decision? 
" Who was responsible for the final decision? 
" How were the alternatives generated? 
" Were any alternatives rejected before being fully evaluated? If so, why? 
" What alternative was selected? 
" How was the alternative selected? 
" Why was the selected alternative chosen? 
" What factors /issues were considered to be influential in the way the decision was 
made? 
" How were the important factors identified? 
" Were long-term or short term issues dominating? 
" Were any factors ignored that should have been considered? 
" How were the alternatives measured in terms of the issues? 
" What information was gathered to support the decision making? 
" When was information gathered to support the decision making? 
" Was sufficient information gathered to support the decision making? 
" How was it decided whether enough information was gathered? 
" What information was not available? 
" How was the decision made without it? 
" What were the consequences of incomplete information? 
" After the decision was made, what evaluation of the decision was made to ensure it 
was the best decision? 
These questions will be asked of the specific project under consideration but also of the 
way conceptual and preliminary engineering design is carried out in general. 
Caroline M Roberts Page A50 APPENDIX 7 
Risk Based Decision Making For The Management Of Structural Assets 
APPENDIX 8 REFERENCES 
1 Krishnakumar, K. (1992). Genetic algorithms: An introduction and an 
overview of their capabilities. AIAA guidance, navigation and control 
conference, Report no. AIAA-92-4462-CP, 728-738. 
2 Goldberg, D. E. (1989). Genetic algorithms in search, optimisation and machine 
learning. Addison Wesley Publishing Co. 
3 Saaty, T. L. (1980). The Analytic Hierarchy Process. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
4 Royal Military College of Science: Operational Analysis Course Note 285: 
Formalising Subiective Judgements. Cranfield University, UK. 
5 Roberts, C. (1998). Case Study RBD 3: Review of conceptual and preliminary 
engineering design methods in APA. 
Caroline M Roberts Page A51 APPENDIX REFERENCES 
